Anthony and wife vs. Stephens et al. all notice of the restriction contained in the deed of March 4th, 1872, or of the agreement entered into by Stephens to reconvey to complainants, at the time he purchased the said lot for his wife, Rose. He also stated that his house and other improvements were completed at the time he was served with a copy of said bill. Several affidavits were read on the hearing of the application for injunction, unnecessary here to be set forth. The injunction was refused, and complainants excepted and assign said ruling as error. NISBETS & JACKSON, represented by THE REPORTER, for plaintiffs in error. LANIER & ANDERSON, by brief, for defendants. WARNER, Chief Justice. This was a bill filed by the complainants against the defendants, praying for an injunction to restrain Austin Brighthaupt and his wife, Rose, persons of color, from exercising acts of ownership over a certain city lot in the city of Macon, or further building thereon, on the ground that there is a clause in the deed conveying the lot to Stephens by the complainants, dated 4th March, 1872, under whom it is alleged the defendants claim title, in the following words: "On the express understanding and agreement, on the part of the said Alexander H. Stephens, that the lot of land so conveyed is never to be sold to or occupied by negroes. We are inclined to the opinion that the first deed executed by Mrs. Anthony to Stephens, with the full knowledge and consent of her husband, would have estopped him from setting up a claim or title to the land, and that Stephens and those claiming under him acquired a good title to the lot, as against the complainants, under that deed, wholly independ ent of the subsequent deed, executed the 4th of March, 1872, containing the alleged restriction. The defendant, Austin Brighthaupt, denies all knowledge of the restriction con Odom vs. Gill. tained in the deed of 4th of March, 1872, when he purchased and paid for the lot, and it appears that he went forward and built a house on the lot before the complainants. took any steps to restrain him. The words contained in the deed of 4th March, 1872, are words of covenant, and not words of condition, and the evidence of the insolvency of the defendants is not at all satisfactory. In view of the facts disclosed in the record of this case we will not interfere with the exercise of the sound discretion of the presiding Judge of the Court below in refusing to grant the injunction prayed for. Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed. B. B. ODOM, plaintiff in error, vs. WILLIAM C. GILL, defendant in error. An appeal would, by section 3554 of the Code, lie from the verdict of the jury in the County Court, in a collateral issue, at the discretion of the Judge presiding in said Court. County Court. Appeal. Collateral issue. Before Judge CLARK. Lee Superior Court. March Term, 1872. B. B. Odom obtained a rule absolute against William C. Gill, former sheriff of Lee county, at the February Term, 1861, of Lee Inferior Court, requiring him to pay to said Odom the sum of $304 50 principal, and $15 85 interest, within sixty days, or on failure thereof to be attached for contempt. The money was never paid. The Inferior Court was abolished, and its business transferred to the County Court. At the January Term, 1867, of the County Court, William C. Gill upon divers grounds moved that the aforesaid rule absolute and order for attachment be vacated. Odom traversed the grounds of the motion, and the issues were submitted to a jury, which found in favor of the movant. Application Odom vs. Gill. was made by respondent for the privilege of appealing to the Superior Court. The Court allowed the appeal. When the case was called in the Superior Court, Gill moved to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the case could not be brought up in that manner. The motion was allowed and the appeal dismissed. To which ruling Odom excepted, and now assigns the same as error. R. J. & L. P. D. WARREN, for plaintiff in error. FRED. H. WEST, represented by CLARK & Goss, for defendant. MCCAY, Judge. This appeal must have been dismissed without any examination of the Code. Section 3554, Revised Code, expressly provides that an appeal will lie to the Superior Court, from the verdict of a jury in the County Court, on a collateral issue: Provided, the Judge of the County Court, in the exercise of his discretion, permits it. This, as the record shows, the Judge of the County Court has done, and the right to appeal would seem to be complete. It has been argued, that as it does not affirmatively appear, that this appeal was upon payment of costs and giving bond for the eventual condemnation money, the appeal was properly dismissed on that ground. It would hardly be fair to sustain this dismissal on that ground; no such point was made in the Court below. Perhaps had this ground been insisted on, it might have been possible for the appellant to perfect the record, by showing the cost had been paid and bond given. But we are not sure this was necessary. The statute says the appeal is to be at the discretion of the Judge. The very nature of such an issue being as it is only collateral to the final judgment, would seem to be outside of the reason of the law requiring costs to be paid and bond given in case of appeals. The appeal is provided for in lieu of a new trial, which is the course such issues take in the Superior Court. Judgment reversed. Hill et al. vs. Alford. JOSHUA HILL et al., plaintiffs in error, vs. WILLIAM ALFORD, next friend, defendant in error. 1. Where there is no ambiguity on the face of a will, parol evidence is inadmissible to explain it. (R.) 2. Where a will provided that, as testator's children should marry or come of age, the executor should give off such portions of the property as he thought proper, the title to the same remaining in the estate until the youngest child should marry or come of age, when it should be brought into the general fund and a final division take place, and in case all the children should die without leaving children at the time of their death, then the property to pass to the Inferior Court of Putnam county, for certain specified purposes, and the youngest having survived all the children, and having been placed in possession of the entire estate, and having died after he arrived at full age, leaving two children: Held, That the purchasers, under an execution against said youngest child, obtain a valid title thereto as against his children. (R.) Will. Ambiguity. Parol evidence. Remainder. Before Judge ROBINSON. Morgan Superior Court. September Term, 1871. For the facts of this case, see the decision. REESE & REESE; FOSTER & FOSTER, for plaintiffs in error. 1st. The first error complained of is the admission of the testimony of witnesses, Branham and Ogilby: See Code, secs. 2420, 2421, 3747; Doyal and wife vs. Smith, ex'r, 28 Ga., 262. No ambiguity in this will, either latent or patent: 1 Greenleaf's Evidence, 297, 300; 1 Burrill's Dict., 90; Billingslea, adm'r, vs. W. B. Moore, (2 and 3 head notes,) 14 Ga., 370. 2d. The second error complained of is the charge of the Court, "that the plaintiffs, the children of Andrew F. Bird, at the death of Andrew F. Bird, under the last will and testament of George L. Bird, took an estate in remainder in the property in dispute." 1. They cannot take by implication: Jarman on Wills, 466; Wilkerson vs. Adams, 1 Veesey & Beams., 466, (marg. p. ;) Wright vs. Hicks, 12 Ga., 156, (head notes, 7, 8, 9.) 2. Nor can they take under the terms of will; the law favors the vesting of estates: Jarman Hill et al. vs. Alford. on Wills, 726; 16 Ga., 345; 20 Ga., 834; 33 Ga., 341; 3 Kelly, 356; 14 Ga., 232. 3d. There is no difficulty in construing this will and arriving at the intention of testator from the will itself. Transposing clauses: Code, 2420. This will has already been construed for all the purposes of this cause by this Court: See Cogburn vs. Ogilby, adm'r, 18 Ga., 56. "A patent ambiguity is one which appears on the face of the instrument itself, and renders it ambiguous and unintelligible: as if, in a will, there was a blank left for the devisee's name." Brown's Maxims, 261 and 468; Smith on Contracts, 28; Bacon's Maxims, 90. "A latent ambiguity is thus: If I grant my manor of S. to J. F. and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all; but if the truth be that I have the manors both of South S. and North S., this ambiguity is matter in fact, and, therefore, it shall be holpen by averment whether of them was that the party intended should pass:" 1 Powell on Devises, 477; 2 Kent Com., 556. J. WINGFIELD; BILLUPS & BROBSTON; L. E. BLECKLEY; NISBETS & JACKSON, for defendant. 1st. Parol evidence of the circumstances and surroundings of testator admissible: Code, sec. 2421; 12th Ga. R., 47; 31st Ib., 198; 14th Ib., 370; 17th Ib., 267; 1st Greenleaf's Ev., 410; 1st Jarman on Wills, 363; Blackstone's Coms., book 2d, 513; 6th Vesey R., 32; 7th Ib., 518. 2. In construction, transposition of sentences, etc., allowed: Code, sec. 2420; 1st Jarman on Wills, 538, 317; 24th Ga. R., 102. 3d. By will of George L. Bird the fee never was intended to vest: 2d Red. on Wills, 345; 1st Jarman on Wills, 500; 29th Ga. R., 545. 4th. Subse quent restrictive clause controls: 1st Jarman on Wills, 412; 6th Peters' R., 76; 30th Ga. R., 461; 24th Ib., 102. 5th. Rules of construction: 1st Red. on Wills, 432 et seq.; 2d Jarman on Wills, 742 et seq. WARNER, Chief Justice. This was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, to recover the possession of a tract of |