under a deed or mortgage of real estate given by a husband in which the wife joins is defeated, her act in joining in the conveyance becomes a nullity, and she is restored to her original situation, and may, after the death of her husband, recover dower, as though she had never joined in the conveyance. Hinchliffe v. Shea, N. Y. Ct. Ap. Oct. 5, 1886; 7 East. Rep. 326. - --- When 11. EQUITY-Fraud · Rescission in Part When Proper-Contract-Part Written, Part ParolConsideration must be Averred and Proved-Account Acknowledgment of Correctness may be Shown Incorrect-Mortgage--Assumption of Debt-Party Paying Equitable Part Treated as Surety. A party who has been fraudulently induced to make a contract cannot, as a rule, affirm it in part and avoid it in part; but where the contract is divisible into several independent parts resting on different considerations, he may retain the subject of one part, and at the same time maintain a suit in equity to rescind another part on equitable terms, or, by tendering back the consideration or benefit received under that part, treat it as rescinded at law. A contract party in writing, which cannot be made complete without supplying an essential part by parol evidence, is to be treated as a parol contract; and one who relies upon such a contract, which does not show upon its face that it was made upon an adequate consideration, must aver and prove that there was a sufficient consideration for it. A written acknowledgment that an account is correct, made without consideration, will not estop a party from showing that it is incorrect as against parties having notice of its incorrectness before acting upon it. Where two persons purchase real estate as tenants in common, giving a purchase-money mortgage thereon, and afterwards make partition thereof, the one who pays his equitable share of such mortgage debt stands in the relation of surety to one who purchases from the other, and assumes his share of the mortgage debt, and such surety is entitled to have the land so purchased first sold to satisfy the mortgage debt before the portion set apart to him shall be taken. Higham v. Harris, S. C. Ind., Sept. 15, 1886; 8 N. E. Rep. 255. 12 Limitation of Actions-Presumption of Payment, from Lapse of Time--Liens-Laches.The common law presumption of payment, arising from the lapse of time, arises upon every species of security for the payment of money, including evidences of debt excepted out of the statute of limstations. Equity follows the law in this respect. The lien of a contractor for the construction of a railroad is presumed to have been paid after the lapse of twenty years, where there are no circumstances or evidence showing that it has not been paid. Such contractor cannot, therefor, after the lapse of such time, under such circumstances, enforce such lien by bill in equity or otherwise. Hayes' Appeal, S. C. Penn. Oct. 4, 1886; 18 Weekly Notes of Cases, 322. 13. EVIDENCE - Admissions. - Declarations of defendant, contained in letters signed by him and mailed by his order, which directly contradict his testimony on the trial, are admissible in evidence against him, although the letters are not addressed to the plaintiff. Hosmer v. Groat, S. J. C. Mass., Oct. 29, 1886; 3 N. Eng. Rep. 78. 14. EXECUTION—Levy-Officer's Return-Amendment. If the return of an officer making a levy contains sufficient matter to indicate that in making the extent all the requirements of the statute have been complied with, an amendment of a mere clerical error may be made, notwithstanding any intervening interest of a subsequent bona fide purchaser. Peaks v. Gifford, S. C. Me. Sept. 24, 1886; 5 Alt. Rep. 879. 15. FALSE IMPRISONMENT-Commitment for Contempt-Process not Void-Court's JurisdictionWhat it is-Commitment for Contempt-Attorney Resisting Motion for Discharge.-All the facts constituting an alleged contempt were undisputed,and were presented to the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings for consideration upon a hearing, After the hearing the court decided that a contempt had been committed, and ordered the party guilty thereof to be committed. Held, that the decision of the court was an exercise of the judicial function, and that the decision, although afterwards set aside as erroneous, did not render an order or process based upon it void, nor subject the party procuring it to an action for damages for false imprisonment. The power of a court to entertain jurisdiction of an action does not depend upon the existence of a sustainable cause of action, but upon the performance by the party of the prerequisites authorizing the court to determine whether one exists or not. In an action for false imprisonment, where the defendants, as authorized attorneys, resisted a motion for the discharge of the plaintiff, who had been committed for contempt, pending an appeal to determine whether he was guilty of such contempt, and where the motion for the discharge was overruled by the court before whom it was made, held, that the defendants were not liable in damages for false imprisonment; held, further, that they were not responsible for the action of the sheriff in continuing the imprisonment after the order of commitment was claimed to have been complied with. Fischer v. Langbein, N. Y. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1886; 8 N. E. Rep. 251. 16. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Divorce in One StateProceedings for Alimony in Another.-A and P were married in West Virginia, at their domicile, where A retained his domicile, but P went to Tennessee, where, in ex parte proceedings, she obtained a divorce a vinculo from A; but, as there was no personal service upon A, her application for alimony was dismissed without prejudice and to enable her to sue for it elsewhere. She then brought suit here for alimony alone, and to reach certain property in Ohio belonging to A; in which case she obtained service upon A, who also appeared and filed pleadings in the case, and on trial the court found sufficient cause, and allowed her alimony. Held, P had a right thus to bring her action for alimony alone, and she could have her claim therefor determined, and, if sustained upon trial, the court could allow her reasonable alimony out of the property of A. Woods v. Waddle, S. C. Ohio, Oct. 19, 1886; 8 N. E. Rep. 297. junction to restrain a threatened nuisance. Thornton v. Roll, S. C. Ill., Sep. 9 1886; The Reporter, vol. 22, 586. 18. INSURANCE-Agent Negligence of.-An exception will not be sustained to a finding of the trial court that an agent of an insurance company, instructed to cancel a policy, did not use due diligence in delaying until a loss occurred five days thereafter, when he could have given notice of the cancellation within half an hour. The court properly refused to rule that "inasmuch as, by the terms of the policy, the company had sixty days after proof of loss in which to pay the amount thereunder, the action was prematurely brought" against the agent for the loss sustained by his negligence, the proof of loss having been made and the writ dated the same day. The offer of defendant to prove that "orders generally from the companies are to cancel the policy as soon as convenient, and that it is generally understood that an agent has from five to ten days in which to cancel a policy," was rightly refused. Phoenix etc. Co. v. Frissell, S. J. C. Mass., Oct. 22, 1886; 3 N. Eng. Rep. 69. 19. Fire Insurance-Practice-Testimony.The condition in a fire insurance policy, that insured shall not effect a second insurance without the written consent of the insurer, is not waived by the fact that the agent of the company saw the policy of a second insurance, subsequently taken out by the insured, read portions of it, and conversed with insured upon its terms. The taking out of the second policy rendered the first policy void. Motions to strike out testimony should not prevail when the testimony offered is competent, and no objection is made thereto at the time it is offered. Robinson v. Fire Association, etc., S. C. Mich., Oct. 11, 1886; 5 W. Rep. 715. 20. JUDGMENTS - Liens-Statutory Subordinate to Prior Equities-Deed-Mistake in Description -Prior Equity.-Judgmeut liens are general statutory liens; they cannot be created by agreement, and they will not be allowed to stand in the way of prior specific qualities. In 1865, T obtained a deed by which it was attempted and intended to convey certain real estate, including that in controversy, but, by mutual mistake of the parties and scrivener, the description did not include such real estate. In 1879, appellant obtained a sheriff's deed thereto on a sale on a judgment against T in 1872. In 1875, appellee obtained a judgment against T's grantor, after he had parted with all interest in the real estate, except the naked legal title, and in 1885 he obtained a sheriff's deed thereof, on a sale upon said judgment made in 1884, but at T's request, his grantor made a deed to his wife, correcting the mistake, in 1879, and she made a deed to appellart in 1884. T and appellant have continued in possession. Held, that appellant's equity is superior, and he is entitled to have his title quieted as against appellee. Wells v. Benton, S. C. Ind, Oct., 12, 1886; 8 N. E. Rep. 444. 21. NEGLIGENCE-In an action for causing the death of plaintiff's intestate, where the only evidence is that, while engaged in defendant's employment in making starch, he was injured by starch being blown out of the boiler upon him, there being no evidence that the boiler was out of repair or improperly constructed, such evidence does not sustain due care on his part or negligence on the part 22. of defendant, and the court may order a verdict for defendant. Blanchette v. Border City, etc. Co., S. J. C. Mass., Oct. 29, 1886; 3 N. Eng. Rep. 92. Railroad Crossing Whistle Evidence-Character of Railway Train.-It is the duty of a railroad company, in running its trains over its track, to have the whistle of its engines sounded three times, 80 rods from the place where the railroad crosses any public highway, except in cities and villages. Where no whistle is sounded, or other alarm given, and damages are sustained by a train of cars running over cattle upon the highway, the company is chargable with negligence; and it is not relieved from its liability therefor merely by the evidence of the owner of the cattle, in charge of the same, that he saw the smoke and heard the puffing of the engine drawing the train more than half a mile from the crossing, because no one is bound to conclude that the engine or train will cross the highway without sounding the whistle 80 rods from the crossing. Where a person has lived several months on a farm near a railroad crossing of a public highway, and his business requires him to cross the track frequently, and he is able to tell the time the regular trains cross the crossing, he is competent to testify whether a particular train is an irregular or extra one. Missouri, etc. Co. v. Stevens, S. C. Kans., Oct. 7, 1886; 12 Pac. Rep. 25. 23. PARTITION Trust-Instructions Notice. Where the court gives binding instructions to the jury to find for one party or the other, it must be assumed that the evidence advanced by the other party is true and that every fact fairly inferred therefrom is true. The title of all heirs in the real estate of a decedent is extinguished by a decree and sale in partition of the orphans' court and delivery of sheriff's deed, and the interest of the heirs is thereby converted into personalty. To establish a trust by parol, the evidence must be full, clear and convincing. When real estate is held by a title regular on its face, a bona fide mortgagee thereof, or one claiming title under such mortgagee, is not liable to be affected by any secret trust or equity if he be without notice thereof. Notice to an attorney or agent in a particular transaction, given in the course of that transaction, is notice to to the principal. Partition is made of lands of tenants in common; when their possession is common; when the possession of one is adverse to the others the proper remedy is ejectment. Bigley v. Jones, S. C. Penn., Nov. 8, 1886; 17 Pitts. Leg. Jour. (N. S.) 140. 24. PAYMENT-Plea of-Burden of Proof.-Where an allegation of payment is denied no burden is cast on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has committed fraud or perjury. The burden is on the latter to establish the alleged payment and whether he succeeds or fails the verdict is no evidence that he is guilty of forgery or fraud. If under a plea of payment the evidence is so evenly balanced that the jury cannot tell wnich prepondarates, the defense fails. Where the execution of a receipt is denied,the party offering it must satisfy the jury by the weight of the evidence that it was executed by the other party. Where no request is made to the court to charge on the question of the burden of proof, failure to do so is not a subject of error. Mitchell v. Metchell, S. C. Penn., Nov. 9, 1886; 17 Pitts Leg. J. (N. S.) 143. 25. PUBLIC LANDS-State Lands-Swamp Lands Impeaching Titles.-Where land is a part of the swamp and overflowed lands granted by congress to the State and the State has never sold or disposed of it, the state alone is competent to impeach the title of those claiming it, or to complain of any disposition made of it by the United States. Driver v. Evins S. C. Ark., Sept., 25, 1886; 1 S. W. Rep. 518. 26. SALES.-A sale of real and personal property was made for a lump sum. A portion of the price was paid and the possession of the property delivered. The legal title to the real estate was in a third person to secure a certain sum of money, less in amount than the balance of the purchase money. The purchaser paid off the incumbrance and took a deed from such third person. Held, that the purchaser was liable to the vendor for the amount of the purchase-money less the partial payment, and the amount paid in discharge of the incumbrance. Bartlett v. Baker, S. C. Me., Sept. 23, 1886; 7 East Rep. 249. 27. Fraud-False Representations. - Upon the sale of a mill, where representations of the vendor made to the purchaser were mere expressions of opinion, and not statements of the existence of positive facts, upon which the purchaser had a right to rely in making the purchase; and where the testimony shows that the purchaser made a personal examination of the property, and also made inquiries of parties living at the place where it was located; and he had ample opportunity of ascertaining all the facts bearing upon the desirability of making the purchase, and the value of the property-such representations would not be sufficient to found the charge of fraud upon, if they should prove to be untrue. Representations that farmers would bring in enough logs from the surrounding country to stock the mill, or that the amount of logs would be cut by farmers and be delivered at the mill for custom sawing, for four or five years in succession, sufficient to meet the capacity of the mill, were representations of mere matters of opinion, and not sufficient to establish fraud. Fraud cannot be presumed, but must be established by a preponderance of evidence, and where two witnesses affirm, and two others no more interestedjin the subject-matter and fully as creditable deny, the fraud, it is not proved. Where fraud is relied on in a suit to set aside a deed of a steam saw-mill, lands and appurtenances, and to set aside mortgages and notes given thereunder, an alleged defect in the title, when connected with the fraud alleged, must stand or fall with that allegation, and, the fraud not being established, complainant must seek his remedy in another action. Allison v. Ward, S. C. Mich., Oct. 14, 1886; 5 West. Rep. 730. 28. SET-OFF-Trust-Assignment.-A set-off, to be allowed, must be a debt between the same parties and in the same right, and complete when the action was instituted. A bank received a cashier's check of another bank, as a conditional payment of the debt of a third party. The latter bank made an assignment in trust for creditors and the check was not paid on presentation. At the time of the assignment there was, on the books of the first bank, a credit to the insolvent bank of the proceeds of notes, indorsed and discounted for the latter's accommodation. In an action by the first bank against the debtor, for the debt, held, that this deposit was not a valid set-off against the debt. Union, etc. Bank v. Cannonburgh, etc. Co. S. C. Penn., Oct. 4 1886; 4 Penn. Rep. 262. 29. TRESPASS-Replevin - Officer.-The owner of personal property may maintain trespass against the plaintiff in replevin suit, who causes such property to be taken on the replevin writ, as the property of another, the defendant in replevin; and the fact that the plaintiff in replevin acted as a servant of the officer in serving that writ would not protect him though the officer might have a valid defense. Williams v. Bunker, S. C. Me., Sept. 23, 1886; 7 East. Rep. 249. 30. TROVER-Sheriff - Pleading — Attachment.—In an action of trover against a sheriff for seizing under attachment the property of plaintiff for the debt of a third person, where the defense was that plaintiff's title was fraudulent as to the creditors of the attachment debtor, the embarrassed circumstances of the attachment debtor may be shown as a material circumstance tending to sustain the defense. Where, in such action, the pleadings of defendant contain the substance of the general issue and a good notice that he intends to prove plaintiff was not the owner of the property at the time of its seizure, they are sufficient. Where the person making the affidavit for the writ of attachment avers that she is the agent of the party suing out the writ, it is a sufficient averment of ageney. That a bond filed for an attachment was defective is not an objection which goes to the jurisdiction, as a new bond could have been filed. Testimony as to transactions between the parties to the alleged fraudulent transfers, involving an investigation of facts and circumstances which would tend to show whether or not the attachment debtor was acting as owner or as agent of the property, was properly admitted. Adams v. Kellogg, S. C. Mich; 5 W. Rep. 722. 31. TRUST FOR CHILDREN-Default of Appointment-Class When to be Ascertained.-By her will E H in exercise of power to appoint amongst her children or remoter issue given to her by the will of M H directed her trustees to pay the income of a certain trust fund to such child or children of hers as should survive her, during their lives, in equal shares if more than one, and in case of the death of any of her children in her lifetime, or afterwards, she directed that the issue of such child, or any one or more of them, should take his, or her, or their parents' share, in such shares and proportions of his, her, or their parents should by will appoint; in default of such appointment such issue to take equally as tenants in common. E H had several children, all of whom were born in the lifetime of M H and all of whom were born in the lifetime of MH and all of whom survived E H. Some of these children were now dead, without having exercised the power of appointment given by the will of E H. They had children, of whom some predeceased and others survived their parents. Held, that the persons to take in default of appointment by the children of E H were all the children of such children, whether they survived their parents or not.-Re Hutchinson; Alexander v. Jolley, Eng. Ct. Appl; 55 Law Times Rep. 527. 33. WAYS Of Necessity Grantor May Designate Private-By Prescription Evidence Grantor's Declaration. In case of a grant of land which is inclosed by other land of the grantor, a right of way by necessity arises, but the grantor has the right to designate the way to be pursued. He may designate a new way in preference to one already in use, and in such case a subsequent purchaser of his remaining land takes the same subject to such right of way. The use and enjoyment of a right of private way across the land of another for five years is sufficient to create a right of way by prescription, provided the user is under claim of right, is continuous, uninterrupted and exclusive, and within the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner. In case of a dispute concerning the existence and location of a right of way claimed by plaintiff as a of necessity, the declarations of the original owner of both plaintiff's and defendant's lands, who designated the way to be used at the time of his conveyance to plaintiff, are admissible. Kripp v. Curtis, S. C. Cal.. Sept. 22, 1886; 11 Pac. Rep. 879. 34. WILL-Charge on Land-Legacy.-A testator directed his executor to satisfy and pay his just debts, etc., out of his "estate," and gave and bequeathed to K $200, which he directed his executor to pay out of his "estate." Testator then gave, devised, and bequeathed all the rest, residue, and remainder of his estate, real, personal, and mixed, to his niece, J C. Held, that the real estate was given to J C. unconditionally, and was not charged with payment of the legacy to K. White v, Kauffmun, Md. Ct. App., Oct. 3, 1886; 5 Alt. Rep. 865: 35.- Construction-" Death Without Issue "--Conditional Limitation.-Where land was devised to one, and if he died without issue, then to certain others, subject to the proviso that certain legacies should be paid by the primary devisee, and by a subsequent clause in the will it was provided that, if the primary devisees should die before the provisions of the will became an act, then the devisees over should perform all the conditions as to the payment of legacies required of the primary devjsee, held, that the words "death without issue" referred to the death of the primary devisee at any time, and not merely to his death in the lifetime of the testator, and that the primary devisee took a fee subject to a conditional limitation. Vanderzee v. Haswell, N. Y. Ct. App., Oct. 5, 1886; 8 N. E. 247. 36. Contest Evidence Remarks of Contestunt-Undue Influence-Circumstantial Evidence Trial--Order of Evidence -- ObjectionCompetency for Two Purposes.--In a will contest a remark made by one of the beneficiaries, who was also a witness in the case soon after the date of the will, that he and Aunt Fanny had got the will fixed as they wanted it, and other similar remarks, admissible in evidence, both as admissions by a party in interest, and also to contradict his testimony that he used no undue influence, and cannot, therefore, be excluded on the ground that other beneficiaries under the will should not be affected by his admissions. Undue influence may be found from all the facts and circumstances surrounding a case, even if there is no direct and positive evidence. If evidence which would be competent, both as an admission of a party in interest and as a contradiction of that party's testimony, is admiited, no objection being made at the time, before 37. 38. the party in question has testified, and afterwards counsel ask the court to charge that the testimony is inadmissible, but the court charges that it is admissible as a contradiction of the party's testimony, there is no error. Saunders' Appeal, S. C. Conn., June 18, 1886; 6 Atl. Rep., 193. tions - Provision for Maintenance Rights of Widow-Rights of Children-Statute of Limita· Devise -- Pleadings -- Devisees -- Action to Set Aside Sale.-Where a testator devises land to his widow for the support of herself and family, and to be divided between their children at her discretion, (naming them), the children have a present interest in the same; and, where the widow makes a sale, they are entitled to an immediate right of action, not only against the widow, but against the purchaser also, to have the sale set aside, and the land restored to them, for the purposes for which it was intended. Where land is devised by a testator to his widow for the support of the family, and to be divided between their children at her discretion, and the widow makes a sale of it, the right of action which accrues to the children immediately after the sale, to have the same set aside, and the land restored to them for their support, is absolutely barred by the lapse of thirty years. Where a petition is filed by the devisees of a testator to have a sale set aside, made by the widow, who is also a devisee under the will, and the petition shows that the action is barred, and that they are not within any exceptions of the statute saving their rights thereto, the rule requiring the statute to be pleaded in cases where it is sought to be availed of does not apply. Stillwell v. Leavy, Ky. Ct. Appls., Oct. 21, 1886; 1 S. W. Rep. 590. -- Testator Witnesses Publication Imperfect Declarations · Sufficiency of, when Proof- Construction Description of Gift Where Words Sufficiently Definite. testator cannot speak at all, or only with difficulty, he may communicate his knowledge by signs or by words, unintelligible to some listeners: but if he does it in a manner capable of conveying to the minds of the witnesses his own present consciousness that the paper being executed is a will, it is a substantial and sufficient compliance with the provisions of the statute of wills requir ing a publication at the time of the testamentary act. While the imperfect and indefinite declarations of a testator cannot be made sufficient by proof of a previous conversation with the subscribing witnesses not connected with the factum by the words of publication used, yet, if they are so connected by the very language of the testator, at the time of execution, as to make them an essential part of the communication he has made, they are sufficient proof of the due publication of the will. The words of a testator in his will, "I leave and bequeath to my niece *** all the money I die possessed of in several banks and bonds, besides all I bequeathed to her in my former will," are sufficiently definite and certain to transfer to the niece whatever money the testator had at his death, which was on deposit or stood to his credit in any banks, or was invested in and represented by bonds. In re Will of Beckett, N. Y. Ct. Appls., Oct. 5, 1886; 8 N. E. Rep. 506. tion.-Where a testator left $100 to each of his six daughters, excepting two of them, one of whom had already received that amount, and the other of whom had received $60, and was to have $40 more, and it appeared that prior to the date of the will he contemplated giving $100 to one of the four by crediting her and her husband with that amount in a sale of land to them, the deed to be in the wife's name, but the husband then refused to accept such a deed, the fact that the deed was accepted by them after the making of the will should not preclude such dnughter from receiving her legacy. Upon a proceeding in equity against heirs to subject certain land devised to the payment of legacies, which, by the terms of the will, are to be charged upon the land devised only in case there is not sufficient undevised land to pay the same, if the defendants seek, by cross-petition, to have certain other land, held adversely by petitioner, surrendered as part of the estate, the burden is on them to show title in themselves or their ancestors. Davis v. Justice, Ky. Ct. Appls., Sept. 18, 1886; 1 S. W. Rep., 588. 40. WITNESS-Competency-Child.-Where it appears to the presiding judge that a child, offered as a witness, does not sufficiently understand the nature and obligations of an oath, he may permit the child to be properly instructed, if of sufficient age and intellect to receive instruction. If the judge find the witness competent, it is no objection that she has been instructed by a Christian minister since the last adjournment of the court. The court cannot be called upon to express its opinion to the jury as to whether the testimony of a witnees is contradictory and conflicting. Where the court has fully and properly instructed the jury upon a a point, further instruction may be refused. On the trial of an indictment for incest by a father upon a daughter, the testimony of medical experts as to the daughter's condition soon after the commission of ihe offense is admissible. Commonwealth v. Lynes, S. S. C. Mass., Oct. 22, 1886; 3 N. Eng. Rep. 89. RECENT PUBLICATIONS. THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE-together with the Rules of the Common Law and the Regulations of Particular Statutes Governing the Relations of Husband and Wife,and Parents and Child, throughout the United States. And the Law suspecting the Dissolution of Marriages and the Granting of Divorces. By Maxwell Brothers' Counselors at Law. New York; L. 7 E. Strouse & Co., Law Publishers, 1886. This is a very small book (114 pages,) on a very large subject. It of course makes no pretention to be exhaustive, nor is it addressed exclusively to the legal profession. The authors say in their preface: "The purpose of this little work is to furn ish a brief statement, in convenient form, of the leading principles which govern the relations growing out of the marriage union, and is addressed alike to the legal profession and to the general reader who may find in its pages the answer to such questions respecting the reciprocal rights and obligations of husband and wife and parent and child, and questions touching the severance of those relations, as most commonly and frequently arise in every-day experience." The book is well written and well arranged. There are six chapters, each divided into suitable sections; and as far as it goes, and for the purposes which it is designed to accomplish is, in all respects, well executed. It is a matter of question with us, however, whether these little compendiums are of any value to the profession or to the general reader either. They are not sufficiently full for the lawyer who most needs resort to the regular text-books, digests and reports. As to the general reader we apprehend that, notwithstanding its lucidity, this work, like others of its class, will prove misleading. The conciseness necessary in so short a book has prevented the authors from noting many dif ferences and distinctions that may be material in questions investigated by the amatuer, whose want of praetice in such matters might well superinduce error. JETSAM AND FLOTSAM. AN OCULIST'S TEST. In a large factory in which were employed several hundred persons, one of the workmen, in wielding his hammer carelessly allowed it to slip from his hand. It flew half way across the room, and struck a fellowworkman in the left eye. The man averred that his eye was blinded by the blow although a careful examination failed to reveal any injury, there being not a scratch visible. He brought a suit for compensation for the loss of half of his eyesight, and refused all offers of compromise. The day of the trial arrived, and in open court an eminent oculist retained by the defence examined the alleged injured member, and gave it as his opinion that it was as good as the right eye. Upon the plaintiff's loud protest of his inability to see with his left eye, the oculist proved him a perjurer, and satisfied the court and jury of the falsity of his claim. And how do you suppose he did it? Why, simply by knowing that the colours green and red combined make black. He procured a black card on which a few words were written with green ink. Then the plaintiff was ordered to put on a pair of spectacles with two different glasses, the one for the right eye being red and the one for the left eye consisting of ordinary glass. Then the card was handed him, and he was ordered to read the writing on it. This he did without hesitation, and the cheat was at once exposed. The sound right eye, fitted with the red glass, was unable to distinguish the green writing on the black surface of the card, while the left eye, which he pretended was sightless, was the one with which the reading had to be done. RECENTLY in Kern county, California, a man charged with murder was held by the superior court in $500 bail. A few days after a prisoner was before a justice, charged with stealing a suit of clothes. He was held to answer, and when the question of bail came up the justice said, after figuring awhile: "The judge of the superior court releases a man who is charged with murder on $500 bail. I think, after comparing the degrees of crime, I will give you a chromo and let you go. |