Further progress was achieved by a more and more frequent recourse to arbitration to settle international differences, thus substituting legal for violent methods. From 1829 to 1830, eight cases were submitted to a chosen arbiter; from 1830 to 1860, thirty cases; from 1860 to 1880, forty-two cases; from 1880 to 1900, ninety cases. The initiative taken by the Tsar, in 1899, may have been premature, but it was the natural outcome of a movement which had already produced remarkable results. His proposal for the limitation and gradual reduction of armaments failed, as did the British proposal at the second Hague Conference in 1907, mainly owing to the attitude of Germany. It is possible that, had this attitude been different, the 1914 conflagration would have been postponed, or even avoided.

Deprived by Germany of the powerful instrument which the High Court of The Hague might have become, the Powers who strove for peace endeavoured, in the first years of the century, to internationalise all important European issues, and to substitute European conferences for bi-lateral negotiations, in order to allow moderating influences to make themselves felt on both sides. Nobody played a more important part in these efforts to internationalise, or, at any rate, to Europeanise the issues threatening the peace of the world than Lord Grey, then Sir Edward Grey. The method was successfully applied at the Algeciras Conference, following the Kaiser's sensational visit to Tangier in 1905. It helped to a certain extent to solve the Franco-German crisis, following the no less sensational German demonstration at Agadir in 1911. It provided a settlement for the Balkan conflicts of 1912 and 1913, Germany exerting a restraining influence on Austria, and Great Britain exerting a similar influence on Russia. Here again, there is nothing to show that, had Germany's attitude been the same in 1914, the same result might not have been achieved.

But the German Government had decided otherwise. The Kaiser's military and naval advisers had obtained the upper hand in Berlin. They had tired of diplomatic pressure, in spite of the successful annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by the equally successful Bagdad railway negotiations; they had even tired of bold demonstrations, in spite of their having acquired by such means the most important stretches of the French Congo. They realised that the Pan-German plan, implying the annexation

or the protection of Belgium and Holland on the one side, and of the Straits and the Near East on the other, could never be realised during this generation if the German and Austrian initiative continued to be hampered by European interference. In order to take flight and to cast its shadow all over the world it was essential that the German eagle should stretch its wings freely towards the West and the East; and, since such freedom could only be obtained by force, force would become the first and last argument of the Central Powers.

There are many testimonies to the change of attitude which occurred in Berlin in 1912. But it may be safer to ignore individual opinions, however reliable and disinterested, and merely to examine the trend of events from the Sarajevo murder, on June 28, 1914, to the declaration of war by Great Britain on August 4th. It is impossible to do this, in the light of the German documents published by Kautsky and collected by Count Montgelas and Professor Schucking, without realising that the issue lay entirely with the German Government. Had the Kaiser and his counsellors restrained Austria as they had done in 1912 and 1913, or had they favoured and furthered Sir Edward Grey's offer of mediation, there seems no reason for believing that the world-war could not have been avoided. But the main purpose of German diplomacy at the time seems to have been, on the one hand, to encourage Austria's rash initiative and, on the other, to oppose passive resistance to British efforts to internationalise the negotiations.

When Count Hoyos brought to the Kaiser the well-known autograph letter from Francis-Joseph (July 5th) he was told that Austria might rely on Germany's support, and that the moment for launching an attack on Serbia was especially favourable. When, on the other hand (July 26th), Sir Edward Grey placed his proposal before the Powers, France and Italy promptly accepted it, but Germany declared that she would only take part in mediation at Austria's express wish, "since in vital matters people consult nobody." A second appeal to Germany, made three days later, through Prince Lichnowsky, and asking her to suggest, since she objected to mediation, any other method by which the Council of Powers might prevent war, only elicited the Chancellor's bid for British neutrality during his famous interview with Sir Edward Goschen. In return for such neutrality

Germany undertook to respect the integrity of France and of Belgium, if the latter did not take sides against Germany.

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The report of this interview, of which the accuracy has never been questioned, reveals the anxiety of the civilians in the German Government to conciliate Sir Edward Grey, while avoiding his intervention. Austria had been allowed to declare war on Serbia the day before, but she must not go too far and put herself in the wrong by refusing to negotiate with Petersburg. Meanwhile, the Kaiser advised a "douce violence" and that Belgrade should be held "as a guarantee," to give the Austrian army a "visible satisfaction d'honneur." None of Berlin's warnings to Vienna, which were supposed to give sound proofs of Germany's goodwill, suggest that the military operations should be interrupted pending the result of further negotiations, though Berlin was informed at the time that Russia's general mobilisation could not be prevented as long as the Austrian army continued to bombard Belgrade. For the last time, on July 31st, Sir Edward Grey pressed for solution which, while giving satisfaction to the Austrian claims, would respect Serbia's integrity and sovereignty. But, by that time, the conflict had indeed become "unavoidable " through Austria's precipitate action and through Germany's decision to "localise the conflict " and to allow her Ally's armies a "satisfaction d'honneur." It might be interesting, from a purely historical point of view, to discuss whether the issue was precipitated by Russia's hasty mobilisation or by the equally hasty German ultimatum which followed; but these considerations are not essential when dealing only with the question of responsibility. Neither are the respective parts played by the Kaiser's military and civil advisers, in these fateful days, of first importance here, since the final decision rested with the German War Lord, the author of the irresponsible Willy letters and still more irresponsible marginal notes.

In his interview with Sir Edward Goschen, Von BethmannHollweg had alluded rather irrelevantly to the future of Belgium in case of a general conflict. We know now, what we did not know in 1914, that the German ultimatum to Belgium demanding a free passage through that country, under the pretext that French troops were being moved along the Meuse, had been drafted by the German Chief of Staff as early as July 26th, that is to say three days before the above interview and a full week

before the French mobilisation. This draft, slightly amended by the German Foreign Office, had been sent, two days later, in a sealed envelope, to the German Minister in Brussels, with a covering letter instructing him not to open the document before receiving fresh instructions. As soon as the news of the Russian and German mobilisation reached him in London, Sir Edward Grey, in accordance with the action taken by Mr. Gladstone in 1870, wired to the French and German Governments, asking whether they were willing to pledge themselves to respect Belgian neutrality. While France immediately answered in the affirmative, the German Foreign Secretary demurred, under the pretext that such a pledge might reveal the plan of campaign. Though he could only have entertained very slight hopes as to the true meaning of this reply, Sir Edward Grey merely declared that "the British attitude would be largely determined by public opinion" and that "the neutrality of Belgium would appeal to public opinion very strongly." The German Government was thus given a last chance of adopting an attitude which would not involve immediate British intervention. By launching their ultimatum upon Belgium on August 2nd, they brought Great Britain automatically into the war and deliberately violated an international convention which was considered as the foundationstone of European peace.

It would be useless to discuss here whether Great Britain's moral obligations towards France would have compelled her to enter the struggle at a later stage. Such considerations do not diminish in the least degree the paramount importance of Germany's ultimatum. The fact remains that the violation of Belgian territory by German troops provoked the British declaration of war, and allowed the British Government to enlist, within a few months, a large army of volunteers, which greatly contributed to stabilise the western front after the Battle of the Marne.

Up to 1914, the peace of Europe had been preserved by the respect of neutralised zones, by the mediation of the Council of the Powers and, to a certain extent, by the peace movement inaugurated at the Hague Conference. The latter had been rendered ineffective owing greatly to Germany's decision not to accept any limitation of armaments. By her refusal to respect the 1839 treaty and to allow European diplomacy to interfere

effectively in the Austro-Serbian affair, she destroyed the last chances of a pacific settlement.

It is impossible to form a fair judgment on the question of war responsibility without examining this question in all its aspects. Many writers have enlarged on Germany's military and naval preparations and on her imperialistic ambitions in the West and in the East. But it has not been pointed out often enough that, while her policy gave an impulse to the forces of war, it also weakened and discredited the forces of peace. To quote Mr. Marvin again, it must be remembered that :

The war broke out owing to the refusal of Germany to submit the matter in dispute to arbitration and, in our own case, from our resolve to enforce an international agreement by arms. The Allies were therefore a League of Nations enforcing the findings of a world tribunal. The greatest of wars was, in effect, the execution of a decision by the greatest of courts.

It is a strange mistake to think that the Covenant of the League of Nations, embodied in the Peace Treaty, is mainly the outcome of American idealism. Without in the least wishing to diminish the importance of the American contribution, we may consider that the ideas embodied in the League had been slowly developing in the course of the nineteenth century, and that the world-war was mainly the result of the refusal of certain Powers to subordinate their imperialistic ambitions to international law and morality. The violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 provoked a reaction throughout the world which, more than anything else, helped to restore the work of international peace which had been so recklessly destroyed. It is therefore of the utmost importance, at a time when Germany's entry into the League is seriously contemplated, that the main issue which determined the war and which, to a great extent, determined the peace, should not be blurred by the sporadic publication of questionable or incomplete evidence.

The British Government must be congratulated upon their recent decision to publish all the documents in the archives of the Foreign Office bearing on the origin of the war, and it is greatly to be hoped that the French Government will follow suit, in order that the historian may obtain a complete record of events, and that all possible suspicions should be dispelled. No doubt, after the completion of this patient work, a certain number of inaccuracies