5. CONFLICT OF LAWS. Jurisdiction - Legacy Charged on Land.-No court, State or Federal, can confer title nor reach nor sell land situated in a State other than where the court is held. Williams v. Nichol, S. C. Ark., July 3, 1886, 1 S. W. Rep. 243.

6. CONTRACT.-Sale-Fraud-Sheriff's Interpleader -Change of Title to Personal Property, Unaccompanied by Change of Possession.-Property sold on the faith of misrepresentations of fact on the part of the vendee, as to his financial condition,cannot be taken in execution by creditors of the vendee, and may be recovered by the vendor, in a feigned issue, fraud having vitiated the sale. By contract between A.,a Pennsylvania tanner,and B., a Boston leather dealer, A. was to buy raw hides, deliver them to B. at the tannery. in Pennsylvania, cause them to be marked with a private mark as B.'s property, send bills thereof to B. at Boston, tan the hides for him and then send them to Boston for sale. B. was to pay to A., "as compensation for said tanning, such sums as should equal the proceeds of the sales of said leather, after deducting therefrom the said purchase price of the hides and skins from which the leather was made; also, five per cent. on the gross amount of the sales, freight on the leather, interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, and all premiums for insuring the hides;" A. to be liable for all losses. The parties were not to be partners, and the hides were, in every state, to belong exclusively to B: Held, that as to third persons, B. was merely a lender of money, and not a purchaser of the hides, and, therefore, could not hold them as against A.'s execution creditors. Ensign v. Hoffield, S. C. Penn., April 28, 1886; 28 Weekly Notes of Cases, 105.

7. CRIMINAL LAW.-Larceny and Receiving Stolen Goods-Indictment-Verdict-Instructions-Evidence Error. An indictment framed in two counts, one for larceny, and the other for receiving stolen property, will support a general verdict. On the trial of such an indictment, it is improper to instruct the jury that, if they find the accused guilty, they must specify on which count their indictment is based. It is not a reversible error to instruct the jury that the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is evidence of guilt. Cook v. State, S. C. Tenn., June 10, 1886; 1 S. W. Rep., 254.

8.

Reasonable Doubt-Instructions— Subject of Statute Embraced in Title.-Where the charge to the jury states, among other things, "that the rule requiring the jury to be satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to warrant a conviction, does not require that the jury should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of each link in the chain of circumstances relied on to establish the defendant's guilt," the language used is inaccurate, and the metaphor calculated to mislead the jury; for while the court doubtlessly intended to announce the proposition that it was not necessary for the State to have proven beyond a reasonable doubt every circumstance offered in evidence, and tending to establish the ultimate facts on which a conviction depended, yet there was great danger of the jury applying the figure to the ultimate and essential facts necessary to conviction. It is no answer that other parts of the. same instruction stated correctly the law on the subject of reasonable doubt. The judgment must be reversed. Where the title

of an act clearly expresses one general subject, the addition of subdivisions thereof does not necessarily vitiate the whole title. Clair v. People, S. C. Colo., April, 1886, 8 Crim. Law Mag., 184.

9. DAMAGES.-Eminent Domain - Interest.— The proper rule to follow to measure the amount of damages a land-owner would be entitled to by reason of the running of a railroad through his premises, is to ascertain what price the property would have brought either at public or private sale before the construction of the railroad, and what it would bring after such construction, the difference being the amount of the damage. In order to arrive at the increase or shrinkage in the market value, there must be a just and fair comparison of the special advantages and the actual disadvantages resulting from the opening and operating of the road and the construction of its works. The damages found bear interest from the time of the taking. Setzler v. Pennsylvania, etc. Co., S. C. Penn., March 1, 1886.

10. DEED.-Release-Construction.-Parties cannot be permitted to vary or change the meaning of the plain, unambiouous language used in a written instrument; hence, where a deed says: "All right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever, which I, the said releasor, have, or ought to have, in or to a certain tract of land," etc., it is a release which conveys whatever interest the releasor has in the property, and its effect is not destroyed by the statement in the deed that the premises had been theretofore mortgaged to grantor. Whether the grantor in the quitclaim deed intended to release the right to reversion or not, he has in fact done so, and the law will afford him no relief. The condition is irrevocably gone, and plaintiff's title is complete. Grantor subsequently, at the time of his death, had no interest in the property, and there was nothing on which the deed from his administrator could operate. Hoyt v. Ketchum, S. C. Conn., June, 1886; 2 N. Eng. Rep. 557.

11. DOWER.-The widow of a deceased mortgagee, who had a dower interest in the premises which she had not released, but which had not been set out to her, cannot convey any part of the premises to a third person to hold as against the administrator of the mortgagee. Plummer v. Doughty, S. C. Me., August 6, 1886; 6 East. Rep. 451. 12. EMINENT DOMAIN-Contributory Negligence. -Acquisition of land for the purposes of a railroad does not embarass the right of the owner of adjoining lands not taken in the freest use of them in any lawful business, nor expose him to be charged with contributive negligence if his property of an inflammable nature, necessarily and carefully used in the course of such business, is set afire by sparks from a defective or unskillfully managed locomotive. Kalbfleisch v. Long Island, etc. Co., N. Y. Ct. App. June 1, 1886; 3 Cent. Rep.

662.

13. EVIDENCE-Parol- Written Instrument.-Evidence that after the time of executing a written contract the parties agreed upon a modification of it, is admissible; but proof of a subsequent conversation between them, in which one of them stated, orally, his understanding of the contract differently from its written terms, and the other did not dissent from his statement, does not amount to such subsequent modification, and is not admissible. Corse v. Peck, N. Y, Ct. App., June 1, 1886; 3 Cent. Rep. 611.

14. -. Written Not Variable by Parol-Corporations-Transfer of Stock.-The intestate died owning a benefit certificate in a mutual insurance corporation, made payable to his personal representative. The by-laws permitted assignment prescribing the formalities. In a contest for the proceeds of the policy between the representative and some of the heirs: Held, that parol evidence of an assignment was inadmissible, and that the formalities of the assignment must be strictly followed, the same being intended for the protection of the association. Elliott v. Whedbee, S. C. N. C. February, 1886; So. Atl. Rep.

15. EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR-Mortgages -Foreclosure-Bonds for Maintenance—Surviving Widow-Demand.-An administrator of a deceased mortgagee may maintain a suit to foreclose a mortgage, given the husband to secure a bond for maintenance of the husband and wife, though the breach did not occur till after the death of the mortgagee. In such suit it is not necessary to show that the surviving widow had made a demand on the administrator of the deceased mortgagor for support out of the mortgaged estate. Plummer v. Doughty, S. C. Me. August 6, 1886; 6 East. Rep.

451.

16. FRAUD-Fraudulent Representations-The purchase of stock representing property is a purchase of the property itself. A false and fraudulent representation, as to property of a corporation, of material facts which necessarily affect the value of the shares of stock therein, constitutes a cause of action against a party who induces another, by means of such fraudulent misrepresentation, to purchase such shares. It is not material to such cause of action that the purchase price or money advanced on the faith of the representation be paid to the party making it for his individual benefit. Although the plaintiff is present and examines the property he has a right to rely upon the representation of the defendant as to its extent and boundary, and is not bound to examine the title when defendant professes to know all about it. Scwenk v. Naylor, N. Y. Ct. App. June 1, 1886; 3 Cent. Rep. 665.

17. - Statute of Frauds.-In an action for procuring credit to be given to another by false representations of pecuniary responsibility, oral representationf or assurances are properly excluded; and where no part of the written statement of the party obtaining the goods on credit was untrue, there was not sufficient evidence of a conversion on the part of either defendant. Bates v. Youngerman, S. J. C. Mass. June 29, 1886; 2 N. Eng. Rep. 514.

18. GIFT-Legacy-Remoteness.—A gift over to persons ascertainable with certainty within the allowed time, with no contingency or uncertainty as to who should finally take, is valid; and where the contingency is one that happened, the validity of the devise would not be affected by the consideration that another contingency might be too remote. So there is no objection, on the ground of remoteness, to a gift to unborn children for life, and then to an ascertained person, provided the vesting of the estate in the latter is not postponed too long. Seaver v. Fitzgerald, S. Jud. Ct. Mass. March 31, 1886; 2 N. Eng. Rep. 511.

19. GUARANTY-Commercial

Law-Protest-Col

lateral Security.-Writing upon a note, "For value

received we guarantee the within note until paid," is an absolute and unqualified contract by each signer of the guaranty to pay if the maker does not. Upon maturity, it is the duty of the guarantors to go to the holder and pay the note, and this without demand or notice. Under such circumstances, no party to the note is released from liability thereon, by reason of any omission to act on the part of the holder. Where, upon taking, as collateral, notes indorsed by makers of a joint and several principal note, the holder gives a receipt stating that there is to be "no release from the joint and several note, all are to be held: " the holder assumes no obligation to demand payment, notify indorser, or bring suit on the collateral notes; but is only bound not to act in intentional bad faith, nor to hinder the pledgors in enforcing payment. Where the indorsers of such collateral notes have knowledge, power and opportunity to enforce them against the maker, it is their duty to do so and to protect themselves from loss through delay of the holder to proceed against the maker at maturity; otherwise the negligence of the holder becomes their own and they cannot set off the amount so lost against their liability on the principal note made by them. City, etc. Bank v. Hopson, S. C. Conn. May 31, 1886; 2 N. Eng. Rep. 556.

20. INSURANCE-Life Insurance Beneficiaries in Mutual Insurance Company. A clause in the charter of a mutual insurance company, that the purpose is in part for the "relief of widows and orphans by voluntary contributions," does not mean that the benefit necessarily enures to the widow and orphans. The representative is entitled to recover, in the absence of a valid assignment under the by-laws, for purposes of administration. Donald v. Benton, 4 Dev. & Bat. 435; Etheridge v. Palin, 72 N. C., 213; Wilson v. Sandifer, 76 N. C., 347; Baker v. The Railrood, 91 N. C., 308; Rogers v. Chestnet, 92 N. C., 81, cited and approved.) Elliott v. Whedbee, S. C. N. C. February, 1886; S. Atl. Rep.

21. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-Pleading-Damages -How Alleged-Aider by Verdict.-A general allegation of damages will admit proof as to damages necessarily resulting from the injury complained of, and which are implied by law. The plaintiff should, however, allege specifically what actual and also what exemplary damages he claims; and, if he fails to do so, a special demurrer will be sustained. In such cases, if the defendant fails to raise the question by demurrer, and the issue of fact is passed upon by the court or jury, the defective pleading is cured by verdict, and defendant is precluded from revising it on appeal. Moehring v. Hall, S. C. Tex. June 1, 1886; 1 S. W. Rep. 258.

22. MISTAKE-Fraud.-Whether a party was honestly mistaken as to a boundary line, or whether his representations as to it were fraudulently made with knowledge of their falsity, is a question of fact for the jury. Schwenk v. Naylor, N. Y. Ct. App. June 1, 1886; 3 Cent. Rep. 665.

23. MORTGAGES-Debt-Evidence of Debt.—A mortgage secures the debt, not the note, bond, or other evidence of it. No change in the form of the evidence, or the mode or time of payment-neither a judgment at law on the hote or bond, merging the original evidence of indebtedness, nor a recognizance of record taken in lieu of the note or bondnothing short of actual payment or express re

lease of the debt will operate to discharge the mortgage. This principle is illustrated in the decisions of this court cited in the opinion. The transfer of a debt secured by a mortgage carries with it the security, without any formal assignment or delivery of the latter. Stimpson v. Bishop, S. C. App. Va. June, 1886; 10 Va. Law Journal, 543.

24. NEGLIGENCE-Municipal Corporation - Grade of Street.-Whilst a lot owner can recover in trespass for the throwing of dirt on his premises by the city authorities in making a street, he cannot sue in damages on the case for the throwing of dirt on the premises by reason of the elevation of the roadway; a change of grade. Kehrer v. City of Richmond, S. Ct. App. Va. April 22, 1886; 22 Rep. 219.

25. PARTITION-Co-Tenant-Improvements- Tenant by Curtesy.-A., the husband of B., one of the several co-tenants, made valuable and permanent improvements upon a portion of the said land. A bill for partition having been filed, and partition decreed among the parties according to their interests, held, (1) that A., being tenant by curtesy initiate, was not, in making the improvements, a mere stranger or volunteer; (2) that, as the improvements were such as were reasonably necessary for the proper enjoyment of the land, the portion of the land so improved should be awarded to the heirs of B., without accounting to the others interested for any portion of the same. It seems that improvements would inure to the benefit of all the co-tenants where one co-tenant undertakes to improve the whole estate, as by erecting a building covering the whole of a city lot. Kelsey's Appeal, S. C Penn. May 31, 1886; 5 Atl. Rep. 447.

26. PARTNERSHIP-Levy on Partnership Property— Title Acquired Thereby.-When an execution or attachment against an individual partner is levied on the partnership property, the purchaser at the sale under the levy acquires only the partner's interest in the assets which may remain after the payment of the partnership debts, and which can only be ascertained by an account in equity. "In other words, the effects of a partnership cannot be taken by attachment or execution to satisfy a creditor of one of the partners, except to the extent of his interest in the effects after settlement of the partnership debts. He thus purchases a mere right in equity to call for an account, and thus to entitle himself to the interest of the partner in the property which may be ascertained to exist upon a settlement-which may be something or nothing. Warren v. Taylor, 60 Ala. 218; Andrews v. Keith, 34 Ala. 722; Daniels v. Owens, 70 Ala. 297; Parsons on Part. (3rd ed. *359, *351); Collyer on Part. (Wood's ed.) 187, note; "Story Eq. Jur. § 677;" Farley, Spear, & Co. v. Moog, S. C. Ala., Dec. Term, 1885-86.

27. PAYMENT-Evidence of- Promissory Note. Where "received in full" is written across the face of a note, the natural inference is that the satisfaction of the note took effect from the date of the latest credit recorded on the back of the note, or because of some additional payment contemporaneously made, and that money paid later by the maker to the payee was applied, not to the receipted note, but to another note between the same parties, on which a balance was due. Chapman v. Smoot, Md. Ct. App. June 21, 1886; 5 Atl. Rep., 462.

28. PLEADING-Every pleading must proceed upon some single definite theory, which is to be determined from the general scope and character of the pleading. Bank of Indianapolis v. Root, S. C. Ind. June 26, 1886; 8 N. East. Rep. 105.

29.

Account Filed as Exhibit-Uncertainties Cured--Set-Off and Counter-Claim-When it May be Replied to a Set-Off-Where a copy of an account, which is the foundation of a pleading, is properly filed therewith as an exhibit or bill of particulars, it will cure uncertainties therein. A set-off may be pleaded by the plaintiff to a set-off by the defendant, if it existed at the time of the defendant's set-off was pleaded, although it may not have existed at the time of the commencement of the original action, Blount v. Rick, S. C. Ind., June 26, 1886; 8 N. East. Rep. 108.

30. PLEDGE AND COLLATERAL SECURITY.— Contract - Reduction of Debt — Right to Withdraw Collaterals.-Where collaterals are given under a contract that the pledgor, in the event of a reduction of the indebtedness by him, shall be entitled to select from the securities pledged an amount equal to the reduction, it is sufficient if the reduction is made in part by rents from property voluntarily mortgaged for such debt, or from the sale thereof; and one to whom he has transferred a part of such securities, less than the amount of such reduction, is entitled to hold the same as against the pledgee, even though no valuable consideration was given therefor. Bank of Indianapolis v. Root, S. C. Ind., June 26, 1886, 8 N. East. Rep. 105.

31. PRACTICE.-It is not ground for exception that instructions to the jury are not given in the iden tical language of a request by a party. Walker c. Walker, S. C. N. H., July 3, 1816; 6 East. Rep. 425. 32. SALE.-Mutual Assent-Partner Offering "To Give or Take"-Acceptance-Conditions.—An offer by one partner to give a certain sum for the other partner's interest in the firm, or to sell his own intereet for the same sum, concluding with the words, "the party purchasing to give sufficient security for the payment of company indebtedness, and for purchase price," which offer was accepted by the other partner, "to sell on the terms mentioned:" Held, not to be a complete sale, and that the first offer was only one of the steps leading to a sale, which contemplated that parties should meet, and complete transaction. Gates v. Nelles, S. C. Mich., July 15, 1886; 29 N. W. Rep., 73.

33. TITLE TO LAND.-Actual Possession of Another -Breach of Peace.-A person who has, or thinks he has, a title to land which is in the actual possession of another, cannot lawfully take possession without the consent of the holder, even though he commit no breach of the peace. The recent authorities sustaining this position are: Turnley v. Hanna, 67 Ala. 101; Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn. 12; s. C., 52 Amer. Rep. 552. Morris t. Robinson, S. C. Ala., December Term, 1885-1886.

34. TROVER.-Conversion-Lien.-One who has the lawful possession of the personal property of another, does not necessarily have a lien on it for the expense incurred in getting such possession; and his unlawful retention of it, claiming such a lien, in defiance of the owner's right of possession, is a conversion. Nutter v. Varney, S. C. N. H., July 30, 1886, 5 Atl. Rep. 457.

35. TRUST.- Execution for Collection of Funds— Injunction.-Trusts are peculiarly within the province of a court of equity, and an injunction will be awarded on the application of a trustee to restrain his cestui que trust from issuing execution for the collection of trust funds on a judgment in his name. Reeser's Appeal, S. C. Penn., May 31, 1886, 5 Atl. Rep. 445.

36.

37.

Mortgage Foreclosure - Purchase by Plaintiff-Agreement to Reconvey.-An arrangement was made,by the attorney of both parties, in an endeavor to perfect a title, by letter, to the effect that a foreclosure sale was to take place in due and lawful form, and that if the plaintiff, or any one for her, became purchaser, she should go into possession as such, but that at any time within one year "after taking title" she should reconvey to defendant upon being paid the mortgage debt, interest, etc. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to a deed from the referee, and is not liable to account as mortgagee in possession, since she is in as purchaser. Belter v. Lyon, Ct. of App. N. Y., June 8, 1886; 7 N. East. Rep., 821.

Removal of Trustee.-Equity has power to remove a trustee for breach or neglect of duty, anything showing a lack of capacity, fidelity, or honesty; but not for any mere error of judgment, or mistake as to the true construction of the will under which he acts. Williams v. Nichol, S. C. Ark., July 3, 1886; 1S. W. Rep., 243.

38. WARRANTY.-Of Title.-A disputed and doubtful equitable title is not, as a compliance with a warranty or representation, equivalent to a clear and undisputed legal title; and damages may be recovered for the substitution of the one for the other. Schwenk v. Naylor, N. Y. Ct. App., June 1, 1886; 3 Cent. Rep., 665.

39. WAYS.-Laying Out-Curative Statute-Legalizing Construction of Gravel Road — InjunctionWhen it will not Lie-Gravel Road AssessmentCuratice Act.-There being a general law authorizing county boards to lay out and construct gravel roads, and the board of commissioners of Wells county having attempted to act under such law, but committed an irregularity in taking the initial steps at a special, instead of a regular session, the act of April 11, 1885 (Acts 1885, p. 178), legalizing their action in constructing such road, is constitutional. The fact that a party assessed for the construction of a gravel road obtains an injunction before a legalizing act is passed, will not avail another person assessed, but not a party to the former action, in a suit for an injunction brought after the curative act is passed. Johnson v. Wells Co., S. C. Ind., June 15, 1886, 8 N. East. Rep., 1. 40. WILL.-Devise-Heirs - Construction.- Where the language of a will is, "all my other property, either in money, stocks, bonds, goods, vessels, real estate, or whatever it may be, is to be received in trust for the heirs of my children," followed by provisions for giving the income or life estate to his wife and children, it manifests a desire to have all the property finally go in the same direction. In such a devise the word "heirs" should receive a strict construction, and in case of the death of one of testator's children, his equal proportion of the trust fund should be paid to the heirs at law of such deceased child. Fabens v. Fabens, S. J. C. Mass., March 31, 1886; 2 N. Eng., 380.

Liability. Where a legacy is charged upon land, the courts of the State where the land is situate have exclusive jurisdiction to protect the legatee. Where land is charged with the payment of a legacy, the acceptance of such land by the devisee makes him personally liable for the payment of such legacy, even though it be greater in amount than the value of the land devised. In such a case equity will enforce payment of the legacy by sale of the land, and at the same time compel the devisee to make up the deficiency, if any. Williams v. Nichol, S. C. Ark., July 3, 1886; 1 S. W. Rep., 243.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.*

[Correspondents are requested to draw up their answers in the form in which we print them, and not in the form of letters to the editor. They are also admonished to make their answers as brief as may be.—Ed.]

QUERIES.

22. M. is indebted to one of the ice dealers of Youngstown, Ohio, on a bill contracted three years ago; he is irresponsible and unable to pay, being the head and support of a family and entitled to certain exemptions. For the purpose of compelling him and other delinquents to pay old bills, all of the ice dealers of said place entered into a written agreement in the spring of this year, to boycot all persons indebted to any one of them. In pursuance of said agreement, M. was notified that if he did not pay by a certain day that he would be placed upon the "black list," and the ice market closed against him. Being unable to pay he did not comply, and all ice dealers refused to sell him, though tendered the cash for the ice upon delivery. He then made arrangements with a neighbor to buy more than he wanted, and in that way obtained ice for a short time, and until the dealers found that out, when they refused to sell any more to the neighbor. So that, in fact, he has been absolutely unable to obtain any ice during the season. Has he a cause of action at common law? K. & HO

QUERIES ANSWERED.

Query 39. [22 Cent. L. J. 335.]—A., a married man, in 1878 conveys property without his wife's signature. In 1881 A. is divorced from his wife. By the decree both parties are restored to all their property rights obtained during marriage. Can A.'s wife, after the divorce, set up and claim dower in the property sold by the husband during marriage without her joining. Quote authorities. X. Y. Z.

Answer. This query is somewhat ambiguous. Property rights obtained during marriage cannot be "restored" by a decree of divorce, since, prior to the divorce, the marriage existed, and in law the rights existed. A dower right does not arise till the death of the husband, and it cannot arise unless the woman was the wife of the deceased at the time of his death. Chenowith v. Chenowith, 14 Ind. 2; 2 Bishop on Mar. & Div., § 706. A divorce a vinculo always barred dower at common law. 4 Kent Com., 54. If the State statute changes the common law and gives a divorced woman a dower interest, then, of course, she is entitled to a dower interest in the real estate sold by him without her joining. Forrest v. Forrest, 6 Duer, 103. S. S. M.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE LAWS OF THE INDIANA TERRITORY. 1801-1806, inclusive. Paoli, Ind.: Throop & Clark. 1886. INDIANA HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAMPHLETS. The Laws and Courts of Northwest and Indiana Territories. By Daniel Waite Howe. Indianapolis: The Bowen-Merrill Co., Publishers. 1886.

We are in receipt of the foregoing works, the former a volume of over 200 pages, in regular law-book style, the latter a pamphlet of twenty-five pages, both printed under the auspices of the Indiana Historical Society. The object of the publication of these volumes, the preservation of the early records of the State, is most praiseworthy, and the Historical Society of Indiana deserves, and will doubtless receive, the thanks of the citizens of the State, and of those who shall come after them, for thus preserving the memorials of the early and trying days of their ancestors.

THE CHURCH AND THE CIVIL LAW.-A Manual of Ecclesiastical Law-With an Appendix of Forms. By Charles B. Howell, L. L. B. Author of "Michigan Nisi Prius Cases etc. Detroit, Chas. B. Howell, 1886.

This is a handsome little volume which we think will prove very useful to persons connected with the management of the secular concerns of Churches, and those acting professionally for such persons. As different as the church and the law are in so many respects, there are many points in their respective orbits in which they may and often do come into contact, and this work is designed especially to inform persons connected in any way with the church of all the points in which religious bodies are likely to be affected, beneficially, injuriously,or indifferently by the ordinary civil law of the land. The subject is one of the great and increasing importance. As the author justly observes in his preface. "The temporalities of the churches in this country are fast increasing in value, and those interested cannot be too careful in preserving their titles inviolate." The only regret we can feel about this book, is that the author has confined himself so closely to Michigan and has not taken in other States as well. As it is however, the book is well executed and will no doubt prove very useful.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

BRINGING A JURY TO TIME.-"Bailiff," said an Arkansas judge one day last week to the officer in charge of the jury, "will you please inform the jury that there will be a horse-race in Merrick's pasture at 3 o'clock?" The jury had been out for forty-eight hours, but in less than thirty minutes they came into court with a verdict.

CONGRESS has very properly sat down on "contract labor," by prohibiting the use of convicts or aliens on any Government work. Now, let the States arrange for the same thing, and it will be settled completely.

AN EXTREME REMEDY.-We have lately seen it suggested that "an effectual temperance measure, which ought to be adopted by the United States, by each of the States, and by every legislative body, would be to make a single overt exhibition of drunkenness a crime, which, if by a judge, should instantly expel him from the bench; if by an executive official should secure his instant dismissal; if by a congress

man or member of a State legislature, should subject him to immediate expulsion; and if by a lawyer, should disbar him from the courts." "Let the galled jade wince, our withers are unwrung." We are not a bit afraid, being, in this respect, as immaculate as the ideal husband, of whom it was said by an old woman, that he "doesn't drink no sperets and isn't hard on his clothes." However. for the sake of our professional brethren who are less ironclad, we protest against this proposition as harsh and cruel. We can recall no case in any of the books in which a "plain drunk” was ever visited with so heavy a penalty, except in Shakespeare, (where you can find almost anything), the case of Cassio, who lost his office by "putting an enemy into his mouth to steal away his brains." We always were sorry for Cassio, regarding him as the victim of misplaced confidence in the strength of his head, and the purity of his liquor,as well as of a too rigorous military discipline. If such a rule were enforced in these days it would deplete our army list with a rapidity that could not be even approximated by a "bloody war and a sickly season."

DIAGNOSIS OF DRUNKENNESS.-The following article from the London Lancet is given space here because of the high authority of that journal, and because it is a strong illustration of the fact that appearances are often deceptive:

"There is reason to fear that mistakes are not unfrequently made, even by skilled observers, in the recognition of drunkenness, by what may be called "apparent intoxication." The unsteaey gate, the congested face and neck, the vacant eye, with drooping lid, and even the spirituous breath of apparent intoxication, may one and all be the effects of disease or disturbance of function, which has no necessary connection with the abuse of alcohol in any form. A melancholy instance of blundering in respect to this matter may be cited from the life of the late Colonel Herbinger, who was accused of intemperance during his field service at Tonquin, but happily acquitted. Professor Peter, who had opportunities of studying the case of this recently deceased officer shortly before his death, elicited that he was suffering from a malady of some years' standing, which produced cerebral anæmia with such giddiness that he could scarcely sit on his horse. Similar cases are by no means uncommon, and while it is more than ever necessary to denounce the practice of permitting police officers to determine whether a man or woman is drunk or the victim of disease, it is requisite to go much further than this, and to call the special attention of skilled practitioners in medicine to the possibility of being mistaken by erroneous impressions on this subject. Not only will anæmia of the brain, however induced, cause giddiness, but certain forms of defective dissimilation will bring about the same results, together with symptoms still morǝ deceptive."

The article from the Lancet is defective in that it fails to point out to the unprofessional, the true, scientifle criteria of inebriety. It seems that the "unsteady gait, the congested face and neck, the vacant eye with drooping lid, and even the spirituous breath, may consist with sobriety, and the question remains, how is anybody to know when a man is drunk? If a staggering, red-faced, vacant-eyed, alcoholic-smelling man, is not drunk, who is drunk? The old rule was, that a man was sober as long as he could see a hole in a ladder; the more stringent rule was that he must be able to walk a chalk line. Now it would seem that all signs fail, and, common as drunkenness is, even police courts must not convict without the warrant of a surgical expert.