confined in the Connecticut Hospital, the balance should be applied to the support of insane indigent residents of that town confined in the Norwich Hospital or any other institution or place, and that, if such income should not then be exhausted, any balance should be appropriated and expended for the support of insane paupers belonging to and having a legal residence in Hamden.

In view of these claims this complaint has been brought to the superior court by the present trustees for its advice in answer to the five following questions, to wit:

PRENTICE, J. George Atwater of Hamden made his last will October 26, 1867, and died a short time thereafter. By his will he directed trustees thereunder to convey the residue of his estate after the termination of two lives, to the persons who at the time of such conveyance should constitute the board of trustees of the General Hospital for the Insane of the state of Connecticut, located at Middletown, in trust. The trust was expressed in the following language: "The said Trustees of The General Hospital for the Insane of the State of Connecticut shall reserve the whole amount received from my estate as a separate fund (to be known as the Atwater Fund) for the benefit of the insane poor of the state of Connecticut and shall have the right to appropriate and expend the annual income of the fund for the support of indigent insane persons, giving preference to indigent insane persons, if any such there "(b) Have the said trustees the right to apmay be, belonging to and having legal resi-propriate and expend any portion of the andence in my native town of Hamden, but the nual income of said fund for the support said trustees shall not appropriate or expend of indigent insane persons belonging to and the principal of the fund." having legal residence in said town of Hamden who are confined at the Norwich Hospital for the Insane, or any institution or place other than said hospital at Middletown?

January 26, 1886, this residue, then amounting to $23,975.81, was, pursuant to the terms of the will, turned over to the then trustees of said institution, and the trustees thereof for the time being have ever since continued to administer the trust created by the will. The name of the institution was in 1874 changed by substituting the word "Connecticut" for the word "General." Special Laws of 1874 (volume 7) p. 821. It will hereinafter, for brevity's sake, be referred to as the Connecticut Hospital, as will the similar institution, quite recently organized and located at Norwich, be designated as the Norwich Hospital. The trustees, by the advice of counsel, have declined to appropriate and expend any of the income of the fund for the support of paupers, whether residents of the town of Hamden, or of any other town, or for the support of insane persons confined as indigents in the Norwich Hospital, or in any other institution or place even though they were legal residents of Hamden. In making expenditures of the income they have confined it to the support of persons committed to the Connecticut Hospital, giving preference to those of its inmates who were legal residents of Hamden, and had been committed as indigents. In this way the greater portion of the income has been expended. But when some portion remained after all those of the class last described had been provided for, the trustees have from time to time appropriated from such balance sums for the support of indigent persons committed to said institution who had no legal residence in Hamden.

Claim is now made on behalf of that town that the language defining the trust requires of the trustees different action on their part in this, that if the entire income of the fund should not at any time be appropriated for the support of indigent residents of Hamden

"(a) Have said trustees the right to appropriate and expend any part of the annual income of the fund created by said clause of said will for the support of insane paupers, as distinguished from indigent insane persons, belonging to and having legal residence in said town of Hamden?

"(c) Is it the duty of said trustees to appropriate and expend any portion of the annual income of said fund for paupers belonging to and having legal residence in said town of Hamden when the number of indigent insane persons confined in said hospital is insufficient to exhaust the entire annual income of said fund?

"(d) Is it the duty of said trustees to appropriate and expend any portion of the annual income of said fund for the support of insane paupers belonging to and having legal residence in said town of Hamden when the number of indigent insane persons confined in the said Hospital for the Insane at Middletown, or in the Norwich Hospital for the Insane, or in any institution or place other . than said hospital at Middletown is insufficient to exhaust the annual income?

"(e) Have the said trustees the right in any case to appropriate and expend any portion of said annual income for the support of insane paupers, whether belonging to and having legal residence in said town of Hamden or not?"

It will be noted that four of these questions gather about a single general one-as to the right of the trustees to expend any part of the income of the fund in the support of insane paupers chargeable to the town of Hamden. The third and fourth on the list admit of a construction which manifestly was not intended. Thus construed, they reach out to situations which are so clearly beyond the range of present possibility that it is not conceivable that advice pertinent to them is desired. One thus construed is sufficiently broad to include a situation where the number of indigents confined in

lined the policy of the state in respect to the institution. It dealt, among other things, with the subjects of commitment and support. The regulations thus adopted divided its inmates into two entirely distinct classes, and made different provisions as to each. One class was made to consist of insane paupers. Proceedings for their commitment were to be begun by the first selectman of the town, and the town of the inmate's legal

the Connecticut Hospital was insufficient to exhaust the income of the fund in their support; while the other would carry the situation to the further extent of assuming that the number of indigent insane, whether confined at Middletown, Norwich, or elsewhere, was insufficient to use up the income of this fund of less than $25,000. It is evident that the language of the two questions was used with reference to no such situation, but to define one where the support of indigent in- | residence was made chargeable with one half sane residents of Hamden confined in the Connecticut Hospital, in the one case, and there or elsewhere, in the other, did not exhaust the current income. Our advice to the superior court is given to the questions thus restricted in their scope. We are thus excused from determining the question of possible academic interest as to what the duty of the trustees would be if there were no other persons than paupers who could receive support from this income.

[1] The term "pauper" has a distinct and well-defined meaning in our law. It is used to designate those persons whose support imposes a burden upon the public treasury. One may be ever so destitute of estate or ability to earn a livelihood, and yet not be a pauper. He may be cared for by the voluntary action of friends or relatives. The duty to care for him may by law be cast upon relatives. He becomes a member of the pauper class only when, other means of support failing, he becomes a public charge. This has long been sơ. General Statutes 1821, p. 369.

of the cost of support, the state paying the other half. The other class was made up of persons described as persons in indigent circumstances, not paupers, who had become insane. Proceedings for the commitment of such persons might be made by any one, and the one-half of the cost of support not borne by the state was chargeable to the person making the application. Public Acts of 1867, p. 118 et seq.

Mr. Atwater made his will three months after this act went into effect. It is evident that he was fully informed of the act of 1866 (Laws 1866, c. 37) establishing the hospital. His strictly accurate use of its somewhat elongated name, and his selection of its governing board, correctly described as trustees, to execute his trust sufficiently attest this. It is evident that he had followed the history of the proposed enterprise, since he was able to describe its chosen location. That he knew of the passage of the act of 1867, and its provisions, is also apparent, else how came he by the knowledge that its scheme contemplated the care of in[2, 3] The term "indigent," on the other digents? Clearly he was deeply interested hand, is one which in its common accepta- in the subject of the care of the insane poor, tion is used with more direct and single ref- and we must conclude that when he gave erence to financial ability and resources. It his thought to his testamentary provisions is ordinarily used to indicate one who is he knew what the state had done and condestitute of property or means of comfortable templated doing at the institution at Middlesubsistence, and for that reason is needy town. These facts and the significant seor in want. Webster's New International quence of the dates upon which the act was Dictionary. As thus used, a pauper certain-approved and his will executed, together with ly fully supplies the conditions. But words oftentimes come to have a meaning in certain relations or as applied to certain conditions other than their ordinary meaning, and when so used they are to be construed accordingly in order that the intention of the user may be effectuated.

Statutory provision for the public care of insane paupers has existed in this state ever since 1699 at least. Col. Rec. 1689-1706, p. 285. Prior to 1866, however, there was no state institution in which they might be cared for. In that year the institution of which the plaintiffs are the trustees was established, and its government placed in the hands of a board of trustees. No provision was made for commitment thereto or support therein, but the preamble of the act plainly indicates that it was designed as a place for the care of the insane of the state, including paupers. The following General Assembly, by an act which was approved and

his use in his will of descriptive language similar to that contained in the act, combine to create an inference well-nigh irresistible that he was familiar with the policy of the state embodied in the act of 1867, and continued in substance to this day, of treating paupers and indigents not paupers as belonging to entirely separate classes subject to separate treatment, and that he formulated the language of his will in recognition of that policy and the distinction which it established.

[4] We, therefore, conclude that when he made provision for insane indigents he used his language in the sense indicated by the statute, and intended thereby to confine the class of persons who were to be the beneficiaries of his bounty to insane indigents who were not paupers, and to exclude paupers, the burden of whose support rested upon the public and in no measure upon individuals.

the right in the due execution of their trust | when plaintiff's grantor received her deed from to make expenditures for the support of in- the true owner, was admissible under a general sane indigents confined in the Norwich Hospital. Hayden v. Connecticut, 64 Conn. 320, 324, 30 Atl. 50. We are able to anticipate no other conditions in which that would be true.

ting court, in the event that the Connecticut Hospital was unable to receive additional inmates, might commit to other institutions. To establish ownership in land, a chain of General Statutes, § 2742. In 1905, following deeds must connect back to some one as a the establishment of the Norwich Hospital, source of title, who at the time of the conveythis provision was dropped, and that already hence a chain of deeds beginning with an ownance was the owner of the land conveyed; and quoted contemplating the commitment of in- er, who at one time was in possession, and comdigents to one of the state institutions, adopt-ing down regularly to the present claimant es ed. Public Acts of 1905, c. 196, § 4. Trans- tablished a prima facie claim. fers to state institutions of persons originally

ORDS.

In ejectment, a city map, made from surveys between 1872 and 1876, was introduced in evidence. Field notes of that survey coming from the proper source were introduced in evidence. They were contained in a small book, marked "Weld No. 1," and testimony was offered to show that Mr. Weld, now dead, was city engineer from 1872 to 1876. The book was found in the custody of the city engineer, but bore no date. Held, that it was sufficiently identified to be introduced in evidence, though, had it contained a date, it might have been introduced 'without identification.

10. EVIDENCE (§ 372*) — DOCUMENTARY EVI-| consider that the plaintiff has made out a DENCE-PUBLIC DOCUMENTS-ANCIENT REC- prima facie case; that is, such a state of facts as would entitle him to recover, if the defendant had offered no evidence to sustain his defenses." The defendant excepts to this, in the first place, as changing the burden of proof and imposing upon him the burden of overthrowing the title thus established. Read by itself, it is open to this criticism. The court was speaking after the case was closed and all the evidence was in, and the question for the jury was not, whether at the close of the plaintiff's case in chief he had made out a prima facie case, but whether upon the entire evidence he had made out a case.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1613-1627: Dec. Dig. § 372.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Gardiner Greene, Judge.

Action in the nature of ejectment by Charles C. Stevens against John Smoker. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. No error.

[2] The defendant had offered evidence tending to show title by adverse possession in Mrs. Howard, and that she was in possession of the land in dispute, claiming title, at the time Mrs. Stevens received her deed from

Walter J. Walsh, for appellant. John El- the husband's trustees in bankruptcy, and at liott and Frank S. Bishop, for appellee.

the time she conveyed the parcel to Mrs. Hull. This evidence could have been offered without pleading the special defense. Practice Book 1908, p. 250, § 160. Its effect was to discredit the plaintiff's deeds as pieces of evidence, because, if true, those deeds were void; the grantors being at the time ousted of possession. While, therefore, the deeds, together with proof of original ownership in Robert Stevens, might have withstood a motion for a nonsuit when the case in chief was closed, that circumstance was of no consequence, after the defendant had introduced evidence tending to prove that the deeds were void.

THAYER, J. To one of the two pieces of land in controversy the plaintiff claimed title by inheritance as one of the heirs at law of his mother, who died intestate in 1900; to the other he claimed to have acquired title by deed from one Hull, who had acquired it by deed from the plaintiff's mother. He claimed to have proved that his mother had acquired title to both parcels from the trustees in bankruptcy of her husband, Robert Stevens, who, prior to his bankruptcy, had owned both, as well as other adjoining land, and who, in 1866, had conveyed a piece of the adjoining land to one Catherine Howard, from whose grantee the defendants acquired it. The first parcel is the southerly end of a narrow strip of land known as Stevens' lane, extending southerly from Congress avenue, in New Haven. The other is a small triangular piece of land west of and adjoining the first piece. The defendant in his answer denied the plaintiff's allegations of title and possession, and set up as separate de-lished his case, and that if they should find fenses that the first tract was a public highway, and that the defendant and his grantors had acquired title to the other tract by adverse possession.

[3] The burden of proof remained with the plaintiff throughout the case. But the court was here speaking of the plaintiff's claim only. In other portions of the charge the jury were told that a deed by a party ousted of possession, unless made to the person in possession, is void, and were also told that the question for them was whether, in view of all the evidence, the plaintiff had estab

that any of the deeds introduced in evidence by the plaintiff purport to convey title to any portion of land of which the grantor was ousted by the entry and possession of another, such deed was void as to such land. In view of these instructions, we think the defendant could not have been harmed by the unnecessary statement that the deeds made out a prima facie case.

[1] The court having called the jury's attention to the deeds from Robert Stevens' trustees in bankruptcy to Mrs. Stevens, conveying both tracts, and to those from Mrs. Stevens to Mrs. Hull, and from Mrs. Hull to the plaintiff, of the second tract, and to [4] It is claimed that the instruction that the fact that no administrator had been ap- the deeds made out a prima facie case was pointed on Mrs. Stevens' estate, said to wrong, because ownership of land cannot them: "So far as title by deed and inherit- be made out upon a paper title alone. It is ance is concerned, the plaintiff has therefore true that a mere chain of deeds alone will made out a title to both parcels claimed suf- not establish ownership in land. ficient to maintain an action, unless and un- Brown, 81 Conn. 218, 226, 70 Atl. 699. It til the defendant has by evidence, under one must connect back to some one as a source or more of his defenses, shown something of title, who, at the time of his conveyance, to defeat such right. You may therefore was owner of the land conveyed. The find

Foote v.