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AS MARKED BY DECISIONS Selected from the AdvanCE REPORTS.

ACTIONS.

Tort

The question as to the nature of an action founded on the alleged duty of a landlord to see that the premises are Contract or in repair becomes of special importance in its relation to the Statute of Limitations. Thus in Altsheler v. Conrad, 82 S. W. 257, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides that a petition alleging that defendant agreed to fix the premises plaintiffs leased of him, but did not do so, and that thereafter plaintiffs' employee was injured by the defect in the premises, and recovered judgment of them in a certain amount, which they seek to recover of defendant, is not founded on the personal injuries to the employee, to which the one-year Statute of Limitations applies, but on the breach of contract, to which the five-year statute applies.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Intent

In Mass v. Burdetzke, 101 N. W. 182, the Supreme Court of Minnesota decides that a person who takes possession of land in the erroneous belief that it is public land, with the intention of holding and claiming it under the federal homestead law, may acquire title thereto by adverse possession as against the true owner. Compare Altschul v. O'Neill, 35 Or. 202.

In Murphy v. Rony, 82 S. W. 396, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides that admissions inconsistent with ownership made by one in possession of land Admissions after acquiring title by adverse possession do not constitute an estoppel, but may be considered on the issue of whether the possession was in fact adverse.

ASSAULT.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina decides in State v. Thornton, 48 S. E. 602, that when the correction adminAuthority of istered by a school-teacher is not in itself imSchool- moderate, and therefore beyond the authority Teacher of the teacher, its legality or illegality must depend entirely on the quo animo with which it is administered.

BANKRUPTCY.

An important decision in the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is found in Provable Crawford v. Burke, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9, where Debts: it is decided that only such debts created by the Discharge fraud of a bankrupt as were so created while he was acting as an officer or in a fiduciary capacity are excepted from the operation of a discharge in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Sec. 17, Subd. 4, since to hold that the language of this subdivision, making an exception in favor of debts "created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary capacity," includes all debts fraudulently contracted, would render meaningless the exception in Subd. 2 in favor of such claims for fraud as have been reduced to judgment.

Estate;

The United States District Court (S. D. New York) decides In re D. H. McBride & Co., 132 Fed. 285, that a Assets of contract between author and publisher for the copyrighting, publication, and sale by the latter Copyright of a series of books salable only in Catholic schools and convents, and the payment of a royalty thereon to the author, is a personal engagement, although the publisher may be a corporation; and where it expressly provides that it shall not be transferred without the author's consent, and that, on a failure to carry out its provisions the copyrights shall revert to the author, such copyrights cannot be sold by a trustee in bankruptcy as an asset of the publisher's estate against the objection of the author, who is entitled, on petition therefor, to have them assigned by the trustee in accordance with the contract.

BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

Manufactur

The difficulty of defining precisely a non-legal term is appearing in the decisions of the courts with regard to the word "manufacturing" as used in the BankIng Corpora- ruptcy Act of 1898. Thus In re Troy Steam tions Laundering Co., 132 Fed. 266, it is decided by the United States District Court (N. D. New York) that a corporation conducting a laundry, the largest part of its business being the washing, starching, ironing, and polishing of collars, cuffs, etc., for manufacturers, before they are put on the market, is engaged principally in manufacturing, and is subject to proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy. See note to Mattoon Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 42 C. C. A. 4.

BILLS AND NOTES.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma decides in Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 78 Pac. 321, that a promissory note which contains the following stipulation in relaNegotiability tion to attorney's fees, to wit: "It is stipulated by the parties to this note, that in event the same is collected by an attorney, or by any proceedings at law, an attorney's fee consisting of ten dollars and ten per cent. of the amount so collected shall be paid by the makers hereof to the holder of the same," destroys the negotiable character of the instrument, and thereby makes it non-negotiable, and the note is therefore subject in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value to all the legal defences which might be interposed against the note in the hands of the original payee. Compare Adams v. Leaman, 23 Pac. 53, 7 L. R. A. 224.

CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey decides in Murphy v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co., 58 Atl. 1018, that although it Boarding cannot be held, as a matter of law, that a perMoving Car son who attempts to board a trolley-car while it is in motion is negligent, yet, when the fact that the car is in motion is the sole producing cause of the injury sued for, the risk of its occurrence is one which the person making the attempt must be held to have assumed.

CARRIERS (Continued).

An interesting decision in reference to the extent to which a carrier must protect a passenger from injury from Protection of his fellow travellers occurs in Grogan v. BrookPassenger lyn Heights R. Co., 89 N. Y. Supp. 1027, where it is decided by the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second Department) that in an action against a carrier for injuries to a passenger, where it appeared that defendant exercised complete control over the platform from which a passenger entered its car through a window thereof, thereby inflicting injuries on plaintiff by kicking him in the face, when no reason appeared why the defendant could not have compelled its passengers, who had congregated on the platform with the purpose of taking passage on the train in which plaintiff sat, to enter the cars through the doors, the question of defendant's negligence was for the jury.

Ity for Goods

The cases have not reached very satisfactory conclusions upon the question of to what extent a carrier may be relieved of liability for an act of the shipper in Responsibll loading cars with his own goods. It has of Consignee several times been pointed out that this is a duty which the carrier itself should perform and not entrust to a shipper, as knowledge of the care , required in loading cars will frequently not be possessed by such shipper. However, the Supreme Court of Michigan, dealing with an analogous question, decides in Edward Frohlich Glass Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 101 N. W. 223, that where under an agreement between defendant railroad company and a consignor the latter was authorized to select cars for the transportation of its merchandise, and it selected a car which had been delivered to it loaded with sand for the shipment of a consignment of glass to plaintiff, and damage resulted by reason of the unsuitableness of the car, the railroad company was not liable to the consignee for negligently furnishing an unsuitable car, since as against the railroad company the consignee was bound by the consignor's selection under such agreement. Compare Pratt v. Ogdensburg, 102 Mass. 557.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Due Process

of Law

The United States Supreme Court decides in Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18, that an arbitrary interference with property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which cannot be justified as an exercise of the police power, results from the narrowing by municipal ordinance of the limits within which gasworks may be erected and maintained, so as to include within the prohibited territory property purchased for that purpose within the district wherein the erection of such works was then permitted, and on which such erection was then proceeding in compliance with an existing ordinance and a permit of the Board of Fire Commissioners, where such change was not demanded by the public welfare, and seems rather to have been actuated by a purpose to perpetuate a monopoly enjoyed by a gas company whose works were still within the privileged district.

In City of Mt. Vernon v. Kenlon, 89 N. Y. Supp. 817, the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second Estoppel Department) holds that the constitutionality of to Question a law requiring the bond of an officer to be a

Constitution.

ality lien on the real estate of the officer and his sureties cannot be attacked by persons voluntarily executing such bond. Compare Village of Olean v. King, 116 N. Y. 355.

CONTEMPT.

It is held by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Lorick & Lowrance v. Motley, 48 S. E. 614, that on disobedience of an order of court by trespassing Sentence on lands adjudged to belong to another, the trespasser may be required by the court to pay damages suffered by reason of the trespass in contempt proceedings or suffer imprisonment. Compare Ex parte Thurmond, I Baily, 608.

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