United States domestic exports of selected commodities that might be used, directly or indirectly, for rearmament or war, 1934 and 1937-40 1 All gasoline; aviation gasoline not separately reported prior to 1939. Statistics for 1934 include naphtha and other finished light products. Includes ammunition for sporting purposes, and fireworks. Mr. REED. Before you were here, Mr. Crowther, I had put in the shipments of all kinds of material to the point of absolutely depriving us of the essential war materials that we needed to build our Navy and our Army for this fight. We stripped ourselves of copper, we made ourselves short of petroleum and even tin, by exporting them to Germany, Japan, and Italy. And at the same time, in the light of that article, why should we enter into trade agreements to lower the tariffs on competitive commodities. Mr. CROWTHER. I think that we also pretty well stripped ourselves of machine tools during that period. Mr. REED. Yes. I have that right here, some $37,000,000 worth. Here you have the outstanding proposition appearing in every paper in this country-all over the United States-advertising for scrap of all kinds, yet we put it right into the hands of our enemy. Were they friendly as a result of it? They struck a dastardly blow at us with the very materials that we sent. Had we not sent this material when we did and in the quantities that we did, there could have been no Pearl Harbor. There could have been no Wake Island. They would not have dared strike such a blow, but they had this scrap, all of this scrap and material just dropped into the sea close to the shore in their harbors, and all they had to do when they wanted it was to haul it up with big magnetic cranes. Their mills are right there where they can transform it into implements of war to strike at us. I call that the most inept leadership that any country ever displayed because we had been warned by the military, and here was a publication in 1938 saying that they must rope us in, get us into this war, so I am making this point, that Washington was not far wrong when he said, "We need not expect disinterested favors from other nations." I would like to put this message, approved by the Conservation Division of the War Production Board, in the record. Also, I would like to put in this table by the Tariff Commission, which shows that of 160 major commodities affected by trade treaties, 63 rates are equal to or lower than the 1913 rates on the same com modities, Underwood bill, and that 118 are equal to or lower than the 1922 rates on the same commodities. Mr. COOPER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (The matter above referred to follows:) This message approved by Conservation Division WAR PRODUCTION BOARD In behalf of the Governor and the State committee we urge every committee to organize itself into a band of Salvage Commandos. You can either sell your scrap to a junk dealer or you can give it to a charity, which in turn will sell it to a junk dealer who performs an important function by sorting it, grading it, packing it, and shipping it to the right place. We urge local charities and civic organizations to cooperate with the local salvage committee and devise a plan of action and collection. We urge the scrap dealer to cooperate as fast as he can in the collection and shipment of materials. We urge industrial executives to appoint salvage managers who have both the responsibility and authority to salvage obsolete machinery, tools, and dies. We urge every farmer and every householder in America to act at once. Go over your premises with a fine-tooth comb. If you have already turned in your scrap, look again—you'll probably find more. If you do not have enough of your own to warrant someone coming after it, form a neighborhood pool, or take it yourself to the nearest collection point. If there is an old heater or boiler in your basement too heavy for you to move, get your neighbors to help you. This is a people's job. It is something you can do without interfering with other war work or personal duties. It is not enough to pile up a little stuff and expect somebody to come and get it. Most of the work is being done by patriotic volunteers with inadequate facilities. They need your help in collecting scrap material in the largest possible amounts and in getting it to the right place. It is a direct and personal obligation to all of our boys on all fronts. You may think, "My little bit" won't help, but your "little bit" multiplied thousands and millions of times can create a mountain of raw material which can actually turn the tide. The situation is serious. Your help is needed now. HOW SCRAP IRON AND STEEL GO TO WAR The steel used in our war machines is made by melting together(1) Pig iron (about 50 percent); (2) Scrap generated in the steel plant in the process of steelmaking (about 25 percent); (3) Scrap purchased from outside junk sources (about 25 percent). We have plenty of iron ore to make the pig iron needed. But our furnaces operate faster when there is plenty of scrap to mix with the pig iron. This so-called scrap which goes into the furnaces to make the steel for tanks, ships, and guns is actually refined steel-with most impurities removed. Some of the finest quality steels are made 100 percent from scrap. The iron and steel scrap which you collect is bought by the steel mills from scrap dealers at established, Government-controlled prices. Throw your scrap into the fight. JUNK NEEDED FOR WAR-SCRAP IRON AND STEEL A crisis exists in our war-production program which can be solved only by the patriotic cooperation of the American people. We are faced with a serious shortage of steel scrap, rubber, and other vital materials. This shortage must be filled. By "scrap" we mean the ordinary junk which today is lying in the barnyards and in the gullies of farms; in the basements, attics, and garages of homes and stores throughout the country. The steel industry operates on the basis of half and half-about 50 percent metal from pig iron, and 50 percent remelted scrap metal. Therefore, about 50 percent of every tank, every ship, every submarine, and every gun is made of scrap iron and steel. The steel industry has been rapidly stepping up its production-from 67,000,000 tons in 1940 to a record-breaking 83,000,000 tons in 1941. Production in 1942 is already ahead of 1941, but we need to get production up to the industry's full capacity of 90,000,000 tons-a total equal to the output of the rest of the world combined. This volume of production cannot be attained or increased unless an additional 6,000,000 tons of scrap iron and steel is obtained promptly. We are faced with the fact that some steel furnaces have been allowed to cool down and that many of them are operating from day to day and hand to mouth, due only to the lack of scrap. The rubber situation is also critical. In spite of the recent rubber drive, there is a continued need for large quantities of scrap rubber. We are collecting every possible pound of scrap from the factories, arsenals, and shipyards; we are speeding up the flow of material from automobile graveyards; we are tearing up abandoned railroad tracks and bridges, but unless we dig out an additional 6,000,000 tons of steel and great quantities of rubber, copper, brass, zinc, and tin, our boys may not get all the fighting weapons they need in time. Fortunately, the material exists in America's great "mine above the ground." There is enough iron and steel on farms alone, if used with other materials, to make Twice as many battleships as there are in the whole world today; or Enough 2,000-pound bombs to drop three per minute from big bombers incessantly for more than 3 years. Locating and collecting this scrap is going to require a canvass of every house and every farm. Even one old shovel will help make four hand grenades. We have set up the machinery for this, but it is not perfect. It is a problem that can be licked only by American resourcefulness, American organization ability, American muscle, and American will to win. Comparison of reduced trade agreement rates of duty with the corresponding rates in the Tariff Acts of 1913 and 1922 This comparison is based on the rates for the 160 commodities shown in Major Import Statistics in Relation to Trade Agreements. These commoditeis are those having imports valued at $500,000 or more each in 1939 on which reduced rates were in effect on Feb. 1, 1943. Of the 160 commodities, the rates of only 150 are comparable enough to have significance.] NOTE. These figures are preliminary. When the form of the rate has not changed, the comparison is based on the actual rates; when a direct comparison of the rates cannot be made the equivalent ad valorem rates are used; when one of several alternate rates are applicable, no comparison is made. Source: U. S. Tariff Commission, April 1943. Mr. GEARHART. I am sorry that I did not see you before you began your testimony this morning, as I might have warned you against some of the pitfalls and dangers you would encounter on the path that you chose to follow. I am afraid that you are guilty of lese majesty in several places in your paper. When you said that these treaties have worked more for world disorder instead of world peace, you flew right in the face of arguments which the Secretary of State had made in favor of this program's continuance Mr. CROWTHER. May I interrupt you at that point? Mr. GEARHART. I was just going to add because of the recent pronouncements by the Secretary, the mentioning of that subject, or arguing to that end, constitutes nothing but piffle, and when you added to that statement a quotation from a colonel who was serving in the uniform of the United States, a former distinguished industrialist, to the effect that these measures encouraged a spread of autarchy, engendered hatred, and served to increase international and economic and political anxiety, I am afraid you entitled yourself to the encomium of "superpiffler." And in the estimation of another still more undiplomatic diplomat who draws a salary down there, you might have found that your Americanism has been brought under question. Now, that is a little frivolous, of course. Mr. WOODRUFF. He speaks from experience. Mr. GEARHART. I aspired to speak from a bitter experience of just the other day. I had made the point that the reciprocal trade-agreement program, as now administered by the State Department and by direction of the President, had not in all cases worked for peace and harmony in the world, but in a great many cases had created irritations among nations, which was in effect the very opposite of what the Secretary of State was then contending was his principal reason for asking for this continuation of authority. Now, I will yield for the remark that you were about to make a moment ago. Mr. CROWTHER. I have great respect for the Secretary of State and the State Department, but I do not have any patience with the form of argument by epithets-that is, if you do not believe as a man does, to question your Americanism. That is a most contemptible form of argument. It has been well said that patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, and that is the way I feel about that form of argument. Mr. GEARHART. I appreciate your words more than I can tell you. Mr. CROWTHER. And, sir, I am willing to meet that at any time, any place. Mr. GEARHART. I was going to mention the fact that-and this is facetiously and in good humor-one of the members of this committee put the gods on the side of this program. By necessary reasoning, you and I have got to take our position among those who have sold their souls to Mephistopheles. There is no other place for us, is there? Mr. CROWTHER. It possesses such an element of humor, to me, that it overrides everything else. I think it is just plain funny. Mr. GEARHART. Now, you will remember back in the campaign of 1932 that the Hawley-Smoot tariff was one of the great issues. In those neighborhoods where it was good political argument, those of the Democrats roundly denounced the treaty and promised its repeal. But the tariff was a local issue, at least it had been pronounced so by some of the distinguished figures of yesteryear. In the neighborhoods where it was not a good issue to advocate the repeal of the bill, they heard about these arguments being made elsewhere, which caused the President of the United States to feel concerned whether that was a good argument to be made all over the United States. You will remember that he made a speech in Baltimore when he used these words: I know of no effective excessively high tariff duties on farm products. I do not intend that those duties shall be lowered. To do so would be inconsistent with my entire farm program, and every farmer knows it and will not be deceived. Now, in view of the fact that the great majority of the Democratic orators were arguing that it was an embargo tariff, and the President was arguing in the proper places that it contained no excessively high tariff duties, how are we going to decide whether it was a high tariff they were denouncing and praising? Mr. CROWTHER. I do not know any method, and if you will recall the Hawley-Smoot schedule, it was practically an agricultural tariff. There were very few increases in industrial products. Heavy increases were made in agricultural products, and Candidate Roosevelt specifically said that those high increases were not too high. Mr. GEARHART. And in the face of that statement, under the administration of this act, they have reduced the tariff on nearly 400 agricultural items. Was the President right in 1932, or are the New Dealers who have handled the affair since that time right? Mr. CROWTHER. I am afraid that is a question, sir, that I cannot answer. I have been working for some time on a white book on the foreign policy of the United States since 1933, and it goes all around the block and meets itself. I cannot discover that there was any policy, and would not like to admit that a New Dealer could ever be right. Mr. GEARHART. That does put us in a bad position when I asked whether one New Dealer was right or another one. you Mr. CROWTHER. You put me in an awkward fix, sir, but that speech was before the New Deal was born; I believe that that speech was made in Baltimore. Mr. GEARHART. This morning the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Robertson, threw out the startling information that the HawleySmoot Tariff Act raised the ad valorem levies to 50 percent. I am afraid he was not correctly informed, because the ad valorem average was 40 percent, and the ad valorem average of the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 was 38.4 percent. So the rise that was made in the tariff rates by the Hawley-Smoot Act amounted to only 1.6 percent, and nearly all of that raise as you pointed out, went to agriculture. I might point out that the items on the free list under the FordneyMcCumber Act totaled 63.8 percent and on the Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930 it was 66.7 percent. So we added to the free list by that act, which has been so roundly denounced by those who are trying to defend the administration of this program. We have been told that our tariff was so high that the British Empire, in desperation, immediately began the negotiation of the |