Mediation. and his minister Sully 18. He subsequently developed his plan more fully in 1729, and based it upon the state of possession amongst the European Powers as settled by the treaties of Utrecht, seeking to make that state of things perpetual by preserving the equilibrium of forces between those Powers, and by adjusting all controversies between them by pacific means. With this object in view he proposed that the members of the Christian commonwealth of Nations should renounce the right of making war upon one another, and accept the mediation of an European Diet for the settlement of their mutual differences, three fourths of the votes being necessary for a definitive judgment 17. This scheme in its speculative details has many striking features of resemblance to the machinery of the existing Germanic Diet. § 7. Mediation, whereby a third Power interposes its good offices to bring about the peaceable settlement of a matter which is in dispute between two Powers, differs from Arbitration in this respect, that the decision of an arbiter is obligatory, whilst a mediator merely gives counsel and advice. It is perfectly lawful for an independent Power to offer to mediate between other independent Powers which are either preparing for or actually engaged in war, and to suggest to them a compromise, if a claim of right has 16 Projet de Traité pour rendre la Paix perpetuelle entre les Souverains Chrétiens, pour maintenir toujours le commerce entre les Nations, et pour affermir beaucoup davantage les maisons souveraines sur le trône, proposé autrefois par Henri le Grand Roi de France, agréé par la Reine Elizabeth, par Jaques I. et par la plupart des autres po tentats de l'Europe. Utrecht, 1713. 17 Wheaton's History of the Law of Nations, p. 262. It is not improbable that the project of the Abbé St. Pierre may have suggested to Prince Metternich some of the details of his plan for organising the Diet of the Germanic Confederation. been set up by either of them; or in case the dispute should relate to an injury which has been inflicted upon either of them, to advise that a reasonable satisfaction for the injury should be offered and accepted. It is obviously the duty of an individual, when he is not under any obligation to take part in a dispute between his friends, to endeavour to bring about an amicable settlement between them; whilst it is frequently the interest of a Nation to prevent war breaking out between other Nations, for some of the sparks of the fire which is kindled in its neighbourhood may possibly reach it; whilst, on the other hand, it may be dangerous to a Nation to have both or either of its neighbours ruined. A care for its own safety will therefore justify a Nation in interposing its good offices between disputing Nations. The interposition of a Nation to prevent a war between two other Nations is an act of a totally different character from the intervention of a Nation in the domestic affairs of another Nation; and whilst the latter is objectionable on principle, as an encroachment on the just rights of an independent political community, the former is not only in strict law an international proceeding, but may be the imperative duty of a Nation, whenever the occurrence of war would oblige it to take part with one or other of the belligerents. Puffendorf 18 holds that two or more neutral Nations, if they have a common interest that a war should be terminated, may lawfully agree upon what terms peace ought to be concluded between the belligerent parties, and may thereupon prescribe such terms of agreement to the belligerents, with a manifesto that they will join their forces against the party which refuses those terms; and that this sort of mediation 18 Law of Nature and Nations, L. V. c. 13. § 7. of Greece. Sweden is the more commendable, if it puts an end to a war which would prove destructive to one or both of the parties. Upon some such principle, Russia, France, and Great Britain, interposed as mediators between the Ottoman Porte and the Hellenic people, and secured on the part of the Porte the recognition Kingdom of an independent kingdom of Greece, under their joint guaranty. Bynkershoek holds that it is not 19 allowable for a Nation to interpose between other Nations and to compel them to make peace; but the practice of Nations is opposed to his views, and one of the instances which he cites seems to suggest a principle which rather sanctions the right of interposition, than militates against the existence of this right. Thus France, England, and Holland, united to compel Sweden to make peace with Denmark on 21 May 1659, at a moment when Sweden was on the point of entirely subjugating Denmark. The extinction of the international life of a State, in the continued existence of which, as a member of the family of Nations, all other Nations have an interest, is an event respecting which all Nations may claim to have a voice, and, if they please, to take up arms to prevent it. War between Nations, in the sense in which it imposes the duties of Neutrality upon other Nations, is a contest for the attainment of Right, and not a struggle to accomplish the ruin of either party. Grotius 20 maintains that war may be justly undertaken by any Nation against a Nation which prosecutes its revenge with malice, and exceeds the just measure of punishment in avenging a wrong which it may have suffered from another Nation. Thus a powerful Nation, under the pretext of injury received and Denmark. W 19 Quæst. Jur. Publ. c. 25. § 10. 20 De Jure Belli, L. II. c. 20. § 40. from a weaker Nation, might declare war against it, circumstances any Nation would be justified in § 8. It is not always easy for a third Power, which offers to mediate between two contending Powers, to satisfy them both of the integrity of its intentions in offering its mediation, and if it should advise either to remit something of its pretensions, to preserve a character for impartiality. Hence it becomes advisable, when war threatens to break out between any two Nations, in the necessary absence of any constituted tribunal before which the plaint of a Nation can be brought for adjudication, that two or more Nations should offer their joint mediation to maintain peace. Grotius holds that it would be not only useful, but that it is in some respects necessary, that Con- Congresses gresses of the Christian powers should be held from Powers. time to time, in which the controversies, that may have arisen amongst any of them, may be settled by others whose interests are not affected by them, and in which 21 De Jure Belli, L. II. c. 23. § 8. 4. of Christian W Conferences of Vienna. measures may be taken to compel disputing parties to accept peace on equitable terms. The practice of the Sovereign Powers of Europe since the peace of Westphalia has been to cooperate in a policy of Mediation, wherever there has been probable danger of the Balance of Power, as established by the Treaties of Osnabrück and Munster, being effectively disturbed. A system of European Concert has thus been maintained, with slight intermissions, since that time, by Conferences or Congresses of the European Powers. A Congress 22 is an assembly of Plenipotentiaries, appointed to find out means of conciliation, and to discuss and adjust the respective pretensions of the contending parties, who should always be invited to take part in the deliberations of the Congress. One of the most recent instances of this form of joint Mediation is furnished by the Conferences of Vienna, commenced on 15 March 1855, and in which Austria, France, and Great Britain endeavoured to mediate between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, with a view to prevent a war between those Powers, and to bring about an amicable settlement of their differences in the general interest of Europe. The Plenipotentiaries of the two contending Powers took part in the Conferences; and when the efforts of the Congress had failed to secure peace, the mediating Powers" sided with that Power, which in their opinion had been wrongfully attacked. 9. It is the duty of a Nation, when it advances a claim of right, to show a good foundation for demanding a thing which it does not possess. Possession in the case of Nations gives rise to the Right of not being disturbed, unless the origin of the possession can be shown to have been wrongful. Hence 22 Vattel, L. II. c. 18. § 330. |