Stover v. Lasater.

JOEL STOVER v. J. M. LASATER.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. Jurisdiction. Forfeiture. The act of 1875, ch. - provides that any person guilty of turbulent or riotous conduct within or about any hotel, theater, inn or public house, "shall be liable to a forfeiture of five hundred dollars, and the owner or persons so offended against, may sue in his own name for same." A suit for the recovery of the forfeiture should be brought in the Circuit Court. Justices of the peace have no jurisdiction of such suits.

FROM COFFEE.

Appeal in error from the Circuit Court of Coffee county. J. J. WILLIAMS, J.

P. C. ISBEL for Stover.

W. A. THOMA for Lasater.

DEADERICK, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Stover sued Lasater before a justice of the peace for Coffee county. The cause of action stated in the warrant was "$500 for forfeiture for violations of the first and second sections of the act of the Legislature passed on the 23d day of March, 1875, pages 216 and 217 of the acts of 1875."

That act provides that any person guilty of turbulent or riotous conduct within, or about any hotel, theater, inn or public house, etc., may be indicted and fined not less than one hundred dollars, "and the offenders shall be liable to a forfeiture of five hundred dollars, and the owner or persons so offended against, may sue in his own name for the same."

Stover . Lasater.

The magistrate before whom the trial was had, gave judgment for costs against plaintiff, and he appealed to the circuit court. There, on motion, the warrant was quashed, and plaintiff has appealed to this court. By the act of 1875, ch. 11, the jurisdiction of justices of the peace was increased to $1000 on notes, upon endorsements of negotiable paper, where demand and notice are especially waived. The same act in section two increases said jurisdiction, in all unsettled accounts, obligations, contracts or other evidences of debt, not included in the previous section, to $500. And the third section provides that said justices shall have jurisdiction in cases "for the recovery of property, and in all cases of damages, except libel and slander, arising from either tort or contract," to the extent of $500.

In the case of Duncan v. Maxey, 5 Sneed, 114, suit was brought before a justice for a penalty of $62.50, for "firing the woods." As the law then stood, justices had jurisdiction to the extent of $500 on notes of hand; $250 on accounts, obligations, contracts and other evidences of debt; and $50 in cases of damages, whether arising out of contracts or tort.

It was held that the action for a penalty was not within the justice's jurisdiction, although it was recoverable by an action of debt; that it did not fall within either class of cases, specially enumerated, but was a pecuniary punishment for a wrong done in violation of the statute, and must be sued for in the Circuit Court.

We think the reasoning of that case applies to this, and the judgment will be affirmed.

Tucker v. State.

JAMES TUCKER v. THE STATE.

1. CRIMINAL LAW.

For abduction, for prostitution and concubinage, under section 4618 of the Code, the defendant is guilty, though the abduction may be with the consent of the female.

2. SAME. Indictment. An indictment containing two counts, one for abduction for prostitution and one for abduction for concubinage, is good. Two offenses of like nature, punishable alike, may be included in the same indictment.

FROM CANNON.

Appeal in error from the Circuit Court of Cannon county. ROBT. CANTRELL, J.

J. A. JONES for Tucker.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL LEA for the State.

DEADERICK, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an indictment under section 4618 of the Code, which provides that "any person who takes any female from her father, mother, guardian, or other person having the legal charge of her, without his or her consent, for the purpose of prostitution or concubinage, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary, not less than two nor more than ten years." By the act of 1871, the term of imprisonment was increased from ten to twenty-one years.

The defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court

Tucker v. State.

of Cannon county, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for ten years, and has appealed to the court. The evidence satisfactorily establishes that the defendant, a married man, secretly carried off the daughter of prosecutor, aged about fourteen years, and cohabited with her on his way from the State. That he passed with her from Cannon county, to Alabama, thence through Memphis to Texas.

The court charged the jury that if the girl was taken from her father, without his consent, for the purpose of prostitution, or concubinage, although she may have consented to go, that the offense would be made out. And we think the charge is correct.

The indictment contains two counts. One charging the purpose to have been prostitution, and the other concubinage. And the jury found defendant guilty on the last count..

There is no objection to the joinder in different courts, of two offences of like nature and punishable alike, in the same indictment. And the evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding in the second count, and the judgment will be affirmed.

Fulgum v. Mayor, etc., of Nashville.

J. G. FULGUM v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF

NASHVILLE.

TAXES. Corporation. The Commercial Hotel, in the city of Nashville, was assessed in 1874 by the city assessor, at $39,750. The corporation tax being $2. The State and county valuation was $35,725, and the State tax was 40 cents upon the $100. By an ordinance of the city, a tax of $40 and one per cent upon the rental value of a hotel was levied for the privilege of keeping hotel, said ordinance providing that small hotels of less than ten rooms, shall pay no privilege tax. Held,

First. That the corporation might assess the property at a higher value than the value placed upon it by the State, if it be not assessed higher than its actual value. The constitution providing it shall be levied upon the same principles as the State tax, to-wit, at its value, and maintaining uniformity.

Second. Corporations may levy a higher rate of taxation than the rate levied by the State and county.

Third. The requirement of the payment of $40 and one per cent on rental value for the privilege of hotel keeping, and the exemption of small hotels of less than ten rooms, does not render the ordinance objectionable, but the same is reasonable and valid.

8L 635 13L 304

FROM DAVIDSON.

Appeal in error from the Circuit Court of Davidson county. N. BAXTER, J.

J. P. HELMS for Fulgum.

W. K. MCALISTER, JR., for city.