tion. It is competent for the court to decide that it is verified before a proper officer, and when the court has so decided, and an order of adjudication has been entered, it is too late for the debtor, or for any creditor, to raise the question. An order of adjudication is a judgment, and is as effective as any other judgment to cure irregularities in practice which do not touch the jurisdiction of the court." The serious consequences which would result from holding, in conformity with the petitioner's claim, that any irregularity or defect in the preliminary proceedings renders the adjudication void ab initio, are forcibly stated by Judge Woodruff in In re Raynor, supra. No title to real estate, acquired under bankruptcy proceedings, would be safe, no matter to what extent the bankrupt's property had been administered and distributed, or how many suits have been instituted and successfully maintained by the assignee to recover real or personal estate which the bankrupt had disposed of in fraud of his creditors. Everything would be liable to be disturbed and unsettled at any stage of the proceedings, if the court is bound to treat such irregularities and defects as jurisdictional facts. In the present case more than three years elapsed from the date of adjudication before any question was raised. In the meantime the assignee, unconscious of risk, and presuming upon the regularity of the adjudication and the validity of his appointment, has been performing generally the duties of his position, compromising claims, bringing actions, and distributing assets. Treating the adjudication as void, he becomes a tort-feasor, and is liable as a trespasser for the honest execution of a trust which the court obliged him to perform by virtue of his office. Such considerations are not conclusive against the construction of the law contended for by the petitioner, but they afford very reasonable grounds for believing that the congress, in framing the act, never intended an interpretation should be given to it which would lead to such results. It follows, from this view, that any irregularity in verifying the petition, or the debts of the petitioning creditors, may be amended, nunc pro tunc, if any amendment is deemed necessary to make the proceedings regular. The application to vacate and set aside the adjudication is denied. RUIZ v. EICKERMAN. (Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri. January 24, 1881) 1. DISCHARGE IN BANKRPUTCY-FOREIGN CREDITOR-DOMESTIC FORUM. A discharge in bankruptcy can be pleaded to the suit of a foreign creditor in the domestic forum.-[ED. Demurrer to Plea of Discharge. TREAT, D. J. A demurrer is interposed to the answer of Eickerman, who pleads discharge in bankruptcy. The plaintiff is an alien non-resident, insisting upon his demand against the defendant, and that a discharge in bankruptcy under the laws of the United States does not relieve the defendant of plaintiff's demand. The proposition involved pertains to international laws, concerning which there ought to be no discord. If the cases of insolvent laws as among the states of this country, inter sese, are considered, the fullest exposition of which is given in Cook v. Moffet, 5 How. 307, or, as to foreign demands, in Murray v. De Rotterhem, 6 John. Ch. 52, it will be ascertained that the rule is this: An insolvent law, or bankrupt law, has no extraterritorial force. If the foreign party sues, despite the insolvent or bankrupt discharge, in the law of the forum, he must accept the rules pertaining thereto, with the exception of such modifications as spring from the complex nature of our state and federal governments. As the laws of the federal government in bankruptcy are supreme, a discharge thereunder is sufficient, whether the creditor is a citizen of a state other than that in which the bankrupt is a resident, or is an alien, a resident of a foreign country. Of course there can be no extraterritorial operation of a United States statute as to the discharge of personal obligation. When the intraterritorial law has granted such a discharge as to all creditors, the foreign creditor suing in the domestic tribunal is subject to the lex fori, and his right to sue is dependent thereon. The plaintiff in this suit had a cause of action against the defendant. The plaintiff was a non-resident and citizen of Spain, and as such could have recovered judgment. But defendant availed himself of provisions of the bankrupt act under which the plaintiff could, by proper proceedings, have proved his demand and shared in dividends made. He elected not to do so, and therefore his demand is discharged as to this defendant, so far as the United States law operates; that is, within the territorial limits of the United States. The discharge in bankruptcy is valid, in the absence of fraud, in whatever court of the United States a suit is brought, although it may not protect the defendant from a suit brought in a foreign jurisdiction, if he should be found therein. The demurrer to this special answer of Eickerman is overruled. In re BJORNSTAD, Bankrupt. (District Court, W. D. Wisconsin. January 26, 1881.) 1. COMPOSITION PROCEEDINGS-DISCHARGE. A discharge from all debts by means of composition proceedings is a discharge within the meaning of section 5116 of the Revised Statutes relating to the discharge of a voluntary bankrupt.—[ED. In Bankruptcy. Application for Discharge. Rufus B. Smith, for bankrupt. Lewis, Lewis & Hale, for creditors objecting. BUNN, D. J. From the stipulation of facts in this case it appears that the bankrupt filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and was duly declared a bankrupt, and has paid. a fraction over 15 per cent. of his debts, but has obtained the consent in writing of a majority in number and value of his creditors to his discharge. It also appears that on a former occasion, in 1877, and prior to the filing of the petition and adjudication in this case, the bankrupt and one Martin Madson, as copartners, doing business under the firm name of J. Bjornstad & Co., filed their voluntary petition in this court to be declared bankrupts, and under and as a part of the proceedings in that case they obtained a composition with their creditors, which was confirmed by order of the court on April 10, 1877. The question now, on this application for a discharge, is whether the case comes within the provision of section 5116, Rev. St., which is that "no person who has been discharged, and afterwards becomes bankrupt on his own application, shall be again entitled to a discharge, whose estate is insufficient to pay 70 per centum of the debts proved against it, unless the assent in writing of three-fourths in value of his creditors who have proved their claims is filed at or before the time of application for discharge." It is claimed by the bankrupt that he has never been "discharged” within the meaning of the provision; but I am satisfied he has. The effect of the composition proceedings was to discharge him from all his debts,-as well those in favor of his creditors who were opposed to the composition as of those in favor of it. It is true, the discharge came by operation of law, and as the effect of the composition proceedings, rather than by any formal order of the court. But the result is the same. He was discharged from his debts, as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, as certainly as though no composition had taken place, and he had been discharged by an order of the court at a later stage of those proceedings. The purpose of section 5116 is to impose a stricter and additional requisition as a condition of a discharge in a case when the bankrupt coming in voluntarily, and filing his petition, has once before had the benefit of the bankrupt law, and by virtue of it been discharged from his obligations. In such case, unless he pay 70 per cent. of the proved debts he must obtain the consent of three-fourths in value of the creditors. The provision is a reasonable one, and in my judgment applies as certainly in a case like this as where the former discharge was by the order of the court. If he now obtains a discharge it will be his second discharge from all his debts by virtue of the bankrupt law. The application for discharge is denied. 1. RE-ISSUE-WHAT NECESSARY TO AUTHORIZE-REV. ST. § 4916. To authorize a re-issue the original patent must be inoperative or invalid, either from defective or insufficient specifications, or from claiming as new more than the patentee had a right to claim, and the error sought to be corrected must have arisen by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention; and where the original shows upon its face that the grounds for a re-issue do not exist, or where a comparison of the letters disclose different inventions, the re-issue is void. The specifications may be made more definite, or the claim modified to make it more conformable to the right of the patentee, but the invention must be the same. Powder Co. v. Powder Works, 98 U. S. 138. 2. SURRENDER OF PATENT-JUDGMENT OF COMMISSIONER NOT CONCLUSIVE UPON COURTS. The action of the commissioner of patents in accepting a surrender and granting a re-issue of letters patent is judicial in its character, and presumed correct, but is not conclusive upon the court; but they may always compare the original and re-issue to see whether they disclose a case in which the commissioner has jurisdiction to grant a reissue. Giant Powder Co. v. California Co. 18 O. G. 1340; S. C. 4 FED. Rep. 720. 3. IMPROVEMENT IN PRESERVE CANS - RE-ISSUE-VARIANCE BETWEEN RE-ISSUE AND ORIGINAL LETTERS. An original patent for improvement in preserve cans, etc., (No. 43,463) manufactured of tin, contained a single claim, and that for producing indelible lettering designs, etc., upon sheet tin or tinned sheet iron by a combination of lithographic or plate printing, and the action of heat upon the surface of the tin and upon metallic colors printed on such surface; the process as described being for print *Reported by Homer C. Eller, Esq., of the St. Paul bar. |