for, where the claim of the creditor has not been reduced to judgment, and no steps have been taken to fix a lien on the property for the purchase money, except by asking, in the objections to the allowance of the exemption, that such lien be established.-In re Butler (D. C.) 100.

A court of bankruptcy is without jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in a state court against a bankrupt in an action on the case for fraud, pending his discharge, since such action cannot affect the proceedings in bankruptcy, and in no case could the discharge constitute a defense thereto. In re Wollock (D. C.) 516.

Bankr. Act 1898, § 17, cl. 2 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428], does not limit the claims exempted from release by a discharge on account of fraud to such as have been reduced to judgment. In re Wollock (D. C.) 516.

A specification of objections to the discharge of a bankrupt is not a pleading, within the meaning of Bankr. Act 1898, § 18c [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3429], requiring all pleadings setting up matters of fact to be verified, and such specifications need not be verified.-In re Jamieson (D. C.) 697.

As precedent to obtaining discharge, held necessary for bankrupt to assign his interest in spendthrift trust to trustee in bankruptcy.—In re Fleishman (D. C.) 960.

A contract for the sale of goods held not to retain title in the seller to such goods or their proceeds, or create a fiduciary relation between the parties, so that the debt of the purchaser for the proceeds of goods sold and not paid for would not be released by his discharge in bankruptcy. In re Butts (D. C.) 966.

Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, § 17. cl. 4, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428], construed as to debts excepted from release by the bankrupt's discharge on the ground of fraud, etc.In re Butts (D. C.) 966.

Leave to amend the specifications filed in opposition to the discharge of a bankrupt can only be granted by the judge.-In re Peck (D. C.)

972.

The verification of specifications of objection to the discharge of a bankrupt by the attorney for the objecting creditors, who states under oath that "the matters alleged above are true to the best of his knowledge and belief," is sufficient. In re Peck (D. Č.) 972.

So-called specifications of objection to the discharge of a bankrupt, which merely state the grounds for refusing a discharge in the language of the statute, without any attempt to specify any particular act of the bankrupt, are wholly insufficient, and no evidence can be received thereunder, nor do they afford any basis for amendment.-In re Peck (D. C.) 972.

Bankr. Act § 6, Act July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 548 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3424], held not to enlarge exemptions allowable under state laws, nor prevent the enforcement of Code Iowa, § 4015, prohibiting the allowance of exemptions on executions for purchase money.-In re Boyd (D. C.) 999.

A bankrupt held estopped to object to the jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy to order exempt property sold for the benefit of the seller in payment of the price, though he had not recovered judgment and levied execution as required by Code Iowa, § 4015.-In re Boyd (D. Ĉ.) 999.

The claim of creditors of a bankrupt to have exempt property sold to pay unpaid portions of purchase price should be presented by the creditors, and not by the trustee in bankruptcy.— In re Boyd (D. C.) 999.

§ 9. Appeal and revision of proceedings. Appeal from discharge in bankruptcy held dismissible under Bankr. Act 1898, § 25 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3432], and Circuit Court of Appeals Rule 14, subd. 3 (31 C. C. A. liv. 90 Fed. liv), on account of insufficiency of the record.-Williams Bros. v. Savage (C. C. A.) 497.

One held not entitled to a second petition for review of the same proceeding in bankruptcy.Beach v. Macon Grocery Co. (C. C. A.) 736.

his motion to expunge a claim allowed, unless A trustee may appeal from an order denying further preferences were surrendered, and directing a return of a preference_previously surrendered by the creditor.-Livingstone V. Heineman (C. C. A.) 786.

On appeal by a creditor of a bankrupt from an order approving a composition, under which a majority of the creditors have received the amounts to which they were entitled, the assenting creditors are necessary parties.-Marshall Field & Co. v. Wolf & Bro. Dry Goods Co. (C. C. A.) 815.

Fiancée of cashier of insolvent bank, furnishing securities for loan to it through inducement of cashier, held entitled to recover from receiver as preferred creditor.-Hallett v. Fish (C. C.) 986.

Evidence held to show that cashier, in securing aid for loan to insolvent bank, was acting for the bank, and not for himself.-Hallett v. Fish (C. C.) 986.

§ 2. Functions and dealings.

Where a husband deposited money in bank in his wife's name, but stated that he would draw the checks, the bank became prima facie the debtor of the wife, the transaction being notice to it of her ownership; and, where the money was in fact her separate property, it could not discharge such indebtedness by paying out the

mission v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.) 934.

The same evidence which warrants a finding that dissimilar circumstances and conditions exist, which justify a lower rate for a longer haul to one point than for a shorter haul to another, also establishes that the charging of such rates does not give one point an undue preference

§ 1.

1. Right of action and defenses. An agreement which contains nothing unfair, and which truthfully states the understanding of the parties so far as it attempts to state it,

will not be canceled because it is inchoate and incomplete.-Kerr v. Southwick (C. C. A.) 772. § 2. Proceedings and relief.

A bill for the cancellation of an instrument for fraud will not support a decree which, although finding the instrument valid, enjoins the defendant from misrepresenting its legal effect as construed by the court.-Kerr v. Southwick (C. C. A.) 772.

See "Shipping."

CARGO.

CARRIERS.

Carriage of goods by vessels, see "Shipping,"

§ 4. Carriage of passengers by vessels, see "Shipping," 5.

Combinations in restraint of trade, see "Monopolies," § 1.

§ 1. Control and regulation of common carriers.

A railroad company is under no duty as a common carrier to permit hackmen to enter its stations for the purpose of soliciting business from its passengers, and therefore its granting of such right to one person or concern does not entitle others to equal privileges on the same terms.-Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co. (C. C. A.)

215.

A railroad company may enjoin hackmen from congregating on the sidewalk around the doors of a station to solicit business in such numbers as to materially interfere with ingress and egress.-Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co. (C. C. A.) 215.

A finding that the rates charged by railroads for shipments to a particular point are unreasonable in themselves, and in violation of section 1 of the interstate commerce act (24 Stat. 379 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154]), cannot properly be based on evidence which only tends to show that they are too high, as compared with the rates charged between the initial points and one or two other points.-Interstate Commerce Com

§ 2. Carriage of goods.

Promise of carrier not to insist on provision in bill of lading exempting it from loss or damage by fire held founded on valuable consideration.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Cau (C. C. A.) 15.

A general Eastern freight agent of a Western railroad, having his office in New York, has apparent power by virtue of his position to contract for the through carriage of goods over his own and connecting lines of transportation, and such a contract, made with one having no knowledge of any limitations on his power, will bind receivers operating his road, and for whom he is acting.-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 873.

The fact that a shipper, after receiving a bill of lading, negotiates the same, is not a ratification or adoption of its terms, as between him and the carrier, which will operate to annul a prior valid contract under which the goods were shipped, and under which rights have vested and obligations have accrued.-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 873.

The mere receipt of a bill of lading does not alter or affect a prior contract under which goods have been actually shipped and are in course of transit, without an actual consent to the change.-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 873.

Receivers, operating a railroad, held liable in damages for a loss resulting to a shipper, with whom they contracted for through shipment over their line and a connecting steamship line, from delay in transshipment, on the ground that they failed to exercise care to prevent such delay.-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 873.

3. Carriage of passengers.

A railroad company is liable in damages, without notice or demand, for the action of a conductor in wrongfully ejecting a passenger, where the conductor acted without malice; and. in an action to recover such damages, evidence of negotiations between the parties for a settlement is not admissible, on the theory that it shows a ratification by the company of the conductor's action.-Pennsylvania Co. v. Lenhart (C. C. A.) 61.

In an action to recover damages for plaintiff's wrongful ejection from a railroad train, it was error to permit plaintiff to testify to further transactions and conversations between him and employés of the company, after his ejection and after his right of action was com

61.

A railroad company held liable in damages
for the ejection of a passenger for his refusal
to pay fare, where he presented a mileage book
which, under the circumstances and the terms
of the contract, it was the conductor's duty to
accept.-Pennsylvania Co. v. Lenhart (C. C. A.)

61.

A passenger on a railroad train is not re-
quired to pay fare, when demanded by the con-
ductor, where he has presented a legal ticket,
in order to save the company from liability for
damages for his wrongful ejection.-Pennsyl-
vania Co. v. Lenhart (C. C. A.) 61.

Evidence in an action for injury to a passen-
ger on a steamboat, caused by a failure of part
of its machinery to operate. held sufficient to re-
quire the submission of the question of de-
fendant's negligence to the jury-Wilmington
Steamboat Co. v. Walker (C. C. A.) 97.

In an action against a railroad company for
the death of a passenger, deceased held as a
matter of law not guilty of contributory negli-
gence in riding in the car reserved for colored
passengers.-Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Sul-
livan (C. C. A.) 799.

CAUSE OF ACTION.

See "Action"; "Malicious Prosecution," § 1.

ances.

1035

An instrument conveying personal property
as security for a debt will be treated as a mort-
gage in equity, although informal in its lan-
guage.-Davis v. Turner (C. C. A.) 605.
§ 2. Filing, recording, and registration.
Evidence held not to show that a chattel mort-
gage by a country merchant to his cotton factor
was fraudulently withheld from record.-In re
Williams (D. C.) 542.

3. Construction and operation.

A provision of a chattel mortgage with ref-
erence to after-acquired property construed, and
held to apply only to property added to maintain
or increase the efficiency of the mortgaged
plant.-In re Sentenne & Green Co. (D. C.) 436.
4. Removal or transfer of property by

mortgagor.

A chattel mortgage of a mechanical plant, cov-
ering additions made to maintain or improve its
condition and efficiency, which is valid against
the mortgagor, will be enforced as to additions
made to the plant for that purpose by a pur-
chaser from the mortgagor, who assumed all
his obligations under the mortgage.-In re Sen-
tenne & Green Co. (D. C.) 436.

5. Payment or performance of condi-
tion, release, and satisfaction.
Where a country merchant shipped cotton to
a factor holding a mortgage lien, and made
drafts against the proceeds of the shipment,
leaving a balance due the factor in good faith,
the mortgage given as lien protects such bal-
ance. In re Williams (D. C.) 542.

CHINESE.

Exclusion or expulsion, see "Aliens," § 1.

CHOSE IN ACTION.

Assignment, see "Assignments."

CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.

See "Courts," § 6.

CITATION.

See "Process."

CITIES.

See "Municipal Corporations."

CITIZENS.

See "Aliens"; "Indians."

Citizenship ground of jurisdiction of United
States courts, see "Courts," § 4; "Removal of
Causes," § 1.

Privileges and immunities, see "Constitutional
Law," § 3.

CIVIL RIGHTS.

§ 2.

Steam vessels and sail vessels.

A steamer held in fault for a collision with a meeting schooner at sea in a fog, for failing to keep a proper lookout, because of which she did not hear the schooner's fog signals and keep out of the way, as was her duty as the burdened vessel.-The Gadsby (D. C.) 851; The Frank A. Palmer, Id.

§ 3. Vessels in tow.

Evidence considered, on which it was held that a steamer 240 feet long, passing up the "lime kiln crossing" in the Detroit river, was solely in fault for a collision with the second of two barges in tow of a meeting steamer, on account of her improper navigation in changing her course across the channel, which is only 440 feet wide, after meeting the first tow.-Mitch

ell Transp. Co. v. Green (C. C. A.) 49; Green v. Mitchell Transp. Co., Id.

A steamer passing free through a rather narrow channel, and meeting another vessel with tows, is bound to take into account the fact that such tows are likely to be somewhat unwieldy, and vary more or less in their several courses, and to guard against the danger and keep out of the way, if she can without peril to herself.-Mitchell Transp. Co. v. Green (C. C. A.) 49; Green v. Mitchell Transp. Co.,

Id.

A steam lighter held in fault for a collision in the night with a barge in tow on a hawser in New York Bay for failing to keep a lookout and to observe the lights on the tug, indicating a tow astern.-The Komuk (D. C.) 841; The Clarence, Id.

A tug and barge in tow in New York Bay in the night have the burden to show that the failure of the barge to carry the lights required by the pilot rules did not contribute to a

Evidence considered, and held to sustain a decree holding a schooner, anchored in a narrow channel in Narragansett Bay, in the night, solely in fault for a collision with a steamer, on the ground that she did not maintain a proper anchor light.-The Maggie Ellen (C. C. A.) 662.

§ 5. Fog or thick weather.

The requirement of article 16 of the international navigation rules [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2868] that all vessels shall go at a moderate speed in a fog, "having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions," is absolute, and a vessel is not relieved from liability for its violation because so constructed that she cannot be properly controlled at a speed which is moderate under the circumstances aud conditions.-The Eagle Point (C. C. A.) 449.

6. Narrow channels, harbors, rivers,

and canals.

A collision between two ocean steamships meeting in Patapsco river, where the channel is 600 feet wide, held due solely to the fault of one for maintaining full speed and for the violation of the inland navigation rules by her pilot in attempting to pass on the wrong side of the channel. The Acilia (C. C. A.) 455; The Crathorne, Id.

vessels in narrow channels to keep to the side Article 25 of the inland rules, requiring steam on their starboard hand, is applicable to navigation in a channel in the Chesapeake Bay 600 feet wide, and is mandatory, superseding all prior rules and local customs.-The Acilia (C. C. A.) 455; The Crathorne, Id.

A ferryboat and a tug both held in fault for a collision in North River while on crossing courses.-The De Veaux Powell (D. C.) 522; The Lackawanna, Id.

A lighter held in fault for a collision caused by

her backing into another vessel when leaving her pier, through the fouling of her propeller by driftwood, which might have been prevented by the exercise of proper care.-The Despatch (D. C.) 856.

§ 7. Special circumstances and errors in extremis.

Evidence held not to exonerate a barge in tow from liability for a collision with a meeting tow in a channel in St. Mary's river.-The Aus tralia (C. C. A.) 220.

§ 8. Suits for damages.

Where a collision in a channel between two passing tows results from the sheering of one across the channel, the burden rests upon her to free herself from liability by showing that the sheer was caused by some force which could not have been overcome by exercise of proper care and skill in navigation.-The Australia (C. C. A.) 220.

Where it is shown that a collision was caused by the deviation of one of the vessels, which