1. A writ without the seal of the court, or a statement of the fact, if there be
no seal, is bad, and the objection may be taken by a plea in abatement.
Pharis v. Conner, 87.
2. If there be several causes of abatement, the defendant may plead several
pleas in abatement at the same time. Ib.
3. After the expiration of the charter of a bank, it ceases to exist for any
purpose; and suits then pending in its name against its debtors must abate.
Bank of Mississippi v. Wrenn, 791.
Where a sale of lands was made by an administrator, by virtue of an act of
the legislature, and the administrator, in making the same, did not comply
with the requisitions of the act, upon a bill filed by the heir to have the
sale set aside, and a decree to that effect, an account will be ordered of the
rents of the lands to be charged to the purchasers, and they will be credited
with the value of all permanent improvements, so it does not exceed the
value of the aggregate rents. Williamson v. Williamson, 715.
The Act of Congress establishing the Mississippi River as the western boun-
dary of the Mississippi Territory, and adopting the Common Law for the
government of that territory, thereby fixed the middle of that river as the
true boundary line. Morgan & Harrison v. Reading, 366.
1. The affidavits made to obtain a writ of habeas corpus cannot be regarded as
evidence upon the hearing. Hardy v. Smith, 316.
2. A certificate of a competent officer appended to the answer, stating that
the parties appeared before him, and made oath that the facts, matters and
things, contained in the answer which was signed by them, were true, is
evidence of a sufficient affidavit to the truth of the contents of the answer.
Yeizer v. Burke, Watt & Co. 439.
3. It is competent for the complainants in a suit in Chancery to waive the in-
sufficiency of an affidavit to the answer of the defendant; and permitting
the case to be disposed of on its merits, is equivalent to such a waiver. 1.
1. In the case of a special agent, who is one constituted for a particular pur-
pose, and under a limited authority, his principal is not bound if he exceed
that authority. Planters Bank v. Cameron, 609.
2. The acts of a general agent, or one whom a man puts in his place to trans-
act all his business of a particular kind, or at a particular place, will bind
his principal, so long as he keeps within the general scope of his authority,
though he may act contrary to his private instructions. Ib.
1. An Indian must personally reside for five years on the land he claims as
his reservation, before he can acquire a title to it under the treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek. The residence of an agent is not sufficient.
Harris v. Newman, 565.
2. The acts of agents under the treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek may be im-
peached for fraud. Ib.
3. In the case of a special agent, who is one constituted for a particular pur-
pose, and under a limited authority, his principal is not bound if he exceed
that authority. Planters Bank v. Cameron, 609.
4. The acts of a general agent, or one whom a man puts in his place to trans-
act all of his business of a particular kind, or at a particular place, will bind
his principal, so long as he keep within the general scope of his authority,
though he may act contrary to his private instructions. Ib.
Where the parties to a suit have agreed upon the facts, and for the pur-
pose of using that agreement as evidence, have reduced that agreement to
writing, they are concluded by it from introducing any evidence to vary or
contradict the agreed state of facts. To permit it, would be a surprise to the
other party. Morgan & Harrison v. Reading, 366.
1. Courts may amend the mistakes or errors of their clerks, made at a previ-
ous term, provided there is anything in the record or proceedings to amend
by; but they cannot at a subsequent term amend their own judgments, un-
less it be in the manner provided for by the statute.
Russell, et ux. v. McDougall, 234.
2. In no case can an amendment be made at a subsequent term, unless there
be something in the proceedings to amend by. Ib.
3. Memoranda made by the Judge, on the back of the declaration, at the time
of the trial, constitute no part of the proceedings in the cause.
lb.
4. Amendments by the sheriff of his returns upon the executions, are not regu-
lated by any certain rules, but are addressed to the sound legal discretion of
the Court. Such amendments may be made at a term after the return term.
Planters Bank v. Walker, 409.
5. Aliter, with reference to amendments upon process before judgment; such
amendments cannot be made after the term to which the process was re-
turnable.
6. Where the sheriff returned an execution, "levied upon two hundred bales
of cotton;" and upon a trial of the right of property therein, it was pro-
posed to permit the sheriff to amend his return, and state that the levy was
in fact made upon the cotton in the seed, which when ginned and baled
amounted to only one hundred and seventy-one bales; held, that the Court
below ought to have permitted the amendment, but that to do so was in the
discretion of that Court, and that that discretion, however exercised, could
not be controlled by this Court. Ib.
7. An improper exercise of that discretion which is allowed to the Court below
in granting or refusing amendments, is no ground for the reversal of the
judgment in such case.
1. It is too late upon an appeal from the dissolution of an injunction, upon bill
and answer filed in the Chancery Court, to object that the answer was not
filed within the time limited by the rules of the Court after the demurrer
overruled. The objection to the answer should have been made in the
Court below before it was filed and considered.
Yeizer v. Burke, Watt & Co. 439.
2. It is too late to object to the sufficiency of the jurat, to answer to a bill in
Chancery, on an appeal from the final decree of the Chancellor, upon the
merits of the case; such objection should be made in the Court below. Ib.
3. A certificate of a competent officer appended to the answer, stating that
the parties appeared before him and made oath that the facts, matters, and
things, contained in the answer which was signed by them, were true, is
evidence of a sufficient affidavit to the truth of the contents of the an-
swer. Ib.
1. By our statute (How. & Hutch. 607), a petition for a discovery is an appli-
cation addressed to the discretion of the Court; yet after judgment thereon,
either party may bring the case to this Court by appeal or writ of error.
Scott v. Hamblin, 285.
2. Where a supposed creditor of a county presents his claim for allowance be-
fore the board of police, and the board of police refuse his application, such
refusal is a judgment of the board of police, from which an appeal under
the statute (How. Hutch. 453), by bill of exceptions or certiorari, will lie to
the Circuit Court. County of Yalabusha v. Carbry, 529.
3. The statute authorizing appeals to the Circuit Court from the decisions of
the board of police, is not unconstitutional; an ultimate appeal being given
to this Court. lb.
4. An agreement made of record before the board of police, that an appeal
prayed from their decision may be tried in the Circuit Court de novo, upon
such evidence as might be introduced, is equivalent to an agreement of trial
by jury in that Court, and is a waiver of any objection that might otherwise
arise from the trial being so had. Ib.
5. Where the statute authorized an appeal by bill of exceptions from the de-
cisions of the board of police, and that body consented of record to an ap-
peal without the bill of exceptions; held, that the consent cured the error. I.
6. Whether a party aggrieved by the decision of the board of police has a right,
upon the removal of his case to the Circuit Court by certiorari, to a trial in
that Court by a jury ; quære.
7. An agreement by the president of the board of police, on an appeal, in re-
gard to the mode of trial, must bind the county, where there is nothing in
the agreement contrary to law, or calculated to injure the county. Ib.
1. Debts due to a decedent are assets, but not to charge the executor or ad-
ministrator, till he has received the money. Berry v. Parkes, 625.
2. An executor or administrator may release or compound a debt, and if in so
doing he appears to have acted for the benefit of the estate, he will not be
chargeable with it as assets. Ib.
1. In an action on a promissory note by the assignee against the maker, the
latter will not be permitted to prove what consideration the former gave for
the note. Turner & Co. v. Brown, 425.
2. If such proof is admitted by the Court, when objected to by the assignee,
it is error, and a new trial should be granted. lb.
3. The statute of this State making bonds, bills single, &c. assignable by in-
dorsement, and authorizing the assignee to sue in his own name, does not
require the indorsement of a bond to be under seal; the right to sue will
pass by a mere parol indorsement. Montgomery v. Dillingham, 647.
4. Where an obligor in a bond is applied to by a person about to trade for it,
to give information, whether he is liable upon it, and upon such application
responds that he is liable, and will pay the amount due upon the bond to the
assignee, and the assignee thereupon trades for the bond; held, that even
though the consideration of the bond as between the obligor and obligee
had wholly failed, the obligor would be bound to the assignee., such as-
surance being a waiver of any special defence. Ib.
5. The assignment of a bond, conditioned to make title, the obligor having a
good title, conveys an equitable right which would be sufficient consider-
ation for a note or a bill single. lb.
6. The assignee of a note, transferred by any bank within this State, since
the act of 1840, cannot maintain an action thereon in his own name.
Payne et al. v. Baldwin, et al. 661.
7. Assurances given by the maker of a note to the assignee, before the assign-
ment, that it would be paid, amount to a waiver of all equities.
Where the banks of the Mississippi river above low water mark were used
without the consent of the owner, and where the owner had published his
terms for the use of the bank, which were known to the person so using it;
held, that the owner of the soil could recover, according to those terms, for
the length of time his bank had been so occupied and used.
Morgan & Harrison v. Reading, 366.
1. E. & B. sued out an attachment against J. E. B., and B. & L. executed a
bond to E. & B. conditioned that J. E. B. should appear at the Circuit Court
and answer the plaint of E. & B. and abide by and pay and satisfy any
judgment that might be rendered against him; held, if the bond was intended
as a contract between the parties, that E. & B. might sue and recover there-
on against the obligors, or either of them, on J. E. B.'s failure to comply with
the conditions of the bond. Emanuel & Barnett v. Laughlin, 342.
2. Where a garnishee in his answer gives a narrative of some pecuniary trans-
actions between himself and the defendant without discovering any indebt-
edness, and it does not appear in the record that the truth of the answer
was questioned, a final judgment cannot be entered against the garnishee.
Frost v. Patrick, 783.
3. In such a case, a judgment nisi should be entered and a scire facias ordered,
&c. lb.
1. An attorney at law has a lien on money which he has collected, for the
amount due him in the particular case in which it was received, but not for
any general balance due him for professional services rendered in other
cases. Pope v. Armstrong, 214.
2. An attorney at law has a lien on the fund recovered by him for his fees and
costs in recovering that fund; but the lien on that particular fund does not
extend to general debts for legal services.
Cage v. Wilkinson & Miles, 223.
3. Perhaps aliter, as to papers in the hands of the attorney. Ib.
1. A bank charter is a contract, within the meaning of that term, as used in
the Constitution. Payne et al. v. Baldwin et al. 661.
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