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decisions, or those of the arbitrators appointed by it, enforceable by all the sanctions set forth in the Covenant. Of these the economic and financial boycott is, apparently, obligatory in all cases; it comes into force as soon as the Council decides to apply it. The obligation to give naval or military aid against the recalcitrant State is, it seems, optional, though-as Professor Gilbert Murray has pointed out-" morally" there is no option in the matter. The effective application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XVI of the Covenant would thus, at least in very many cases, involve the employment of the British fleet to enforce the blockade. The mere possibility of such an obligation having to be met would involve, not further disarmament, but an increase of the navy. Moreover, the boycott is a double-edged weapon which may hurt the boycotter as much as, or more than, the boycotted. It might be very effective against nations whose very life depends on their freedom to import; but would it be effective against a highly industrialised country rich in raw materials? It might be effective were it really a general boycott. But supposing the United States held aloof, as it would probably do. In that case the trade forbidden to other nations would simply be taken by the Americans, and the British fleet would be charged with the duty of seizing American blockade-runners on the high seas. To say the least of it, that would certainly endanger the good understanding between the English-speaking peoples."

Professor Murray thinks not. The coercion of an aggressor State would, he maintains, appeal to the moral sense of the American people, and they would not resent this policing of the seas as they resented the blockade enforced during the Great War, about the rights and wrongs of which opinion in the United States was divided. History does not support this view but tends to show rather that the moral sense of the American people, like that of other peoples, is apt to be limited by their business instincts. After all, Napoleon was an aggressor, if ever there was one; the moral sense of the American people was certainly offended by his activities; yet the enforcement of the Orders in Council was one of the main causes of the war of 1812. Recent American historians have pointed out that the moral sense of the pious merchants of Boston did not prevent them from carrying on a flourishing trade with the enemy during the very crisis of the war which ended in the expulsion of the French from

North America. You cannot " change the mind of Europe," or of America, by Protocols.

Any critic of the Covenant and the instruments intended to perfect it lays himself open to the charge of a cynical disregard for the welfare of humanity. The charge is unjust. No sane man wants war. All those who know anything of the present state of Europe and the world at large can see that the fires of war have been damped down, but not extinguished. They know, especially, that it is the natural alarms of France that make the problem of general security an urgent question of practical politics. Those who criticise the Geneva proposals differ from those who unreservedly support them not as to ends, but only as to means. The question remains the same as that asked by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in reference to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance: Are the guarantees of such a nature as to persuade the nations that it would be safe to disarm? In my opinion, no guarantees are certain that depend on States pledging themselves to definite action in circumstances that cannot be foreseen. Moreover, if the fear of the sanctions provided by the Covenant fail to prevent war-which is what it is asserted it will do the world is likely to be in a worse case than if no Covenant had existed. The study of the old diplomacy was to isolate war when it broke out, and in the great majority of cases it succeeded. Under the Geneva dispensation, every war will be general;

there will be no neutrals "; and when once war has broken out, who shall say what new combinations it will produce or in what unforeseen directions it will rage?

The ideal of the League of Nations is the noble one of substituting the supremacy of justice for the supremacy of force. But, as M. Skrzynski, the representative of Poland, said, “What is justice?"

There is justice based on a recognised code of law; but there is another kind which is not based on any recognised law; it can also be called justice, but it cannot be mentioned where peace is concerned, for justice in the abstract, without law, means revolution.

His deduction is that there must be "a definite code, backed by sanctions, affording a guarantee to all countries and recognising the inviolability of established treaties and territorial statutes." These requirements, he thinks, are met by the Covenant as amplified by the Protocol. But what of the other kind of justice?

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Long ago I pointed out that to attempt to enforce peace involved the impossible task of stereotyping "territorial statutes " which, sooner or later, the nations would outgrow. It might be possible, for a time at least, if the "established treaties" were generally regarded as just. But the treaties which the Covenant is intended to protect are certainly not so regarded. The European map, as reconstructed at Versailles, is an alarming object. The old balance is gone. Europe, with its oppressed minorities," its "zones and its "corridors," is suffering from political appendicitis, which -to all appearance only a serious operation can cure. It certainly cannot be cured by putting the patient in a straight jacket. Sooner or later the suppressed inflammation, caused by oppression and a belief in "justice in the abstract," will break out, and for such a case the Covenant provides but the feeblest of palliatives. According to Article XIX

The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

Does this mean that the League will, in case of need, re-arrange the political boundaries of the world to fit the growth or shrinkage of nations? That would hardly make for peace. Yet the alternative seems to be that the function of the League as the guardian of international peace, after the nations have been formed into so many closed retorts full of expansive forces, is to sit on their safety-valves until a series of explosions blow the territorial statutes and the League itself into space.

W. ALISON PHILLIPS

WAR RESPONSIBILITY IN 1914 AND TO-DAY

1.

2.

3.

4.

These Eventful Years. Published by the Encyclopædia Britannica. 1924. History of Modern Europe, 1870-1919. By G. P. Gooch. Cassell. 1923. The Outbreak of the War, 1914-1918. By Sir CHARLES OMAN, M.P., H.M. Stationery Office. 1919.

Les Origines de la Guerre. By RAYMOND POINCARE. Paris: Plon Nourrit et Cie. 1921.

5. Les Origines de la Guerre Européenne. By A. GAUVAIN. Paris: A. Colin.

6. The Evolution of World-Peace. By F. S. MARVIN. Oxford University Press. 1921.

7. Neutrality of Belgium. Handbook prepared by the Foreign Office. 1920.

HE question of war responsibility is not merely of historical

interest. It is of vital importance for Europe, for it is at the basis of the Peace Treaty and of all amendments which have been or will be added to this treaty. Unless Germany and the Allies agree as to the reasons which brought about the war, peace can only assume the character of a temporary truce, pending new developments. Such a truce may, for the time being, settle the difficulties facing the various governments, but it cannot provide against a new general conflict that security for which all the nations of the world are at present clamouring. Security depends on the acceptance by all contracting parties, if not of every feature of the settlement, at least of the main principles which inspired it. The most important of these principles is that embodied in Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, according to which "Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected, as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies." Unless this clause, in the moderate and restricted terms in which it is couched, is agreed to, not only by the governments concerned, but by the peoples who have chosen these governments, all the efforts to provide security in the shape of regional defensive pacts, compulsory arbitration or sanctions, may prove valueless. There will always be some Power or some group of Powers who will

consider themselves the victims of an injustice, who will strive secretly or openly to break loose from the duties implied by the contract, and who will seize the first opportunity to obtain by force such " rights as they have not been able to secure by peaceful negotiations.

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The application of the various treaties somewhat hastily drafted in 1919 does not come within the scope of this argument. Most of these treaties have already undergone important and even sweeping alterations since their conclusion. The expediency or practicability of certain measures has been, and may still be, questioned; the mode of their application may depend on circumstances; but the main moral principle which underlies them cannot be challenged without bringing down the whole diplomatic structure erected so patiently during the last five years. This is not a question of expediency, but a question of right or wrong. If judgment is given against the authors of the treaty, it entails not only amendment, but complete revision.

It may be asked why the question of war guilt should be revived. Various reasons prompt us to discuss it. Since the London Agreement of August last, there has been a distinct improvement in the relations between Germany and the Allied Governments. The inclusion of Germany among the members of the League of Nations has now become a possibility, even an imminent possibility. The German Government may take this opportunity to re-open the question of responsibility, as they attempted to do during the London negotiations and immediately after the signature of the Agreement. The problem is constantly discussed beyond the Rhine, and certain publicists have carried these discussions into Allied countries. It has been urged that, since the signature of the Peace Treaty, new documents have come to light owing to the publication of the German and Austrian archives and of some Russian diplomatic papers. A considerable number of books and memoirs have also been published in Great Britain, France and Germany by statesmen, diplomats, naval and military authorities, who played a prominent part in the world conflict. These new testimonies are said to throw a fresh light on the development of events, and more particularly on the origins of the war, which can no longer be accurately appreciated according to the 1919 standard. In face of this moral offensive, which has awakened sympathetic echoes in every country, the

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