A search for authorities directly in point upon this subject has not been very fruitful. We find the following statement of the rule in 7 Enc. of Ev., at pages 754, 755:

"Evidence of the commission by the defendant of the same offense under similar circumstances is admissible to show motive and intent, and the defendant's system, habit, and course of business. Such acts only may be proven for this purpose, as were done subsequently to the taking effect of the law upon which the particular prosecution is based. It has been held that testimony of other sales is admissible only when the act constituting the offense is equivocal or committed under peculiar circumstances."

The following cases are cited by the author in a note bearing the heading:

"In prosecution for violating local-option law, evidence of other sales made before the prohibitory law came into effect is not admissible on the question of intent. Efird v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 447 (71 S. W. 957); State v. Dunning, 14 8. D. 316 (85 N. W. 589).”

In Efird v. State, supra, which arose under a localoption law, the court of criminal appeals of Texas said:

"It has also been held that it is proper to show sales and delivery of whisky to other parties as evidence tending to show system of doing business"-citing authorities. "However, in view of the fact that this case must be reversed, we would suggest that, if this testimony relates to the period when local-option was not in force, then it would not be admissible. But it is germane and proper to prove sales to other parties, as stated above, as a circumstance going to establish a system under which appellant was violating the law."

In State v. Dunning, supra, it was held that in a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors as a beverage without a license, under the law of 1897, which took effect March 3, 1897, it was error to permit evidence of sales made which was not limited to sales made between the time when the statute took effect and when the indictment was presented.

As to the admissibility of evidence of other offenses to show the habit, course of business, and system of respondent, we have pointed out that it should be confined to the commission of the same offenses under similar circumstances. Such acts only may be shown for this purpose as were done subsequent to the taking effect of the law upon which the particular prosecution is based.

The reason why other offenses under different circumstances may not be shown is because it is not competent to show that a respondent is a violator of law generally. When it is necessary to show a particular intent in order to establish the offense charged, proof of previous acts of the same kind is admissible for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge or intent. People v. Wakely, 62 Mich. 297-303 (28 N. W. 871).

This subject is discussed and the cases relating thereto cited by Justice OSTRANDER in People v. Burke, 157 Mich. 108-112 (121 N. W. 282).

We are of opinion that the trial court erred in the admission of the testimony, and in the charge in the instances pointed out; that the respondent was prejudiced thereby; and that for such errors the case should be reversed. People v. Hickman, 164 Mich. 672 (130 N. W. 331).

We have examined the other assignments of error. They mostly hinge upon the rulings in the reception of testimony of witnesses as to the prior sales, and the questions are not likely to arise on another trial, in view of what we have said. We find no error in the rulings relating to the testimony of the witness Frank Walker as to the claimed sales after May 1, 1911.

The conviction of respondent is set aside, the case reversed, and a new trial granted.

MOORE, C. J., and STEERE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did

not sit.

PEOPLE v. BRANNEN.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR-BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS-CRIMINAL LAW -JUDGMENT.

A writ of error does not lie in any case before judgment, and will not issue to review bastardy proceedings after conviction and before judgment or sentence.

2. SAME-CERTIORARI.

No judgment known to the common law is rendered in such cases; the proceedings are purely statutory, the judgment being final and reviewable only by writ of certiorari.

Error to Oakland; Smith, J. Submitted November 14, 1912. (Docket No. 136.) Decided December 17, 1912.

Hugh J. Brannen was convicted of being the father of an illegitimate child. Dismissed.

Andrew L. Moore, for appellant.

Carl H. Pelton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Clinton McGee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

PER CURIAM. In bastardy proceedings respondent was convicted by a jury. A motion for a new trial was denied. No judgment has been entered. Respondent assigned errors and settled a bill of exceptions, which is brought into this court by writ of error.

A writ of error lies in any case only to review a judgment. Aside from this, the practice in such cases has been misconceived. We are aware that in one, and, perhaps, in more than one, case the proceeding appears to have been reviewed upon writ of error; no notice being taken of the use of the writ. See Hull v. People, 41 Mich. 167 (2 N. W. 175). The proceeding is, however, purely statutory, not after the course of the common law, and is summary. No judgment known to the common

law follows the verdict, and the judgment rendered is final. 2 Comp. Laws, §§ 5904, 5905 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] §§ 4989, 4990). The only remedy available to an aggrieved party is by writ of certiorari. Cross v. People, 8 Mich. 113.

The writ must be dismissed.

BALDERSON v. PORTLAND TELEPHONE CO.

TELEGRAPHS AND TELE

NEGLIGENCE PERSONAL INJURIES PHONES-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. Evidence that defendant's linemen, in placing wires, laid certain wires across the driveway and yard of plaintiff, that plaintiff supposed the men had ceased working and, though he had been informed that they might recommence work at any time, left his team, on a subsequent day, standing for a short time directly over the wires, that he looked to see if the men were working before he left the horses standing, but could see no one, and that defendant's servants began tightening the wires and raising them while the animals remained above the wires, frightening them and causing serious injuries to plaintiff, presented a question for the jury as to plaintiff's contributory negligence, and the court should not have directed a verdict for defendant.

Error to Ionia; Davis, J. Submitted November 13, 1912. (Docket No. 10.) Decided December 17, 1912.

Case by John C. Balderson against the Portland Telephone Company for personal injuries. A judgment for defendant on a verdict directed by the court is reviewed by plaintiff on writ of error. Reversed.

Alfred R. Locke and George E. Nichols, for appellant.

Scully & Davis, for appellee.

STONE, J. This suit was brought to recover damages for an injury which the plaintiff claims to have suffered by reason of the negligence of the defendant in the manner hereinafter described. The case was tried before a jury. At the close of the plaintiff's testimony the trial court, upon the motion of defendant's counsel, directed a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and a judgment for defendant was entered.

At the time of the alleged injury the plaintiff resided upon a farm in the township of Portland, fronting on the highway extending northerly from the village of Portland. The defendant is a telephone company, and in October, 1910, was engaged in building and extending one of its telephone lines upon the highway in front of plaintiff's farm and residence, and on the west side of the road near the highway line.

On October 26, 1910, the defendant having erected its poles to a point some distance north of plaintiff's residence from the village of Portland, and having strung two wires upon the poles and crossarms to the second pole south of the driveway of the plaintiff's yard, they were then made fast to the said pole.

On plaintiff's premises there was situated a dwelling house just west of the highway, on the south side of which a driveway extended from the road, which driveway the plaintiff used in going to his residence, and to barns situated southwesterly from the house. There were two trees standing in front of plaintiff's house just north of the driveway and near the highway line. It was arranged between plaintiff and defendant's superintendent that these trees, one of which was somewhat defective, should be cut down, and plaintiff assisted the defendant in cutting them, and they were felled in a southwesterly