313; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S. 183; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214; Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet. 97.*

When a petition for removal to a federal court is denied by the state court, the petitioner may do one of three things. He may object to the ruling, save an exception, and litigate the cause in the state courts. Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Bacon, supra; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5; Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Gordon v. Longest, supra. He may remove the suit to the federal court despite the ruling of the state court. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Koontz, supra; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, supra. He may proceed in both courts at the same time. Kern v. Huidekoper, supra; Removal Cases, supra.

If the petitioner litigates the cause in the state court and preserves an exception, he may have the order of the state court denying his petition for removal reviewed in the state appellate court. In proper cases he may come here asserting a denial of his right of removal. Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Bacon, supra; Stone v. South Carolina, supra; Removal Cases, supra. If he removes the cause to the federal district court despite the state court ruling and the federal court assumes jurisdiction over the objection of his adversary, the latter, after final judgment, may contest this assumption of jurisdiction in the circuit court of appeals, and in this court in proper cases. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U. S. 92; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451; Graves v. Corbin, 132

'See Centaur Motor Co. v. Eccleston, 264 F. 852; City of Montgomery v. Postal Telegraph Co., 218 F. 471; Donovan v. Wells, Fargo Co., 169 F. 363; Murphy v. Payette Alluvial Gold Co., 98 F. 321; Johnson v. Wells, Fargo Co., 91 F. 1; Shepherd v. Bradstreet Co., 65 F. 142.

Opinion of the Court.

312 U.S.

U. S. 571. If petitioner proceeds simultaneously in state and federal courts and both render final judgments, he and his adversary may obtain review of the question of removability by following respectively the courses just outlined. Kern v. Huidekoper, supra; Removal Cases, supra.

Petitioner is protected whichever course he elects. If he makes timely application for removal and properly objects to its denial by the state court, participation in subsequent proceedings in the state court is not a waiver of his claim that the cause should have been litigated in the federal court. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., supra; Removal Cases, supra; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, supra. Compare Miller v. Buyer, 82 Colo. 474; 261 P. 659; State v. American Surety Co., 26 Idaho 652; 145 P. 1097; Ashland v. Whitcomb, 120 Wis. 549; 98 N. W. 531. If he removes the cause notwithstanding the state court ruling, he may nevertheless resist further action by his opponent in the state court. Kern v. Huidekoper, supra; Removal Cases, supra.

However, the issue of removability is closed if the federal district court refuses to assume jurisdiction and remands the cause. Section 28 of the Judicial Code, supra, precludes review of the remand order directly (Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U. S. 199; Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U. S. 374; City of Waco v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U. S. 140; In re Pennsylvania Company, 137 U. S. 451), or indirectly after final judgment in the highest court of the state in which decision could be had. McLaughlin Brothers v. Hallowell, 228 U. S. 278; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556; compare Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U. S. 440.

Here, petitioner attempted to remove the cause, as it had a right to do, even though the state court had denied its petition for removal. The federal court held it was

not removable as a separable controversy and remanded it to the state court. For the reasons already stated, we are not at liberty to review the remand order. Consequently, we must assume, so far as this case is concerned, that the suit was not removable. Having made this assumption, we must conclude that the state court had jurisdiction to enter the default judgment (Yankaus v. Felterstein, 244 U. S. 127; Southern Pacific Co. v. Waite, 279 F. 171), and it was for that court to determine the effect of the disclosure filed in the federal court. Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187; Broadway Ins. Co. v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., 101 F. 507; compare Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 33; 7 P. 2d 279. If, in cases like the present one, the state court is assured that the federal court will decide promptly the question of removability, it is better practice to await that decision (Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Koontz, supra), but we cannot say that failure to do so is a denial of a federal right if the cause was not removable.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court is

Affirmed.

COX ET AL. v. NEW HAMPSHIRE.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE. No. 502. Argued March 7, 1941.-Decided March 31, 1941. 1. Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. P. 574.

2. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. P. 574.

Opinion of the Court.

312 U.S.

3. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional exercise of control by local government, the question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places. P. 574.

4. A state law providing that no parade or procession upon any public street shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town, or from a licensing committee for the city, and subjecting any violator to a fine, held constitutional, in view of its construction by the state supreme court, as applied to members of the band of "Jehovah's Witnesses," who marched in groups of from fifteen to twenty members each, in close single files, along the sidewalks in the business district of a populous city, each marcher carrying a sign or placard with "informational" inscriptions. P. 575.

5. In exercise of its power to license parades on city streets, the State may charge a license fee reasonably adjusted to the occasion, for meeting administrative and police expenses. P. 576. 91 N. H. 137; 16 A. 2d 508, affirmed.

APPEAL from the affirmance of judgments imposing fines on violators of a state law regulating parades in city streets.

Mr. Hayden Covington, with whom Mr. Joseph F. Rutherford was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Frank R. Kenison, Attorney General of New Hampshire, with whom Messrs. J. Vincent Broderick and Jeremy R. Waldron were on the brief, for appellee.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants are five "Jehovah's Witnesses" who, with sixty-three others of the same persuasion, were convicted in the municipal court of Manchester, New Hampshire, for violation of a state statute prohibiting a "parade or

procession" upon a public street without a special li

cense.

Upon appeal, there was a trial de novo of these appellants before a jury in the Superior Court, the other defendants having agreed to abide by the final decision in that proceeding. Appellants were found guilty and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. State v. Cox, 91 N. H. 137; 16 A. 2d 508.

By motions and exceptions, appellants raised the questions that the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in that it deprived appellants of their rights of freedom of worship, freedom of speech and press, and freedom of assembly, vested unreasonable and unlimited arbitrary and discriminatory powers in the licensing authority, and was vague and indefinite. These contentions were overruled and the case comes here on appeal.

The statutory prohibition is as follows (New Hampshire, P. L., Chap. 145, § 2):

"No theatrical or dramatic representation shall be performed or exhibited, and no parade or procession upon any public street or way, and no open-air public meeting upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted, unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town, or from a licensing committee for cities hereinafter provided for."

The provisions for licensing are set forth in the margin.1

'New Hampshire, P. L., Chap. 145, §§ 3, 4, and 5 are as follows: "Section 3: Licensing Board. Any city may create a licensing board to consist of the person who is the active head of the police department, the mayor of such city and one other person who shall be appointed by the city government, which board shall have delegated powers to investigate and decide the question of granting licenses under this chapter, and it may grant revocable blanket