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of the business, if the business is not conducted on the undertaking business in Jersey City at a loss. on property on Pavonia avenue belonging to her, and she lived in another of her houses on Ninth street. Testatrix owned another

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 2084–2087; Dec. Dig. § 494.*]

8. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§§ 494, 93*)-CONTINUANCE OF DECEDENT'S BUSINESS CHARGES AGAINST EXECUTORS.

lot on Henderson street, with a stable thereon. All four children were minors at testatrix's death February 1, 1899, the ages of the Where an executor continues decedent's children being then, respectively, about 20, business without authority, the legatees cannot be required to pay him compensation for serv- 17, 15, and 12 years. Complainant Mrs. Gilices in conducting the business, or expenses in ligan had been recently married. The desettling its accounts, including counsel fees in- fendant Daly, the brother of testator, assumcurred by litigation necessary in settling the ac-ed sole charge of the administration of the counts, from property other than that coming into his hands. estate, as acting executor, and continued the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors business. This was done, as he says, at the and Administrators. Cent. Dig. §§ 2077, 407, verbal request of his sister just before her 408; Dec. Dig. §§ 494, 93.*] death, and for the purpose of keeping the

9. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (8 469*)-young family together and aiding in their

ACCOUNTING JURISDICTION.

The settling of the accounts of a business continued by an executor without authority after testator's death is properly made in the Chancery Court rather than in the orphans' court, especially where the executor claims payment for his services in conducting the business, and asks a personal decree against the legatees for payment of any deficiency.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 2000-2013; Dec. Dig. § 469.*]

10. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 93*)CONTINUANCE OF DECEDENT'S BUSINESS CONTINUANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY.

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Where a business continued without authority by an executor after testator's death, though mortgaged, had a substantial value when taken over by him, but was afterwards sold by him for a nominal price, the executor would be chargeable for any future claim on the mortgage debt if the purchaser did not assume it.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. 8 407, 408; Dec. Dig. § 93.*]

11. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 93*)CONTINUING DECEDENT'S BUSINESS.

Beneficiaries under the will are entitled to

offset their claim to a fair rental value of premises connected with a business continued by the executor without authority against payments made by him for the benefit of the estate by continuing the business.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. 88 407, 408; Dec. Dig. § 93.*]

Suit by Mary A. Gilligan and others against John K. Daly and others for an accounting by an executor and guardian. On exceptions to a master's report. Exceptions sustained as stated.

John J. Mulvaney, for exceptants. Collins & Corbin, for defendant Gallagher. Charles M. Egan, for defendant Daly.

support. The will did not authorize or re quest the continuance of the business. The business was carried on by the executor in the name of M. J. Boylan, the husband of the testatrix, who had originally established it, and in the name under which testatrix had carried it on since her husband's death in 1891. The business continued until June, 1907, when it was sold by the executors and purchased by or for the benefit of defendant Matthew, who had been employed for some years by the executor in carrying it on. The value of the goods and chattels used in connection with the business received by the executors was about $1,838, as valued in the inventory, the same being subject, however, to a chattel mortgage held by the National Casket Company for about $1,800. At the time of the sale in 1907, the mortgage had been reduced by payments made from the business to about $1,000, and the entire property subject to the mortgage was sold to the purchaser for $1; the mortgage so far as appears not being assumed by him. The resi due of the chattels realized $139 at the sale, being purchased by the solicitor of the executor and Matthew. The depreciation in value of the stock (assuming that the purchaser is to pay the balance due on the mortgage) by reason of its continued use in the business is thus an amount about equal to the payment on the mortgage. The business

was continued by the executor not for his own personal benefit, but with the object of benefiting the family. The executor himself for the purpose of keeping the family together, and at the request of the older children, removed to the homestead house and occupied a portion of it, paying to the guardian EMERY, V. C. This is a bill for account- what seems to have been a fair rent for the ing filed by Mrs. Gilligan and Thomas Boy- portion occupied by himself and his family. lan, two of the children and legatees of Mary For some years after the mother's death the E. Boylan, against defendants Daly and younger children, except Thomas, lived with Boylan, executors of testatrix, and also the oldest, Mrs. Gilligan. Thomas was emagainst the defendant Dennis Gallagher, ployed in the business, but for a short time guardian of all the children. Matthew and only. The daughter Irene also assisted, and Irene Boylan, the two other children, and Matthew, the younger son, was employed legatees, are also parties defendant. At the from his sixteenth year, became the manager time of her death the testatrix was carrying of the business, and finally became the owner

neglect or omission to file accounts will always be given due weight in considering all the circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule that the mere omission to file them disentitles the guardian to compensation. Wilson v. Staats, 33 N. J. Eq. 524; In re Barcalow, 29 N. J. Eq. 282, 285 (Runyon, 1878); Birkholm v. Wardell, 42 N. J. Eq. 337, 7 Atl. 569 (Runyon, Ch., 1886); 11 A. & E. Ency. (2d Ed.) 1284. In this case the guardian seems to have kept regular accounts with vouchers for disbursements, and to have been ready to submit them for inspection, and the delay in the general settlement of the accounts, while not regular, was not so unreasonable as to deprive the guardian of his statutory compensation. The allowance did not exceed the statutory fees, and the exceptions to such allowance as well as to the counsel fees allowed to the guardian, which appear to be reasonable, are overruled.

The commissions allowed to the executor stand on a different basis. The statute (Orphans' Court Act [Rev. P. L. 1898, p. 762] § 129) provides that the commissions of executors, etc., shall not exceed the following rates: "On all sums that come into their hands not exceeding $1,000 seven per centum, if over $1,000 and not exceeding $5,000, four per centum, on such excess," etc. The entire amount of the personal property which came to the executor and as inventoried was less than $3,000, and, had this entire amount. passed through the executor's hands, the commissions to which the estate of deceased as it was at her death would have been subject was not over $150.

of it. No account had ever been filed by the executor, and, in connection with a bill filed by the complainants for partition of the real estate, after the sale of the business, this bill for accounting by the executor is filed. The executor, Daly, had kept books of account in the course of the business, showing its receipts and disbursements, and in the fall of 1906, on complainant's demand for an accounting, a general statement taken from these books was made, and some examination of the books was made by or under the direction of complainants. This examination apparently was at the complainant's own expense. On the present bill for accounting the executor did not submit any account with his answer. The defendant guardían annexed his account to his answer. Reference to a master was ordered, both in the partition and accounting suit, to state the executors and guardian's accounts, and also accounts as between the children. The statement of the executor's accounts involved the production and examination of the books of accounts of the business, and testimony in reference to the conditions of carrying it on. The master reported that the business was carried on without authority, but that it was not carried on by the executor for his personal benefit or profit, but with the intention of benefiting the estate in the general interest of the family. He reported, further, that the carrying on of the business had not resulted in any loss to the estate, but, on the contrary, had been for the benefit of the estate to the extent of about $2,250 by payments made for the benefit of the estate, viz., $942.08, on account of the chattel mortgage, $600, on account of a real estate mortgage on the Ninth street and Henderson street properties and $800 paid to or for the benefit of the .children, $200 each. He also finds that in carrying on the business the executor himself advanced money necessary to pay current bills, and himself supervised the busi[3] One risk which an executor takes in ness. In keeping the accounts, the executor such continuance of business is that the eshad made no charge for his services, but in tate suffer no loss therefrom, and this instating and reporting the accounts the mas- demnity against loss extends to loss by reater while allowing to the guardian commis- son of running the business as well from sions according to the statutory rate reports payments for service of the executor in caras to the executor that after due considera-rying it on, or additional expenses in settling tion he fixes his commission at $600. He fur- his accounts, as from any other cause. ther allows to the counsel of the executor and of the guardian $250 each. The counsel for the executor is also the counsel for the defendant Matthew Boylan and for the guardian ad litem of the infant defendant Irene Boylan, who now lives with her uncle, the executor. No counsel fee was allowed to the complainants. Several exceptions were filed to the master's report, but complainants have formally waived all the exceptions but those relating to the commissions and counsel fees.

[1] As to the guardian's account, the objection is that, not having regularly made and filed his accounts, he is not entitled to

[2] In carrying on the business, the executor clearly acted without authority, not only because of the general rule relating to the administration of estates, but also because all of the legatees were infants, incapable of consenting to the continuance, and one of them is still an infant.

[4] Where an executor continues the business of testator under authority of the will, or merely for the purpose of winding up the business, his compensation for this service is included in his commissions as executor, and the basis for fixing commissions is not the gross receipts or expenses of the business, but the net income and the amount by which this increases the corpus of the fund, and cannot include a charge for services in continuing the business. In re Merchants Case, 39 N. J. Eq. 506, 509 (Runyon, Ch., 1885), affirmed on appeal 41 N. J. Eq. 349, 7 Atl. 633; Beard v. Beard, 140 N. Y. 260, 264, 35 N. E. 488 (1893); 18 Cyc. 1150. In the pres

ally liable for debts; and, secondly, that this court in enforcing the liability of trustees does not act as a court of penal jurisdiction or for the purpose of punishment, but only for the purpose of compelling restitution, or granting compensation for losses actually sustained. Lord James in Vyse v. Foster, supra, 42 L. J. Ch. p. 251.

ness up to December 31, 1907, according to estate against loss, and also of being personthe executor's accounts as presented to the master, were $69,152.64, and the entire disbursements were $68,574.36 (not including the executor's allowance or counsel fee), and, if the executor's commissions be considered to stand on the same basis as if the business were authorized, there has been no increase of the corpus, but rather a diminution, unless the payments of $2,250 above referred to be considered as additions.

[5] But the right of the executor to compensation (beyond his statutory commissions on the amount of the estate coming to his hands) is based on other principles where the carrying on of the business is unauthorized. In such case the general rule is that the beneficiaries have the option to charge the executor either with the value of the estate and interest, or with the amount of the net profits realized from the business. 3 Williams, Executors, *1793; 1 Perry, Trusts, 430; 11 A. & E. Ency. (2d Ed.) 975. And the beneficiaries have the right to an account of the profits for the purpose of determining this option.

[6] In estimating the profits the general basis for charging trustees is that, so far as ascertainable, they should include only the profits resulting from the employment of the testator's estate as capital, and due allowance should be made for other elements creating the profits, such as the business skill and credit of the executor carrying it on. Willett v. Blanford, 1 Hare, 253; 11 L. J. Ch. 182 (Wigram, V. Ch., 1842); Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 8 Ch. 307, 42 L. J. Ch. 245, 250 (C. A. 1873); s. c. on appeal to House of Lords, 44 L. J. Ch. 37, 47, 7 H. L. 318.

[8] The indemnity to the estate against loss includes in my judgment protection of the legatees against being called on by the executor for payment from property other than that which came to the executor's hands of any portion either of his compensation for services in carrying on the business or expenses of settling its accounts, including counsel fees incurred by reason of litigation necessary for the settlement of the accounts. [9] The examination and settlement of the accounts of the business in this court rather than in the orphans' court was proper, especially in view of the fact that the executor on the settlement claims payment for his services rendered in carrying on the business, and, should the amount claimed be allowed, he now asks a personal decree against the legatees for payment of the deficiency. In considering, therefore, whether the carrying on of the business has been a benefit to the estate, the additional expense of the litigation reasonably necessary in this court over the account must be charged as an expense of the business. The payments made for the benefit of the estate from carrying on the business must be examined from this point of view, and will be considered in their order as given in the master's report: [10] First. The payment of $942.08 on account of the chattel mortgage. This payment is offset by the depreciation in value of the property covered by the mortgage. When taken by the executor, it was valued at $1,740 (as appears by the executor's answer), and was sold in June, 1907, for $1, subject to the mortgage. Unless the purchaser assumed the mortgage, the executor still remains chargeable for the future claim on the debt secured by the mortgage. Second. The sum of $600 applied on the Daumont mortgage on the Ninth street and Henderson street properties. Third. The sum of $200 paid to each of the four children, $800 in all. These last payments to the children seem to have been made not out of the business, but

[7] Compensation for executor's services may be allowed as part of the expenses of the business and be deducted in ascertaining the net profits with which he is chargeable, but in carrying on the business without authority the executor is at the absolute risk that the estate which comes to his hands suffer no loss or diminution by reason of carrying on the business. If the executor can show that there has been no loss, but rather a benefit to the estate, then no liability to the estate results from his illegal action other than that of accounting for the profits or benefits received, and in so accounting for the profits or benefits received he may be allowed proper compensation for his services in carrying on the business, and such allow-out of rents received after the business had ance will be deducted from the profits for which he is to account. These seem to be the [11] As against the $600 and any other paygeneral principles on which allowances in ments claimed to have been made for the these cases are based. It might happen, benefit of the estate by carrying on the busitherefore, that the actual compensation to ness, the children are clearly entitled to offthe executor in cases where the business was set their claim to a fair rental for the premcontinued without authority would some- ises. Rental is an expense of the business, times be larger than where authorized, and and should not be contributed by the benetherefore fixed by the statute, but it is to be ficiaries. The guardian of the infants shortconsidered, first, that in the former case the ly after the death of the testatrix paid off continuance of the business is at the person- with money received for the children from

ceased.

As the executor's account appears to stand and on the evidence, it is not satisfactorily proved that the estate, up to this date at least, has benefited by the carrying on of the business, and, inasmuch as the executor in taking this risk is bound to indemnify the estate against loss, I am not willing in this case to allow him compensation for his services in carrying on the business on the basis of proof of benefit. If the estate is relieved from the obligation of the chattel mortgage, he is entitled now, I think, to commissions on the value as fixed by the inventory, but, inasmuch as the sale of the mortgaged chattels produced only $1, it is clear that nothing has passed through his hands on this account, unless by his sale he has procured the payment of the mortgage. The exception to the allowance of $600 compensation and to $250 counsel fee is therefore sustained.

which he himself had been carrying on the property, and from that time the property was unincumbered. The building on it was a frame building, built for a stable, but fronting on Pavonia avenue, a business street, and the front part of the building was fitted up for and used as an office in connection with the undertaking business. It had considerable rental value, one witness (the only one on this point) estimating it at $50 per month. After the sale of the business in 1907, the executor, Daly, seems to have received as rentals from Matthew $30 per month for the property. During the time the executors carried on the business and up to July, 1907, no rent whatever was paid for the Pavonia avenue property, but from the business there was paid the taxes on the property and water rents from 1902, amounting to $1,269.43. In the years 1899, 1900, 1901, and 1903 the guardian of the infants, according to his accounts, paid $198.10 for taxes, $52.50 for insurance, and about $60 for water rents, in all over $300 charges on the Pavonia avenue property. If these amounts be deducted from the amount stated to have been paid from the business for the benefit of the infants, it leaves the sum of $909.43 and $600 for the eight years the business was carried on to be offset against rents for the property. From June 26, 1907, Matthew has been paying $30 per month for this property, a total of $840 up to the stating of the account (October 15, 1909), and from this rent and rents received by the ex-be conditional on the estate being relleved ecutor from other properties during the same from obligation under the chattel mortgage. interval to the extent of $890 the executor after closing out the business has paid taxes and other charges and also the $800 to the devisees. These payments do not seem to have been made out of the business. That a

rental of $200 per year above the taxes and

It

This is without prejudice, however, to any application which may be made hereafter for an allowance to the executor out of the net profits resulting from the business. appears by the executor's evidence that several thousand dollars of debts are uncollected, and he estimated (then) that $1,000 might be collected. For such collections he must hereafter account, and, when the entire accounts of the business are closed, he may apply for compensation out of any profits appearing to have arisen. His compensation on this accounting must be limited to his statutory fees based on the inventory values, and

(79 N. J. E. 31)

BOARD OF HEALTH OF POMPTON
LAKES v. E. I. DU PONT DE
NEMOURS POWDER CO.

(Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

1911.)

Aug. 4,

1. INJUNCTION (§ 132*) — PRELIMINARY IN

JUNCTION.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 302; Dec. Dig. § 132.*] 2. NUISANCE (§ 31*)-REMEDIES INJUNCTION -PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

water rents and insurance could have been received is so probable that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, I am not willing to adjust the executor's accounts of Preliminary injunctions are ordinarily the business as if he had proved satisfacto-ing the status quo pending final hearing. granted to protect property rights by maintainrily that the carrying on of the business was a benefit to the estate pecuniarily. If the allowance of $600 as his compensation for carrying on the business be sustained, there is no benefit whatever to the estate, but, on the contrary, a loss, inasmuch as his compensation for carrying on the business and counsel fees rendered necessary in settling the business accounts must be paid by the children out of the proceeds of the sale of the lands devised to them by the testatrix, and which never passed through the executor's hands at all. Payment from this source would manifestly be a return or repayment by the devisees of any moneys received by them from the business, and, if allowed, charges them, instead of the executor, with a portion of the expenses for carrying it on.

A preliminary injunction to restrain a nuisance affecting a property right is sometimes granted to protect such right pending hearing. though the answer and affidavits question or deny the nuisance, if the right to be protected is not disputed, and satisfactory proof by affidavit is made of specific instances of violating such right; but, unless irreparable injury will result, injunction will usually be denied until final hearing, and sometimes until after determination of the questions of law involved.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Nuisance, Cent. Dig. §§ 72-76; Dec. Dig. § 31.*] 3. NUISANCE (§ 77*) - PUBLIC NUISANCE — REMEDIES INJUNCTION.

mitting local boards of health to summarily Before the enactment of the statutes perabate a nuisance, as by maintaining a plant

spreading noxious vapors, or enjoin its maintenance, chancery exercised jurisdiction over it to protect the enjoyment of property.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Nuisance, Cent. Dig. §§ 189, 190; Dec. Dig. § 77.*] 4. NUISANCE (§ 96*)- PUBLIC NUISANCEREMEDIES.

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The usual remedy for a public nuisance in absence of statute was by indictment, where the existence of a nuisance, when disputed, was established by a jury, and a judgment of abate

ment was rendered.

EMERY, V. C. The bill in this case is filed by a local board of health under the health acts to enjoin the continuance of a nuisance hazardous to the public health, alleged to be created by the defendant's operation of its fulminate of mercury plant, spreading noxious fumes and vapors in the borough. On the bill and ex parte affidavits filed by com. plainant, answer, and affidavits by defendant, and affidavits in reply, application is

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Nuisance, now made for a preliminary injunction. Cent. Dig. § 218; Dec. Dig. § 96.*]

The affidavits filed in support of defend

5. NUISANCE (§ 77*)—PUBLIC NUISANCE-IN-ant's answer show a fairly disputed question

JUNCTION.

The Attorney General may file a bill or information to enjoin a public nuisance dangerous to the public health.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Nuisance, Cent. Dig. §§ 189, 190; Dec. Dig. § 77.*] 6. NUISANCE (§ 77*) - PUBLIC NUISANCEREMEDIES INJUNCTION.

In the absence of statute, equity will interfere by injunction with great reluctance where the injury is indictable, even though its jurisdiction is invoked by the Attorney General, and, in the absence of statute, a nuisance dangerous to public health will not ordinarily be enjoined upon a bill or information filed by the Attorney General.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Nuisance, Cent. Dig. §8 189, 190; Dec. Dig. § 77.*] 7. NUISANCE (§ 78*) - PUBLIC "NUISANCE” INJUNCTION BY HEALTH BOARD.

The "nuisance" contemplated by Health Act (2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1637) § 28, permitting any local board of health to file a bill in the name of the state for an injunction to prohibit the continuance of a nuisance hazardous to public health, is a nuisance which is hazardous to public health, and hence the subject of indictment. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Nuisance, Dec. Dig. § 78.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4855-4864; vol. 8, p. 7734.] 8. NUISANCE (8 84*) - PUBLIC NUISANCE REMEDIES.

The Health Act (2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1637) $28, provides that any local board of health, instead of summarily abating a nuisance hazardous to the public health, may file a bill in chancery in the name of the state for an injunction to prohibit its continuance, and that such action shall proceed according to the practice in such cases on the relation of individuals, and emergency cases shall have precedence over other litigation, and may be heard on final hear ing within such time as a chancellor directs. Held, that the statute only contemplated the granting of an injunction on final hearing, and a preliminary injunction should not be granted, especially where defendant's affidavits made a substantial question as to the existence of a nuisance dangerous to the public health at the time of the hearing of the motion for a preliminary injunction.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Nuisance, Dec. Dig. § 84.*]

Application for a preliminary injunction by the State, on the relation of the Board of Health of Pompton Lakes, against the E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Company. Application denied.

Allan C. Rowe, for complainant. F. J. Faulks, J. P. Laffey, and Lindabury, Depue & Faulks, for defendant.

of fact as to the existence at the time of the filing of the bill of a nuisance hazardous to the public health, and the question of nuisance or no nuisance should not be determined upon ex parte affidavits, and pending the hearing, even if the case in this respect was one to be governed by the usual practice of the court in reference to the granting of preliminary injunctions in cases of nuisance to individuals.

[1] Preliminary injunctions are ordinarily granted for the necessary protection of property and rights to or connected with property pending the final hearing, and for the purpose of preserving the status quo, in order that a decree on final hearing may be effective. Kerr, Injunctions, 338, 340. In Attorney General v. United, etc., Telegraph Co., 31 L. J. Ch. 329 (1862), which was an information and bill to enjoin a public nuisance, Romilly, M. R., said (page 331), that whatever the court might do on final hearing, it interfered by interlocutory injunction only to protect property.

[2] Where, on the application for preliminary injunction, the property right sought to be protected is not subject to dispute, and satisfactory proofs of specific instances of violation are made by the affidavits, a preliminary injunction restraining defendant from committing the alleged nuisance pending the hearing is sometimes granted for the purpose of protecting complainant's enjoy. ment of his property pending suit, and this is granted even though the defendant's answer and affidavits question or deny the commission of the nuisance. But, unless the case of nuisance to individuals is one which comes within the rule of protection against what is considered irreparable injury, the restraint of the private nuisance by injunction, where the fact of nuisance is fairly disputed, is generally withheld until final hearing, and sometimes until after settlement of the question at law. The present bill, however, is not based on the general equity jurisdiction of the court for the protection of any property or property rights, either of the state or of the relators, and the sole basis for the present application to the court is the statutory right given to the relators by the health act. The local boards of health (section 13,

2 Gen. St. 1895, p. 1637) are to examine into

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