FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. A corporation FRAUD-Continued. created by another State is subject to the laws of that State, and its organization, corporate functions, who shall become members, and their rights as members, are all questions for its courts, because questions of local law. Madden v. Penn Electric Light Co., 432.

FORFEITURE. In a suit upon a recognizance the entry of a forfeiture stands for proof of all the steps necessary to complete the forfeiture, including the facts that the defendant and his bail were duly called and did not appear and answer, and the liability of the recognizors is absolutely fixed thereby, so that relief can only be obtained by petition to the court to remit the forfeiture for cause shown. (Super. Ct.) Commonwealth v. Fogelman, 17.

FORGERY. Liability of corporation for permitting a transfer of stock on forged power. See CORPORATION. Pennsylvania Co. v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 145.

FRAUD. It is a fraud to secure the execution of an instrument by representations as to the manner in which payment shall be made differing in important particulars from those contained in the paper, and, after the paper has been signed, to attempt to compel literal compliance with its terms, regardless of the contemporaneous agree ment, without which it would never have been signed at all. Clinch Valley Coal & Iron Co. v. Willing, 13. One who, without any intention to deceive, makes a mere misrepresentation, from which he derives no advantage, is not liable to one who acts upon the faith of the representation and suffers loss thereby. (Super. Ct.) Jalass v. Young, 40.

Where alleged false representations are made by a vendee, for the purpose of securing credit for future purposes, it should clearly appear; if made for the purpose of inducing the vendor to carry notes of the vendee for purchases previously made, there can be no recovery in a feigned issue. (Super. Ct.) Harding v. Lloyd, 66. False representations as to a material fact, of which the vendee has knowledge, and of which the vendors have not, made for the purpose of obtaining goods by credit and relied on by the vendor, constitute false pretence and fraud in themselves. It is not necessary that there should be, in addition, any artifice or trick used to obtain the goods on credit. Id.

A false statement of a material matter will not ordinarily overthrow a bargain, unless the statement was the means of inducing it, but where parties treat on a basis of confidence and trust, the party making the statement is bound by it. Edelman v. Latshaw, 89.

A party who brings about a sale of an article by misstating its real value, upon which subject he has information, to which the other party is entitled but which the first party withholds from him, is guilty of fraud and must answer in an action of deceit, although both parties have equal opportunities of learning the market value of the article. Id.

A purchaser cannot be held guilty of fraud on account of representations made by his purchasing agent, when it does not appear that the latter was authorized to make any statement as to the financial standing of his em ployer. Id.

An insolvent party has the right to protect certain creditors to the exclusion of others even without the knowledge of the preferred creditors. (Super. Ct.) Lasher v. Medical Press Co., 19.

Leaving the property purchased at a judicial sale in the hands of the former owner is not per se sufficient evidence of a collusion or fraudulent sale. (Super. Ct.) Snyder v. Boring, 275.

In the admission of evidence having a tendency to show fraud and in determining whether the allegation is established, great liberality is always exercised, and the united force of the items of testimony having this tendency is to be considered. (Super. Ct.) Max Meadows Land and Improvement Co. v. Mendenhall, 348.

"Separator skimmed milk" is a title used to indicate that a valuable and necessary constituent has been, wholly or in part, abstracted not only from the original milk, but as well from that which is known to the trade as "skimmed milk," and the seller of such, under the label "skimmed milk," is not careful, honest or innocent, but practices a fraud both on the public and on the honest dealer, and such a sale is a breach of the ordinance to prohibit the sale of adulterated or impure milk in the city of Philadelphia, as well as of the Act of Assembly of July 7, 1885. (Super. Ct.) Commonwealth v. Hufnal, 360. FRIVOLOUS DEMURRER. While a bill, which sets up a contract under which defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff gas for use in his dwelling and office so long as he desired to use it; that the plaintiff fitted up buildings to receive the gas; that the defendant furnished gas for some five years, and then verbally notified the plaintiff that the contract had come to an end, and that thereafter the rates would be increased; that plaintiff tendered the price agreed upon by the original contract at the time called for in the same, but defendant demanded an increased rate, and threatened to cut off the gas unless that rate were paid, and took steps to cut off the gas, and thenceforth, under protest, the sum demanded was paid, and prays that the defendant be required to carry out its original contract, shows a good cause for equitable relief, yet it is not so manifestly clear a case that a demurrer thereto should be regarded as frivolous, and the bill taken on the overruling of said demurrer pro confesso under the equity rules, section 37. (Super. Ct.) Corbet v. Oil City Fuel Supply Co., 480.

GAS COMPANY. A gas company, which has accepted the provisions of the Act of 1874, has by virtue of section 34 of the same Act, as amended by the Act of June 2, 1887, P. L. 312, exclusive privileges within the district or locality, covered by the charter, until the stipu lated dividends shall be earned and divided among the stockholders, as against another corporation, whose charter sub-dates that of the acceptance of the provisions of the Act of 1874. Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh Illuminating Co., 265.

The insolvency of a purchaser and his knowledge of it when he makes a purchase are not, alone, sufficient to invalidate the sale or support an action by the seller in rescission of it. There must be some trick, artifice, or deception used, or conduct which reasonably involves a false representation, to accomplish the purpose, and the right to rescind does not exist, unless the sale was brought A gas company, whose corporate purpose is manufac about by fraud. (Super. Ct.) Ralph v. Fon Dersmith, turing and supplying illuminating and heating gas, is not limited to things which are necessary parts or appliances for manufacturing or supplying gas strictly, but may not only supply the gas itself, but, incidentally, such appliances and conveniences as will induce new customers to use gas, or old customers to use more. caster Gas Co., 434.

116.

Where a merchant, called upon by a reporter for a mer cantile agency, makes a truthful statement of his affairs, a rating given him by the agency, which is communicated to the subscribers thereof and which is really higher than is deserved, cannot be used as evidence of fraud to rescind a sale, made on the faith of the rating. Id.

Malone v. Lan

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh Illuminating Co., 265.

GIFT. A parol gift from husband to wife, shortly HUSBAND AND WIFE-Continued. before the death of the husband, can be supported only by clear and convincing testimony, but where the auditor and court find the facts establishing such gift, the findings will not be reversed unless manifest disregard of the evi dence before the auditor appear. Wise's Estate, 515. Declarations made by a decedent, at the time of mak ing a gift, that all his property was to be his wife's and expressing regret that he had not made a will giving all to her, do not conflict with the fact of possession of certain securities belonging to his estate, alleged to have been given to her by the husband. Id.

has not been altered by statute in this State, and the husband is still liable for torts of his wife; the presumption that where she commits a tort in his presence she acts under his coercion still exists, and to render her liable for a tort, committed jointly with her husband, it must be shown that she acted wholly of her own will. (Super. Ct.) Hess v. Heft, 60; Slichter v. Heft, 60.

Money paid by one to his son-in law, and secured by a bond conditioned, "that if the bounden S. . . . shall and do well and truly pay or cause to be paid unto B.... the just and full sum of $7,800, like money aforesaid, with interest to be accounted for when a final settlement is made of his estate, without fraud or further delay then the above obligation to be void, and of no effect, otherwise to be and remain in full force and virtue," is not a gift from the obligee to the obliger, but a debt. Balmer v. Strickler, 547.

Á wife may testify that she signed a note with her deceased husband solely as his bail and at his request or command. (Super. Ct.) Strause v. Braunreuter, 253.

Where the wife claims that money paid by her husband for certain real estate, the title to which was in him, was lent to him by her at various times, running through a period of many years, the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of her husband and establishing the loans, is on her, and it is her duty to overcome the effect of the circumstances which, unexplained, make a case against her. Martin's Estate, 283.

INJUNCTION. The office of a preliminary injunction is not to subvert, but to maintain the existing GRADE CROSSING. In determining what is status, until the merits of the controversy can be fully reasonably practicable within the Act of June 19, 1871, P. heard and determined. It cannot be used to take propL. 1360, with regard to the avoidance of grade crossings, erty out of the possession of one party and put it into the court must bear in view that safety of life and limb is the possession of another. Fredericks v. Huber, 121. the object sought to be insured by the Legislature, and Equity, however, regards the substance rather than the very considerable expense and difficulty should be in-form, and will not allow itself to be baffled by a wrongcurred before exposing to risk, either life or limb. Scran- ful change whilst its aid is being invoked, and the status ton & Pittston Traction Co. v. Delaware & Hudson Canal in quo which will be preserved by preliminary injunction Co. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Lackawanna is the last actual, peaceable and non contested status, Street Ry. Co., 357. which preceded the pending controversy. Id. The fact that an electric railroad company does not INJURY TO PROPERTY. The rule that when possess the right of eminent domain, and hence, cannot, a corporation, in the construction or enlargement of its against the will of owners abutting on a street, which own works, takes for its own use or injures private procrosses a steam railroad, elevate its own track for the pur-perties it becomes liable to the owner of the property, is pose of an overhead crossing, affords no reason for permitting it to cross the steam road at grade. Id.

HEATING COMPANY. Where a public heating company which is under contract to heat a certain house, suddenly, without warning, withdraws the heat therefrom, the company is liable in trespass. (Super. Ct.) Hoehle v. Allegheny Heating Co., 553.

HIGHWAYS. Road supervisors cannot be required to anticipate the possible or probable movements of a frightened horse, except where there is an obvious source of danger, such as a declivity or excavation by the roadside, or a bridge not properly guarded. (Super. Ct.) Dixon v. Butler, 209.

The right of a railway company to the surface of a street covered by its tracks is superior to that of the public. The cars have the right of way thereon over private vehicles and pedestrians, and the latter must yield to the paramount right, but this does not absolve the company from greater care cast upon it because of the increased speed of its cars on crowded thoroughfares. (Super. Ct.) Smith v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 501.

So long as the right of common user exists in the public, it is the duty of a passenger railway company to exercise such watchful care as will prevent accidents or injuries to persons who, without negligence on their part, may not at the moment be able to get out of the way of passing car. Id.

a

The duty of a township to keep the highway clear of impediments to travel does not include the power to enter upon the land of an abutting owner, and to destroy, remove or prevent the use of structures he has erected there for the prosecution of a legitimate business. Haines v. Barclay Township, 564.

HUSBAND AND WIFE. The common law, as to the responsibility of a husband and wife for torts,

not restricted to corporations vested with the right of eminent domain and, where the taking or injury occurs, the damages recoverable are compensatory of either a permanent depreciation of the property or the cost of removing the obstruction and restoring it to its former use. Thompson v. Traction Co., 247.

INSURANCE. In the absence of express stipulation and where no inquiry is made, a failure to state facts known to the insurer or his agent, or which he ought to know, is not concealment. Hey v. Guarantors Liability Indemnity Co., 423.

An insurance broker, acting in the line of his business, is the agent of the insured by whom he is employed, and not of the insurer, and representations made by him in the placing of insurance bind the insured. R. Freedman v. The Providence Washington Ins Co., 462.

INSURANCE (Fire.). Destruction of a building by flood or freshet is as clearly accidental as the destruction of it by lightning; and the exception of the latter from the contract of insurance, is a recognition by the insurer of liability for loss arising from other causes of the same nature. Hey v. Guarantors Liability Indemnity Co., 423.

Where a policy of fire insurance provides that it shall be void "if the subject of insurance be a building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple," but the insurance company's agent had, at the time of issue of the policy, notice that the building was erected upon land held by a lease, the company cannot set up this provision in the policy as a defence. (Super. Ct.) Davis v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 569.

While a contract of insurance is a contract of indem. nity against loss by fire, and a direct burning of the building by a willful act of the insured is not one of the risks within the contemplation of the parties to the contract, loss through mere carelessness and negligence of the

INSURANCE (Fire)—Continued.
insured or his tenants or servants, not amounting to
fraud, although the direct cause of the fire, is covered
by the policy, unless specially excepted. (Super. Ct.)
Showalter v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 76.
When an insane person burns his own building, the
loss ensuing is within the terms of a policy of fire insur-
ance unless expressly excepted. Id.

Where a lunatic intentionally sets fire to the property of another, which is insured, the insurer having paid the loss, may recover the amount of the same from the lunatic. (Super. Ct.) Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Showalter, 80. Where an insurer, after a fire, with knowledge that the conditions of the policy had been violated by the insured, writes a note to him offering to pay the amount, fixed by a committee of its directors, appointed to appraise the loss, in which note it does not deny liability on the policy and, subsequently, takes steps for the ascertainment of the loss, in accordance with the terms thereof, there is evidence from which the jury may find a waiver of the breach of condition. Earley v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 37.

A person who places fireworks in his insured dwelling, and permits the same to remain there, violates and renders void a policy, which provides as follows: "This policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement endorsed thereon or added thereto, shall be void if there be kept, used or allowed on the above premises, fireworks." Heron v. Phoenix Fire Ins. Co., 55.

INSURANCE (Life)-Continued.
their relationship, but submitted to the jury the claim as
a creditor on the evidence; held, not error. Id.

The court refused to allow the plaintiff to be asked in cross-examination whether he had endeavored to collect his claim out of his sister's estate: held, error, as the question tended to show a course of conduct incompatible with the claim. Id.

In an action to recover on a life insurance policy,where the evidence is that, at the time of the taking of the pol icy, the insured was suffering from a chronic disease, and, therefore, uninsurable under the terms of the policy, it is for the jury to reconcile the evidence of medical testimony and determine the fact whether the insured was in sound or unsound health at the time the policy was issued. (Super. Ct.) Schwartz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 573. An insurance company cannot forfeit a policy for nonpayment of premium, when there is due to the insured an amount of reversionary interest greater than the amount of premium due. Matlack v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73.

INSURANCE (Marine.) The risk under the "running down" clause in a marine insurance policy is to be confined to the damage done and actually paid to the owners of the vessel run down and its cargo. Goucher v. Providence Ins. Co., 112.

In a libel upon a vessel, the H., charged with having run down another vessel, the W., the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing that the H. should be surrendered and sold, the proceeds to be distributed between the own INSURANCE (Life). When a husband has a ers of the W. and the owners of the cargo, that the policy, non-assignable by its terms, made in favor of his amount of damage should be found by a commissioner, wife, and, after procuring from her an assignment thereof and that the defendants might contest the amount of the to a creditor, makes default in payment of premiums at liability, but not the fact of liability, and that, in no event a time when the reversionary interest due him is greater should the liability exceed the amount for which the H. than the amount of premiums due, and takes from the was sold. The damages were fixed at $33,000. The vessel insurance company an assignable policy bearing the same sold for $17,000, and was bought in by the owners of the number and for the same amount as the old policy, which W. Subsequently, one of the owners of the H. brought policy is assigned to the creditor, who pays the premiums an action against the insurance company on a policy conthereon for a great number of years, the wife is, on the death taining a "running down" clause, in which the vessel was of the insured, entitled to claim, as under the first policy, valued at $38,400, and claimed that the proportionate loss and to receive the amount of the insurance money, less the amount of premiums paid by the creditor whose payments were made in good faith in the belief that he held the policy as collateral and for the joint benefit of the holder and beneficiary. Matlack v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73.

Where a life insurance company has declared a policy forfeited and refused to accept a premium, the fact that the insured subsequently fails to pay the premiums as they fall due, does not affect the right to recover on the policy. National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Home Benefit Society, 517.

That which is not a bar to an action on the policy by the insured, or his administrator, is not a bar to a suit on it by the beneficiary named in it.

Id.

to be paid by the insurance company should be based on the amount of damage, as found by the commissioner. The insurance company in an affidavit of defence recited the stipulation, admitted liability for the proportionate share of the amount realized by the sale of the H., and denied further liability: held, the liability was for the proportionate share of the amount for which the H. was sold. Id.

JOINT ACCOUNT. See EXECUTORS. Cassel's Appeal, 195.

JUDGE. It is the duty of a judge, at nisi prius, to repress natural sympathy with the injured and suffering, and to hold the jury firmly down to the consideration of strict rights and responsibilities. Cookson v. Pittsburgh & Western Ry. Co., 101.

JUDGMENT. A judgment cannot be corrected in a co-ordinate court, McClain's Estate, 126.

Where a life insurance company agrees to reinsure the members of another company upon the execution of a satisfactory transfer application, the company agreeing to assume the insurance of the members in the former com- A judgment may be corrected for mistake, but only by pany may not impose any conditions as to the status of the risk in any individual case, but must assume all existing risks, the applications for transfer being executed in due form. Id.

An agent of a life insurance company who prepares an application for an insurance, is, in so doing, the agent of the company, not of the insured, and mistakes made by him cannot be used by the company to avoid the contract. Mullen v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 529.

the court in which it was rendered, and on proper appli cation; it cannot be done in a collateral proceeding. Id. An obligation in the official bond of a school district treasurer, joined in by sureties, is several, as well as joint, and the judgment obtained therein will not be disturbed, for the reason that one of the parties to it is dead at the time of entry of such judgment. (Super. Ct.) Commonwealth v. Joyce, 191.

While an auditor cannot go behind the judgment of a In a suit on a life insurance policy on the life of a sister court of competent jurisdiction to inquire into its reguin favor of her brother, the plaintiff claimed as a creditor larity or merits, yet he may receive testimony that it has of the insured, the court ruled that the plaintiff had no been paid or otherwise satisfied. (Super. Ct.) Mcinsurable interest in the life of his sister by reason of Gonigal's Estate, 216.

F

JUDICIAL SALE. The legal presumption that a
judicial sale was fair, continues until overcome by suffi-
cient proof that it was collusive or fraudulent. Leaving
the property with the former owner is not of itself suffi-
cient evidence of collusion. (Super. Ct.) Snyder v.
Boring, 275.
JURISDICTION. The Common Pleas has no fence being that the property was untenantable by reason
jurisdiction to sustain an action brought by two executors of a meagre water supply, whether, at the time of execu-
against their co-executor to recover assets of the estate, tion of the lease, the plaintiff made an agreement to
which they allege the latter collected as agent and ap-remedy any deficiency in the service of water as should
propriated to his own use. Such an issue involves an be found necessary, upon which assurance the lessee and
accounting, and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the his surety signed the lease, is a question for the jury,
Orphans' Court. Lafferty v. Corcoran, 31.
where there are corroborating circumstances from which
inferences may be drawn in support of the probability
of the contemporaneous parol agreement. (Super. Ct.)
Smith v. Harvey, 229.