the drug, the exclusion of a letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in response to a query by defendant physician as to dispensing of narcotics held proper,

Evidence that defendant, a physician, dispensed the drug to addicts and to persons other than those specified in the indictment is admissible to show his intent. (Thompson v. United States, 258 Fed. 196, 1919.)

The courts take judicial notice of the facts of chemistry contained in the United States Pharmacopœia.

In prosecution of a physician for violating the Harrison Narcotic Act order forms used by defendant to procure morphine from a druggist other than the one with whom he was charged with having conspired and with having made a sale were admissible on the issue of intent to furnish the drug to an addict, and not to aid or cure a patient in his practice as a physician.

In prosecution of physicians for violating the Harrison Narcotic Act the testimony of qualified medical experts that the prescribing of the drug under stated quantities and circumstances would not be in the course of a physician's regular practice was admissible on the issue whether the drug was dispensed in the legitimate course of defendant's practice as physicians. (Melanson v. United States and Ellsworth v. Same, 256 Fed. 783, 1919.)

Indictments-In prosecutions for violations of the act.

Indictments charging that defendants knowingly, unlawfully, and feloniously had in their possession and under their control smoking opium, not having theretofore registered with the collector of internal revenue, as required by act December 17, 1914, and not having theretofore paid the special tax provided for thereby, but not alleging that defendants were in any of the classes thereby required to register and pay such tax, were fatally defective in substance, and too uncertain to be sustained, since, when an offense can be committed by only certain classes or persons, the indictment must allege that accused is in one of those classes. (United States v. Woods (and five like cases) 224 Fed. 278, 1915.)

In view of sections 1, 2, and 8 of the act an indictment charging defendant with conspiring with M. to have a dram of opium in the possession and under the control of M., and as the overt act charging that defendant issued to M. a prescription therefor, in bad faith, knowing it was not given for medicinal purposes, but for supplying one addicted to the use of opium, is insufficient; the unlawful thing charged consisting in having the drug in the possession and under the control of M., the word "person" in section 8 referring only to those required by the act to register and pay the tax, and it not being alleged M. had the drug in his possession for any of the purposes for which he would have to register and pay the tax. (United

States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 225 Fed. 1003, 1915, affirmed in 241 U. S. 394, 1916.)

Statutes creating and defining crimes can not be extended by implication or intendment, and an indictment under such a statute must allege directly and with certainty every element essential to bring the offense within its terms.

Where a statute defining an offense contains an exception in the clause creating the offense, which is so incorporated with the language defining it that the offense can not be accurately and clearly described, if the exception is omitted, the indictment must allege enough to show that the accused is not within the exception; but, if the language creating the offense is so completely separable from the exception that the essential ingredients of the offense may be accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the exception, it need not be negatived therein, but it is a matter of defense.

An indictment under Harrison Antinarcotic Act December 17, 1914, section 8 (38 Stat. 789), charging that defendant not having registered and paid the special tax required by section 1 of the act, had in his possession a quantity of morphine, is insufficient to charge an offense where it is not alleged that he was engaged in a business which required him to register and pay such special tax.

Exemptions from liability for offenses created by acts of Congress are matters of defense; but matters excepted from the granting clause of the act are not within the terms of the act, and such matters. must be negatived in the indictment or complaint. (United States

v. Carney, 228 Fed. 163, 1915.)

Under sections 1 and 8 of the act an indictment charged that in violation of section 1 defendant unlawfully sold, dispensed, and distributed morphine sulphate tablets as a dealer to a consumer. Held, that this was equivalent to charging that he had them in his possession, and hence au offense was charged; but, as the offenses were charged as violations of section 1, proof of registration and the payment of the special tax would be a complete defense. (United States v. Curtis, 229 Fed. 288, 1916.)

Indictment for such offense must allege it was committed within the essential period, or it fails to allege an offense.

Under Revised Statutes, section 1025, excusing defects of form, indictment charging that defendant violated the antidrug act by giving an order for opium, and, after acceptance, failing to preserve a duplicate so as to be readily accessible, was sufficient, though alleging the date of the offense no more definitely than some unknown date within the essential two-year period, which did not tend to defendant's prejudice.

To the requirement that an indictment must allege a day certain, there are two fairly recognized exceptions: Misdemeanors, and offenses of omission, rather than of commission.

Violation of the antidrug act by giving an order for opium, and, after acceptance, failing to preserve a duplicate so as to be readily accessible, is an offense in nature but a misdemeanor, failure to obey an administrative regulation, a mere statutory infraction, and not a true crime, though made a felony by Penal Code (act Mar. 4, 1909) section 335 (35 Stat. 1152).

An indictment charging violations of the antidrug act, in that defendant gave an order for opium and failed to preserve a duplicate after acceptance so as to be readily accessible, need not allege the offense as of a day certain; the charge being an omission to perform a statutory duty. (United States v. Gaag, 237 Fed. 728, 1916.)

Indictment under Harrison Narcotic Act, sections 1, 2, charging accused with dealing in forbidden drugs without having registered and paid the special tax, Held, not bad for duplicity, or because vague, indefinite, and uncertain. (United States v. Loewenthal, 257 Fed. 444, 1919.)

An indictment for violation of the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act which described defendant as not being then and there an officer of the Federal Government or State government engaged in making purchases of the specified drug, and not being any other officer entitled to make such purchases, Held, not insufficient, as failing to negative all statutory exceptions from the operation of the statute by section 1.

An indictment is sufficiently certain if it fairly informs accused of the crime intended to be charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, and so as to make the judgment a complete defense to & second prosecution.

Count of indictment for violation of the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act, Held, not bad, as not negativing the exception of section 6, that the provisions of the act shall not be construed to apply to the dispensing of remedies not containing more than a quarter of a grain of morphine, etc. (Stetson v. United States, 257 Fed. 689, 1919.)

An exception in the enacting clause of a penal statute must be negatived by the indictment, but an exception in a later section need not be negatived.

Description of a statutory offense in the language of the statute is sufficient, provided the language used according to its natural import fully describes the offense.

Indictment for violation of the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act stating the charge substantially, though not literally, in the language of section 1 of the act, fully defining the offense, and also alleging the sale of morphine in certain so-called morphine checks and other forms, Held, sufficient. (Stetson v. United States, 257 Fed. 689,

An indictment under section 2 charged that accused gave an order to a certain person for one of such drugs, and that he failed to preserve a duplicate of the order for two years, and also failed to keep a record of the amount of the drug by him dispensed and distributed. Held, that this was not an attempt to plead in the alternative, nor did it plead two violations of the law, as a physician is excused from failing to keep a duplicate of the order only when he keeps a record of his dispensing, and the indictment alleged the absence of the exception, which makes the provision for the retention of the duplicate of the order unnecessary. (United States v. Charter, 227 Fed. 331, 1915.)

An indictment charging in substance that defendant did " "dispense, distribute, and sell" a derivative of opium to persons named without a written order on the prescribed form and not in the course of his professional practice as a physician, Held, to charge an offense under Harrison Narcotic Act, Dec. 17, 1914, section 2. (Foreman v. United States, 255 Fed. 621, 1918.)

Though section 2 declares that nothing in the section shall apply to registered physicians who distribute narcotics in their professional practice, Held, that an indictment, though averring that defendant was a registered physician, charged with a violation of section 2, in that he sold and dispensed heroin not in his professional practice, and in that the sale was not made in pursuance of a written order on a blank issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

An indictment charging a violation of section 2 in that defendant sold and dispensed heroin, not on a written order on a blank issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Held, not uncertain, ambiguous, and duplicitous, though it was averred that the defendant was a registered physician. (United States v. Hoyt, 255 Fed. 927, 1917.)

An indictment charging violation of the Harrison Narcotic Act which averred that defendant at the time of the offense knew that cocaine was a derivative of coca leaves, and that morphine and heroin were salts and derivatives of opium, sufficiently averred by implication the fact that cocaine was a derivative of such leaves, and that morphine and heroin are salts or derivatives of opium.

In view of section 1025, Revised Statutes, imperfections in indictment for violating the Harrison Narcotic Act in that it did not aver that cocaine is a derivative of coca leaves, and that morphine or heroin are salts or derivatives of opium. Held, harmless imperfections, carrying no consequences.

Under section 8 indictments charging violation of the act were not defective, because not averring facts showing defendants did not come within any of the exceptions of the act. (Melanson 7. United States and Ellsworth v. Same, 256 Fed. 783, 1919.)

Under section 1025, Revised Statutes, providing that defects of form, not prejudicing defendant, shall not invalidate indictments, and Harrison Narcotic Act, section 8, relative to negativing exceptions in an indictment, an indictment under sections 1 and 2 of the Harrison Act need not negative exceptions in those sections. (United States v. Lowenthal, 257 Fed. 444, 1919.)

Powers of Congress.

Congress may prohibit the importation of opium and regulate its relation to interstate commerce, as is done by act of December 17, 1914, providing for the registration with collectors of internal revenue of dealers in opium, imposing a tax on dealers, and making it unlawful for any person who has not registered and paid the tax to have in his possession any opium or derivative thereof, and providing that such possession shall be presumptive evidence of a violation of the act. (United States v. Brown, 224 Fed. 135, 1915.)

Questions for the jury-Prosecutions for violations of the act.

In prosecutions of physicians for having conspired to violate the Harrison Narcotic Act and having made sales illegally, question whether or not cach defendant had conspired with a druggist, a codefendant, to dispense the drug in the guise of prescriptions to patients but really to addicts for the gratification of their appetite, and not for their cure, Held, for the jury under the evidence.

In prosecution of physicians for sale of drugs in violation of Harrison Narcotic Act whether dispensing of drug in each case was a dispensing of it by a physician to a patient, in which case no order form was required, or whether the form of prescription was used by defendants as an evasion of the law, and not in good faith, in which case the dispensing would be a sale, and an order form necessary to bring it within the law, Held, for the jury.

In prosecution of physicians for having violated the Harrison Narcotic Act whether two persons were consumers of the drug and not patients of defendants, and whether defendants and the druggist on whom they issued prescriptions, their codefendant, knew the true character in which such persons sought to procure the drugs, Held, for the jury. (Melanson v. United States and Ellsworth v. Same, 256 Fed. 783, 1919.)

In prosecution of physicians for having violated and conspired to violate the Harrison Narcotic Act the trial court in his general charge properly submitted an issue as to the good faith of defendants in issuing their prescriptions to supposed patients, since the defendants could only protect themselves if the prescriptions were issued legitimately in their practice. (Id.)