separated from the question of national or imperial ambition. Germany's policy entered a new and critical stage when, after the fall of Bismarck, William II conceived the idea of challenging British power in the North Sea. The first Navy Bill was introduced in 1897. The well-known preamble to the second Navy Bill, adopted after the outbreak of the Boer War, and five years before the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, leaves no doubt whatever as to the policy pursued, which was still further emphasised by the Kaiser's flamboyant declaration: "I will not rest until I have brought my Navy to the height where my Army stands."

It has often been remarked that, from the beginning of his reign, the Kaiser, in a wild desire to out-Bismarck Bismarck, recklessly jeopardised Germany's future. But, if William II showed little tact and discrimination in the conduct of his policy, it must be recognised that it was the only one he could follow if he were determined to establish his hegemony over the world. As long as Europe alone was concerned, Germany might have maintained her leading position, and even have improved it, by respecting the independence of the Netherlands and abstaining from crushing France; for, in this way, Great Britain could have been conciliated. But, as soon as the Kaiser's plans extended to Africa and Asia, and more particularly as soon as they implied the control of the Channel ports, a conflict with Great Britain became unavoidable, and naval armament became imperative. A secret or open anti-British policy and the fulfilment of PanGerman dreams were from the first inseparable.

It is, therefore, not a matter for wonder that Germany steadily refused to accept the various proposals made by Great Britain for reducing the scale of armaments. In 1905, after Tangier, she refused to come to an understanding upon the basis of a relative strength of 5 to 3; again, in 1912, a few months after Agadir, she discouraged Lord Haldane's suggestion of a proportion of 16 to 10. Her refusal to countenance in any way the British proposal for an agreed limitation of armaments between the Powers, made at the Hague Conference of 1907, is still more characteristic. Manifestly, as long as the German Empire maintained its leadership on the continent, all attempts to restrict national initiative in order to reduce the chances of war were doomed to failure.

It is unnecessary to enter into details with regard to the progress of German armaments on land during the same period. From the time of the Franco-Prussian War, the supremacy of the German army had remained unchallenged. The Triple Alliance's military power was never seriously threatened by the FrancoRussian Entente, for, if the latter combination showed a certain advantage in numbers, it was heavily handicapped by the fact that communications between the two Allies could be made almost impossible in time of war, and by imperfect organization and defective transport on the Russian side. This was made obvious when, in the spring of 1913, Germany raised the power of her standing army to 822,000, and enforced a capital levy of fifty million pounds for war equipment. France's adoption of the three-years' military service and the work of reorganisation undertaken by the Russian headquarters, which was not completed when the war broke out, must be considered to represent the effort of the Dual Entente to keep pace with the progress of the Triple Alliance. The balance could only have been redressed in favour of the former by the neutrality of Italy and the entry of Great Britain into the conflict; but both these conditions implied a deliberate aggression on the part of the Central Powers.

It must in all fairness be recognised that Germany was not interested in the maintenance of the status quo in the same way as were older nations. Her large and rapidly-increasing population required commercial outlets, and her colonial development had taken place too late to provide her with important overseas possessions, though it must be noticed that she was slow to develop the colonies she had been able to secure. If it could be shown that the German people, hemmed-in on all sides by hostile combinations of Powers, had become unable to extend their overseas trade, and that the German emigrants were hampered in their efforts by the selfish policy of other nations, it might be argued that the Empire was arming merely to break the bonds which stifled its normal life. This objection scarcely deserves an answer. The importance of the German mercantile marine in pre-war days need not be emphasised. The success of German traders all over Europe, but more especially among the Allied nations in London, Antwerp and St. Petersburg, was notorious. The prosperity of the German settlements, particularly in the United States and Brazil, was equally recognised.

Many German business men were so satisfied with this pacific progress that, up to the eve of the war, they endeavoured to check the dangerous activity of military and naval Pan-Germanists. Whenever German opinion became restless, they urged that the launching of a war of aggression was a foolish gamble, entirely unjustified, since the Empire could obtain all it required by pacific methods and diplomatic pressure.

The legend of hostile encirclement does not stand the test of historical criticism. As a matter of fact, the Triple Entente would never have existed if Germany had renounced her imperialistic dreams. Had the overtures made by Mr. Chamberlain in 1901 been less coolly received, the whole course of European history might have been altered. Even after the conclusion of the Entente, the privileged position of Germany with regard to any further expansion which might take place, without infringing the rights of another Power, was implicitly recognised by the British Government. They were careful not to oppose the Bagdad railway project, in spite of the increased influence it gave to a rival Power in a sphere which had been for years considered as within British influence, and went as far, in 1913, as to admit that economically Germany occupied a favoured position in Portuguese African territories. It cannot be upheld that no concessions could be obtained from France and Russia. A first convention was signed with France in 1909, in which Germany's economic interests in Morocco were adequately acknowledged. Without discussing the abrupt methods employed at Agadir, two years later, in order to safeguard these interests, it must be admitted that the result of the negotiations which followed, and through which Germany obtained half of the French Congo, were extremely fruitful to her. As for Russia, shaken by the war against Japan, and governed by a weak Tsar subjected to the Kaiser's influence, she can scarcely be said to have been overbearing or intransigent in her attitude towards Germany, who exacted from her, in 1905, a very advantageous commercial treaty. On two occasions, at Björkö, in 1905, and at Potsdam, in 1910, William II almost succeeded in breaking up the Entente; and, on two other occasions, in 1909 and 1912, German diplomacy succeeded, in spite of Russia, in supporting Austria's claims and in thwarting Serbian expansion towards the Adriatic.

The publication of the Willy-Nicky correspondence disposes

of the idea that Germany's existence was threatened by her neighbour, whose strength was undermined by intrigues and social unrest; but it reveals the growing impatience of the Kaiser at being unable to isolate the partners of the Entente, whose union was the only obstacle in the way of his ambitions. A war between Germany and Russia might, no doubt, have been avoided if William II had succeeded in uniting the continental Powers against England. After the signature of the Björkö Treaty, he proclaimed that a new leaf had been turned over in the history of the world: "Japan may feel inclined to join. . . . Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden will all be attracted to this new, great centre of gravity. The continental combine, flanked by America," would become the "only manner to block the way to the whole world becoming John Bull's private property." Thus would "English self-assertion and impertinence " be "cooled down."

Anxiety to ease the tension between ex-enemies and to restore friendly relations between all nations must not blind the public to certain obvious truths, which have been strengthened rather than weakened by the recent publication of documents bearing on the origin of the war. The fatalistic theory according to which all the Great Powers" staggered and stumbled "into the conflict, half-blinded by fear and bending under the overwhelming weight of armaments, is entirely misleading, for it does not take into account the deliberate intention of the Central Powers to establish their hegemony by force, and to ignore or to discourage al attempts made by other parties to solve their differences by more civilised methods.

"In this welter of national passions and the devastations of war, from which we have just emerged," writes F. S. Marvin, in "The Evolution of World-Peace," " it may well seem a fantastic folly to maintain that the growth of internationalism is really the most important feature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and that it is for this, if at all, that later ages will look back to us with special gratitude. Yet such is our contention." The same period, which is characterised by an enormous increase in armaments, is also remarkable for the growth of a movement tending to diminish the chances of conflict by neutralisation, arbitration, or diplomatic conferences. The same century, which is noticeable for the development of a suspicious and sometimes aggressive nationalism, is also conspicuous for the steady growth

of a feeling of international solidarity, manifested not only in the domain of trade or science, but also in works of relief undertaken on an unprecedented scale. Events have fulfilled the predictions of the pessimists, who thought a conflagration was inevitable in view of the rivalries and conflicting interests existing between nations and groups of nations. But the deeply-rooted conviction that international solidarity would prevent such a war was not without very serious foundation for those who, looking at the other side of the picture, realised the rapid progress of peaceful ideals, based on common economic and moral interests. For the first time in the course of history, mankind had become conscious of its unity as well as of its divisions. The British Empire was developing into an association of free nations belonging to all races and all climates. Pan-Americanism was unifying the New World and, even in Europe, the seed sown at the time of the French Revolution was slowly germinating.

In spite of all its imperfections, the work of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 may be considered as the first step in the right direction. It endeavoured to establish the maintenance of the status quo by the preservation of the balance of power. Switzerland, one of the danger spots on the European map, was neutralised. The Netherlands, a far more dangerous zone, which had been for centuries the cockpit of the continent, was strengthened in order to resist the assaults of French imperialism. When, fifteen years later, this creation of the Vienna Congress was threatened by the Belgian Revolution, further progress was achieved by the neutralisation of independent Belgium, who, left to her own devices, would again have become a bone of contention between the Powers. While the measures adopted in 1815 were manifestly directed against France, the work of the London Conference of 1831 was the result of general agreement. Talleyrand stood beside Lord Palmerston and the representatives of Prussia, Austria and Russia in declaring, in the protocol of January 20th, that "The plenipotentiaries are unanimously of opinion that the five Powers owe it to their real interest, to their common friendship, to the tranquillity of Europe to issue a solemn testimony, an

undeniable proof of their firm resolve to seek no increase of territory, no exclusive influence, no single advantage from the arrangements regarding Belgium . . . and to afford to that country itself and to all the States surrounding it the best guarantees of tranquillity and safety."

VOL. 241. NO. 491.

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