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necessary in the daily course of social or commercial life. It was however inevitable that when case law had grown to a large mass, and general principles of municipal law were established, some amount of codification should follow. Decisions which ensued then became to some extent explanations of statutory law rather than the enunciations of legal principles. This process has in recent times been accelerated through the complexity and internationalism of modern commerce, and we see it in operation in such a measure as the Marine Insurance Act of 1906 which codified the law on this subject-an Act of importance to foreigners as well as to British subjects. This feature, and the increase of legislation dealing with the social life of the nation, are from the point of view of the jurist and historian gradually diverting the growth of law into less interesting channels, for the decisions of the courts necessarily turn more on the interpretation of statutes and less on the enunciation of principles of law.

In the preceding review the subject of criminal law has not been referred to. It is a subject which deserves and should receive separate notice, for except as regards procedure it is in fact a part of the social history of the nation. It was admirably dealt with in the late Sir James Stephens' "History of the Criminal Law in England,"* and therefore it is permissible to express a doubt whether Professor Holdsworth would not have been well advised to have omitted criminal law from his exhaustive work, thus reducing its rather unwieldy size.

* See EDINBURGH REVIEW, April, 1884, p. 332.

E. S. RoscCOE

THE STUDY OF WAR

A Study of War. By Admiral SIR REGINALD CUSTANCE. Constable. 1924.

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HERE has recently been published a remarkable book entitled "A Study of War," by Admiral Sir Reginald Custance. In this book is examined and set forth a theory of war, and there is made available a scientific basis to which to refer when considering past wars and preparing for security in the future. Indeed the book might well be insisted upon as a text-book for statesmen, politicians, sailors and soldiers. For the theory of war concerns the security of the nation, which is the concern of every citizen of that nation and especially of the political and military orders. A similar service was performed by Clausewitz for the German people and was largely accepted outside Germany. But in Sir Reginald Custance's book there is presented for our investigation the British doctrine of the "will to security" as opposed to the German doctrine of the "will to power."

The book is one which requires the closest study and the most searching consideration, or the inevitable result will be incorrect assumptions and false deductions. In particular one must avoid the assumption that the author of the book is enunciating a hard and fast theory of war in its entirety and that all that is required to ensure success is to appreciate this theory. In his preface Sir Reginald Custance makes it plain that "his theory leaves the individual native talent and initiative unfettered to solve the ever-varying problems which present themselves in the course of every war." He is particularly emphatic that the theory which he unfolds must be looked upon as a framework, within the scope of which it is necessary to keep, but a framework of such ample proportions as to leave full play for the individual genius. The purpose of this article is only to call the attention of the reader to the main features of the theory unfolded in the book. It must be left to the reader himself critically to examine the premises laid down, to consider the historical illustrations given, and to supply for himself further historical examples with the object of further testing the truth of the conclusions drawn.

In the scientific study of war or of any other subject, precise definition is of the first importance. It is in this respect that so many text-books and historical studies of war have been weak; and it is here that Sir Reginald Custance gives us a firm basis from which to start. The whole problem with which we are concerned is stated in the first chapter in a little over two hundred words. In primitive communities, as in modern times, when a difference arises on any question an attempt may be made to settle that difference by talk or diplomacy; if that fails, the disputants resort to force and the decision turns on the relative fighting strength of the disputants. Throughout the ages when nations go to war to settle a difference the armed forces are the deciding factor and the battle the decisive act. In every war, whether it be a fight of primitive man or a war on the modern scale, each side begins with an object which is the whole reason of using force. This object may be defined as "national or political."

It is further to be noted that in every case, after having resorted to war, the armed force of each side endeavours to destroy or disable the opposing armed force, and therefore has an aim which may be defined as military. From this it follows that in every war" the idea of war as a political act includes both the national or political object and the military aim." These must not be confused. The example of the fight between two primitive men shows that the national or political object is finally achieved by the complete or partial fulfilment of the military aim— that is by killing or disabling the opponent.

But, it may be asked, what exactly is meant by the national or political object? In the consideration of the cause of wars, as for example that of the Spanish Succession, historians have usually concentrated their attention upon dynastic quarrels concerned with the succession to the throne of certain countries. Sir Reginald Custance contends that by so doing they have often obscured the real national or political object of the war. He examines the Græco-Persian War of the fifth century B.C., the Spanish-Netherlands War of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the American Civil War, and finally the Great War that began in 1914. The conclusion reached is that the real national or political objects with which wars are concerned can all be grouped under the head of "security "-security either

for a particular political system with ideals in opposition to the ideals of another political system, or for a particular religious faith, or for a particular dynasty, or for trade. Conflicting interests in each case were menaced, and the national or political object on each side in the war became the security for those threatened interests. In his own words, the national or political object of war is "security for every questioned right, every threatened interest, and for the State itself, including its political system and territory."

Criticism may be expected to centre round this definition. Is it to be believed, it may be asked, that in the last war for example, though security may have been our own national object, it was also the German object? How was German security ever affected? Was not rather the national or political object of the Germans definitely the desire to rule Europe and to add to their territory? We are perhaps too near the events clearly to understand the motives underlying the German action in 1914. Ambition and the desire for power may have had an immediate influence in deciding the Germans to embark on war in August of that year, but we are probably justified in saying that in the broad sense the desire for security was the underlying motive. For many years previous to the war Europe had been witnessing the growth of two distinct political ideals: the autocratic ideal of Germany, the democratic ideal of Great Britain and Franceeach threatened the security of the other. The spread of democratic ideals was threatening the German political system; the German political ideal, with its desire to suppress the free-will of other European nations, threatened the liberties as well as the territories of France and Great Britain. Whatever spark may have served to start the conflagration, the conditions for that conflagration existed in the presence of two conflicting political ideals.

Passing to the question of the military aim, Sir Reginald Custance points out that the decision is complete when one of the opposing armed forces is destroyed. Complete destruction is rarely possible, but security can be reached if one force succeeds in neutralising the action of the opposing armed force, so as to prevent it from carrying out its military aim. Thus either the destruction, or the neutralisation, of the enemy armed force may be termed the primary military aim in all warfare.

The carrying out of the primary military aim necessarily takes time. Contributory measures have to be taken during this period to ensure its achievement. These measures include the building up of resources, such as increasing the trained personnel of the navy, army and air force and increasing ammunition supplies. They also include the weakening of the opposing resources by the stoppage of enemy trade. A further important part of these measures includes the strengthening of the national morale and directing will, whilst taking every step to weaken that of the enemy. The efficiency of the armed force is intimately connected with the directing will and the morale of the nation, as was shown in the last war by the effect on the German army of the hardships endured by the civilian population. These contributory measures may be termed the secondary military aim. Their importance consists in strengthening the means for carrying out the primary military aim.

Sir Reginald Custance emphasises the importance of considering the military aim as a whole and not in parts. To destroy the opposing armed force is only part of the definition. It may not be possible to destroy. Neutralisation must then be effected, and before this can be achieved, or whilst it is being attempted, full consideration must be given to the other part of the military aim, namely the weakening of the enemy, the strengthening of ourselves. It is further to be noted that the military aim concentrates its attention on the armed forces as the deciding factors, that is their destruction, neutralisation or weakening.

The question of battle as the deciding factor in carrying out the military aim is fully investigated in the chapters which deal with the detailed considerations involved in the definition of the primary military aim, that is :

(a) To destroy the opposing armed force in battle. (b) To neutralise the enemy armed force either by

1. Threatening battle; or

2. Evading battle; or

3. Postponing battle.

The destruction of the enemy armed force means the destruction of his navy at sea and his army on land-aircraft being included as an integral part of each. Sir Reginald Custance shows that since the navy cannot take part as an organized force in the land battle nor the army in the sea battle, therefore the land

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