that an alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at all has been infringed; and the importance of leaving free speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim injunctions. We entirely approve of, and desire to adopt as our own, the language of Lord Esher, M. R., in Coulson V. Coulson: To justify the court in granting an interim injunction, it must come to a decision upon the question of libel or not. Therefore the jurisdiction was of a delicate nature. It ought only to be exercised in the clearest cases, where any jury would say that the matter complained of was libellous, and where, if the jury did not so find, the court would set aside the verdict as unreasonable.' In the particular case before us, indeed, the libellous character of the publication is beyond dispute; but the effect of it upon the defendant can be finally disposed of only by a jury, and we cannot feel sure that the defense of justification is one which, on the facts which may be before them, the jury may find to be wholly unfounded; nor can we tell what may be the damages recoverable. Moreover, the decision at the hearing may turn upon the question of the general character of the plaintiff; and this is a point which can rarely be investigated satisfactorily upon affidavit before the trial on which further it is not desirable that the court should express an opinion before the trial. Otherwise, an injunction might be granted before the trial in a case in which at the trial nothing but nominal damages, if so much, could be obtained. Upon the whole we think, with great deference to North, J., that it is wiser in this case, as it generally and in all but exceptional cases must be, to abstain from interference until the trial and determination of the plea of justification." A. M. Goodspeed, for appellant. C. A. Prince and J. M. Hall, for appellees. MORTON, J. The plaintiff does not rely upon the fact that the dam was partially constructed by the defendant before the passage of chapter 383, Statutes of 1889. The plaintiff could not avail himself of that fact in this suit. If the dam is maintainable under that statute, the plaintiff would not be entitled to its abatement, although it was partly erected without right (Ware v. Canal Co., 3 De G. & J. 212), and if he is entitled to damages for the technical violation of his rights, his remedy is at law. Washburn v. Miller, 117 Mass. 376. Nor does he rely upon the point suggested by the defendant, that the operation of the act is confined, as it clearly may be, to Barnstable county. 66 Cooley Const. Lim. (3d ed.) *390. The plaintiff claims that the statute of 1889, chapter 383, under which the court found that the dam was completed and is maintained by the defendant, is unconstitutional, because (1) it purports to authorize the taking of private property for a use which is not public in its nature, and (2) if the statute is constitutional the defendant has not brought himself within it. But in regard to the first point we think the plaintiff misapprehends the consti tutional provision which applies to the act in question. The statute was not an exercise on the part of the Legi-lature of the right of eminent domain, but was enacted under the provision which gives it power to "make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes and ordinances, * * * so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this Commonwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof and of the subjects of the same." Const. Mass., pt. 2, chap. 1, art. 4. It is upon this provision that the Mill Acts have been placed finally in this State after what appear at times to have been somewhat conflicting views. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Mill Corp. v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467; Murdock v. Stickney, 8 Cush. 113; Hazen v. Essex Co., 12 id. 475; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454. It may be doubted whether as new legislation they could be sustained as an exercise of the right of eminent domain. Murdock v. Stickney, Lowell v. Boston, ubi supra; Cooley Const. Lim. (3d ed.) 534; Jordan 7. Woodward, 40 Me. 317. Upon this provision also stand the Cranberry Act," so called (St. 1866, chap. 206), the act in regard to draining meadows, swamps, marshes, sioners to open the flood-gates of a mill, or erect a tembeaches and lowlands, with its authority to commisporary dam on the lands of another person, and to assess the damages upon the proprietors (Pub. St., chap. 189); the act in regard to proprietors of wharves, general fields and lands lying in common, with the control which it gives to a certain proportion in number and interest over the property of the rest (Pub. St., chap. 111), and the act in regard to partition, by which one co-tenant may be compelled to take money instead of land, or to give up for a time the occupation and enjoyment to another. Pub. St., chap. 178. The Mill Act and these and other like statutes, of which various illustrations might be given (Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606), rest upon the principle that property may be so situated or of such a character that the absolute right of the individual owner to a certain extent must yield to or be modified by corresponding rights on the part of other owners, or by what is deemed on the whole to be for the public welfare. See Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Denham v. Commissioners, 108 Mass. 202; Com. v. Tewksbury, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 55. The provision above quoted does not authorize the Legislature to take property from one person and give it to another, nor to take private property for public uses without compensation, nor to wantonly interfere with private rights. These are always to be carefully guarded and protected. But of necessity cases will arise where there will or may be a conflict of interests in the use or disposition of property, and questions may and will come up affecting the public welfare in regard to the use which shall or shall not be permitted of certain property. It is for the Legislature in such instances, under the power thus conferred upon it, and with due regard to private rights, to enact the necessary laws. It is for the public good that swamps and waste lands should be reclaimed and made productive. It is also for the public good that streams should be used to operate mills, to raise cranberries and to cultivate useful fishes. If private rights appear to some extent to be invaded, that is inseparable from the nature of the use authorized, without which the streams could not be advantageously or profitably used, and compensation is provided for any injury that may be done. The character of the property and the resulting general good are deemed sufficient to justify the action of the Legislature. It is doubtful however whether any property of the plaintiff is taken, or any of his rights are invaded. The statute in question authorizes the erection and maintenance of a dam across any stream for the purpose of creating or raising a poud for the culture of useful fishes. It is to be erected "upon the terms and conditions and subject to the regulations contained in chapter 190 of the Public Statutes, so far as the same are properly applicable in such cases.' The chapter referred to is what is known as the "Mill Act." Under that it has been held that the right to erect and maintain a dam to raise water for working a mill does not give to the mill-owner any right to the land flowed, or take away any right from the land-owner. The latter may embank his laud, and thus stop any flowage of it, or if he chooses he may collect of the mill-owner damages in gross or annually for the flowage. Until the land-owner manifests his election to claim damages he cannot be compelled by the millowner to submit his land to be flowed, and until then the only right which the mill-owner has as between himself and the land-owner is to maintain his dam without liability to the land-owner for damages in an action at law. While the land-owner may protect his land from flowage, he cannot of course wantonly interfere with the right which the statute gives to the mill-owner to maintain his dam. Williams v. Nelson, 23 Pick. 141; Murdock v. Stickney, supra; Storm v. Manchaug Co., 13 Allen, 10; Lowell v. Boston, supra; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 163; Head v. Manuf. Co., 113 U. S. 9. There would seem to be nothing in the purpose for which the right is given to erect and maintain a dam to create a pond for the culture of useful fishes that should give to the party erecting or maintaining such a dam any greater rights over the lands flowed by it than a mill-owner would have over lands flowed by the dam maintained by him. Without any thing more we should be slow to infer from a power to maintain a dam to create a pond for the culture of useful fishes any greater rights over lands flowed than from a power to maintain a dam to raise water for working a mill. It appears from the facts found in the present case that the defendant's dam flows about sixty acres, all of which, with the exception of about three-fourths of an acre, belonging to the plaintiff, is owned by the defendant. It is also found that the land of the plaintiff was of small market value for any other use to which it could be applied, and that there is "much laud in Barnstable county similarly situated, having small market value for any purpose to which it can be applied by its separate owners, which would be enhanced in value if it were shown by successful experiment that such land could be profitably used for the cultivation of useful fishes under the powers conferred by " the act in question. In view of these facts, and for the reasons above stated, we think that the claim of the plaintiff that the act is unconstitutional cannot be maintained. We come to this conclusion the more readily because a contrary result would oblige us we fear to hold, if the question were directly presented to us, that the Cranberry Act, under which a large and profitable industry has grown up, was also unconstitutional. Although several cases under that act have been before this court, no doubt as to its constitutionality seems to have been suggested. Bearse v. Perry, 117 Mass. 211; Hinckley v. Nickerson, id. 213; Blackwell v. Phinney, 126 id. 458; Howes v. Grush, 131 1d. 207. The plaintiff further contends that if the act is constitutional the defendant has not brought himself within its scope, because it does not appear that any direct or positive benefit will be derived by the public from the defendant's acts, and because the dam has been erected and will be maintained by him wholly for his own personal pleasure, profit and advantage. But the court has found that "the dam was built and is maintained for the purpose of raising and creating a pond for the culture of useful fishes, and that the pond raised by said dam is well stocked with trout." This finding brings the case within the exact words of the statute. It is not necessary that it should also appear that the object of the defendant was to benefit the public. The Legislature deemed the culture of useful fishes for any purpose beneficial, and passed this statute, as it did the Mill Act, for the purpose of enabling a lessee or owner of lands or flats to raise a dam across a stream so as to engage in that occupation and use the stream without the liability to constant lawsuits from persons whose lands might be flowed. No doubt the defendant's object is his own personal pleasure, profit and advantage. But if the enterprise is successful the public will be benefited by the introduction and building up of a new and profitable industry, and lands now of little value and not available for any other use will be made valuable. We think this contention must also be overruled. The result is that in the opinion of a majority of the court the decree appealed from must be affirmed FIELD, C. J., dissenting, said among other things: "The purpose of the statute is not public. Cultivating fish for one's private use no more concerns the public than cultivating corn or other articles of food. The taking for such a purpose of the land of another by overflowing it cannot be justified as an exercise of the right of eminent domain. Notwithstanding what has been said in some of our decisions, overflowing a person's land without his consent is a taking of property, while the overflow continues, and is a tort, which would be enjoined unless the statutes authorized it. The Mill Acts were originally sustained on the ground that the erection of water mills was for the public benefit, and this was strictly true of grist and sawmills, if the public had the right to have their grain ground and their logs sawed at the mills. The acts however extended to mills of all kinds, in most of which the interests of the public were less direct. Still the erection of water mills, when water was the only available source of power, was always of public concern sufficient to justify the damming of streams, if compensation were paid to the persons whose lands were overflowed. Mill acts were in force long before the adoption of the Constitution, and it could not properly be held that it was the intention of that instrument to render them void. But the damming of the waters of a running stream, so that the lands of the upper proprietors are overflowed, is something more than the reasonable use of the water, which every proprietor is entitled to make, as it runs through his land, without paying any compensation to the upper or lower proprietors. It has never been supposed that the Mill Acts would be sustained if they contained no provision for compensation to the persons whose lands were flowed. As was said in Isele v. Bank, 135 Mass. 142-144: "The right to flow water back upon the land of another is not the less an easement because such other may lawfully wall or dike against it. Such right on his part diminishes the extent of the easement, but does not alter its character." Kenison v. Arlington, 144 Mass. 456. The statute cannot be sustained on the ground that it authorizes the improve. ment of property of different owners for the common benefit of the owners, or for the public benefit, or on the grouud that it authorizes the improvement of property which otherwise would be practically useless. It is not confined to useless or swampy lands, or to lands of any particular description. The constitutionality of the statute must be determined by its meaning, and not by the special facts of the present case. It is possible under the statute that any owner or lessee of lands or flats situated in Barnstable county, for the purpose of making a fish pond for his own private use and pleasure, may overflow the greater part of the arable land in the county with the buildings upon it. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO CON TRACT. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, DE- COMMONWEALTH V. PERRY. The statute of Massachusetts of 1891, chapter 125, section 1, which provides that "no employer shall impose a fine upon or withhold the wages or any part of the wages of an employee engaged at weaving, for imperfections that may arise during the process of weaving," violates the Constitution of Massachusetts, article 1, which declares the inalienable right "of acquiring, possessing and protecting property," since this includes the right to make reasonable contracts. alties or without, so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this Commonwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the same.' It might well be held that if the Legislature should determine it to be for the best interest of the people that a certain class of employees should not be permitted to subject themselves to an arbitrary imposition of a fine or penalty by their employer, it might pass a law to that effect. But when the attempt is to compel payment under a contract of the price for good work where only inferior work is done, a different question is presented. There are certain fundamental rights of every citizen which are recognized in the organic law of all our free American States. A statute which violates any of these rights is unconstitutional and void, even though the enactment of it is not expressly forbidden. Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Massachusetts enumerates, among the natural, inalienable rights of men, the right "of acquiring, possessing and protecting property." Article 1, section 10 of the Constitution of the United States provides, among other things, that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." The right to acquire, possess and protect property includes the right to A. E. Pillsbury, Attorney-General, for the Common- make reasonable contracts, which shall be under the wealth. A. J. Bartholomew, for defendant. KNOWLTON, J. This is an indictment under the statute of 1891, chapter 125, the first section of which is as follows: "No employer shall impose a fine upon or withhold the wages or any part of the wages of an employee engaged at weaving, for imperfections that may arise during the process of weaving." Section 2 provides a punishment for a violation of the provisions of the statute by the imposition of a fine of not exceed ing $100 for the first offense and not exceeding $300 for the second or any subsequent offense. The act recognizes the fact that imperfections may arise in weaving cloth, and it is evident that a common cause of such imperfections may be the negligence or want of skill of the weaver. When an employer has contracted with his employee for the exercise of skill and care in tending looms, it forbids the withholding of any part of the contract-price for non-performance of the contract, and seeks to compel the payment of the same price for work which in quality falls far short of the requirements of the contract as for that which is properly done. It does not purport to preclude the employer from bringing a suit for damages against the employee for a breach of the contract, but he must pay in the first instance the wages to which the employee would have been entitled if he had done such work as the contract called for. It is obvious that a suit for damages against an employee for failure to do good work would be in most cases of no practical value to the employer, and a theoretical remedy of this sort does not justify a requirement that a party to such a contract shall pay the consideration for performance of it when it has not been performed. The defendant contends that the statute is unconstitutional, and it becomes necessary to consider the question thus presented. The employer is forbidden either to impose a fine or to withhold the wages or any part of them. If the act went no further than to forbid the imposition of a fine by an employer for imperfect work, it might be sustained as within the legislative power conferred by the Constitution of this Commonwealth, in chapter 1, section 1, article 4, which authorizes the General Court "to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes and ordinances, directions and instructions, either with pen protection of the law. The manufacture of cloth is an important industry, essential to the welfare of the community. There is no reason why men should not be permitted to engage in it. Indeed the statute before us recognizes it as a legitimate business into which anybody may freely enter. The right to employ weavers, and to make proper contracts with them, is therefore protected by our Constitution, and a statute which forbids the making of such contracts, or attempts to uullify them or impair the obligation of them, violates fundamental principles of right which are expressly recognized in our Constitution. If the statute is held to permit a manufacturer to hire weavers and agree to pay them a certain price per yard for weaving cloth with proper skill and care, it renders the contract of no effect when it requires him under a penalty to pay the contract-price if the employee does bis work negligently and fails to perform his contract. For it is an essential element of such a contract that full payment is to be made only when the contract is performed. If it be held to forbid the making of such contracts, and to permit the hiring of weavers only upon terms that prompt payment shall be made of the price for good work, however badly their work may be done, and that the remedy of the employer for their derelictions shall be only by suits against them for damages, it is an interference with the right to make reasonable and proper contracts in conducting a legitimate business, which the Constitution guarantees to every one when it declares that he has a natural, inalienable right" of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property." Whichever interpretation be given to this part of the act, we are of opinion that it is unconstitutional, and inasmuch as the instructions of the judge permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty on the second count, a new trial must be granted. We do not deem it important to consider the other exceptions taken by the defendant, further than to say that we are of opinion that the motion to quash was rightly overruled. For the cases supporting the view we have taken, and for a further discussion of the principles involved in the decision, see Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Penn. St. 431; State v. Goodwill (W.Va.), 10 S. E. Rep. 285; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; People v. Marx, 99 id. 377; People v. Gillson, 109 id. 389; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294. Exceptions sustained. HOLMES, J. (dissenting). I have the misfortune to differ from my brethren. I have submitted my views to them at length, and considering the importance of the question feel bound to make public a brief statement, notwithstanding the respect and deference I feel for the judgment of those from whom I differ. In the first place, if the statute is unconstitutional as construed by the majority, I think it should be construed more narrowly and literally, so as to save it. Taking it literally, it is not infringed, and there is no withholding of wages when the employer only promises to pay a reasonable price for imperfect work, or a price less than the price paid for perfect work, and does pay that price in fact. But I agree that the act should be construed more broadly, and should be taken to prohibit palpable evasions, because I am of opinion that, even strued, it is constitutional, so far as any argument goes which I have heard. 80 con The prohibition if any must be found in the words of the Constitution, either expressed or implied, upon a fair and historical construction. What words of the United States or State Constitutions are relied on? The statute cannot be said to impair the obligation of contracts made after it went into effect. Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 391. So far as has been pointed out to me, I do not see that it interferes with the right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property any more than the laws against usury or gaming. In truth I do not think that that clause of the Bill of Rights has any application. It might be urged perhaps that the power to make reasonable laws impliedly prohibits the making of unreasonable ones, and that this law is unreasonable. If I assume that this construction of the Constitution is correct, and that, speaking as a political economist, I should agree in condemning the law, still I should not be willing or think myself authorized to overturn legislation on that ground, unless I thought that an honest difference of opinion was impossible or pretty nearly so. If the statute does no more than to abolish contracts for a quantum meruit, and recoupment for a defective quality not amounting to a failure of consideration, I suppose that it only put an end to what are, relatively speaking, innovations in the common law, and I know of nothing to hinder it. But I do not confine myself to technical considerations. I suppose that this act was passed because the operatives or some of them thought that they often were cheated out of a part of their wages under a false pretense that the work done by them was imperfect, and persuaded the Legislature that their view was true. If their view was true I cannot doubt that the Legislature could deprive the employers of an honest tool which they were using for a dishonest purpose, and I cannot pronounce the legislation void, as based on a false assumption, since I know nothing about the matter one way or the other. The statute, however construed, leaves the employers their remedy for imperfect work by action. The objection that this remedy is practically worthless is, I apprehend, no less true, although for different reasons, if the workman's wages should be detained unjustly. My opinion seems to me to be favored by Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366; Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 80, 81. CHAMPERTY. OREGON SUPREME COURT, NOV. 17, 1891. BROWN V. BIGNE. A bona fide agreement by a third person to supply funds to carry on a suit, and receive therefor a portion of the proceeds of such suit, is not valid either on the grounds of champerty, as now understood, nor because opposed to public policy. THIS is a suit to specifically enforce a written con tract entered into between plaintiff and defendant Bigne in April, 1887. The facts are these: In April, 1881, one Pierre Manciet died in the city of Portland, largely indebted, but possessed of a large estate, con sisting chiefly of real property, the legal title of which stood in his name, but of which Bigne claimed a onehalf interest as a partner of Manciet. By his will he appointed his widow and Bigne executors thereof. They undertook the management of the estate, but shortly thereafter the widow died leaving Bigne sole executor. He continued to act as such executor for five or six years, but no attempt was made to adjust his alleged partnership interest until February, 1887, when he presented to the County Court for allowance a claim against the estate for $27,373.02, for money alleged to have been overdrawn by Manciet, and also a claim to be the owner of an undivided one-half of all the property mentioned in the inventory, except certain furniture belonging to the widow. The Manciet heirs contested this claim, claiming that he was not and never had been, a partner of their ancestor, and was not entitled to any interest whatever in the estate. In this state of affairs Bigne, being heavily indebted and without means, except his interest in the Partnership estate, sought the assistance of plaintiff to enable him to prosecute his claims, and if possible reaconsiderable negotiation the contract in suit was lize something from the partnership estate. After finally entered into, whereby in consideration of the sum of $6,000 to be advanced by plaintiff as might be required to carry on the litigation with the Manciet heirs, and establish Bigne's interest in the estate, Bigne sold, assigned and transferred to the plaintiff an undivided one-half interest in and to all his right, title and interest in the property, real, personal or mixed, as fully and particularly set forth and described in the inventory of the estate, and also an undivided half of any claim he might be able to establish against the estate of Manciet. After this contract was made Bigne's claim was vigorously litigated, finally resulting in a decree of this court establishing his right as a partner to one-half of certain real estate in and near Portland, and his claim against the private estate of Mauciet for $9,530.87, and against the partnership estate for $7,890.81. The individual and partnership estates then proceeded rapidly to a final settlement, and the real estate having appreciated largely in value, and exceedpudiate his agreement, and hence this suit. ing greatly the partnership debts, Bigue sought to reThe defendants Bigne and Clossett, who are appellants here, claim as a defense that the agreement sued on is champertous and void. James Gleason, for appellants. Thomas N. Strong, for respondent. BEAN, J. The only question in this case is whether the contract between plaintiff and Bigue is champertous and void. The solution of this question depends upon how far the ancient doctrine of champerty and maintenance is to be recognized in this State. It is conceded at the outset that the contract in suit was honestly and fairly made, and that Brown acted in entire good faith in the matter. No advantage was sought or taken of Bigne. He was fully informed as to the extent, amount and value of the property claimed by him, and it was at his earnest solicitation that Brown made the contract. When he was without means or credit to prosecute his claims, and sore pressed by the Manciet heirs, who sought to exclude him from his share in the estate, he applied to Brown for aid in the struggle, who thereupon in good faith ties omit from their definition the statement that the prohibits the purchase of the subject-matter of a pending lawsuit, although accompanied with an agreement to indemnify the vendor against costs and expenses. Knight v. Bowyer, 2 De G. & J. 421. Nor is a contract to support a pending litigation, in consideration of having a stipulated part of the money or thing recovered, per se void, as against public policy. Coondoo v. Mookerjee, L. R., 2 App. Cas. 186. In this country, where no aristocracy or privileged class elevated above the mass of the people has ever existed, and the administration of justice has been alike impartial to all, without regard to rank or station, the reason for the ancient doctrine of champerty and maintenance does not exist, and hence has not found favor in the United States. Roberts v. Cooper, 20 How. 467; Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 643. In some of the States the whole doctrine is regarded as entirely obsolete. Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86; Bentinck v. Franklin, 38 Tex. 458. But the doctrine, in a more or less modified form, is generally recognized in a great majority of the States of the Union, and contracts which come within the mischief to be guarded against in the administration of justice are held to come within the rule. Lathrop v. Bank, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 489; Gilbert v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 548; Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 142; Lafferty v. Jelley, 22 Ind. 471: Holloway v. Lowe, 7 Port. (Ala.) 488; Weakly v. Hall, 13 Ohio, 167; Backus v. Byron, 4 Mich. 535; note to Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 15 Am. Dec. 319. To meet the changed condition of society and administration of justice, the rule has been much modified, so that upon modern construction the doctrine of champerty and maintenance, as regards a layman, is confined to cases where a man, for the purpose of stirring up strife and litigation, encourages others either to bring actions or to make defenses which they have no right to make, or otherwise would not make, such interference is considered as having a tendency to pervert the course of justice. Dorwin v. Smith, 35 Vt. 69; Findon v. Parker, 11 Mees. & W. 675: Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369. The gist of the offense consists in the officious intermeddling in another suit, and contracts not within the mischief to be guarded against should not be held to come within the rule. It may now be stated as a general rule that a man may sell the whole or part of a thing in action, as well as the whole or part of a thing in possession. The right of disposition is involved in the very idea of property. With few exceptions, not material here, whatever a man may own he may sell, and whatever a man may lawfully sell another man may lawfully buy, and whenever a man has bought any thing in the nature of property, he is entitled to all the remedies the law may afford to enable him to possess and enjoy it. It follows that there is now no rule of law which prohibits the purchase of any thing otherwise capable of assignment merely because it may become the subject of a lawsuit. From this it logically follows that the purchase of a right, which is the subject-matter of a pending lawsuit by one standing in no fiduciary relation, is not unlawful, unless it is made for the mere purpose or desire of perpetuating strife and litigation, nor can it make any difference, on principle or authority, that the consideration for the purchase is to be used in conducting the litigation and paying the expenses thereof. A fair bona fide agreement by a layman to supply funds to carry on a pending suit, in consideration of having a share in the property if recovered, it seems to us, ought not to be regarded as per se void, either on the grounds of champerty, as now understood, or of public policy. Indeed it may sometimes be in furtherance of justice and right that a suitor who has a just title to property, and no means except the property itself, should be assisted in that way. The doctrine of champerty is directed against speculation in |