The provisions of this section have been considered in the treatment of section 4864.1 motors to a street railway company, retaining the title until paid the price in full, so long as he remains unpaid has a good title against a purchaser for value, and without notice. Lorain Steel Co. v. N. & B. St. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500, 516; Com. v. Boston Terminal Co., 185 Mass. 281, 288. 1. p. 782, ante. Beach's Appeal, 58 Conn. 464, 473. "The statute saves the rights of the conditional vendor in every case irrespective of the subject matter of the sale; which fully answers a suggestion made in the present case, that the doctrine of conditional sales is not applicable to the sale and delivery of property, like that under consideration, which perishes in the using." Mack v. Story, 57 Conn. 407, 415. "Under this statute the attaching creditor acquires the rights of the vendee, not those of the vendor. Having taken the property from the possession of the vendee, the attaching creditor cannot, for his own benefit, require the vendee to continue to perform the conditions of the sale, by paying either to him or to the vendor the installments of the purchase price as they fall due under the contract, even though the vendor, who is not a party to the attachment, may still be able to enforce the performance by the vendee of such conditions. Nor does the statute give to the attaching creditor, whether or not he pays such installments to the vendor, the power, given by the contract of sale to the vendor, of enforcing a forfeiture of the vendee's rights on account of the latter's failure to make such payments. It is the duty of the person attaching property sold on condition to perform the conditions of the sale. It is only those desiring to avail themselves of the privilege of performing the conditions of such sales who are permitted by the statute to attach such property." Pearne v. Coyne, 79 Conn. 570, 576. Creditors of the conditional vendee of a piano attached her interest under general statutes, § 834, and subsequently purchased the vendor's interest and dissolved the attachment upon substitution of bond. In an action in the nature of trover by the vendee against the attaching creditors and assignees, it was held, that as the vendee's obligations to pay installments was conditional upon her right to possess and use the piano and she had been deprived of this right, the creditors as vendors could not enforce a forfeiture against her until they had restored her right; that as attaching creditors they succeeded only to the rights of the vendee and could not enforce a forfeiture against her for non-performance; that they could not take advantage of a default which occurred prior to the assignment and had been waived by the original vendor. Pearne v. Coyne, 79 Conn. 572. The interest of a conditional vendee is transmissible to his trustee in insolvency, and he may secure title for the creditors upon performance. Robinson's Appeal, 63 Conn. 297, citing, Newhall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass. 445; Beach's Appeal, 58 Conn. 473. The absolute title to personal property in the possession of the vendee under an unrecorded contract of conditional sale, passes to his trustee in insolvency, notwithstanding the latter had actual knowledge before the assignment of the terms of the conditional sale, and afterwards had notice of the debtor's failure to make the stipulated payments. Such knowledge on the part of the trustee cannot affect the creditors of the insolvent debtor. National Cash Register Co. v. Woodbury, 70 Conn. 321. Section 835. Disclosure by Vendor of Claim on the Property. -Such attaching or levying creditor may summon said vendor to appear before the judge of the court or justice of the peace before whom the suit shall be or may have been pending, to disclose fully on oath what claim he has on said property, which summons shall be signed by such judge or justice, be returnable at such time and place as he may appoint, and be served as other civil process, at least six days before such time. If such vendor shall be absent from the state when such summons shall be served, such judge or justice shall make a reasonable order of notice to him; and if such summons shall have been duly served, and such order, if any, duly complied with, and such vendor shall fail to disclose as aforesaid, such neglect shall be prima facie evidence that he has no interest in said property. It is a fundamental principle of public policy as well as of law that all a man's property shall be liable for his debts. Equitable 1. Remington v. Cady, 10 Conn. 44, 47; Davenport v. Lacon, 17 Conn. 278, 281; Tolland County Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 50 Conn. 495. See also, Hughes v. Kelly, 40 Conn. 153; Morey v. Hoyt, 62 Conn. 516, 542; Smith v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149. "In conformity with the settled policy of this state, that all the property of a debtor should be holden for the payment of the debts of its owner, our courts have construed the language of these statutes as rendering liable to attachment certain legal and equitable interests in property, the absolute or legal title to which property is not in the debtor, but which interest is within his control and can be fairly appraised or sold . . and such other interests in goods or lands, whether legal or equitable, as, with justice to both debtor and creditor may, in the manner provided by statute, be appropriated to the payment of the former's debts. Punderson v. Brown, 1 Day (Conn.), 93, 96; Davenport v. Lacon, 17 Conn. 278; Johnson V. Conn. Bank, 21 Conn. 148, 156; Bunnell v. Reed, 21 Conn. 586; Middletown Savings Bank 4. v. Jarvis, 33 Conn. 372, 379. We have, however, never held that an uncertain interest, incapable of just appraisal, and possibly of no value, may be thus sequestered for the creditor's doubtful benefit, and we think we ought not to so hold. When an interest which may be strictly neither goods nor land is nevertheless clearly property, capable of being fairly sold and appraised, which is subject to the debtor's control, and which ought to be responsible for his debts, we say that the policy of the state for two hundred and fifty years clearly indicates that such interest is attachable property within the statute While it is unjust that one should keep from his creditors property which can be fairly sold or applied to the satisfaction of his debts, it is equally unjust that a creditor should seize and destroy an interest of his debtor which is SO uncertain and contingent that it cannot be fairly appraised. The policy of the law justifies the extension of the right of attachment to property which, though not strictly within the letter, is as well as legal interests may be attached. This section was enacted to facilitate the attachment of the buyer's interest, if any, and make it available for his creditor's use.3 Section 1253. Concealment or Conveyance of Property Sold on Condition. Every person who shall, with intent to place personal property, sold on condition that the title shall remain in the vendor after delivery, beyond the control of the vendor, remove, conceal, or aid or abet the removal or concealment of any such property, and any vendee of such property who assents to such removal or concealment shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than six months. Every vendee of conditional sale who shall sell or convey such property, or any part thereof, without the consent of the vendor, and without informing the person to whom he sells or conveys that the same is subject to such conditional sale, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than six months. The provisions of this section round out the security of the seller and minimize the moral hazard of giving credit upon the security of conditional contracts. They still permit the vendee to dispose of his interests but only with the seller's consent. This preserves to the seller the delectus personarum, which is an important right of the seller in this class of transactions. A sale in violation of this section, the penalty of which implies a prohibition, is illegal and conveys no title.1 within the equity of the statute." Smith V. Gilbert 71 154-5. Conn. 149, "The general rule is that all one's property is liable for his debts. But to that rule there are many exceptions. All property exempt by statute from attachment is within the exception; so is ordinary trust property designed to secure a maintenance for some unfortunate debtor; so also the income of trust property where it is payable to the beneficiary at the discretion of the trustee. The exceptions indicate unmistakably that it is the policy of the law not to take from the debtor his means of subsistence, not to take from him his necessary daily food and clothing." Tolland County Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 50 Conn. 493, 495. 2. Davenport v. Lacon, 17 Conn. 283; Middletown Savings Bank v. Jarvis, 33 Conn. 373, 377. 3. See Lewis v. McCabe, 49 Conn. 141, 153. 1. See sec. 73, ante. CHAPTER 286. SALES AT WHOLESALE BY RETAIL DEALER.1 Section 4868. Sale by Retail Trader of Entire Stock at One Transaction. When any person who makes it his business to buy commodities and sell the same in small quantities for the 66 1. History.- This statute was first enacted in 1901, (Pub. Acts, 1901, ch. 161), and provided that whenever a retail dealer" who was defined to be one who made it his business to buy commodities and sell the same in small quantities for immediate consumption for the purpose of making a profit," should, “at a single transaction, and not in the regular course of business, sell, assign or deliver the whole or a large part of his stock in trade, such sale, assignment or delivery should be made in writing," acknowledged and recorded in the town clerk's office within one day, exclusive of Sunday or legal holidays, otherwise they would be void against all persons who were creditors of the vendor at the time of such transaction." Assignments of insolvent debtors for the benefit of their creditors were excepted from the operation of the statute. This statute was substantially incorporated into the general statutes in the revision of 1902, (ch. 286, §§ 4868-70). The statute received interpretation in the case of Walp v. Mooar, 76 Conn. 515. The facts of this case were that one Davidson, of New Haven, in fraud of creditors and in violation of the statute, sold his entire stock of shoes to one Koch, of New York, who did not know of the fraud. Mrs. Walp, knowing of the fraud bought the goods of Koch in New York. Having acquired Koch's defeasible title before defeasance, her title was good, (Knower v. Cadden Clothing Co., 57 Conn. 202, 217), unless it was affected by the statute. She immediately reshipped the goods to New Haven where Mooar attached part of them, and Mrs. Walp brought an action in the nature of conversion. The court held that, as the purchase in New York was not in good faith, the comity of states laid no obligation upon them to give it effect. It was also held that the statute was not unconstitutional, either as class legislation or as depriving such persons of their property without due process of law (pp. 520, 521), and that "fraudulent and void" meant voidable (p. 517). In Pub. Acts, 1903, ch. 72, § 4868 of the Gen. Stat. was amended so as to prohibit such sales unless seven days previous notice were given, and § 4868, declaring them void against creditors was retained. In Pub. Acts, 1905, ch. 211, § 4868 was further amended to read as given in the text. See Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 438-9. Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia (see Thorpe v. Pennock Mercantile Co., 99 Minn. 22, 30, p. 818 post), have enacted statutes covering the subject-matter, all of which have the same general provisions, differing somewhat in wording from the Connecticut Statute, of which the Massachusetts Act may be taken as a representative. Sec. 1. "The sale in bulk of any part or the whole of a stock of merchandise, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of the purpose of making a profit, shall, at a single transaction not in the regular course of business, sell, assign, or deliver the whole, or a large part of his stock in trade, such sale shall be void as against all persons who are his creditors at the time of such sale, assignment, or delivery, unless he shall, not less than seven days nor more than thirty days previous to such sale, assignment, or delivery, cause to be recorded in the town clerk's office in the town in which such vendor conducts his said business, a notice of his intention to make such sale, assignment, or delivery, which notice shall be in writing, describing in general terms the property to be so sold, assigned, or delivered, and all conditions of such sale, assignment, or delivery, and the parties thereto; and said notice shall be signed by such person or in his name by his attorney. (As amended by Public Acts, 1905, ch. 211.) Section 4869. Such Transaction Void When.- All such sales, assignments, or deliveries of commodities which shall be made without the formalities required by the provisions of section 4868 shall be void as against all persons who were creditors of the vendor at the time of such transaction. Section 4870. Assignment by Insolvent Debtor Not Affected. - Nothing contained in sections 4868 and 4869 shall affect an seller's business, shall be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the seller, unless the seller and purchaser, at least five days before the sale, make a full, detailed inventory, showing the quantity, and, so far as possible with exercise of reasonable diligence, the cost price to the seller of each article to be included in the sale; and unless the purchaser demands and receives from the seller a written list of names and addresses of creditors of the seller, with the amount of indebtedness due or owing to each and certified by the seller, under oath, to be to the best of his knowledge and belief, a full, accurate and complete list of his creditors and of his indebtedness; and unless the |