* * are designed to serve that government. dently was not intended to give the State courts jurisdiction to try criminal offenses created by the National Bank Act. If such jurisdiction exist it must be found elsewhere. Counsel for plaintiff in error maintains his argument of no jurisdiction upon three propositions: "First. The State cannot exercise its criminal jurisdiction over a creature having its origin from the National will, as evinced by the acts of Congress. Second. As against the National will the State has no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws of Congress. Third. The State can exercise control only over institutions whose creation emanated from National anthority to the extent that Congress permits." That a corpora- | tion, as such, may be indicted and tried, aud thus punished criminally for a public offense which it can commit, is no new proposition. Some crimes a corporation cannot commit. It has no soul, and so can have no actual wicked intent. It cannot be guilty of treason, or murder, or criminal conspiracy. Other offenses it may and does commit when it does or omits to do some act, the doing or non-doing of which constitutes the offense, without regard to the intent. So a corporation may be punished criminally, if such acts are made public offenses, for obstructing a highway, polluting a stream or taking illegal interest. This law and this distinction are older than Blackstone, and will be conceded without authorities. The non-ac-located, and no more," etc. It seems clear that the countability of plaintiff in error to the criminal law of || the State which the indictment charges it with violating, if it exist at all, comes not from its character as a corporation, but from its character as a Federal corporation, and the protection thrown about it by the act of Congress under which it was organized. penal law of the State does not forbid any act, or interfere with the exercise of any right or power, couferred or authorized by this section. The thing forbidden by the State law, and which it makes a misdemeanor, is the very thing which the act of Congress excepts from the powers and business of a National bank. This section 30, and other sections of the National Bank Law, strongly characterize the act com business or the powers of a National bank. It can hardly be maintained that a State law forbidding the bank to do an act which the creative law has expressly refused to authorize or allow it to do can "interfere with or impair its efficiency in performing its functions," or that such law, if enforced against it, would "incapacitate the bank from discharging its duties." The principle here involved is the same as in case of an agent or officer of the Federal government. The State may not hinder him in the discharge of any of ficial duty, but the line which limits his duty must also limit his freedom from accountability to State authority. A postmaster, in discharge of and within the bounds of his official duty, is amenable only to the Federal authority, but a postmaster who with one The first proposition of plaintiff in error declares the total freedom from responsibility to State criminal laws of "every creature having its origin from the Na-plained of in this indictment as entirely outside of the tional will, as evinced by the acts of Congress." It would require but little examination to demonstrate that this proposition cannot be maintained without material qualification. It is agreed that plaintiff in error is "a creature having its origin from the National will," to wit, a National bank authorized by and organized under the acts of Congress, but it could not, without criminal liability under State laws, which nobody would question, erect its banking-house across the street in the city of Clark. It is too broadly stated to say that a National bank, because created under and by authority of Congress, is entirely independent of all police authority of the State. It is doubtless true that whatever Congress has authorized it to do it must be allowed to do without interference by the State. A National bank, or any other corporation which Con-hand delivers a letter to a patron, and with the other gress, in the exercise of its legal powers, may authorize to be organized and operated, must be allowed to pursue the business and purpose of its organization, | and exercise all the powers necessary or incident to such business, without any restraint by or accountabil ity to State laws. The State could rightfully pass no law, police or other, that would hinder or obstruct the bank in the prosecution of the business which, under the act of Congress, it was authorized to do, and its powers should be liberally regarded in order to avoid any possible friction between the Federal and the State governments. In Bank v. Com., 9 Wall. 353, where the question was as to the right of the State to tax shares of stock of a National bank, Mr. Justice Miller, in speaking of the right of the State to legislate over and control the instrumentalities of the Federal government and of the limits of such right, says: "That limitation is that the agencies of the Federal government are only exempted from State legislation so far as that legislation may interfere with or impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they wantonly strikes him in the face, is guilty of assault and battery under the police laws of the State. This branch of the law was very thoroughly considered and the cases reviewed in Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, and the court held that Neagle was not subject to be held and tried under and for a violation of the laws of the State of California, not because he was an officer of the United States when he shot Terry, but because in shooting him "he acted in discharge of his duty as an officer of the United States," and that being fully authorized by the laws of the United States to do the very act complained of, he could not be held to answer for the act to the courts of the State of California. So here, if by any construction of the law of Congress, it could appear that the act for which plaintiff in error was indicted was done in the exercise of any of the powers conferred upon it, either expressly or impliedly or incidentally, or was a necessary or convenient act in the discharge of its duties to the government, it could not be held to answer to the State court for such act, for that would be to interfere with it in the discharge of its * T legitimate functions, and this is the doctrine of all the The second proposition-that "as against the Na- wrong and to compel its observance. The act of March, 1887, makes National banks, for all purposes of business intercourse with others, citizens of the States where located, and I do not think that these provisions of section 30, concerning remedies aud consequences purely civil, were intended to supersede or prevent the operation of the police laws of the State. Suppose that the law under which this bank was organized had also provided that a note or discount taken by such bank on Sunday should be void, and that the bank should forfeit the money so loaned. Could it be reaThe third proposition is "that a State can only exer- sonably claimed that such provision would be a bar to cise control over institutions whose creation emanated the prosecution of the bank for a violation of the from National authority to the extent that Congress Criminal Code of the State, forbidding the transaction permits." The correctness of this proposition may be of business on Sunday? I think the answer would be fully recognized, and still leave open and unanswered prompt and satisfactory that the forfeiture declared by the really vital question in this case. Has Congress in the act of Congress was civil in its nature, like exemany manner indicated its willingness or its unwilling-plary damages, and did not take the place of punishness to permit the State to make the taking of unlaw- ment for a violation of the criminal law of the State. ful interest by a National bank a misdemeanor, and Congress has passed no law under which the forbidden punish it as such? The Constitution of the United act may be punished criminally as an offense against States declares that that Constitution and the laws of the public, and as the forfeiture of interest is distinctly the United States which shall be passed in pursuance a civil penalty, it follows that, in our judgment, Conthereof shall be the supreme law of the land. The act gress has left it to the State to exercise its ordinary poof Congress under which plaintiff in error was organ- lice powers in the premises, for "all courts and jurists ized as a National bank is in pursuance of the Consti- agree that State sovereignty remains unabridged for tution, and such bank must be recognized and treated the punishment of all crimes committed within the as an "instrument designed to be used to aid the gov- limits of a State, except so far as they have been ernment in an important branch of the public service." brought within the sphere of Federal jurisdiction by Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29. With a few exceptions, the penal laws of the United States." Com. v. Tenney, having no pertinency to this case, the police power in 97 Mass. 50; Com. v. Peters, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 387. Of the United States belongs to and resides in the States. course we shall not be understood as discussing what Tied. Lim. Police Powers, § 201; License Cases, 5 How. Congress may do, but what it has douc, in respect to 504. This police authority of the State yields to the exempting National banks from amenability to State act of Congress, for it is "the supreme law of the police laws. The only indication that Congress did land," but it yields only to the extent that it is dis- not intend to allow its National banks to be held anplaced by it-only to the extent that the ground which swerable to State criminal laws for taking illegal inthe police law would otherwise occupy is rightfully oc- terest is the fact it provided that a forfeiture should cupied by the Federal law-to the extent that an en- result from such act, and then it is argued that a penforcement of the police law would collide or interfere alty or forfeiture like that named in said section 30 is with the act of Congress, or with the free exercise of inconsistent with, or at least unfavorable to, the rights conferred or the discharge of duties enjoined by thought that Congress understood that such banks it. In the thirtieth section of the act referred to Con- would still be subject, in this respect, to the police gress has provided what results should follow the tak-laws of the State. This would only be a fair inference ing by a National bauk of a greater interest than that allowed by law, and has declared its effect upon the contract, and provided a redress between the parties, and imposed a "forfeiture of the entire interest upon the bank, but this is simply declaring the legal effect of taking such unlawful interest upon the rights of the parties under the contract. It may be disciplinary, and a punishment, but it is a civil punishment as distinguished from a criminal punishment. Exemplary damages, recovered in a civil action, are in a sense penal, but they never prevent the criminal law from operating upon the same act in the name of the State. One is civil and the other criminal. One is based upon the violation of private rights, the other upon the violation of the right of the State to have its laws respected. The reserved right of the State to control the conduct of persons within its limits has al-signed. ways been the more readily recognized by the Federal government from its evident justice, and its advantage to both State and Federal governments. And so the right of the State has never been questioned to regulate its own internal economy; to encourage what it thought desirable, and to discourage and punish what it thought undesirable and hurtful to its citizens; to determine when and to what extent and in what manner the weak should be protected against the strong; to determine, in view of the condition of its own people, which cannot be so well understood by a distant Congress, whether any particular thing is inimical to their welfare, and if so to forbid and punish it, and generally to fix its own standard of legal right and if the forfeiture provided by Congress was such in its nature as did, or would within the common understanding of law-makers, take the place or answer the purpose of the penalties usually provided in police laws, but they do not. They are precisely the penalties found in the interest-regulating laws of States, which also make the taking of illegal interest a criminal offense. It is therefore a strained and unwarranted deduction to conclude that when Congress imposed the usual civil penalties for taking unlawful interest common to nearly all State usury laws, it meant to have such penalties cover other and different ground, and have other and different effect from the same penalties when found in corresponding provisions of State laws. We think the court below had jurisdiction of this case, and this holding disposes of all the errors as The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. All the judges concur. WILL-"MY NEPHEW G. A."- LEGITIMATE PROBATE DIVISION, JAN. 26, 1892. IN THE GOODS OF GEORGE ASHTON A testator by his will appointed four executors, one of whom was described as "my nephew G. A." It appeared that there were two persons named "G. A.". one an illegiti mate son of the testator's sister, the other the legiti-Grant, supra. But speaking with the profoundest defmate son of the testator's brother. The testator also nominated as another of his executors "my nephew E. A.," and it appeared that E. A. was his illegitimate grand-nephew, the son of his illegitimate nephew. He further described as "my niece" a person who was his illegitimate niece. Held, that the language of the will showed that the testator applied the description of nephew and niece to legitimate and illegitimate relatives indiscriminately, and that the court was therefore entitled to admit extrinsic evidence for the purpose of showing that the illegitimate, and not the legitimate nephew was intended by the will. [OTION for probate. MOTION The testator in this case executed by which he appointed four executors. Two of them he described as his nephews, viz., "my nephew George Ashton," and "my nephew Esau Ashton." There was a "George Ashton," the illegitimate son of his sister, and Esau Ashton was his son, and there was also a "George Ashton" who was a legitimate nephew, being the son of testator's brother. The only question in the case was whether parol evidence could be received to show that the testator intended to nominate his illegitimate nephew as executor, and it was agreed that if such evidence were admissible there could be no doubt that the intention of the testator was to appoint the illegitimate nephew. It also appeared that the testator had in the will described as " 'my niece" a person who was his illegitimate niece. B. Deane (Rawlins, with him), moved that probate be granted to George Ashton, the illegitimate nephew, and Esau Ashton. erence of the decision of so great a judge, it may be There is an R. H. Pritchard, on behalf of the legitimate nephew. grand-nephew, and he has also described as his JEUNE, J. The case has been well argued, and although on one point, if it were the only one, I should have wished to look further into the authorities, on another point there appears to me to be no great doubt. The question is whether, where the testator speaks of his "nephew," he must be held to be speaking of an illegitimate or of a legitimate nephew, and whether you can call in parol evidence to show which of the two he intended. Two points are to be kept quite separate. The first point is whether in the word "nephew per se there is a latent ambiguity which will entitle us to inquire whether by the word the testator meant his legitimate or illegitimate nephew. If the matter turned upon that point alone, although I have an opinion, I should have expressed it with much hesitation, because it appears to me there is considerable conflict of authority. The question is, can one say that the word "nephew "though in its primary sense applicable to a legitimate nephew only - may be properly applied, in its ordinary and popular sense, to illegitimate as well as legitimate relatives? If it can, then there is a latent ambiguity, and parol evidence may be introduced. There is a conflict of authority as to how the word "nephew' may be read. There is the case of Grant v. Grant, L. R., 2 P. & D. 8; L. R., 5 C. P. 380, 727, which was heard three times. Lord Penzance, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer Chamber, all held that the word, although in its primary sense importing consanguinity, might in the secondary sense mean affinity, and that parol evidence could be adduced to show which was intended. If that be so, and if "nephew" can be used in so general a sense as to include both consanguinity and affinity, it might fairly be said to include both legitimate and illegitimate nephews and nieces. But the difficulty is that Grant v. Grant, supra, does not appear to have been unchallenged. It must be admitted that the late master of the rolls, in Wells v. Wells, L. R., 18 Eq. 504, disapproved of the decision in Grant v. "niece" a person who was his illegitimate niece. He has made his dictionary for us in an unambiguous way, and if we are entitled to use that dictionary it makes the case clear. But are we entitled to use it? There is a conflict of judicial authority on this point, but I think it is clear on which side the preponderance lies. The case of Hill v. Crook, supra, may itself be referred to, but other cases seem to me nearer to the present. In in re Blower's Trusts, supra, I think the Court of Appeal expressed an opinion that the words "nephews and nieces" might be understood in a sense more general than their primary sense if there was any thing in the language of the testator to show he intended such a construction. On the other hand, in Wells v. Well, supra, the late master of the rolls, following the deci sion of Wood, V. C., in Smith v. Lidiard, 3 K. & J. 252, held that "you cannot import the secondary meaning of the word into the residuary gift merely because it has been used in the former part of the will." It is true that in Merrill v. Morton, supra, Malins, V. C., also followed Smith v. Lidiard, supra, but that learned judge intimated that if he were unfettered by authority he should have come to a different conclusion on the point. But then comes the recent case of In re Joddrell, 44 Ch. Div. 590; [1891] A. C. 304, which is a case of the highest authority. In that case it was held that the court was entitled to look to the other parts of the will to see what sense the testator had put on particular words, and that when it was found that he had employed the word "cousins" to mean both legitimate and illegitimate cousins, it was permissible to say that in using the word "relatives" he included relatives who were illegitimate. Following that, it appears to me clear that the testator here has given us his own interpretation of the language which he has used. He has shown that when he used the word "nephew" he meant illegitimate as well as legitimate nephews, and when he used the word "niece" he meant it to refer to his illegitimate uiece. Therefore when he speaks of his nephew George Ashton-he may have meant either one or other-there is a latent ambiguity, and pa- CONFLICT OF LAWS-PERPETUITIES. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, MARCH 1, 1892. CROSS V. UNITED STATES TRUST Co. OF NEW YORK. A testamentary disposition of personal property, lawful and valid at the place of the testator's domicile, where it was made, is enforceable in New York, although if made in New York it would have been invalid as a violation of the statute against perpetuities AF 16 N. Y. Supp. 137, affirmed. PPEAL from the Supreme Court, General Term, Action by Cornelius V. Cross and Norman F. Cross, Edward C. James, for appellants. Edward W. Sheldon, for respondent United States M. T. McMahon, for respondent Sophia V. Morse. O'BRIEN, J. The will of Phoebe Jane Cross, bearing date May 29, 1877, disposed of a large estate for the benefit of her husband and four children. After making sundry absolute and specific bequests, she gave to the United States Trust Company, a New York corporation, $700,000, in railroad bonds specifically described, to have and to hold in trust for the purpose of collecting and receiving the income thereon, until the payment of the principal, and upon such payment to invest and keep invested the proceeds in safe interestpaying securities, and to collect and receive the income on the same, and to apply it to the execution of five separate trusts, for the benefit primarily, of her husband and each of her four children. As none of the estate is involved in this action, except the portion embraced in these trusts, and that only in a general sense it is only necessary to give a brief outline of the scheme of the testatrix with respect to this part of her property, without any very minute examination of the legal questions which might possibly arise upon the construction of this part of the instrument in some other form of action. The bonds above mentioned were divided into five parts, and the testator directed the trust company, as trustee, to pay the income of one part to her husband during his life, and upon his death to her grandchildren in equal shares, until the death of her surviving child, and as there were four of the children, the trust was therefore to continue during the life of the husband and all of the four children respectively. Upon the death of the last-surviving child, the principal was to be disposed of by the trustee by dividing it into as many parts as there should be grandchildren of the testatrix living, and deliver one part to each who had then reached the age of twenty-five years, but if any of them were under that age, then the trustee was directed to set aside and hold the parts of such grandchildren, and pay the income to them, until they should reach that age, when they were to receive the principal absolutely. The trusts for the benefit of the children were identical as to each, but differed slightly from that for the husband. The trustee was directed to pay the income of the part set aside for each child to him or her for life. If either of the children died without children, then the income which such deceased child was to receive under the trust, if living. was to be paid to the survivors in equal shares, and to the children of any deceased child, the latter to take, as a class, the share that the deceased parent would have taken if living. If either of the children of the testatrix should die leaving children, then the trustee was directed to divide the principal or part from which the deceased parent received the income into as many parts as there were children of such deceased parent surviving, and deliver one of such parts to each of said children who had then attained the age of twenty-five years, to hold absolutely. But if any of said children were under that age, then the trustee was to hold the share of such child and pay the income thereof to him, until he arrived at that age, when he was to receive the principal absolutely. And if any child of such deceased parent should die before reaching the age of twenty-five, then his part was to be paid to her surviving brothers and sisters, and if all the children of such deceased parent should die before arriving at that age, then the trustee was to pay the share of the deceased parent, to which they would have been entitled if living at said age, in equal shares to the children of the testatrix then living, and if none of the children of the testatrix were then living, the trustee was directed to pay said sums over to her surviving grandchildren, in equal shares, to hold absolutely. Upon the death of the last surviving child the trustee was directed to divide all the bonds and securities remaining in its possession, in the manner above described, in which the principal of the fund for the benefit of the husband was to be disposed of. The husband and two of the sons were appointed executors of the will, and the residuary estate was bequeathed to them in trust to convert into money and to pay certain legacies, and the remainder to the heirs at law of the testatrix, "who, by the laws of the State of New York relating to the distribution of intestate estates, would have been entitled to receive the same" in case of intestacy. The husband died on the 9th day of June, 1889, and that part of the trust intended for his benefit has terminated. Mrs. Cross left two sons and two daughters. One of the sons is married, but has no children; the other never married. One of the daughters is a widow, and has three children, one of whom is married. The other is married, but without children. The two sons, as surviving executors and trustees under the will, and individually, with the daughter, who is without children, brought this action against the trust company, as trustee, and the widowed daughter and her three children, for the purpose of procuring a judgment declaring the trusts void, after the death of each of the primary beneficiaries, on the ground that they are in contravention of the statute against perpetuities. With respect to the provision for the benefit of the husband, the absolute ownership of the property bequeathed was suspended by the terms of the will for more than two lives in being at the death of the testatrix. The fund could not be released from the trust till the death of the husband and the last survivor of the four children, and the case is therefore within the statutory prohibition against the suspension of the absolute ownership and power of disposition of personal property. Ward v. Ward, 105 N. Y. 68; Smith v. Edwards, 88 id. 92; Colton v. Fox, 67 id. 348; Schettler v. Smith, 41 id. 328; Knox v. Jones, 47 id. 389; Costar v. Lorillard, 5 Paige, 172; 14 Wend. 265. The absolute ownership and power of disposition was further suspended upon the lives of those grandchildren of the testatrix who were under twenty-five years of age at the death of her last surviving child, and until such grandchildren, respectively, arrived at that age, as to the share of each of them in the personal estate, and this might possibly involve a suspension of the whole or some part of the property embraced in the trust upon a life or lives not in being at the death of the testatrix. Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 56; Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61; Smith v. Edwards, supra. The trusts created for the benefit of the children seem to be open to the same objection. In so far as the duration of the trust is concerned, it might be held good in the contingency of the death of the first beneficiary, leaving children, because in that case the suspension is only upon the life of such beneficiary, whose children take absolutely. The difficulty with this feature of the case is, that as to the children of a deceased parent who are under twenty-five at his death, the absolute ownership is liable to be further suspended upon the life of a child born after the death of the testatrix. Tiers v. Tiers, 98 N. Y. 328. But the disposition of the bonds, in the event of the death of any of the children without issue, would seem to be clearly against the terms of our statute, as in that event the absolute ownership would be suspended during the life of such child, then during the successive lives of the other three, or the last survivor of them. Then there was liable to be a further suspension during the minority, under twenty-five, of any grandchild living at the death of the last surviving child of the testatrix, as to the share of such grandchild, or for his or her life, within twenty-five years. This brief reference to the legal questions involved in the will, growing out of the bequests in trust, under our statute, has been thought necessary only for the reason that one of the defendants in this action, a grandchild of the testatrix, is an infant. Except for that fact it might be sufficient to say that upon the argument there was no attempt made upon the part of any of the learned counsel for the defendants to uphold these provisions of the will as valid under our statute. On the contrary, they must be understood by the course of the argument as admitting that the trusts are not valid under our law, but notwithstanding this they strenuously urge that all the provisions of the will are legal, for reasons which must now be noticed. It has been found as a fact, conclusive upon us, that from a time anterior to the execution of the will, up to the time of her death, on the 29th of June, 1878, the testatrix and her husband were inhabitants of and domiciled in the State of Rhode Island; and further, that by the laws of that State, then and now in force, all the provisions, trusts and remainders contained in the will are valid and effectual. The will was admitted to probate, and the executors accounted, in that State. They transferred the bonds embraced in the trust to the trustee, and these provisions of the will have been executed and carried out since the death of the testatrix. The bonds disposed of by the provisions in question were always actually within the State, and there seems to be no substantial controversy between the counsel with reference to the legal propositions asserted in behalf of the plaintiffs, namely, that all the primary trusts are valid, and can be upheld under our law upon the principle that where several trusts are created by a will, which are independent of each other, and each complete in itself, some of which are legal and others illegal, and the legal can be separated from the illegal and upheld, without doing injustice or defeating what the testator might be presumed to wish, the illegal trusts may be cut off and the legal permitted to stand. Kennedy v. Hoy, 105 N. Y. 134; Manice v. Manice, 43 id. 384; Schettler v. Smith, supra; Savage v. Burnham, 17 id. 561, 576, 577; Post v. Hover, 33 id. 593, 598; Harrison v. Harrison, 36 id. 543; Van Schuyver v. Mulford, 59 id. 432; Tiers v. Tiers, supra. It is not necessary to a decision of this case to point out the precise application of this rule to the trusts in question, and therefore we will not stop to consider how far, if at all, the elimination of the subsidiary trusts would interfere with the scheme of the testatrix as a whole, or the precise portion of the disposition that would be permitted to stand under our law. On this principle, the only part of the property in question yet released from the trust is the share set aside for the benefit of the husband, the trust in his favor having terminated by his death. The controversy is thus reduced, so far as this court is concerned, to a single question, and that is whether this action can be maintained to declare invalid a disposition of personal property by will, perfectly lawful and valid at the place of the owner's death, when made, but which would be invalid if this were a New York will. The property and the trustee are here. So are all the beneficiaries, except one of the grandchildren, who resides in the State of Connecticut. From the present situation of all par. ties interested in the property thus disposed of, it may be assumed that the trust is to be administered here. It is a general and universal rule that personal property has no locality. It is subject to the law of the owner's domicile, as well in respect to a disposition of it by act inter vivos as to its transmission by last will and testament, and by succession upon the owner dying intestate. This is, in substance, the language in which Judge Denio stated the law in this court, and which he concisely and clearly extracted from the authorities cited by him. Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N.Y. 112. The learned judge added that "the principle no doubt has its foundation in international comity, but it is equally obligatory, as a rule of decision in the courts, as any legal rule of purely domestic origin. It does not belong to the judges to recognize or to deny the rights which individuals may claim under it at their pleasure or caprice; but it having obtained the force of law by user and acquiescence, it belongs only to the political government of the State to change it whenever a change becomes desirable." We have in this case the grandchildren of the testatrix, who, next after her husband and children, were the objects of her bounty, claiming certain interests in the corpus of the trust-estate which vested in them under the terms of the will and the law of the domicile. They say that we have no right to use the law of New York for the purpose of cutting them off from their inheritance lawfully bequeathed to them by the law of the State where their ancestor was dom iciled when she made formal disposition of her property. It is manifest that this presents a question touching the disposition and transmission of personal property by will which must frequently arise, of the very highest importance. The plaintiffs admit that so far as concerns the formal requisites essential to the validity of the will, as a testamentary instrument, the capacity of the testatrix, and the construction of its provisions, the law of the domicile must govern; but the validity of the particular trusts attempted to be created depend upon the law of the State, the domicile of the legatee, and the government under which the fund is to be held and administered. In other words, it is claimed that this case forms an exception to the general rule that a disposition of personal property is gov erned by the law of the domicile of the owner, and that |