which he had adopted in the first edition. Many jurists had written monographs on the various phases of private international law. Dr. Wharton carefully analyzed these and presented to the American Bar the fundamental principles which he had gathered from these and from the decisions of the courts. The third and present edition has been prepared by Mr. George H. Parmele. The editor has preserved intact the text and notes of the second edition, together with its system of sectional numbering. The matter which has been added is distinguished by a wider spacing, so that the continuity of the former edition may be restored by omitting the spaced portions. To Dr. Wharton's invaluable discussion of general principles has been added the results of the editor's research through the reports of the modern American and English decisions. Many specific questions have grown to be important which were not considered by Dr. Wharton. The term "Conflict of Laws" has a wider meaning than the one adopted in the treatise. Here it is used to refer to the conflict which arises under the principles of private international law because of the diversity in location or situs of the different elements entering into a question. It does not refer to the conflict which arises because of the co-existence of two systems of jurisprudence over the same jurisdiction. The two volumes are divided into fourteen chapters. The first of these is devoted to the establishment of "Preliminary Principles." This chapter is practically unaltered. "Domicil" is treated of in the second chapter. The editor has added a consideration of the principles of "Taxation" as affected by the situs of property, debts, etc. The next chapter deals with the general principles of "Personal Capacity." The effect of the Conflict of Laws upon " Marriage" and "Divorce” is the topic next considered. The editor has made many important additions in this chapter. The following two chapters are entitled "Parental Relations" and "Guardianship.' Under chapter seven the "Law of Things" is discussed. Here the most valuable addition to the original text is a consideration of the effect of extraterritorial assignments of movables. The second volume opens with the chapter on "Obligations and Contracts." Here the chief additions are discussions on the lex loci contractus, on conflicts arising in the interpretation of insurance policies and bills of lading, and of obligations bearing interest. The titles of the remaining chapters are "Succession, Wills, and Administration," "Foreign Judg ments," "Practice,' "Bankruptcy," "Criminal Jurisdiction,' and "Extradition." The present edition of Wharton on the Conflict of Laws is an important contribution to our legal literature. It embodies the advantages of an edition published nearly a quarter of a century ago, and supplements these with new matter which ought to make the third edition the standard work on the Conflict of Laws. THE LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. A. S. F. BY LEWIS Baltimore: As the first edition is out of print, this book, as is stated in its preface, is practically a new work. It is not and has not been intended as a voluminous and detailed treatise on criminal law, but as a book, short and concise and at the same time comprehensive, and as such it well fills the position for which it is intended. While the text itself is entirely free from quotations both from cases and from other authors, the citations of important cases, English as well as American, are numerous, and have been brought down to the date of publication of this edition. The subject matter of the book is grouped under four different heads: "General Doctrines," "Procedure," " Special Proceedings," and "Specific Offences," but of the entire 566 pages only 251 are devoted to "General Doctrines" and "Specific Offences." while of the remainder, 201 pages are taken up with "Procedure" and "Special Proceedings." However, the brevity and conciseness of statement, together with but this short space devoted to the principles of criminal law, while making the book of less value as a text-book, greatly increases its usefulness to the practising attorney, and this usefulness is further augmented by the fact that the sections, of the book dealing with procedure and special proceedings both include numerous forms and seem to be specially complete and comprehensive. J. K. F. NOTES ON RECENT LEADING ARTICLES IN LEGAL PERI ALBANY LAW JOURNAL-July. ODICALS. The Law of the Constitution in Relation to the Election of Presi dent. J. Hampton Dougherty. The first point that is taken up by the author of this article is that of the appointment of electors under the provisions of the Constitution. We are told, “So comprehensive and unfettered is the grant, so omnipotent the power of the legislature, that it may not only itself choose the electors, or confer the privilege of election upon the people, to be exercised in districts, or by a vote upon a general ticket throughout the state at large, but it may even go so far as to give the power of appointment to the judiciary of a state, or to any body or person." "Thus at the threshold of the electoral system arises a question of transcendent moment, which is, has the organic law of the United States, in clothing a state legislature with plenary power to appoint electors, elevated the legislature of the state above and beyond the state Constitution?" The author does not attempt to answer this question, but leaves it to the consideration of his readers while he goes on to consider the qualifications of electors and the authority in which is vested the power to decide as to those qualifications. Here we find much confusion, and no case has as yet arisen in which it has been found necessary to definitely settle the matter; in the light of this fact the discussion may, perhaps, be considered rather academic than practical. As to the provisions relating to the election of Presi dent and Vice-President, there was, early in the life of the Republic, found much to change in the original methods provided by the Constitution, and even at this period of our history there is much which is open to criticism, notably the dangers of a tie vote in the electoral college. The provision for the succession to the office of President is considered inadequate, as it does not provide for the possibility of the death of the President-elect or of both the President and Vice-President-elect, there being, apparently, no machinery by which to fill the vacancies thus occurring. The often-discussed question whether the Vice-President becomes President upon the death or disability of the President, and, if so, at what time the disability may be considered permanent, is discussed, and no solution of the problem is offered. "The Constitution maintains a sphinx-like reserve" when consulted for a solution of the difficulty. By whom the electoral votes shall be counted and the various formalities in regard to the counting are points which are given a very complete treatment, the importance of the subject being illustrated by the events of 1876, which led up to the enactment of the legislation of 1887, which Mr. Dougherty does not consider successful. In fact, the argument is made that "te electoral system is the weakest and most vulnerable feature of the Constitution, and if disaster shall ever overtake the nation, it will come through the maintenance of the electoral system," and that “the time is opportune for the abolition of the useless and dangerous electoral system." Labor Strikes and Injunctions. P. L. Edwards. There is so much interest to-day in the subject which forms the title of this article that it may be well to call attention to the fact that another in the long series of articles upon the topic has been printed. Apart from the interest which the matter itself presents there seems to be little to differentiate this article from the others of its class which have already appeared. It has the merit, however, of being apparently free from any extreme partisanship, and the usual cases are presented in a logical order and in a manner which brings clearly before the reader the points at issue. Boycotts are treated as well as strikes, and a list of cases given in which they have been declared unlawful, although the list cannot be considered exhaustive. Mr. Edwards says in reference to the topic of which he treats, "This discussion is intended to show to what extent the use of the extraordinary writ of injunction is had in dealing with strikes and labor troubles, and is a practical review of the cases exhibiting the power of the court of equity to restrain and enjoin strikers and organized labor generally from committing tortious acts." It is, perhaps, hardly correct to call the paper "a discussion;" it is rather a plain presentment of the cases from which can be derived a reasonably fair bird's-eye view of the present state of the matters in the courts of law. New cases are constantly coming before the courts for adjustment, however, and in these new cases we find another state of facts, and, in many cases, another judge, who, either from his own environment and circumstances, or because he is of a different mental calibre, is able to give us a judgment from a point of view hitherto not presented to us. For this reason each article of this kind is a sort of report of progress of the position of the courts upon the matter, and is, therefore, of interest, not only to those who follow the law, but to those of the industrial world as well. SOME REMARKS UPON CHARGING THE JURY IN A TRIAL FOR MURDER.* Upon a trial for murder in Pennsylvania the prisoner may be convicted of murder of the first degree, the penalty for which is death, or murder of the second degree, with a maximum punishment of twenty years' imprisonment, or manslaughter, with a maximum penalty of twelve years' imprisonment. It is, there fore, obviously important for the interests, both of the prisoner and the Commonwealth, that the jury should have the law so stated to them that they can easily apply it to the facts of the case. A charge may be correct in point of law and yet so complicated as not to be intelligible to a jury. A judge might read to the jury an approved textbook upon homicide, and yet this, while a correct exposition of the law, would hardly be considered an intelligent way to instruct a jury. So a judge may take the charge of another judge which has been held to be correct and read it to the jury. The charge of Chief-Justice Agnew in the This paper was read before the Pennsylvania Bar Association on Wednesday, June 28, 1903, by the Honorable Robert Ralston, and is here reprinted by permission. case of Commonwealth v. Drum' is published in the Supreme Court Reports This seems to be regarded as the model of what a charge ought to be. It is an elaborate review of murder at common law, first and second degree murder under the statute, manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary, and the law of selfdefence. It is no doubt admirable, but there are few, if any, cases where it is necessary to go into such a wide range of subjects. Yet the judges in Pennsylvania almost invariably deem it essential in a trial for murder to define the various degrees of homicide and consider that they have done their duty when they have given the definition in Chief-Justice Agnew's charge—some of them going so far as to read long extracts from it. Such a charge is no doubt a correct statement of the law and could not be reversed by the Supreme Court: but the judge is not charging for the Supreme Court; he is supposed to be telling the jury what the law is as applicable to the case in hand, so that they can apply it to the facts and render a just verdict. The chief trouble arises from attempting to define murder and manslaughter, because there are no definitions of these crimes which mean anything without further explanation. In his evidence before the Homicide Law Amendment Committee (1874) Baron Bramwell said: "If you had to look for a definition of murder, you would not find it anywhere precisely laid down; you would have to search through Coke's Institutes, Hale's Pleas of the Crown, Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown, Leach's Crown Law, and Russell on Crimes, and a score of other books. You would not find it intelligibly or authoritatively stated anywhere to comprehend all cases; and in addition to that, when you did find it, you would find it encumbered with what I cannot help calling a number of unfortunate expressions about malice, and malice aforethought, and other things which are attended with several mischiefs." In 1389 the Statute 13 Rich. II was passed forbidding the granting of a pardon for murder with "malice prepense." Subsequent statutes excluded from benefit of clergy “wilful prepense '58 Pa. 1. |