give to the subject, we can do no more in the way of analysis than reproduce those general features, and as we deem this a work of supererogation, we shall confine ourselves to giving an extract or two from Captain Siborne's history to illustrate the style and spirit of his labours. We shall, however, in the first place give our readers some general idea of the special character of the work, in order that they may know the kind of information which they may expect to find in it.

The work itself is professedly a military history of that campaign, which may lead our readers to expect a mere professional account-a heap of little details of no general interest beyond that which would be felt by subaltern or non-commissioned officers; or, at most, accounts of strategy and of personal courage which distinguished the leaders and their troops, and which may be calculated to instruct superior officers and animate the spirit of an army. Of the former there is not a line; of the latter only so much as is necessary to enable any man (whether soldier or civilian) to comprehend fully the character of the battles themselves, and the real causes of success or failure. It contains, we feel certain, all the information which a military man would ask: it contains but little, if indeed anything, with which the civilian who wishes really to understand those events as matters of history, can possibly dispense. We have heard but one opinion of the work from military persons of all classes, and we have had ample opportunities of knowing their views; and from the few civilians amongst our personal friends who have spoken of it, we have not heard one unfavourable testimony. This is saying much, for it is no ordinary work that produces such unanimity of impression on thinking men. We regret to say, however, that from the supposed character of the work being purely military, but few literary men have looked into it; and it is with the sole view of disabusing the minds of our readers on this head, that we have been induced to notice it in our Review.

The style, as a literary composition, is easy and flowing; the details are expressed with perspicuity and great simplicity: and the summing up' of the character of the particular operations is traced to the leading conceptions of those who devised them with singular acumen and profound insight into the natural course of human thought. We may add that some of Captain Siborne's descriptions of scenes-as that of Ligny, for instance, are often sublimely terrible.

Napoleon landed from Elba on the 26th of February, 1815, pending the sitting of the Congress for the settlement of the territorial spoils that had been wrested from him only a few months previously; and whilst the different armies were still

retained upon a war establishment. By the end of May a force of not less than 500,000 of the allied troops had been assembled upon different points contiguous to the French frontier, with all the supplies necessary for the prosecution of a vigorous campaign. But, as stated by Captain Siborne :

'Formidable as was the attitude assumed by the allies toward France, and imposing as was their array of armies assembling on her frontier, they nevertheless found their great antagonist prepared, on learning that they had determined on an irrevocable appeal to the sword, to throw away the scabbard. He assumed a bold and resolute posture of defence -armed at all points, and prepared at all hazards, either to ward off the blows of his assailants, or to become himself the assailant. The indefatigable exertions of Napoleon in restoring the empire to its former strength and grandeur were most astonishing; and never, perhaps, in the whole course of the extraordinary career of that extraordinary man did the powerful energies of his comprehensive mind shine forth with greater brilliancy and effect than in his truly wonderful and incredibly rapid developement of the resources of France on this momentous occasion. The truth of this assertion will be best confirmed by briefly enumerating some of the most important objects accomplished within the limited interval of three months-from his landing at Cannes to his taking the field against the allies. Among them were, the complete overthrow of all obstacles in the way of his reascending the throne; the reconciliation, to a very considerable extent, of the several factions whose discordant views and interests had distracted the whole nation; the suppression of the insurrectionary movements in La Vendée, and the establishment of his authority over every part of the empire; the projection of various public measures, laws, and ordinances; the remodelling of the civil and military administrations; the restoration of the army to its previous organization under the imperial regime; the placing the numerous fortresses of the kingdom in an efficient state; the erection of fortified works around Paris, Lyons, and other important points; the re-organization of the National Guard d'élite, to the extent of 112,000 men, and destined principally for garrisoning the fortresses; the adoption of the most active operations in all the arsenals, and the employment of vast numbers of additional workmen in the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Before all these we ought to place the raising, clothing, arming, drilling, and organizing of 410,000 men (including the national guard d'élite) which in addition to the 149,000 men of which the royal army consisted on the 1st of March, formed on the 1st of June an effective force of 559,000 men available for the national defence.'-P. 9.

Napoleon would, moreover, have been able by the 1st of October to form an army of 2,250,000 men!

The general aspect of France at that moment was singularly warlike. It was that of a whole nation buckling on its armour. Over the entire country, armed bodies of men were to be seen in motion towards their

several points of destination: everywhere the new levies for the line, and the newly enrolled national guards were in unremitting course of drill and organization: the greatest activity was maintained day and night in all the arsenals, and in all the manufactures of clothing and articles of equipment: crowds of workmen were constantly employed in the repair of numerous fortresses and in the erection of entrenched works. Everywhere appeared a continued transport of artillery, waggons, arms, ammunition, and all the materiel of war; whilst upon every road forming an approach to any of the main points of assembly in the vicinity of the frontiers, might be seen those well-formed veteran bands, Napoleon's followers through many a bloody field, moving forth with all the order, and with all the elasticity of spirit, inspired by the full confidence of a renewed career of victory-rejoicing in the display of those standards which so proudly recalled the most glorious fields that France had ever won-and testifying by their acclamations their enthusiastic devotion to the cause of their Emperor, which was ever cherished by them as identified with that of their country.'-P. 15.

We wish our limits enabled us to extract the author's fine description of the social and political temperament of the French people at the same period: and we must add that we think the extraordinary financial skill which must have accompanied Napoleon's exertions not less wonderful than any of the other wonders of those three months.

The Prussian thirst for vengeance, p. 20, is finely described; and the following extract from the description of the battle of Ligny, where Blucher and Napoleon were pitched against each other, will tell how deep and sanguinary was the Prussian hatred of the French.

The fight throughout the whole village of Ligny was now at the hottest: the place was literally crammed with combatants, and its streets and enclosures were choked up with the wounded, the dying, and the dead: every house that had escaped being set on fire, was the scene of a desperate struggle: the troops fought no longer in combined order, but in numerous and irregular groups, separated by houses either in flames or held as little forts, sometimes by one, sometimes by the other party and in various instances, when their ammunition failed, or when they found themselves suddenly assailed from different sides, the bayonet and sometimes the butt supplied them with the ready means for prosecuting the dreadful carnage with unmitigated fury. The entire village was concealed in smoke; but the incessant rattle of the musquetry, the crashing of burning timbers, the smashing of doors and gateways, the yells and imprecations of the combatants, which were heard through that misty veil-gave ample indications to the troops posted in reserve upon the heights of the fierce and savage nature of the struggle beneath. In the mean time the relieving batteries on the Prussian side, which had arrived quite fresh from the rear, came into fatl play; as did, also, a reinforcement on the French side, from the artillery of the imperial guard. The earth now trembled under the

tremendous cannonade; and as the flames, issuing from the numerous burning houses, intermingled with dense smoke, shot directly upwards through the light grey mass which rendered the village indistinguishable, and seemed continually to thicken, the scene resembled for a time some violent convulsion of nature rather than a human conflict-as if the valley had been rent asunder, and Ligny had become the focus of a burning crater.

'Fresh victims were still required to satiate the “ king of terrors," who might be said to hold a gala-day in the "valley of death," &c.P. 203, vol. i.

Let us add that the losses on both sides on this one day's battle were about 20,000 men, and that scarcely any of them were prisoners on either side. It was war to the knife.' Twelve thousand Prussians and eight thousand French were either killed or dangerously wounded on the 16th of June at the single battle of Ligny! Who would, then, advocate a rash war?

The mere spirit of nationality, and the spirit, too, of political partisanship, under which these remarkable events are viewed, are at length giving way to a higher and more philosophical tone of investigation. It is now considered less as a question involving the soldierly qualities of the English, Prussians, and French-less as a question of the military skill of Wellington, Blücher, and Napoleon-less as a question of national and dynastic importance in itself and its results-than as a lesson to future warriors and to future statesmen; and above all, than as a lesson to those nations who may be thus embroiled to satiate the ambition of one man, however distinguished amongst the sons of the sword' his career may be. The present work, indeed, being mainly a history of the military strategy of a period of the greatest interest to the welfare of our race, will shew us that

War is a game, which, were their subjects wise,
Kings would not play at.'

Captain Siborne has most effectually answered the very plausible censures of Mr. Alison, and of many writers before him, relative to the want of concentration of the English and Prussian forces before Napoleon's advance into Belgium, and the consequent liability of those troops being beaten in detail' by the Emperor. He also shews that so far from the British general being taken by surprise, his arrangement pending the uncertainty of Napoleon's real point of attack, was the only one that could have effectually watched all the routes by which the hurricance leader' might have moved upon Brussels.*

It

* It has been so often stated as to have become a matter of general belief, that when the Duke first received intelligence of the advance of Napoleon upon

is shown, moreover, that the Duke could have concentrated full two-thirds of his intended disposable force for the field, upon the line of the enemy's operations, within twenty-two hours after the receipt of intelligence of the actual direction and apparent object of these operations' (vol. i. p. 35); and that Blücher could concentrate at his own head-quarters nearly the entire of his force in twelve hours, and upon Napoleon's line of operation in twenty-four. (p. 39.) Those who thus censure the allied commanders invariably forget that it was essential to ascertain the Emperor's plans before any attempt at concentration was made; and, in fact, this objection to the allied movements is so generally confined to civilians, whose ignorance of the fundamental principles of practical warfare may be some excuse for their presumption, that we ought not to censure them too severely. Let them, however, know the motives before they condemn the course pursued.

Napoleon's vigorous measures of the 15th of June, by driving in the advanced Prussian posts under Zieten, did, indeed, lead him into the very error which has been so freely attributed to the Duke-his advance was not sufficiently supported by a concentrated body of troops, or the issue of that campaign would have been much longer retarded, if not altered, in its final character. The battles of Quatre-Bras and Ligny might have ended more successfully for the French, had Ney been more strengthened; the retreat of the Duke upon Waterloo might not have been easily accomplished; and had Napoleon not so unaccountably wasted his precious moments after defeating Blücher at Ligny, he might (even as admitted-nay forcibly pointed out by Captain Siborne) have flanked the Duke in the narrow defiles of Genappe. How would the matter then have stood? This one remarkable instance of Napoleon's fatuity (for it can be called by no other name) lost him everything! And, perhaps, if any one of the Duke's movements may be fairly open to

Charleroi, he was figuring at the Duchess of Richmond's ball at Brussels. Nothing can be more untrue. The Duke was at dinner-and the Duke, it will be allowed, must dine as well as other men-when the courier arrived; and he instantly went to seek the Prince of Orange, who had the command of the first division of the army, and whose troops lay in the direct line of the Emperor's operations. He ultimately found the Prince at the Duchess's ball, and delicately hinted' to him (the Prince, it will be remembered, then stood in a delicate relation to England) the necessity for his being with his division. Such is the origin of this oft-repeated proof of the Duke being taken by surprise.' The Prince, however, behaved gallantly in the fearful events of the three following days; and we must not censure a young man for liking a dance, even though the dance of death' was so soon to be performed under his own eyes, with, possibly, himself as a performer in it.