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will be corrected and some incidents hitherto minimised or exaggerated will appear in their true perspective.

It must not be forgotten, however, that if the study of British and French archives yields results similar to those derived from the study of German and Austrian archives, the outcome of this patient work will only be to make assurance doubly sure and to show that, in the words of Article 231 of the Peace Treaty, Germany and her Allies are responsible for the damage resulting from the war of aggression which they imposed upon the Associated Governments.

This conclusion need not engender any racial or national prejudice. Germany is not the only Power who has, in the course of history, inflicted a great wrong upon the world. All good Europeans recognise to-day that a system of balance of power maintained on increasing armaments implies obvious dangers and temptations. Though German policy contributed greatly to the development of this system, it would be absurd to declare that she was solely responsible for it. But, on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that, according to all the evidence at our disposal to-day, the policy adopted by the Kaiser and his advisers during the first years of the century, and more particularly in 1914, was the determining cause of a conflict which, had this policy been different, might never have taken place. The greatest comfort which may be derived from the study of international relations is the conviction that nothing is left to chance in human affairs and that nations, like individuals, remain "the masters of their fate."

EMILE CAMMAERTS

THE IRISH BOUNDARY QUESTION

WHEN

7HEN on the 6th December, 1921, it was announced that His Majesty's Ministers had at last succeeded in coming to terms with the plenipotentiaries of the Irish Republic the whole world, outside Ireland, breathed a sigh of relief. The Irish Question had been settled; congratulatory telegrams poured in from all quarters, and the belief was all but universal that a new era of peace had dawned, not only for the British Isles, but for all those countries-notably the United States-where the national self-assertiveness of the Irish race had long been a nuisance and a menace.

To those better acquainted with conditions in Ireland the congratulations seemed at least premature. It was clear to them that no reasonable accommodation with the "enemy" would gain the undivided approval of the Irish extremists, that the old cry of betrayal would be raised, and that the withdrawal of the Imperial forces would leave the unhappy country at the mercy of warring factions. The civil war that followed, with its insensate waste of human life and of the national wealth, justified these misgivings.

The firmness of the Government of Northern Ireland on the one hand, and of the Free State Government on the other, succeeded at last in mastering the forces of disorder; and for nigh on two years Ireland has been superficially at peace. The good sense and moderation of President Cosgrave and his colleagues has rallied to the Free State all those in Southern Ireland who know the value of orderly and stable rule, and the success of the first loan issued by the Government gave proof of a confidence which was justified, in spite of defeats and occasional abuses which may be regarded as the natural aftermath of revolution. It was justified more especially by the clear intention of the Government to adhere loyally to the terms of the Treaty. If civil strife again threatens and the accommodation with Great Britain is itself imperilled, this is not the fault of the Free State Government. It is due to the ambiguities of the Treaty itself and to the tangle of difficulty in which the Government consequently finds itself involved.

When the text of the "Articles of Agreement for a Treaty was published, it was at once noted by those who knew Ireland that an agreement had only been reached by postponing the settlement of the two most difficult and perilous questions at issue, namely, that of the boundary between the North and South, and that of the financial adjustment with Great Britain. With the second of these we are not immediately concerned, since it has not become acute, and may never become acute-if Great Britain is content to waive her claims in return for a quiet life. The Boundary Question, on the other hand, has become acute, so acute that it actually pricked the British press and public out of their accustomed indifference to Irish affairs, and set them running hither and thither in search of counsel. British honour, they found, was involved. They have also made the disconcerting discovery that, whatever solution they may favour, British honour will be hopelessly compromised.

In Ireland, of course, this has been long foreseen. Some two years ago the writer of a history of the Irish Revolution, in commenting on the treaty, pointed out that sooner or later the Boundary Question was sure to emerge, and that "whenever it did so, the Imperial Government would find itself faced with the alternative of breaking the contract made with the Ulstermen under the Act of 1920, or that made with Southern Ireland under the agreement of 1921."* That, in spite of all efforts to obscure the issue, is precisely the position to-day. It was stated with admirable clearness by Lord Grey of Fallodon, in the course of the debate in the House of Lords on the Irish Free State (Confirmation of Agreement) Bill :

The position (he said) as it seems to me is this. We entered into an honourable understanding with Ulster in 1920, and we entered into a definite agreement with the Free State under the Act of 1922. If we carry out and implement that definite agreement with the Free State, in the sense in which the Free State seems to understand it, we break our honourable understanding with Ulster. If we keep our honourable understanding with Ulster, we cannot go through with the engagement with the Free State.

The position is clearly not a pleasant one, and it is directly due to the purblindness of politicians who cannot see that contradictory assurances, intended as temporary sedatives, and

*W. Alison Phillips," The Revolution in Ireland "(1923), p. 242.

"formula" of dubious meaning are no cure for political distempers. The formula devised in the small hours of the morning of December 6, 1921, as a sedative for the boundary fever, was peculiarly unfortunate, since it is so ambiguous that the very doctors who agreed to the prescription cannot agree as to its meaning. The formula is contained in the now famous Article 12 of the treaty. This article, after providing means by which Northern Ireland could contract out of the Free State and retain its status under the Act of 1920, laid down that, in the event of advantage being taken of this option,

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A Commission, consisting of three persons, one to be appointed by the Irish Free State, one to be appointed by the Government of Northern Ireland, and one, who shall be chairman, to be appointed by the British Government, shall determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary of Northern Ireland shall be such as may be determined by this Commission.

The British signatories of the treaty are now unanimous in declaring that they understood by this provision no more than a readjustment of boundaries which were admitted both in the North and South to be highly inconvenient; that there had never been any intention of interfering with the essential integrity of the Six Counties. In a private letter to Lord Balfour, dated the 3rd of March, 1922, the Lord Chancellor (Lord Birkenhead) had pointed out that this was the clear meaning of the formula, as interpreted in accordance with diplomatic precedent, and that the mere fact that the matter had been delegated to a Commission and not kept in the hands of the Government ruled out anything but a mere delimitation of frontier. This letter was made public on the 8th of September, 1924; and two days later, at Penmaenmaur, Mr. Lloyd George expressed his complete agreement with it. In setting up the Commission, he said, there had never been any intention but to arrange "the fairest boundaries possible in the circumstances, which would hand over to the Southern States the Catholic parishes which were anxious to join them, but which would, on the other hand, transfer to the North those Protestant parishes which are now in the Free State."* In the House of Commons, on September 30 last, Mr. Baldwin declared that he and his friends who voted for the treaty never had any *The Times, Sept. 11, 1924.

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doubt as to the meaning of Article 12, and as to the limited nature of its terms."* Mr. Austen Chamberlain was even more explicit :

The British signatories of the Treaty (he said) definitely refused to allow the question of the boundary to be settled by county option, by Poor Law district option, or by the vote of the inhabitants taken in any local government circumscription that you might have. They left it to the Commissioners. We left it to them under a form of words which was deliberately adopted to exclude such a dismemberment of Northern Ireland as would be created by cutting out whole counties or large slices of counties. . . .†

A letter from Lord Long of Wroxall, written on the eve of his death, pointed out that this had been the agreed view of the Cabinet.

In view of these assurances, it might well seem that the claims of the Free State and the fears of Ulster are both unfounded. The trouble is that the assurances, for what they are worth, are belated. A study of the negotiations that preceded the treaty, and of the debates that followed it, leaves no such clear impression of the limited scope of the functions of the Commission. As early as the 10th November, 1921, Mr. Lloyd George, writing to Sir James Craig, spoke of “that area within the jurisdiction of the Northern Parliament which had been reserved for discussion with him," and had received by return of post a letter in which Sir James expressed his concern that " notwithstanding certain assurances . . . the area within the jurisdiction of the Northern Parliament is referred to as being open to revision."‡ Clearly this was no mere question of a rectification of frontier, to which Ulster would have raised no objection. Mr. Lloyd George, scenting trouble, proceeded to soothe the nerves of the North. A few days before the signature of the treaty he authorised Sir James Craig to make the following statement to the Northern Parliament :

By Tuesday next, either the negotiations will have broken down or the Prime Minister will send me new proposals for consideration by the Cabinet of Northern Ireland. In the meantime the rights of Ulster will be in no way sacrificed or compromised.§

*The Times, Oct. 1, 1924. fib. Oct. 2, 1924.

Quoted by Mr. De Valera, The Times, Sept. 15, 1924.

SQuoted by the Hon. Robert O'Neill, Speaker of the Northern Parliament, in the House of Commons. 149 H. C. Deb.; 5 ser., col. 312. Also The Times, Sept. 17, 1924.

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