per oz. to 5s. 6d. With these favourable prospects, he thought he should not be presuming too much in anticipating such a favourable change by July, 1816, as would ensure a return to the old currency of the country. He held an account in his hand which would shew the enormous expenditure of specie, which within the last few years had been made on the continent by this country. In 1811, the foreign payments were 15,182,000l.; in 1812, 18,533,000l.; in 1813, 22,931,000l. and in 1814, 31,284,000l. In the face of such an expenditure he thought it was not extraordinary that restrictions should be placed on the cash-payments of the Bank, but now that they might be considered as in a great measure stopped, if no new cause should occur to render their continuance necessary, it was but natural to suppose that these sums would revert to their old channel; and if this should be the case, there was no doubt that, by the period he had fixed, the Bank would resume its payments in specie. Mr. Frankland Lewis contended, that the conclusions to which the bullion committee had come, had been fully verified by every circumstance which had since occurred. When the resolutions of that committee were submitted to the House, it was contended that the depreciation which was asserted to exist, arose only from temporary causes, and would be removed with the return of peace. At this moment the country was in a state of peace, and yet the same evils still existed. He contended, that the facts by no means bore out the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his assertion, that the foreign expenditure of the country was the cause of the disadvantages under which this country laboured with respect to the exchanges; there was only one or two shillings difference between the price of specie now and at the time the celebrated report of the bullion committee was made. When he heard of the immense foreign expenditure, he could not conceive how our keeping an army of 38,000 men in Belgium could materially affect the exchanges, in a year when it was stated that our exports were vastly greater than they had been in any former year. In the year 1795, when the duke of York was in Holland with a much larger army, that circumstance did not produce such an unfavourable effect on our exchanges. He had heard of the large exportation of gold in order to pay for foreign corn. He could not conceive why (VOL. XXIX.) An corn was necessarily to be paid for in gold more than any other article imported : but, at all events, the quantity of corn imported into this country last year, was not more than a third part of what had been imported in some former years. As long as the currency was in a sound state, he maintained that there would be no difference between the price of specie in circu lation and in the market. It had been said that the rise in the value of bullion bad taken place all over Europe; but this was not true, since in France there had never been any difference between the mint and the market price of gold. He agreed that the issues of the Bank, considering the unlimited powers they possessed, had been very moderate; and although inquiry was necessary, he looked with perfect confidence to the capability of the Bank at any time to resume its cash-payments. inquiry was necessary, because he thought the explanations attempted by the other side of the House had failed. He reprobated temporary measures, like the present; and argued that the foreign exchanges were taken at a false par, and that consequently when they appeared against us they were in truth in our favour. It was now said that the Bank was to renew cash payments in July 1816; but would the Chancellor of the Exchequer take upon himself to assert that no new prohibitory Bill would be offered, for which no new excuse would be assigned? It might, perhaps, then be urged that the remittances to absentees on the continent were so extensive as to turn the exchange against us, and that consequently the time was not yet arrived when the Bank could pay in specie. It was plain that there was some radical error, which wanted correction, and it was fit that a committee should ascertain where it lay. A longer delay of such an inquiry could produce no good, and might be attended with very serious consequences. Mr. Rose differed entirely from the hon. gentleman who had last spoken. He thought (although he admitted that he had not heard the speech of the noble lord who introduced the subject) that he had never heard a committee moved for on se slight grounds. It had been generally admitted that the Bank was no party to the act of the Government for restraining the cash payments. He knew that, in point of fact, they were not aware of the measure until two days before it took place. It had appeared, on the examination of the (4 G) for the circumstances already stated, the exchanges must have been still more in our favour; but, at the same time, it appeared to him the most visionary thing in the world, for any man to suppose there was a possibility of resuming cash payments, until the market price of gold was as low as the Mint price. affairs of the Bank at that time, that their property amounted to 16 millions sterling, exclusive of the debt then due to them by government. When the great profits which the Bank had made since the Restriction Act were taken into consideration, there could be no doubt but that their solidity was at least as great now as it had been then. He believed that the price of Mr. Horner thought that the right hon. bullion was now 41. 9s. while the Mint gentleman had even exceeded himself, in price, or, as he might say, the Bank price saying that there were very slight grounds was 31. 17s. It was, therefore, perfectly for the present motion. He considered clear and evident, that while there was that if there had been no grounds at all such a difference, it would be quite useless stated by gentlemen of that side of the for the Bank to issue gold. As fast as they House, still there ought to be an incould coin it, people who dealt in that quiry such as was proposed. It was the article would melt it down, and none of it ministers who brought forward a bill for could continue in circulation. He really continuing the restriction. It therefore could not conceive what the gentlemen rested with them to come down to the on the other side proposed to themselves. House, and state the reasons and the cirIf they were asked, did they doubt the cumstances which made it necessary. The solvency of the Bank, they answered, No. right hon. gentleman, however, who spoke They, however, said, that when the re- last, had cut the matter very short. He striction was first imposed, the country said that circumstances were now the was under peculiar circumstances. Did same as when the restriction was first imnot the same circumstances exist now? posed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and would not the reason of the restriction had, however, held forth a promise of a continue as long as the market price of speedy resumption of cash payments. This gold was higher than the Mint price? promise was no more definite than former The whole increase of the issue of Bank promises of the like nature; and although of England notes, since the Restriction Act he did not question his sincerity, he could was passed, was but about 12 millions. not avoid thinking him too sanguine. He When it was considered that before that must say that he could entertain no such time, there were 44 millions of gold in hope. He had no doubt but when the circulation, it was really wonderful with period should arrive which had been menhow small an increase of issues the wants tioned by the Chancellor of the Excheof the country had been supplied. As for quer, there would be found new ways of gold being in abundance in France while accounting for the exchanges not having there was a scarcity here, it must be re- risen up to his present expectations. He collected that it was not by the rate of was of opinion, that time ought to be given exchanges, but by plunder and rapine that to the Bank to prepare for resuming its France had got her gold. When the cash payments; but he at the same time French laid an enormous military contri-thought, that notice should be given to bution on a country, they were generally content to take half the sum, if it was paid in gold. In considering the out-goings of this country, besides what had been stated as its foreign expenditure, there were very large sums drawn out of it by our absentees, who were now amusing themselves on the continent. This sum was much larger than would generally be supposed. The importation of corn had been considerably more than two millions sterling. There was also a million of dollars sent monthly to Portugal, in pay ment of an old debt. Under all these circumstances, he was astonished that the exchanges were as favourable as they now were. He thought, that if it had not been He them to make this preparation. thought that there could be no safety for public credit, until the Bank, at least, took some steps towards resuming their payments. The right hon. gentleman's expectation appeared to him neither founded on, nor warranted by experience. Other countries had tried the effects of a forced paper circulation in their difficulties, and had met only with ill success and great discredit, whilst others had carried on long and extensive wars without having recourse to such an expedient. Undoubtedly the evil resulting to France from her excessive issue of assignats, was greater in degree than ours; but then it differed only in degree, and not in kind. Since that period, object of inquiry was as to the extent of the profits made by the Bank since the period of the restriction. The right hon. gentleman had stated that these profits' might have been as large if the restriction had not taken place, because the securities of government were so low, that any man might have made 15 per cent., and the Bank being large holders, must have gained in that proportion. But the real profits arising from the restriction, could not be measured this way; they must be measured by the permanent excess of its issues since the removal of all legal limitation upon those issues. Our actual currency since the year 1797, had been nothing else than a forced government paper, the profits of which redounded not to government, but to the Bank. To put a case, Government issues 10 millions of Exchequer bills, on which the Bank accommodates them with an immediate advance of its notes, and receives from them an interest of 5 per cent. on the same. Now this advance would be very liberal on the part of the Bank, if these notes thus advanced to the aid of government were payable on demand in gold. As the case stood, however, the only expense incurred by the Bank, was the paper of which the notes were made, and the cost of the engraving. If 10 millions of one kind of paper were thus furnished in exchange for 10 millions of another kind, and interest upon this sum was paid to the Bank, what was this but a circuitous way of forcing the circulation of a government paper, the profits of which accrued to the Bank alone? Was this a subject on which the House ought to receive no information, except what the Chancellor of the Exchequer should think it right to communicate? The right hon. gentleman had referred to the bullion question, as one that had now become matter rather of fact than of opinion; and this observation, from views no doubt equally profound, had been repeated by the right hon. gentleman who spoke last. For his own part, he remained as firm as ever in his original conviction. He had not been inattentive to the subsequent course of events, and had perceived amongst them many new and curious illustrations of the cur rency and the commerce of Europe. Instead, however, of producing any alter ation in the doctrines maintained on that side of the House, they had served to strengthen and confirm them in his mind in every respect. The great principle on too, France had got a metallic currency; and the right hon. gentleman conceived that he had fully_accounted for this, by attributing it to French conquest and French plunder. But the question was not how it came into France, but how it remained there. The internal laws and policy of a state maintained a money circulation, quite independently of the means by which it was procured. France, with armies running almost to every extremity of the world, had regained a metallic currency, much more abundant than she had ever had before, and much larger than was necessary to a thriving and prosperous community. He regarded it as a proof of real impoverishment, and of the absence of credit, in that country. If he had ever been supposed to entertain an opinion that a currency, exclusively metallic, was a desirable regulation, he had been much misunderstood. He wished to see as much paper as possible in circulation, and the more the better, provided it was at all times convertible into the standard currency of the realm. The right hon. gen. tleman had talked of Jew brokers in a way that he did not very well understand. Was it meant for the purpose of affixing a stigma on their religion? or was it meant that information which could be procured from them alone, ought not to be received by a parliamentary committee appointed to inquire into the subject? When sir Isaac Newton, as master of the Mint, drew up his celebrated report on the state of the different currencies of Europe-that report, which was now a sort of text authority on the principles of circulation-he presumed he was in a great measure founded on the information derived from persons of this description. One of the points that seemed to him most to call for examination, related to the manner in which the Bank had discharged that indispensable duty to the public, of keeping a sufficient treasure in their coffers to meet the future demands upon them, since the year 1797, or rather since 1795. This was a topic on which he knew some ingenious guesses had been made, but it was one on which accurate information was extremely desirable. The situation of a Bank director was one of arduous duties; duties which required for their discharge, not only as much integrity as was possessed by the present directors, but more enlarged views of the true principles of commerce and credit than was evinced by the directors of 1810. Another serious ciated state; a state, the evils of which were too manifest to be denied, and were equally injurious to the public creditor, by diminishing the value of his dividend, and to the private creditor the value of his legal claim. Its effects on public credit, and on our financial situation, would lead him into too wide a field of discussion; but it appeared to him to be incontrovertible, that this evil, excited in consequence of an excess ive issue of Bank paper, is, that the government were not duly vigilant over those issues, and that the renewal of the restriction should not be granted without a declaration that the parliament and the country expected that immediate measures would be taken by the Bank to resume their cash payments. which he had always rested the question | currency was in an artificial and deprewas, that so long as the standard currency of a country remained unvaried, however that standard might be expressed, no change in its real value could affect its relative value to other commodities. When ever depreciation had once begun, then it was possible for commercial or other circumstances to affect the value of gold; but he had never supposed that when gold was at 5. 11s. or, as it had once been, at 51. 14s., that this rise was solely attributable to an excess of paper circulation, or that the apparent depreciation was the true measure of the excess in the issues of the Bank. What he conceived to be the true solution of the difficulty was, that a depreciation having taken place from excess, an opening had been made for the operation of other causes, which were now in a great measure removed. These causes were the occupation of commercial countries by immense armies, the consequent distress and discredit, together with the greatly augmented remittances made from one part of Europe to another. The effect produced by the change of circumstances was to bring back the price of gold to between 47. 9s. and 47. 11s.; precisely what it was in 1810. The exchanges now, though really in our favour, were nominally against us 8 or 9 per cent.; and here he begged to ask, could this appearance be explained, but in a depreciation in the value of our domestic currency? The extraordinary circumstance adverted to, of the price of gold falling in the course of last year to 41. 4s. he ascribed to the then situation of the armies in the North, by which great quantities of bullion were driven in the direction of this country. It happened, too, at the same time, that many of the country banks failed, a circumstance which necessarily operated to induce the Bank to diminish their issues. This was a measure that raised the real value of their paper in the same propor tion. He believed, also, that there had been a rise in the real price of gold,-he meant as measured by other commodities in some of the countries of Europe. This he partly attributed to the effects of war destroying the settled habits of commercial credit, and partly to an interruption in the working of the mines produced by the disturbances of South America. He had reason to believe that from Mexico the supplies were much less abundant than usual. His conclusion was, upon the whole review of this question, that our Mr. Marryatt concurred with a right. hon. gentleman that the restriction ought to be looked on as the act of the legisla ture alone. It was the effect, however, and not the object of the restriction that was now under consideration; and be contended, that the Bank ought no longer to be allowed the possession of such enormous profits, without a participation on the part of the public. The circulation of the Bank previous to the restriction was between 11 and 13 millions; in the year of the restriction it was about eight, and it was now 31 millions. Taking the subsequent increase of their issues at 18 mil. lions, here was in the interest upon that sum, a clear additional annual profit of 900,000l. To this were to be added, the different bonuses they had distributed, and an increase of 11 per cent. on their dividends from other causes. The public interest did not require that the Bank should receive interest upon exchequer bills, nor commercial credit require that the discounts of the Bank should have been increased seven-fold since they ceased to pay in specie. Before the year 1797, it was a regulation of the Bank not to open any discount account with the London bankers. Since that period, this rule had been abandoned, and the consequence was, that most of the London bankers being the correspondents of bankers in the country, the paper of the latter became convertible at all times into paper of the bank of England. Country bankers had, accordingly, sprung up like mushrooms, and, as too many knew to their cost, had been as ephemeral in their duration. The operation of this unfortunate system had been to create a rage for mer cantile speculation, and to raise the price of all commodities in this country. A right hon. gentleman, whom he was glad now to see on the Treasury-bench (Mr. Huskisson), had calculated the rise of prices to be 15 per cent., and had stated it to have been, at the time of this calculation, still increasing. This, then, was a heavier tax than that upon property. The latter produced 14 millions; the former cost the Country 20 millions, and he feared was likely to do so to the end of time. We appeared to him to be in a constant state of vacillation between the buoyancy of our exports, and the depression of our domestic currency. If a person were to go to Paris, and carry with him, as he probably would, a few light guineas, he might procure for each 26 livres 2 sous, which would be an exchange in his favour. Let him buy a bill with his Bank notes, and he would get but 22 livres for his pound, an exchange considerably against him. Such was the difference between London and Paris in the real and the nominal exchange, or between French and English gold on the one hand, and French gold and English paper on the other. The hon. member lamented the minister's dependence upon the Bank; which dependence could not be denied, for according to the words of the wisest man, "the borrower is always the slave of the lender." This dependence he also deprecated the more, because he conceived it seriously prejudicial to the public service. He would vote for the appointment of the committee, in order to ascertain the conditions upon which the Bank directors were willing to resume their payments in cash, as well as upon what grounds the present measure was thought necessary. An explanation of these points was required to satisfy the public. Mr. Tierney began by observing, that a sort of understanding appeared to prevail between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Huskisson), that the one should not say a word about the state of our currency, and that the other should not touch upon the sinking fund. Upon that understanding, however, he should not dwell, but advert to the question before the House. His motive for supporting an inquiry was, he declared, with a view to ascertain the state of things in which it was contemplated that the Bank was likely to resume pay ments in cash, or the grounds upon which the Chancellor of the Exchequer calcu lated that such resumption would take place at the period mentioned in the Bill before the House. If the Bank were likely to resume its cash payments, even at the period alluded to, namely, in July 1816, he was ready to state that he, for one, should rest satisfied. But he could not entertain such a hope he felt convinced, that he should never live to see that event; on the contrary, he fully believed, that as long as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Bank could contrive to agree, the restriction was likely to continue. The House, then, he thought, was bound to inquire into the subject, in order to ascertain how the affairs of the Bank stood, and when the public could look for the gratification of their wishes, in the restoration of a sound currency for the payment of their just claims. The Bank directors always stated, that they were de sirous to resume their cash payments-that they were anxious, truly, for the removal of the restriction; but yet he must say, that he never saw a body of men so patient under restriction as those hon. gentlemen appeared to be, [a laugh!]; for they uniformly opposed every proposition of inquiry, and every measure taken in order to remove that restriction. Such opposition, then, seemed to cast some suspicion upon the sincerity of these gentlemen. The right hon. gentleman reviewed the history of the Bank since the commencement of the restriction in 1797, and thence concluded that the Bank directors were not willing to resume cash payments, because the restriction was found more conducive to their interests. But from the present system of our finances, and the connexion between the Bank and the Treasury, he thought it impossible for the Bank to make its cash payments for a very considerable period, especially after the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that it would require four years to wind up our expenses; for the advances of the Bank to Government in the purchase of Exchequer-bills, &c. with the usual leger-de-main, would be demanded, at least for that period. Of the details of these transactions the House had received an ample and able detail from an hon. gentleman (Mr. F. Lewis); and from these details it was evident, that to all intents and purposes, the Bank had become the master of the minister. This assertion he defied any man to deny; and it imperiously called for the interposition of parliament, because such a state of things was incon |