thereof. It prayed that defendant be compelled to account for all the assets of the fuud, and that they be equally divided between plaintiffs and defendant. Held, that though the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled may be different from that demanded, the com tion. (2) As it was by plaintiffs that defendant was chosen trustee, and through them that he acquired possession and control of the fund, he cannot question their right to call him to account, and insist that the money in his hands be judicially distributed to those entitled thereto. (3) As it is alleged that there is no longer any member of the regiment, other than plaintiffs and defendant, for whose benefit the trust was created, there is no apparent defect of parties to furnish ground for a demurrer. Jan. 20, 1892. Walton v. Stewart. 16 N. Y. Supp. 38, affirmed, without opinion. WILLS-CONSTRUCTION school year, and not to exceed the appropriation. (2) In such case, the board of commissioners having appointed relator teacher at an increased salary for the year beginning March 1, "provided there be sufficient money properly set apart to pay * * * for that period, and if there be not sufficient money for that pur-plaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of acpose, for such portion of that period as the money so set apart shall be sufficient," and there being money in the treasury of the city appropriated to the payment of salaries of school teachers, a peremptory mandamus will issue to compel the comptroller to countersign relator's warraut in payment of her services as teacher for one month. Feb. 2, 1892. People, ex rel. Cronin, v. Coffey. 16 N. Y. Supp. 501, affirmed, without opinion. SUMMONS SERVICE PUBLICATION DEATH PLAINTIFF.-Where service of summons is commenced by publication, and before the expiration of the time of publication plaintiff dies, the continuance of the publication without regard to his death does not complete the service so as to authorize a revival of the action by plaintiff's personal representative. Division, Feb. 9, 1892. Reilly v. Hart. Bradley, J. 8 N. Y. Supp. 717, affirmed. OF Second Opinion by 2434 of theCode of Civil Procedure provides that supplementary proceedings may be instituted before a judge of the court out of which the execution issued, and that where the execution is issued out of a court other than the Supreme Court, and the judges thereof are absent or disqualified, the proceedings may be instituted before a justice of the Supreme Court. Then follows the provision: "In that case, if he does not reside within the judicial district embracing the county to which the execution was issued, the order made by him must be returnable to a justice of the Supreme Court residing in the district, or the county judge, or the special county judge, or special surrogate of that or an adjoining county, as directed in the order." Held, that this provision is not confined in its operation to proceedings iustituted before a justice of the Supreme Court where the execution has been issued out of another court, and that an order made by a justice of the Supreme Court to examine a judgment debtor residing in another judicial district must be made returnable before a justice of that district, though the execution was issued out of the Supreme Court. Feb. 2, 1892. Peck v. Baldwin. 11 N. Y. Supp. 792, affirmed, without opinion. TAXATION-ASSESSMENT-REDUCTION.-Though on certiorari to review an assessment, it appears that all the other property is assessed at only one-fifth of its value, in violation of 1 Revised Statutes, page 393, section 17, providing that assessors shall assess property as they would appraise it in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor, yet, under chapter 269, Laws of 1880, requiring an unequal assessment to be made proportional with the others, relator's property will be assessed at a fifth of its value. Jan. 26, 1892. People, ex rel. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., v. Ganley. 8 N. Y. Supp. 563, affirmed, without opinion. TRUSTS-ACCOUNTING BY TRUSTEE-DEFECT OF PARTIES. (1) A complaint alleged that plaintiffs, who had succeeded the officers of a certain regiment, had elected defendant trustee of a fund which those officers had accumulated for the relief of sick and needy members of the regiment; that the regiment had been disbanded, and all its members discharged from the State militia, except plaintiffs and defendant, who were still members thereof; that since the disbandment there is no longer any object for which the fund can be maintained, and that plaintiffs are the legal successors to the fund, and entitled to equal shares - LEGATEES. - Testator devised to his executors half of his estate, to receive the income, and to apply the same to the use of the wife of the testator's son, G., during her life, "and upon her death I give aud devise the same to and among the lawful descendants of my said son G., in the shares in which they would inherit from him under the laws of the State of New York." Held, that the devise was limited to the issue of G. by his wife who was living at the date of the will, to the exclusion of the children of G. by a second wife, to whom G. was married after testator's death. Feb. 12, 1892. In re Green. 15 N.Y. Supp. 240, affirmed, without opinion. WITNESS-ATTORNEY-HEARSAY PRACTICE-INTERVENTION.-(1) Where the issue is whether an assignment of a mortgage was made for the benefit of the mortgagee's wife, allowing the attorney who was employed by the mortgagee to draw the assignment to testify as to conversations between the mortgagee and the assignee is not reversible error, where the statements testified to as made by the mortgagee are not essential to the wife's recovery, and the only objection made is to the admission of the entire conversation. (2) Where the assignee of a mortgage makes no claim to own it in his own right, a written statement by him that he holds the mortgage in trust for A. is inadmissible in evidence in a suit brought after his death to determine whether he held the mortgage in trust for A. or B. (3) Where judgment has been rendered in a suit brought to determine the equitable ownership of a trust fund, and an appeal is pending therefrom, it is not an abuse of judicial discretion for the trial court to refuse a third person permission to intervene in the suit for the purpose of setting up his claim to the fund. Feb. 9, 1892. Brennan v. Hall. Opinion by Earl, C. J. 14 N. Y. Supp. 864, affirmed. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-TITLE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. In an action to recover an installment of the purchase price of certain land, paid under a written contract, on the ground that defendant's title was defective, on which defendant took issue and asked for specific performance, it appeared that the land was described as beginning at a certain point fourteen and one-half inches west of the starting point, as located by a former survey, to which the description of a deed through which defendant claimed conformed, and that the metes and bounds were the same in both descriptions. It was proved that by a survey made many years after the date of the deed, the tract of which the land in controversy was a part was found to be fourteen and one-half inches longer than by the prior survey; that this surplus had been given to the land east of defendant's property; that there was a fence on the tract which, according to the testimony of the surveyor and a former owner, was the western boundary of defendant's land, and that the distance from this fence to a certain poiut on the eastern boundary of the whole tract corresponded to the distance as stated in the contract of sale. Held, that there was no defect in defendant's title, and that the trial court properly decreed specific performance. Second Division, Feb. 12, 1892. Kelly v. Brower. Opinion by Bradley, J. 7 N. Y. Supp. 752, affirmed. ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS. car with the knowledge of the trainmen, and for the purpose of rendering necessary assistance to a female passenger and little child, the defendant owed him the same duties as a passenger. The learned counsel who has presented the cause for the plaintiff cites us to no authority in support of his contention and it impresses us as unsound. The cases relied upon by the defendant do not, as we think, bear out his position, but show that it is untenable. Lucas v. Railroad Co., 6 Gray, 64; Doss v. Railroad Co., 59 Mo. 34; Coleman v. Railroad, etc., Co., 84 Ga. 1. We have concluded that neither view is correct, but that reason commends as proper a rule between the two. In the case of Railroad Co. v. Crunk, 21 N. E. Rep. 31, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that a railroad company owed the same duty to those assisting a passenger upon a train as to the passenger himself, but it cites no precedent for the ruling, and it is opposed to all cases adjudged upon the subject to which our attention has been called. The law exacts of railroads for the protection of passengers the highest degree of care, and imposes a liability for all injuries which sound judgment, skill and the most vigilant oversight could have prevented, but this responsibility grows out of the relation or contract of carrier and passenger, on account of the great perils of the undertaking. As this is the cause and origin of the rule, it would seem that the rule should be restricted in its application to persons who come within that relation, and such is the effect of the authorities. Lucas v. Railroad Co., 6 Gray, 64; Doss v. Railroad Co., 59 Mo. 34; Coleman v. Railroad, etc., Co., 84 Ga. 1; Griswold v. Railroad Co. (Wis.), 26 N. W. Rep. 101; Thomp. Car., p. 49, § 7. But a denial that the extreme responsibility contended for exists is not an affirmance of the rule that responsibility is restricted to wrongs that are willful or wanton. Such conclusion would rest upon the premise that one attending a passenger enters the cars from curiosity, or upon his own business, under a mere license from the company, and not upon business connected with the company, upon an implied invitation. If this premise be false, and the converse correct, then according to the decisions of this and other courts the carrier would be bound to the exercise of ordinary care (Railroad Co. v. Fairbairn, 48 Ark. 491; Holmes v. Railroad Co., L. R., 4 Exch. 254), and that it is so bound in cases like this is held in the cases first cited, as well as in others upon the subject. Gillis v. Railroad Co., 59 Penn. St. 129; Griswold v. Railroad Co. (Wis.), 26 N. W. Rep. 101. In our opinion the rule is correct upon principle. For it is a matter of common knowledge that in the usual conduct of the passenger business it often becomes necessary for those not passengers to go upon cars to assist incoming as well as outgoing passengers, and that a practice has grown up in response to this necessity. While it perhaps arose out of a consideration for the security and convenience of the traveller, it has proven beneficial to carriers, and now prevails in this State, and extensively elsewhere, and is treated as an incident to the business in the conduct of the public and the acquiescence of carriers. It cannot be doubted that it has increased travel and the earnings of carriers, while it has promoted the convenience and security of passengers, and if it should be abrogated many persons would be compelled to forego journeys, to the detriment of the carrier and their own inconvenience. We conclude that such attendant performs a service in the common interest of carrier and passenger, and that his entry upon a car is upon an implied invitation, which entitles him to demand ordinary care of the carrier. Ark. Sup. Ct., Feb. 6, 1892. Lawton v. Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co. Opinion by Hemingway, J. BONDS-RELEASE OF SURETY-ERASING NAME.-Cosureties signed a penal bond while in the hands of the principal obligor, on condition that such bond should not be a completed instrument until enough co-sureties had signed and justified, in the respective amounts signed by each, to make up the full penal sum, and the bond duly delivered to the proper officer for approval as required by law. After the requisite solvent cosureties had signed, the name of one was erased by drawing a line through his signature, his name in the body of the bond and in the jurat, with the consent of the principal obligor, but without notice to the other sureties. The bond was subsequently delivered to the proper officer for approval, his attention called to the erasure and the bond was then approved by him. Held, that the erasure and discharge of the one co-surety, having released all those who signed after him, all the other co-sureties were discharged. This view of the principal contention in the case at bar is in perfect harmony with the spirit and reason of the overwhelming current of adjudicated cases in the State and Federal courts in this country. In some the facts are strikingly similar to the case before us; in more-in nearly all-the spirit and reason of the decisions are the same. We content ourselves with citing a few out of the great number examined. See Smith v. U. S., 2 Wall. 219; Smith v. Weld, 2 Penn. St. 54; Dickerman v. Miner, 43 Iowa, 508; State v. Craig, 58 id. 238; State v. McGonigle, 101 Mo. 358; State v. Churchill, 48 Ark. 426; Bank v. Sears, 4 Gray, 95; Commissioners v. Daum, 80 Ky. 388; Graves v. Tucker, 10 Smedes & M. 9; Nash v. Fugate, 24 Gratt. 202; 32 id. 595; McCormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457. The laborious research of the attorney-general of the State has produced many authorities bearing upon this particular subject, but a careful examination of them, with others unearthed in our own researches, produces the one solitary disagreeing view of the law. That is the case of Railroad v. Kitchin, 91 N. C. 39. The learned counsel concedes with caution that the court, in this opinion, goes too far in holding a surety liable who would seem to have been not liable, by the universal juridical judgment, outside of the State last referred to. The Kitchin Case is in violent conflict with the views herein advanced, and in irreconcilable antagonism to the long line of authorities hereinbefore noted. The doctrine of the Kitchin Case has been well declared by another court of last resort, in commenting on it, to be unsupported by precedent and wanting in that strength of argument which gives power to the general rule. Miss. Sup. Ct., Jan. 11, 1892. State v. Allen. Opinion by Woods, J. CARRIERS-NEGLIGENCE-RIGHTS OF PERSONS NOT PASSENGERS.-A person who enters a railroad car to assist a lady to a seat cannot demand that the train be held for the full length of time usually required for passengers to get on or off at that place, but only that it be held long enough for the said person to get off, upon notice to the traiuman that he desires to do so. The defendant insists that inasmuch as the plaintiff did not enter the car to take passage upon it, but only as escort to a passenger, the defendant owed him no duty except not to injure him willfully or wantonly, while the plaintiff contends that as he went upon the CRIMINAL LAW-OBLIGATION OF GOVERNMENT TO CALL WITNESSES. - In a prosecution for felonious shooting, without killing, the refusal to require the prosecution to call a certain witness who was present when the shooting occurred, was not error. Sup. Ct. App. Va., Jan. 21, 1892. Hill v. Commonwealth. Opinion by Lewis, P. DURESS-FEAR OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.--The Civil Code, section 1569, defines "duress as "unlawful confinement of the person; " under section 1570, "menace" consists of threats of such duress, or of injury to the character or person, and the Penal Code, section 518, defines "extortion" to be "obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right." Held, that a note payable to one who, for the sole purpose of intimidating the maker, illegally and fraudulently procured a warrant for his arrest on a charge of embezzlement, and which was executed in fear of, and to procure immunity from, arrest and imprisonment, is void. In the case of Bane v. Detrick, 52 Ill. 27, the court said: "The mortgage was void for another reason. It was executed through a perversion and abuse of criminal process. It is proved that Bane got out this process and used it to effect a settlement of a claim which there is much jevidence to show was unfounded. It is against public policy that process should be thus used, and no court will allow the results flowing from it to be enjoyed by him who so uses it. It is a gross abuse of legal process, and no person should have the aid of a court of justice to profit by it." Under that kind of menace which consists in a threat of injury to the character of a person, it is entirely immaterial whether such person is guilty or innocent of the crime to be charged. It certainly would be no defense to the accusation of extortion that the charges or publications threatened to be made by the defendant, and by which he obtained valuable property, were true. The truth or falsity of these matters form no element in establishing the guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with extortion. In Hackett v. King, 6 Allen, 58, it was decided that, though a person was arrested under a legal warrant, and by a proper officer, yet if one of the objects of the arrest was to extort money, or enforce the settlement of a civil claim, such arrest is a false imprisonment, by all who have directly or indirectly procured the same or partici pated therein for any such purpose, and a release and conveyance of property obtained by means of such arrest is void. In Taylor v. Jaques, 106 Mass. 294, the court, in speaking of a certain instruction given by the lower court, said: "We do not concur with that view of the law. If he had embezzled their funds they had a right to have him prosecuted. If he owed them a debt they had a right to accept security for it. But they would have no right to make use of a criminal process for the collection of a debt. An arrest, even upon a legal warrant, and upon a criminal charge, to compel the payment of a mere debt, would be a misuse of legal process, and the threat of such an arrest may constitute unlawful duress. In Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 511, the court said: "But it is now well settled that when there is an arrest for improper purposes, without a just cause, or where there is an arrest for a just cause, but without lawful authority, or where there is an arrest for a just cause and under lawful authority, for unlawful purposes, it may be construed a duress." It will thus be seen that an imprisonment for an unlawful purpose will constitute duress, and such being the fact a threat of arrest and imprisonment, made for unlawful purposes, will constitute menace. There is some authority found in the decisions of the courts of Maine opposed to these views, but we think they are not the better rule. Cal. Sup. Ct., Feb. 20, 1892. Morrill v. Nightingale. Opinion by Garoutte, J. NEGLIGENCE - DANGEROUS PREMISES - LICENSE.The owner of a private paved way opening on a public street, who fails to erect a sign that the way is not public, is not liable for injuries resulting from defects therein to strangers venturing thereon without permission. The defendants were not obliged to put up a sign notifying travellers on the public street that the passage-way was not a public way. Galligan v. Manuf. Co., 143 Mass. 527; Reardon v. Thompson, 149 id. 267; Redigan v. Railroad Co. (Mass.), 28 N. E. Rep. 1133. Nor can the fact that the passage-way was paved be considered an invitation or inducement to the public to enter upon it for their own convenience. The defendants have a right to pave it for their own use, or for the use of their customers. Johnson v. Railroad Co., 125 Mass. 75; Heinlein v. Railroad Co., 147 id. 136; Reardon v. Thompson, 149 id. 267; Donnelly v. Railroad Co., 151 id. 210; Redigan v. Railroad Co., ubi supra. "The general rule is," as stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Reardon v. Thompson, ubi supra, “that a licensee goes upon land at his own risk, and must take the premises as he finds them." See also Redigan v. Railroad Co., ubi supra; Gautret v. Egerton, L. R., 2 C. P. 371, 374; Holmes v. Drew, 151 Mass. 578, distinguished. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 24, 1892. Stevens v. Nichols. Opinion by Lathrop, J. The Chicago Law Journal, in its last issue, can "take the cake" for the most amusing typographical blunder conceivable. In a report of a Michigan case, it speaks of "Chief Justice Scap," and in the same report also speaks of a case in Vesey in which "Lord Scap" gave the opinion. This was a double puzzler for a moment, but the explanation is not difficult. The compositor had set the two names in "lower case; the proof-reader wished them set in small capitals, and marked in the margin "S. cap," and the compositor changed both names to "Scap." 'S capital joke! But another blunder in the same number cannot be laid to the printers, and that is the statement that Story's Equity Pleadings "is perhaps the best work of that gifted author, William M. Story." "Not for Jo," eh? 'Although the decisions of the American courts," said Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in Scaramanga v. Stamp (1880), 49 L. J. Rep. C. P. 674; L. R., 5 C. P. Div. 303, "are of course not binding on us, yet the sound and enlightened views of American lawyers in the administration and development of the law-a law, except so far as altered by statutory enactment, derived from a common source with our own-entitle their decisions to the utmost respect and confidence on our part." This well-deserved compliment to the American judicature has been eclipsed by the judicial committee of the privy council in Huntington v. Attrill (1892), 8 Times L. R. 341. The question arose as to the proper test of whether or not an action is "penal" within the meaning of the well-known rule of private international law which prohibits one State from enforcing the penal law of another, and their lordships adopted "without hesitation" that prescribed by Mr. Justice Gray in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Company, 127 U. S. 20 (Davis, 265): "The rule that the courts of no country execute the law of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties."-London Law Journal. CHIL ALBANY, APRIL 16, 1892. CURRENT TOPICS. HILD-Saving Legislation" is the title of a suggestive report, by Prof. Wayland of the Yale Law School, at the last annual meeting of the National Prison Association, at Pittsburg. Prof. Wayland concedes that crime has been increasing for the last three decades out of proportion to the increase of population. He attributes this in a large measure to the existence of a great professional criminal class and their nurture and instruction of their progeny in crime. He makes the following novel and startling statement: There are at large in our land scores of thousands- rapine or fraud. There are also countless hordes of purity, and whisky, with their mother's milk. The London in 1890. He also gives the following curious information: "The New York police is reported to have recently discovered a flourishing boys' training school for burglars, well equipped with burglars' implements and appliances, and indeed all the paraphernalia of the craft, including the most recent improvements and adaptations, with, we have been told, models of doors to be entered, locks to be picked, walls to be scaled, pillars to be climbed, windows to be entered, etc., the whole under the very competent supervision of a precocious lad of seventeen. Scores of hitherto undetected burglaries were brought home to the members of this college for criminals.” This Prof. Wayland does not believe that reform schools are the probable cure for this evil, but he believes that the State should somehow take hold of such children before they become criminal. looks like a huge undertaking. We entirely agree with him however that there is no question of the State's right to do it in spite of the parents, and it seems that some States have taken measures in that direction. He informs us that in Indiana there is in every county "A board of six persons, three men and three women, appointed by the Circuit Court of each county, serving without pay, and called 'the board of children's guardians.' This board has the power to take under its control children under fifteen years of age who are abandoned, neglected or cruelly treated by their parents; children begging on the streets; children of habitually drunken or vicious or unfit parents; children kept in vicious or immoral associations; children known by their language or lives to be vicious or incorrigible; juvenile delinquents or truants. It provides a temporary home where such children may be maintained and educated. Under order of the court, such children may be indentured as apprentices, or be adopted without the consent of their parents, by the consent of the board filed in the Circuit Court, or such children may be in any manner disposed of as the court shall direct. Substantially similar statutes have been enacted in Michigan, Connecticut and probably some other States." blasphemous and obscene. The foul air which they To this class he would add the children of vagrant, vicious and drunken parents. He informs us that five hundred children under ten years of age were committed in London for drunkenness in VOL. 45- No. 16. "shall" and not "may." As to the cost, it cer tainly could not be so much as the direct and indirect expense now entailed on society by children made criminals by inheritance and training. Mr. Sulzer, in the Assembly, has laid his little torpedo on the track of legal progress and delayed the train for a session or two. The Code of Evidence has been defeated by a vote of fifty-four ayes to thirty-seven nays, thus failing to receive the requisite majority. Mr. Sulzer de anded this "in the interest of our old jurispruden ing heard of Mr. Sulzer before, a to learn something of the venerable practitioner who has flourished so long under and become so familiar with, and been so much benefited by, and grown so to love "our old jurisprudence,' we Never havbeing anxious looked up his record, and discovered that if he is not carried away by measles or whooping cough or precocity during the present year, he will be thirty years old! This is the legal suckling who denounced the Code of Evidence as "Mr. Field's hobby!" Mr. Sulzer says it would cost the State "millions" to construe this Code. This he said, standing in the inadequate, inconvenient, unhealthful and inartistic pile that has cost the State more than twenty millions and is not yet finished. We do not know whether Mr. Sulzer has any sense of humor, but if he has, he must have yearned to laugh when he got off that phrase, "interest of our old jurisprudence." Interest of our old granny! Interest rather of the rich and lazy old lawyers of the City Bar Association whom he represents. If he was sincere, he should have reflected that the Code does not propose many changes, but mainly proposes to put into definite, accessible and permanent form the traditions of the old jurisprudence, so far as they are reasonable and have not been outgrown by modern thought and reform, and to adapt it as to the rest to accepted ideas of contemporary experience. As to "hobbies,” if Mr. Sulzer will only invent and ride one to as good and beneficent a purpose as Mr. Field has ridden his for half a century he will be of much more use in the world than his present vealy utterances give us any reason to hope. Truly, the quality of some of our lawmakers is not "strained," but has come through the coarse sieve of popular selection in very crude form. The Sun speaks of three pending bills for legal reform. One in the National House of Representatives, by General Curtis of this State, for the abolition of capital punishment in Federal cases. The Sun justly says: "Gen. Curtis is well known in this State as an opponent of capital punishment, and has made before the Legislature some of the strongest arguments ever presented to show that the death penalty does not exert a deterrent influence to prevent the commission of murder." General Curtis has always had the sympathy and support of this journal, and his present measure is a wise agitation of the subject, for it is only by constant agitation that reforms are wrought. The second bill is introduced by Mr. O'Connor in the Senate of this State, to give the closing argument to the accused in criminal cases. There is a great deal of force in the answer that as the presumption is of innocence and the burden of proof is on the State, the present rule is right. Much may be said on the other side, especially in capital cases. We have at times been favorably inclined toward the proposed change, at least in such cases. But it can hardly be said that accused persons now suffer any practical injustice from their treatment at the hands of the courts, and we have no sympathy at all with the irrelevant and maudlin appeals by which counsel seek to warp the reason of juries where they have nothing better to say. In respect to the third bill, The Sun says: Senator Saxton "would amend the Penal Code so as to provide that any court authorized to pass sentence may in its discretion suspend sentence during the good behavior of the person convicted." This is correctly stated, but Senator Saxton is too good a lawyer and too judicious a statesman to recommend the enactment in that form. Such a bill in respect to grave offenses, especially by hardened offenders, would be impolitic, not to say absurd. It would be properly addressed to petty and first offenses by young offenders; such a measure is advocated by the leading police authorities and would be a wise vesting of judicial discretion. Of course it was at first rather startling to be informed by the daily newspapers that the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst had been witnessing a circus of naked prostitutes in a bawdy-house and drinking beer there. We confess it took our breath away, and our first thought was that he would better have left this kind of investigation to professional detectives. But we have been reconsidering. It must be conceded that what the doctor did was from good motives. No one will venture a breath against his reputation or his motives. This reduces it to a matter of taste. We do not know that it was intrinsically any more unbecoming in him as a man than it would have been in another man who happened to be an editor or a legislator, and who had the same motives. If it had been an enterprising reporter of no character at all, no one would have thought of criticising the action. Then it was a courageous act, the act of a man conscious of pure motives and careless of popular clamor from lewd fellows of the baser sort. Then again it must be remembered, first, that the doctor is at the head of an organization whose purpose it is to expose and punish such things, and second, that having made complaint in the proper police quarters, he found himself laughed at and ignored, and told not to talk of what he did not know, but to bring proof. So the doctor determined to bring proof, and he brought the best kind of evidence, which so far has resulted in nothing but a disagreement of the jury. How are such deeds of evil to be exposed and punished unless reputable men will sacrifice their personal feelings and encourage other reputable citizens in actively hunting down such shameless violators of decency and law? There are two gin-mills directly opposite our residence in this city, which we are confident, from chance observation, are accessible by side-entrances on Sunday. Now suppose we had the courage to go over there and take a glass of beer on Sunday, in order to bring these violators of law to justice,-would it be fair in the press of this city to mock and sneer at us and revile us? The Sun says Dr. Parkhurst ought to "hide himself in the country." Not so. Those who ought to hide themselves are that unfaithful jury, the recreant and blackmailing police, the editors who sneer at such attempts to suppress a vile abuse, and the notorious keepers of dives and dens. Of course the mischievous reporters have grossly exaggerated what the doctor really did, |