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"An alliance between Church and State in a Christian commonwealth is an idle and a fanciful opinion. An alliance is between two things that are in their nature distinct and independent, such as between two sovereign States. But in a Christian commonwealth the Church and the State are one and the same thing, being different integral parts of the same whole."

Mr. Fawkes also quotes a magnificent passage from "John Inglesant," the more remarkable as written by a Nonconformist. I regret to have to abbreviate it. "The English Church, as established by the law of England, offers the supernatural to all who care to come. It is like the Divine Being Himself, whose sun shines on the evil and on the good. . . . Shall we throw this aside? It has been won for us by the death and torture of men like ourselves in bodily frame, infinitely superior to some of us in self-denial and endurance. If we cannot endure as they did, at least let us not needlessly throw away what they have won. It is not a question of religious freedom only, it is a question of learning and culture in every form. . . . As a Church, it is unique; if suffered to drop out of existence, nothing like it can ever take its place."

Is it quite too late to revive this ideal of a national Church? Those who think so may be cured of their despondency by reading the Primary Charge of the Bishop of Gloucester, Dr. Headlam, the most noteworthy episcopal pronouncement that we have had for many years. Dr. Headlam has learning, statesmanship and courage. If he would mitigate the extreme asperity of his controversial style (as he has done in this Charge) he might be the chief bulwark of a sane central Churchmanship in this country. He knows the history of the Church of England, and his knowledge gives him a confidence in its future which is none too common to-day.

He proves that "our Church claims, and rightly claims, for it is dependent on the whole position it has adopted, to have authority to arrange and put forth for itself a national use." "The fundamental principle is that the authority of the Pope is an usurped authority." "We recognise the competence of our Church to ordain its services for itself, and we intend loyally to adhere to its principles and obey its directions, even when we disagree with them."

It would be impossible even to summarise Dr. Headlam's VOL. 241. NO. 491.

argument. He insists that the Church of England is absolutely independent, that it has a character of its own, which corresponds with the national character of our people, that it has had a glorious history, that it meets the needs of the present age as no other Church can do, being comprehensive and adaptable without any uncertainty about the fundamental principles of the Christian religion, and that it should have a great future, if it remains true to its character as the most Catholic of Reformed and Protestant Churches. It is the old principle of the "via media,” ably and fearlessly applied to present-day conditions.

The attempt which is now being made to drag Anglicanism away from its history and traditions will fail. The ship will right itself by degrees. And the chief influence in restoring the balance will be, I think, the new school of Liberal Evangelicals, who are now freeing themselves from the cramping influences of their party tradition, and are facing the future with clear eyes and unflinching faith. For the strength of Protestantism lies not in theories of inspiration and special providences; it lies in personal devotion to Christ, and in the duty of individual judgment, under the guidance of the Spirit of Truth. Institutionalism may be decaying, and there are at present few signs of a revival of it; but personal religion may even gain by the decline of authority and ecclesiastical discipline; and it is in personal religion that the Christian recovers the faith of the original gospel, and an unassailable basis for confronting the problems of the future.

W. R. INGE

I.

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

The Covenant of the League of Nations.

2. Correspondence

3.

respecting the Proposed Treaty of Mutual

Assistance. Cmd. 2200.

Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security. By GENERAL TASKER
HOWARD BLISS and others.

4. Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

ORE than six years have passed since the Armistice; more

six

than five since the signature at Versailles of the treaty which not only ended the Great War, but would, it was confidently hoped, end war itself. There were those who did not share this confidence; who saw the danger of using the mood of the moment to make the sick world the subject of idealist experiments; who condemned especially the haste with which the Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted, and the short-sighted policy which planted this contentious document so firmly in the treaties that it cannot be withdrawn, or even seriously amended, without tearing them to pieces. These critics, voices then crying in the wilderness, may now derive a melancholy satisfaction from the growing sense of the justice of their reasoning. The world is not at peace; it is full of hatreds and suspicions; it is armed and apprehensive. As for the Covenant, which was to have for ever cured these distempers, its chief champions now admit its insufficiency." Alas,” said Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, at Geneva, "the Covenant was drafted immediately after the war, and before statesmen were able to see clearly the precise nature of the problems which the nations would have to face a year or two after the Armistice."*

That is an interesting admission, especially as coming from such a source. It becomes more interesting when compared with a passage from the speech in which the late Senator Knox introduced in the United States Senate† a resolution in favour of separating the consideration of the establishment of a League

*Verbatim Report of the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, September 4, 1924; col. 2.

†December 18, 1918.

of Nations from the questions involved in making peace with the Central Empires. The object of the resolution, he said, was :not to condemn in advance any League of Nations (and, least of all, the existing entente, or a permanent understanding of all the Englishspeaking peoples) of a kind that might in time commend itself to the considered judgment of the American people, but simply to postpone the larger and very disputable question of some comprehensive league of nations for that separate and very deliberate consideration that its nature demands and that an Act of Congress has already sanctioned.* The debates, which ended in the refusal of the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and in the consequent withdrawal of the United States from any active share in the settlement of Europe, have been dealt with in some detail by the present writer in an earlier number of this REVIEW. Here it may be permissible, however, once more to express regret that the insistence of President Wilson on the Covenant, the whole Covenant, and nothing but the Covenant, produced so lamentable a schism. The League of Nations even when robbed of the stone which was to have been the head of the corner-has done some good work. So far, however, as its main task is concerned, namely, that of restoring and securing the peace of the world, its most ardent advocates do not claim for it any great success. The reason for this is suggested by a passage in the speech of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, already quoted. He spoke of " that terrible problem of blending the ideal with the real which presses upon all of us who want to change the mind and system of Europe." If that be really the problem, as conceived by the august assembly whom the late Prime Minister was addressing, it is not surprising that it has not been solved, and it would be very surprising if it ever were solved within any period of time with which this generation is concerned. The real problem is hard enough, but it is not insoluble. It is essentially that which faced the Allies after the quarter of a century of war which ended at Waterloo, namely—as Castlereagh put it-how" to bring back the world to peaceful habits." It is (that is to say), in the first instance, a problem of practical statesmanship, and its solution has been hindered, not helped, by well-meant experiments in blending the ideal with the real.

*This Act, passed in August, 1916, authorised and requested the President to call a Conference of the nations on the subject of the arbitration of international disputes and of disarmament.

"The Senate and the Covenant." No. 473, Vol. 232. July, 1920.

It is, perhaps, idle to speculate on what would have happened had the association of the United States with Great Britain and her Allies continued. Certain things, however, may be pointed out. The work of pacification and restoration would have been more rapid and more complete, because backed by an unchallengeable force. For the same reason the problem of security would not have emerged; for all the world would have seen the hopelessness of trying to overset a settlement thus sanctioned. Lastly, the Association having done its immediate work, there would have been time enough to enlarge its boundaries and turn it, more or less gradually, into a league which might, in the end, have included all the civilised world.

By a singular irony the rock on which this idea was wrecked has also proved the chief stumbling-block to the League of Nations in its efforts to become effective. It was the obligations imposed under Article X of the Covenant, more especially, which steeled the American opposition. To the recalcitrant senators, as to the present writer, the meaning and implications of this Article seemed perfectly clear. It embodied in solemn treaty form the last of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, namely, that "a general association of nations shall be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." Article X of the Covenant, which was drafted by President Wilson himself, runs as follows:

The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League. In case of such aggression, or in case of any danger or threat of such aggression, the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Nothing could be clearer. The first sentence binds the signatory States, collectively or severally, to go to the assistance of any State threatened with external aggression. The second sentence in no wise limits the obligation, but merely lays upon the Council the duty of concerting the measures by which it is to be fulfilled. In this plain sense it was understood by the American critics of the Covenant, who held that, once embodied in the law of the United States, it would bind them in honour to interfere in arms in any quarter of the globe against acts of aggression, and this not

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