is as broad and liberal, perhaps, in its terms as any statute of amendments ever enacted. I think, however, it cannot be held to be broad enough to permit an amendment of process which will make the process effectual for the purpose of giving jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, which the process as served was ineffectual to do where he has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction, as in this case he has not done. The statute is to be construed as applying only in a case where the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If it has not done so, all its acts are nullities as to him. Nor do I think that the defect of process now in question can be considered as a "defect or want of form" within the meaning of this section. It is a defect. of substance and not of form, and is, I think, properly so treated by the state courts.

It is argued that the defect was cured by the præcipe filed in the clerk's office before the issue of the writ. This clearly is not, so because the præcipe referred to no statute, either by title or by any such general reference as is necessary. The only reference to the statute is in the words "action for statutory penalty; amount claimed, $2,500." This is clearly not a substantial compliance with the statute, even if the statements in the præcipe can be held to be equivalent to an indorsement on the process as a notice to the defendant,—a question which it is unnecessary to determine. The defendant did not waive the objection by his appearance, which was special, reserving his right to make this motion. And it was made seasonably after the filing of the complaint apprised him fully of the nature of the action.

Motion granted.

BROWN v. POND and others.

(District Court, S. D. New York. November, 1880.)

Where the præcipe directing the clerk to issue summons in an action for "statutory penalty; amount claimed, $80,000," is followed by the service of such a summons on the defendant, who was first informed of the nature of the plaintiff's claim in an affidavit accompanying an order extending plaintiff's time to serve a complaint:

Held, that a motion made to set aside the summons must be granted for the same reasons that apply in the case between the same parties heretofore decided, [supra, 31.]

Charles N. Judson and E. H. Bien, for defendants.

Kobbe & Fowler, for plaintiff.

CHOATE, D. J. This is like the case between the same parties decided to-day, [supra, 31,] except that the complaint has been served. The præcipe directs the clerk to issue summons in an action for "statutory penalty; amount claimed, $80,000." It is shown by affidavit, and is not contradicted, that the defendant was first informed of the nature of the plaintiff's claim on the sixteenth of June, 1880, upon the service of an affidavit accompanying an order extending plaintiff's time to serve his complaint. This motion to set aside the summons was made on the twenty-first of June.

For the reasons stated in the other case between the same parties the motion must be granted.

BROWN V. CHURCH and others.

(District Court, 8. D. New York. November, 1880.)

1. ACTION TO RECOVER PENALTIES-REV. ST. § 4963-INDORSEMENTREFERENCE TO STATUTE-PRACTICE.

In an action to recover penalties incurred under Rev. St. § 4963, relating to copyright, the summons was indorsed as follows: "For $2,500 debt for a penalty imposed by title 60, c. 3, of an act of congress entitled 'An act to revise the statutes,' etc., approved June 20,

1874," and from the complaint served the nature of the action fully appeared.

Held, that the indorsement was sufficiently definite and certain to notify the defendant of the statute upon which suit was brought.

That, although it misdescribed the date, there was a sufficient reference to the "Act to revise and consolidate the statutes of the United States," etc., approved June 20, 1874, it appearing that the provisions imposing the penalty sued for were found in title 60, c. 3, of that act, and that it was the only act of congress containing a title 60 and chapter 3.

Also held, that the indorsement substantially complied with the rule of practice (Brown v. Pond, supra, 31) and that the defendant was not misled by the error of date.

Charles N. Judson and E. H. Bien, for defendant.

Kobbe & Fowler, for plaintiff.

CHOATE, D. J. This is a suit to recover penalties incurred under Rev. St. § 4963, for marking as copyrighted articles subject to copyright for which no copyright had been obtained. The complaint has been served, from which the nature of the action fully appears. A motion is now made to set aside the summons as irregular and unlawful on the ground that it was not duly indorsed with a reference to the statute imposing the penalties. The indorsement was as follows: "For $2,500 debt for a penalty imposed by title 60, c. 3, of an act of congress entitled 'An act to revise the statutes,' etc., approved June 20, 1874." It is objected that no such act as is here described or referred to was approved on the twenty-second day of June, 1874, and that this is not a sufficient reference to the "Act to revise and consolidate the statutes of the United States," etc., approved June 20, 1874. The act last referred to contains in title 60, c. 3, relating to "copyrights," the provisions imposing the penalties sued for. The act is evidently misdescribed as respects the date of its approval, but the reference to it by the other descriptive terms is, I think, sufficiently certain and definite to give the defendant notice of the statute under which he is sued. The requisites of the notice on the summons, in order to be in substantial compliance with the statute of New York, are fully considered. in the case of Brown v. Pond, [supra, 31,] heretofore decided, and within the decisions cited in that case. I think it is clear

that there was in this case a substantial compliance with the rule of practice, and that the error of date is immaterial and cannot have misled the defendant. In fact, there is no other act of congress containing a title 60, c. 3. except that approved June 20, 1874, and that act is sufficiently and properly referred to as an "Act to revise the statutes," etc.

Motion denied..

UNITED STATES v. KINDRED.

(Circuit Court, E. D. Virginia. December 10, 1880.)

1. JUSTICE OF The Peace-ACT OF CONGRESS—INDICTMENT-FEDERAL COURT.-The wilful and corrupt violation of an act of congress by a justice of the peace of a state, in the exercise of his office, will render him liable to indictment in federal court.-[Ed.

Motion to Quash Indictment.

L. L. Lewis, U. S. Att'y, appeared for the prosecution. John Lyon, for the defence, relied in support of his plea, demurrer, and motion on Broom's Legal Maxims, 66-7; Missouri v. Lewis, 91 U. S. 31; Ex parte Virginia, 90 U. S. 344; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 139; Slaughter-house Cases, Id. 77; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 76; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 107; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 516; 18 St. at Large 355; and Queen v. Badger, 45 Eng. C. L. R. 468.

HUGHES, D. J. This indictment charges the defendant with unlawfully and corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct, and impede the due administration of justice in the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, in having, upon a warrant sued out by one William. Myrick, dealt with J. P. Davis, a witness under recognizance in the United States court, in the manner set forth in the indictment; that is to say, the indictment, after setting out the facts connected with the warrant, including whipping and unlawful imprisonment, charges that Kindred did issue said

warrant of arrest, and did impose said sentence upon the said Davis to influence and obstruct him as a witness in said court of the United States, and with the further intent to influence, obstruct, and impede the due administration of justice in the said court.

There is a motion to quash the indictment for want of jurisdiction; a demurrer to the indictment based on the same ground of defence; and a special plea in bar setting out that Kindred, in all that he did, acted as a judicial officer, and claiming that if he acted only erroneously he is exempt from trial, because his act was judicial, and can only be reviewed by a state court of appellate jurisdiction; and if he acted corruptly he is amenable only to the authorities and courts of Virginia, and is not amenable to trial and punishment by any court of the United States. To this plea there is a demurrer by the United States.

It is not pretended, if there were no charge of wilful malfeasance or corruption here, but only of erroneous action by the justice of the peace in his judicial capacity, that the court of the United States would have jurisdiction to review the erroneous judgment committed in the discharge of a judicial function. Furthermore, although justices of the peace and all judicial officers are liable to indictment or arraignment in some manner for corrupt acts committed in the exercise of their judicial functions, yet it is not pretended that a court of the United States may try an indictment brought for every such corrupt judicial act against judicial officers of the state. The United States court has no such general power. But it is contended by the United States that if a law of congress, passed as necessary and proper for carrying into effect any constitutional provision, is corruptly violated by any person, even though he be a judicial officer of a state, such person is amenable to prosecution in a United States court for such offence.

The federal government, its officers, and courts have certain well defined powers. The government may establish a post-office system, do all acts necessary to conducting it efficiently, pass laws for punishing depredations upon the