Well, the negotiations did not break down, and the next thing that Ulster learned was that a treaty had been signed with the Irish Republicans, and that under Article XII of this treaty" the area within the jurisdiction of the Northern Parliament " was to be subject to revision.

The disastrous effect of this news was heightened by the language of the ministers chiefly responsible for the treaty. The ink of the signatures was scarcely dry when the Lord Chancellor hurried off to Birmingham, and there delivered a speech in which he suggested that the Boundary Commission would do a good work in rescuing the Catholic districts of Northern Ireland from the oppressions of its Protestant Government.

We propose (he said) that a Boundary Commission shall examine into the boundary lines with a view to rendering impossible such an unhappy incident as that of a few days ago, in which popularly elected bodies of one or two of these districts were excluded from their habitations by representatives of the Northern Parliament on the ground that they were not discharging their duties properly.*

Since the popularly elected body thus suspended was the County Council of Tyrone, this was taken to imply that the terms of reference empowered the Commission to transfer this county, or the greater part of it, to the South. This interpretation was confirmed by the language of the Prime Minister (Mr. Lloyd George) in the House of Commons, on 14th December. He

*This passage was quoted by Lord Londonderry in the House of Lords, and denounced by him as a deliberate insult to the Northern Government (Debate on the Address, Dec. 15, 1921. H. L. Parl. Deb.; Vol. xlviii; 5 ser., col. 70). In repudiating this suggestion, Lord Birkenhead quoted the next paragraph of his speech. This certainly modified the implied condemnation of the action of the Northern Government. On the other hand, it strengthened the impression of the wide powers given to the Commission by speaking of "the population in the particular counties" which "is liable to have its corporate existence terminated in the circumstances I have indicated." În the House of Commons, Mr. Robert O'Neill pointed out that the Lord Chancellor's speech had aroused the suspicions of Ulstermen that there was "something behind this " (149 H. C. Deb.; 5 ser.; col. 314).

+It may be noted that the same reasons which led to the suspension of the Tyrone County Council have since led to the suspension by the Free State Government of-among others-the County Council of Kerry, the Corporation of Dublin and the Corporation of Cork.

began, it is true, by renewing the pledge that in no circumstances would Ulster be coerced; he affirmed that "no change in her present position " would be involved if she decided, by an address to the Crown, to remain where she was; but he then proceeded to indicate the expediency of a most drastic change in her " present position":

We are of opinion (he said) that it is desirable, if Ulster is to remain a separate unit, that there should be a readjustment of boundaries.. There is no doubt-certainly since the Act of 1920-that the majority of the people of two counties prefer being with their Southern neighbours to being in the Northern Parliament. Take it either by constituency or by Poor Law Unions; or, if you like, by counting heads, and you will find that the majority of those two counties prefer to be with their Southern neighbours. What does that mean? If Ulster is to remain a separate community, you can only, by coercion, keep them there, and although I am against the coercion of Ulster, I do not believe in Ulster coercing other units.*

This could only mean one thing, and was greeted with loud cheers by those who resented Ulster's absurd obstinacy in refusing to repudiate the flag of the Empire. Having made an unequivocal statement, the Prime Minister then proceeded to equivocate. Any transference of territory, he said, must be subject to "economic and geographical conditions"; for instance, there was no question of assigning to the South the Catholic enclave in Antrim (which nobody had ever suggested); it was merely a matter of transferring a Catholic parish here and a Protestant parish there; it was doubtful whether Ulster would not even gain in the process. It is not surprising that the minds of British Unionists misgave them, or that the Ulstermen were angry and suspicious. Mr. Bonar Law drew attention to the pledge which the Prime Minister had given him before the last election, that the Six Counties should not be interfered with.† Mr. O'Neill declared that for Ulster this was "a question of life and death," and appealed in vain for a clear statement. The Prime Minister refused to commit himself and, when hard pressed, fell back on the "formula.” "All I have ever suggested," he said, ". . . was that the character of the population and the economic and geographical conditions must be taken into account. That is a matter which has to be decided upon by the Commission."‡

*149 H. C. Deb.; 5 ser.; col. 39. tib. col. 204. tib. col. 314.

It is clear that between December, 1921, and the opening of the debate on the address on February 7, 1922, the British sponsors of the treaty had realised the need for soothing the consciences of their docile Unionist followers. This, however, had to be done with discretion; for a balm for Unionists would be an irritant for Irish patriots. On the 17th February, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans assured the House of Commons that "this Commission is a Boundary Commission to settle boundaries, not to settle territories."* On the 3rd March the Lord

Chancellor addressed to Lord Balfour the letter to which reference has been made above, and on the 21st, in the House of Lords, he denied-in reply to Lord Carson-that there was any ambiguity in the clause. No such thing, he said, had been suggested during the amicable discussion between Sir James Craig and Mr. Collins, in London; it was only when they returned to " the less congenial atmosphere of Dublin" that the latter "put forward certain claims for the first time as to the meaning of the clause, in relation to which no trained lawyer, up to that moment, had even hinted that there lurked ambiguity."

It is not for me (he added) or any member of this Government to lay down for the Tribunal, to which we, in common with another set of persons, are litigants, canons or rules of construction. . . . In my opinion a Commission which deals with boundaries is one thing, and a Commission which deals with a transfer of territory is another—and a different thing. The competent chairman and his competent assistants will doubtless reach some conclusion on a clause which, in my opinion, is clear and unambiguous.†

It is unnecessary to follow the debate further. The Government, on the plea that any alteration of the treaty would destroy it, succeeded in defeating an amendment directed to removing the fears of Ulster by defining the powers of the Commission. The main question thus remained open. Unionist ministers had, apparently, satisfied themselves that nothing but a "rectification of frontier " was possible under the treaty. The Prime Minister,

*150 H. C. Deb.; 5 ser.; col. 1393. of the Irish Free State Bill.

Debate on the second reading

are, of

†Parl. Deb. Lords; 5 ser.; Vol. 49; col. 816; 1922. Debate on Lord Sumner's amendment. The competent assistants course, advocates of the opposing views and, as is always the case in arbitrations, the decision rests with " the impartial chairman."

on the other hand, with his customary skill, succeeded in committing himself neither one way nor the other. Mr. Thomas Moles, one of the members for Belfast, who demanded" a straight answer to a straight question," did not get it." Does he mean a slight rectification, or does he mean large areas?" he asked. To which Mr. Lloyd George replied that he "certainly never gave an assurance that the larger part of Tyrone and Fermanagh would be transferred to the Southern Parliament."* Of course not. He had told Mr. O'Neill, on a former occasion, that he could not say beforehand what the result of the Commission would be, whether to add to the number of the population of Ulster or to diminish it. "It is not for me," he said, "but for the Commissioners to express an opinion upon that."+

The majority of the Coalition, now hopelessly bogged, might take what comfort they could from the will-o'-the-wisp lights shed by the Prime Minister on the situation. The Irish, whether of the North or South, saw the position more clearly. It was-as Captain Redmond exclaimed in the House of Commons-" 1916 over again." In 1916, Ulstermen and Nationalists had agreed to a compromise, only to discover that they had been befooled by contradictory assurances, and the result had been the ruin of the Redmondite party, who were accused of agreeing to the partition of Ireland. It seemed unlikely that, after this warning, the Irish Republicans would walk into the same snare; and Mr. O'Neill put the matter to Mr. Lloyd George with disconcerting directness. "I understand the Prime Minister now to say," he said, "that he merely wants a small rectification of frontiers. . . . I wonder if he said this to the Sinn Fein delegates or did he put it to the delegates in such a way as to make them think that what he wished to do was to give them those two counties in respect of which they have had longings for some time past?" If he meant only a minor rectification of the boundary, "why did he not put it in the agreement ? "

The Prime Minister's answer was that quoted above. The true answer was supplied by President Cosgrave in the debate in the Dáil, on 15th October last. "I have observed," he said, "references by British politicians and British signatories to the treaty, and opinions which were carefully concealed when the negotiations which resulted in the treaty were being undertaken. *150 H. C. Deb.; 5 ser.; col. 1426. †149 H.C. Deb.; 5 ser.; col. 314.

Had these pronouncements been made at the time there would not have been Irish signatories to the treaty." That is the simple truth. For the Irish delegates to have surrendered their claim to at least Tyrone and Fermanagh would have been fatal to them and to any party which supported them; for the Government to have conceded the cession of the two counties would have wrecked the treaty on the opposition of Ulster and her Unionist champions. Hence the "formula," which could be interpreted by the Sinn Feiners as meaning much and by the Unionists as meaning little. It " papered over the cracks." It enabled both the British Parliament and Dáil Eireann to pass the structure erected by the treaty as sound.

Yet both should have been warned. Early in February, 1922, before the meeting of Parliament, Sir James Craig and Michael Collins met in order to attempt an accommodation. They found that on this question of the boundary they had received contradictory assurances from the Prime Minister, and they issued a statement of this fact over their signatures. In the circumstances any agreement was impossible. Sir James expressed his willingness to co-operate with the Free State in readjusting the boundary, which was generally recognised as highly inconvenient ; but, for the rest, he took his stand on the Act of 1920, which guaranteed the essential integrity of the Six Counties. Michael Collins, on the other hand, dropped all pretence of moderation.

Forces of persuasion and pressure (he said) are embodied in the Treaty which will bring the North-East into a united Ireland. If they join us they can have control of their own area. If they stay outside Ireland, then they can have only their own corner, and cannot, and will not, have the counties and areas which belong to Ireland and to the Irish people, according to the wishes of the inhabitants.†

About a year later, after the suppression of the Republican revolt, this view was officially put forward by the Free State Government in a manifesto, elaborately illustrated with maps and statistics, which claimed for Southern Ireland, under the terms of the treaty, not only Fermanagh and Tyrone, but also large sections of Derry, Down and Armagh.‡

*The Times, Oct. 16, 1924.

+Speech of March 5, 1922. In "Arguments for the Treaty," by Michael Collins (Dublin, 1922), p. 13.

"Handbook on the Ulster Question," cit.