jurisdiction of courts of law or equity. The doctrine that courts have an inherent jurisdiction to mould the proceedings to meet new conditious and exigencies is true, but in a limited sense. They cannot, under cover of procedure or to accomplish justice in a particular case, invade recognized rights of person or property. No court, we suppose, can abrogate an established rule of evidence, as, for example, the rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible, or the rule of the common law that parties shall not be witnesses, or that interest disqualifies. They may apply existing rules to new circumstances. Nor is it, we conceive, within the power of the court to create remedies unknown to the common law, or institute a procedure not according to the course of the common law. It is most important that courts should proceed under the sanction of an orderly and regulated jurisdiction, and that as little as possible should be left to the discretion of a judge. The exercise by the court of the power now invoked, as has been shown, is not sanctioned by any usage in the courts of England or of this State. Its existence is not indispensable to the due administration of justice. Its exercise, depending on the discretion of the judge, would be subject to great abuse. We think the assumption by the court of this jurisdiction, in the absence of statute authority, would be an arbitrary extension of its powers. It is a just inference that an alleged power which has lain dormant during the whole period of English jurisprudence, and never attempted to be exercised in America until within a very recent period, never in fact had any existence. We have purposely omitted to repeat the views and authorities upon this question set forth in the opinions in Roberts v. Railroad Co. and in Railway Co. v. Botsford, and we refer to those opinions for a fuller discussion of the grounds upon which the denial of the power claimed proceeds. The order should be affirmed. Upon the death of such owner intestate, the right of action for damages, accruing after his death, vests in his heirs instead of his administrator. In an action to recover damages from an elevated railroad company for damage to property abutting on the street in which the road has been erected, where an expert witness is asked what, in his judgment, is the amount of damage suffered by the property, a general objection to the evidence on the ground of incompetency is insufficient to raise the point that the question involves a fact not provable by opinion. 13 N. Y. Supp. 624, affirmed. Samuel Blythe Rogers, for appellants. G. Willett Van Nest, for respondents. ANDREWS, J. This case and several others now awaiting decision, present the question whether the owner of premises in the city of New York, who after the construction of the elevated railroad in the street upon which the premises abutted, leased them for a term of years, can maintain an action for damages for the impairment of easements in the street appurtenant to his premises, by the existence and maintenance of the road, suffered during the period in which the premises were in the actual occupation of tenants under the lease, or whether the right of action is in the lessee. The case presents the further question whether, upon the death of the lessor intestate, the right to damages accruing from his death to the termination of the lease is vested in his administrators or belongs to his heirs, who upon his death succeeded to his title to the land. There is a further question of evidence to which reference will be made. The question as to the respective rights of lessor and lessee under the circumstances stated, has occasioned considerable controversy, and has been argued in several of the cases before us with much ability, and this question will be first considered. The proposition that the structure of the elevated railroad invades property rights of owners of abutting property is no longer an open question. It is generally, if not universally, true that the structure is located in streets, the fee of which is in the city of New York. The building and operation of the road involves no actual entry upon the lands of the abutting owners, nor any injury to any corporeal hereditaments. The act of the defendant was not therefore a trespass upon land of another, as that injury is defined in the common law. It has been usual in these cases to denominate the injury to abutting owners a trespass. Every invasion of another's rights is such in a general sense, and in this general sense the word has been used as a convenient term to characterize the wrong committed. But the attempt to fasten upon this use an implication that the injury was one to the immediate occupier of the property, viz., to the tenant, rather than to the landlord, has no justification. In the Story Case, 90 N. Y. 171, the court, in speaking of the right of an abutting owner in the public street, said: "The right thus secured was an incorporeal hereditament. It became at once an appurtenant to the lot, and formed an integral part of the estate in it. It follows the estate and coustitutes a perpetual incumbrance upon the estate burdened with it. From the moment it attached the lot became the dominant and the open way or street the servient tenement." The invasion of this incorporeal right by the structure of the elevated road is the gravamen of this and similar actions, and such an injury, although not a trespass upon land, has through. out the course of common law been remediable by an action for damages, technically known as an action of 'trespass on the case." It is a fundamental proposition that only the party injured by a wrongful act can maintain an action for damages. There may be difficulty in some cases in ascertaining the proper party. The same wrong may occasion injury to sev eral persons, or to separate and distinct interests in the same property. But we repeat he only is entitled to maintain an action who can show that his right has been invaded, and to such person or persons only is the wrong-doer bound to make compensation. The owner of real property, so long as he is in possession, and has not leased or created any subordinate interest in the land, plainly is the only person who has been injured by the construction and maintenance of the elevated railway. His easements, appurtenant to the land, have been invaded by the structure, constituting an injury to the inheritance, as distinguished from a mere temporary and casual wrong or trespass, not af fecting the permanent value or use of the premises. It is true that the wrong is not permanent in the sense that it is irremediable. The structure may be voluntarily removed, or its removal may be compelled on the application of abutting owners, and past damages may be recovered. Until the company shall have ac quired by condemnation proceedings or voluntary cession the rights of abutting owners, the ordinary legal and equitable remedies are open to them. It is found as a fact that the defendants proclaim their intention | to continue to maintain and operate the railroad, and this is a necessary inference from the situation. The character and purpose of the structure, the corporate powers and obligations of the defendants, the large amount expended in the enterprise, the right of condemnation given by the statutes, are conclusive not only that the defendants intend permanently to operate the road, but also of the fact that, when forced so to do, they will acquire the legal right as against all parties in interest. That under these circumstances the construction and operation of the road before any consummated right has been acquired by the defendants, whereby the owner of abutting property is deprived of the full enjoyment of his property, constitutes an injury to the inheritance, admits we think of no doubt. In the present case the owner of the lot did not retain the full and absolute dominion, but carved out of the fee a term of years. But by so doing he did not divest himself of his inheritance. He still had an inheritance in the land, technically a reversion. His prior absolute and unqualified estate was divided into two estates, one in the termor, the nature and quality of which is determined by the lease, and the other in himself. In determining whether the lessee acquired by his lease the right to recover damages inflicted upon the property by the road during the term, the situation at the time the lease was executed, the terms of the instrument and the intention of the parties thereto, are to be considered. The first and most obvious consideration is that the lease was of the lot, and that when made the incorporeal and appurtenant easements in the street, to the extent that they had been taken or invaded by the elevated railroad, had been practically severed, though by wrong, from the abutting property. The part so taken away was not enjoyed in connection with the premises leased when the lease was executed. But still more material is the fact that the rent reserved in the lease was for the use of the lot in its actual situation. This is not stated in terms, but there can be no other reasonable inference. The road was then in the street, and was intended to be a permanent structure. It would be an unnatural and violent presumption that the lessor intended to exact, or that the lessee intended to pay, rent measured by the value of the use of the premises without the railroad, on the supposition that it would be removed during the term. On the contrary, it is undoubtedly true that the rent reserved in leases like this represents in the minds of the parties the value of the use of the premises incumbered by the disadvan tages of the railroad. The rent is diminished to the extent of the estimated injury to the rental value of the premises from this cause. In no other view practically could property built upon, and especially business property, be rented at all. Lessees usually desire leases of such property for a considerable period. The owner could not ordinarily rent from day to day or week to week. The loss falls upon the lessor, and the continuance of the wrong during the term imposes no pecuniary loss upon the lessee. To hold that the right of action vests in the lessee, or to divide the claim between the owners of the two estates, would be contrary to justice and to the presumed intention of the parties. There are many cases illustrating the principle before adverted to, that the same wrongful act may af fect distinct interests' in the same property, and give a separate action to the several owners. It was held as long ago as the case of Bedingfield v. Onslow, 3 Lev. 209, that lessee and reversioner may each have an ac tion for an injury resulting from the same wrong, each with respect to his particular estate. A reversioner however, who by his lease has vested the immediate right of possession of the property in the lessee, sustains no legal injury from mere temporary or casual trespasses on the land. Such wrongs affect the possession merely, and are to be redressed at the suit of the tenant. But the construction of the elevated railroad in the street, without having acquired the easements of an abutting owner, if it has diminished the rental value of the property, is a wrong which, within the authorities, affects the inheritance, and gives the reversioner a right of action. He has been compelled to accept smaller compensation for the use of his property than he otherwise would have received, and to that extent has been deprived of its beneficial enjoyment. He has no absolute remedy to compel the removal of the structure, since the right of condemnation can at any time be exercised by the defendants. It has been held that an action lies by a reversioner for a wrongful obstruction of lights of his houses, for a permanent obstruction in the adjacent street, for obstructing a private way appurtenant to his premises, for preventing the access of tenants to a wharf, and for fouling a stream passing his lands, upon which dye works had been erected. Jesser v. Gifford, 4 Burr. 2141; Leader v. Moxton, 3 Wils. 461; Bedingfield v. Onslow, supra; Clowes v. Staffordshire Potteries W.Co., L. R.,8 Ch. App. 125: Kidgill v. Moor, 9 C. B. 364; Bell v. Railway Co., 10 C. B. (N. S.) 287. See Mott v. Schoolbred, L. R., 20 Eq. 22; Add. Torts, 139. It is obvious we think within the authorities, that the lessor in a lease, made after the construction of the elevated railroad, of premises abutting thereon, can maintain an action for damages for the loss of rents occasioned thereby. The principle that diminished rental value is a basis for awarding damages has been frequently recognized in these and similar cases. Francis v. Schallkopf, 53 N. Y. 152; Tallman's Case, 121 id. 119; Drucker's Case, 106 id. 157; Hussner's Case, 114 id. 433; Lawrence's Case, 126 id. 483. It is also a necessary deduction from the circumstances attending the making of ordinary leases of improved property, executed after the construction of the elevated railroad, that the right to recover damages is vested exclusively in the lessor. The circumstances and situation forbid the inference that the parties acted upon the presumption that the road would be removed or abandoned during the term; on the contrary, they act upon the presumption that the wrong will be continued, and the rent reserved is fixed upon this assumption. Baker v. Sanderson, 3 Pick. 348, was an action by a reversioner for damages for obstructing the plaintiffs mills, and it was alleged in the declaration that, in consequence of the obstruction, tenants had threatened to quit and the plaintiff was constrained to make a reduction in rents. The court held that the declaration disclosed a good cause of action, and that a recovery by the plaintiff would be a bar to any action by the tenants for the same obstruction. In Sumner v. Tileston, 7 Pick. 198, the plaintiff sued the defendants for damages caused to the plaintiff's mill by the act of the defendant by raising a dam below. During the period for which damages were claimed, the mill for a time was occupied jointly by the plaintiff (the owner) and his son, and for another part of the time by the two sons, and in each period the plaintiff reduced the rent on account of the back-water. On the trial one of the sons was called as a witness by the plaintiff, and objection was taken to his competency on the ground of interest, which was overruled. On appeal the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action, and on the question of the competency of the son as a witness Parker, C. J., said: "He paid for the use of the mill according to the value of the rent, deducting the ob struction. He can have no action against the defendant for the same reason, viz., that he is not damnified." We should be very reluctant to make a decision which would expose the defendants to a double action in cases like this, and we are satisfied that the cause of action is entire, and is solely vested in the lessor. In a case where the lease was made prior to the construction of the road different considerations would apply. Under such a lease the lessee is the party who would be entitled to maintain the action, for the same reason that we hold the lessor is entitled in the present case, viz., that he is the one who suffers the injury. Other cases may be suggested, as for example where a ground lease is made either before or after the construction of the road, and the tenant makes erections upon the land, or cases where the lease is for such a long term as practically to amount to a fee. We will not anticipate what rule may be held in such cases. It is sufficient to say that they are not controlled by the present decision. This court, in the recent case of Pappenheim v. Railway Co., 28 N. E. Rep. 518, held that upon an absolute sale in fee of premises on a street through which the elevated railroad is constructed, all right to damages subsequent to the conveyance by reason of the location and operation of the railway in the street vests in the grantee. This conclusion seems incontestable. The easements of an abutting owner invaded are appurtenant to his premises, and in the nature of things they are indissolubly annexed thereto, until extinguished by release or otherwise. They are incapable of a distinct and separate ownership. The owner of a lot cannot reserve them upon a sale, and they must of necessity pass as appurtenant to the premises, and with them passes to the purchaser also the right to any remedy for their invasion. In the case of a lease the easements remain annexed to the estate, not dissevered in fact or intention from the inheritance, and whether the general owner alone can assert a claim for damages, or whether both lessor and lessee have an action, will depend on the intention and the circumstances. The holding that the vendee acquires the right to all remedies for the future invasion of the easements accomplishes substantial justice. Both the vendor and vendee knew that the owner of the land as such can compel the removal of the road from the street, or as an alternative that the company must institute proceedings for condemnation. Under such circumstances, the price obtained or given for the property would not ordinarily be regulated on the assumption that the wrong is to continue unredressed, or without compensation, but would naturally represent approximately the value of the land, as if no road had been built, or what would be substantially the same thing, the value of the lot in its existing situation, supplemented by the value of the right which passes to the grantee with the conveyance to recover future damages, or in case of condemnation, to receive full compensation for the easements taken. In case of leases, especially leases for short terms, neither party expects that the wrong will be promptly righted, and in practice as well as theory the rent reserved represents the impaired value of the use. Both the rule declared in the Pappenheim Case and in this operate, as near as may be, to rest the right to compensation in the party who sustains the loss. As to the second question, we entertain no doubt that, on the death of the lessor intestate, or having devised the land, the right to damages from the death of the decedent thereafter suffered goes, with the title, to his heirs or devisees as the case may be. The lessor, in his life-time, never had any claim to recover such damages, and his administrator or executor can have none. It might happen that no future damages would structure removed, the liability of the company, except for past damages, would cease, and the owner who had leased his premises for a term of years at diminished rent, upon the assumption that the road was to continue, would find himself in the position of having let his premises for what for the unexpired term might be an inadequate compensation, but this we conceive would entitle him to no remedy against the company. Such damages would not be regarded as flowing from the original wrong. While the wrong continues the true principle is, we think, that as between lessor and heir or devisee, the right to damages accruing subsequent to the devolution of the title of the lessor vests in those who have succeeded thereto. They sustain the injury, and not the decedent, or his As owners of the reversion, they are entitled to the rents accruing from the decedent's death, and if they are inadequate, and this is attributable to the wrong of the defendants, it is fan injury to the reversion, and the reversioners at the time are the persons entitled to maintain the action. estate. The question of evidence arises on an exception to a question put to an expert witness for the plaintiff, similar to that recently considered in the Roberts Case (N. Y. App.), 28 N. E. Rep. 486, the allowance of which in that case was held to be error. The objection there was specifically taken that the question involved a fact not provable by opinion. Here there was only a general objection on the ground of incompetency. We have been inclined to hold, in view of the course of trials in these cases against the elevated railway, that although the general objection of incompetency made to a question put to an expert asking his opinion might be deemed, in ordinary cases, sufficiently specific, nevertheless to apply that rule in these cases would be unjust, because the objection, considered in connection with the course taken on these trials, would not fairly lead the court or counsel to suppose that the objection was aimed at the mode of proof, but rather to the competency of the fact sought to be proved. We think we should follow the instruction on the subject in the McGean Case, 117 N. Y. 219, and hold that the objection did not raise the point that the opinion of the witness was inadmissible. These considerations lead to an affirmance of the judgment. All concur except EARL, J., dissenting. SEDUCTION-FRAUD-DAMAGES. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, DEC. 1, 1891. LAWYER V. FRITCHER. Defendant, wishing to marry plaintiff's daughter, fraudulently represented that he had a legal right to contract marriage, when in fact he had a wife from whom he was not legally divorced. Through such representations defendant obtained plaintiff's consent to marry the daughter, took her away and kept her four days. The daughter was seventeen years of age, lived with plaintiff and was his servant. Held, that the fraud vitiated the consent and entitled plaintiff to recover for the loss of her services. The jury were authorized to impose punitive damages. 7 N. Y. Supp. 909, affirmed. It appears that the defendant, who is a man sixty years of age, and has a wife from whom he is not legally divorced, and who is living absent from him, on the 6th of May, 1886, came to the plaintiff's house and had an interview with the plaintiff as well as his daughter. On the 16th day of May following he again came to the plaintiff's house and had an interview with him and plaintiff's wife upon the subject of marrying Edith, plaintiff's daughter. During the interview with the plaintiff upon the latter day, upon the subject of the marriage of defendant to plaintiff's daughter, there was a conversation between them in regard to his legal right to contract marriage, and whether the conditions of separation from defendant and his wife were such as to allow of a valid marriage between defendant and plaintiff's daughter. The defendant represented that he had a legal right to marry, and the defendant drew a consent or contract to carry out such design, and induced the plaintiff and his wife to sign it. The consent or contract was in these words: "To Home it may Concern: We, the undersigned, are the father and mother of the bearer, Edith Lawyer. Whereas. Edith and P. J. Fritcher, of Sharon, wish to be united, we give our consent to their contracts. Richmondville, May 16, 1886. PETER LAWYER. CATHERINE LAWYER." Said Catherine Lawyer was not able to write her name, aud Edith was requested to sign her name for her, and did so. After these representations were made and this instrument signed, the defendant carried Edith to Portlandville, in Otsego county, a distance of about thirty miles from her home and residence of plaintiff; stayed at a public house at that place, and said to the lady who kept the house that be was married; occupied the same bed with Edith on the night of the 17th. The next day the defendant carried Edith to Sharon, Schoharie county, where the defendant resided, and stated to his housekeeper, who was a sister of Edith, that she was his wife. On the night of the 18th of May the defendant and Edith occupied the same room and the same bed. After Edith arrived there, and during the 18th and 19th days of May, there was a conversation between Edith and Julia, her sister, defendant's housekeeper, in which Julia told Edith that the defendant could not marry; that he had a wife living and was not divorced from her. Edith, the plaintiff's daughter, was about seventeen years of age, generally lived in her father's family and performed service for him, though she did work out occasionally, but her father had received her wages. Among the declarations made at the interview of the 16th between plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff testifies that the defendant said: "I am just as clear from my wife as though I never had married her." The plaintiff also testified that he believed such statement to be true. This statement and belief preceded signing the paper above set forth. On the 17th or 18th day of May, and after defendant had arrived at his home, and made the statements above to Julia, she procured from a drug store in the vicinity of the defendant's residence some poison. Edith partook of that poison and died of it on the 20th day of May. The principal question involved in this case is whether the plaintiff proved a loss of service and damage in consequence thereof sufficient to maintain the action. The trial judge charged the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for any loss of service by reason of the taking of the poison and the death of Edith in consequence. Nevertheless the jury, under the charge of the court, found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff of $800 besides costs. The General Term was not unanimous in affirming the judgment on the verdict of the jury. One of the learned judges of the General Term, as shown by his dissenting opinion, uses the following language, which indicates the view taken by him and the grounds for * * his dissent from the affirmance of the judgment: "The defendant, a married man over sixty years of age, took plaintiff's daughter Edith, about seventeen years old, from her father's house on Monday, May 17. He did this with the consent of the parents. But the verdict of the jury establishes that he obtained this consent by fraud. That night he stayed with her at an hotel, and occupied the same bed with her, saying to the landlady that Edith was his wife. * The next day after dinner Edith became sick. She had taken poison. The day following, Thursday, the 20th, she died from the effects of the poison. Before death she told her sister that she took poison because she did not want to live, and that she did not want to see anybody. There was evidence that Edith had recovered from her usual monthly courses a week before she went away with the defendant, and that before her death her underclothes were spotted with blood, which a physician supposed to be the menstrual flow. The important point in this case is whether on these facts the court could properly submit to the jury the question whether the plaintiff sustained damage other than that of death, for loss of service by reason of the seduction. It will be seen that there is no evidence of seduction before Monday night; no evidence of Edith's condition from Monday night till Wednesday noon, when she took the poison, and of course no evidence of pregnancy." F. R. Gilbert, for appellant. Wm. C. Lamont, for respondent. POTTER, J. (after stating the facts). I should not feel justified, in departing from my rule in this court, not to write an opinion upon the affirmance of a judgment in a common and ordinary case, except to reconcile differences of opinions by the judges of the court below, and to remove any resort to strained or doubtful reasoning to sustain the judgment appealed from, by a brief presentation of a feature of the case that was not distinctly brought out in that court. This action was brought to recover damages which the plaintiff alleged he had sustained by the unwarranted interference of the defendant with plaintiff's right to service. It is as well settled that he who unlawfully interferes with another's right to service, whether it be the service of a male or female, a minor or an adult, is liable for actual or compensatory damages in the same manner and upon the same grounds that he would be liable for an unlawful interference with any other property right of another. The plaintiff alleges that he is the father of Edith Lawyer; that at the time of the acts of the defendant complained of by the plaintiff she was seventeen years of age and was residing with the plaintiff, and that he was entitled to her services, and that without the consent of the plaintiff the defendant, on or about the 16th day of May, 1886, enticed and persuaded the said Edith Lawyer to leave the residence and service of the plaintiff and to accompany him (the defendant) to Portlandville, in the county of Otsego, etc. etc. The plaintiff also alleges that on the 17th day of May, 1886, the defendant debauched the said Edith, The evidence in this case establishes beyond question that on and previous to the 16th day of May, 1886, Edith was the servant of plaintiff both in law and fact. It follows from that relation that plaintiff was entitled to command and to have her services wholly and without interruption, save such time as was necessary for her rest, health and preservation, until the plaintiff should give a valid consent to dispense with the service, or the law should terminate the relation. The defendant came to plaintiff's house, where she was in fact performing, and was in law bound to perform, services for the plaintiff, and took her from and deprived the plaintiff of such service. If this was done, as plaintiff alleges, without his consent, the defendant is liable to make plaintiff compensation for the loss of service. If the plaintiff's consent was obtained by defendant through fraud, it was void, for fraud vitiates all contracts and all consents. Consent or no consent was one of the issues to be tried by the jury, and the jury has found, upon competent evidence for that purpose, that any consent given by plaintiff was given through fraud, and so was no consent. With this finding by the jury the court cannot interfere. Edith was taken away from the plaintiff by the defendant, and remained with him at an hotel, aud on the way to defendant's home, and at his home, for the space of four days, and the plaintiff was in the meantime deprived of her services, and his right to them was unlawfully interfered with. The gravamen of the action, and of all actions of this nature, is the loss of service, and both pleadings and the proofs in this case make out a cause of action in entire harmony with the fullest requirements of such actions, and entirely dispenses with any necessity or occasion to resort to fiction, as is said to be done in some instances to maintain the recovery of damages in these cases. In the aspect we have been considering this case, it presents an actual and measurable pecuniary damage to the plaintiff. The loss of service constitutes the cause of action, and it can make no difference, as to the right of action, whether that has been accomplished by an unlawful persuasion of the servant to leave the master's employment, or through fraud upon the master, or force upon the servant, or by both such fraud and force. The loss of service is the cause of action, and when that is established a basis for damages to some extent exists, and whether that loss is caused or attended by or followed by sexual intercourse, defilement or pregnancy, loss of health or disability to serve, or for the purpose or with an intention of obtaining those results through a formal but criminal marriage, has relation more especially to the damages the plaintiff may recover than to his cause of action. It true the complaint charged debauchment and illhealth as a consequence, as well as the taking of the servant from the master. Whether the debauchment was proven or not, the taking away by the defendant was proven without any contradiction, and this gave plaintiff a cause of action and a right to damages. In such cases the jury have the right to impose punitive damages in their discretion, in addition to compensatory damages. I think these views are abundantly supported by numerous decided cases, to a few of which I make reference and extracts. Judge Andrews, in People v. De Leon, 109 N. Y. 229, says: "In Regina v. Hopkins, Car. & M. 254, the case of an indictment for the abduction of an unmarried girl under sixteen years of age, against the will' of her father, it appearing that the consent of the parents was induced by fraud, the indictment was sustained, and Gurney, B., said (in that case): I mention these cases to show that the law has long considered fraud and violence to be the same." " In Lipe v. Eisenlerd, 32 N. Y. 238 (which was an ac. tion by the father to recover damages for the seduction of his daughter, who was twenty-nine years of age, but living in her father's family), this language is used: "And any illegal act by which the right of the father, such as it was, to her services, was interfered with to his detriment, was a legal wrong, for which the law affords redress." On page 236 of the same case the judge uses this language: "Finally, it is urged by defendant's counsel that only compensatory damages should have been allowed. The judge refused so to direct the jury, and I think he was right. The object of the action, in theory, is to recover compensation for the loss of the services of the person seduced. This is so far adhered to that there must be a loss of that kind or the action will fall; but when that point is established the rule of damages is a departure from the system upon which the action is allowed. The loss of service is often merely nominal, though the damages which are recovered are very large. It is too late to complain of this as a departure from principle, for it has been the law of this State and of the English courts for a great many years." The same judge further fon in the opinion uses this language: "The true rule [this being an action brought by plaintiff for the seduction of his daughter] I think is that the plaintiff's right to the services may be made out in either way, and that when established so that the action is technically maintainable, the court and jury are to consider whether the plaintiff, on the record, is so connected with the party seduced as to be capable of receiving injury through her dishonor. A mere master, having no capacity to be injured beyond the pecuniary worth of the services lost, should undoubtedly be limited in his recovery to the value of these services. But the case of the plaintiff, as has been mentioned, is quite different." In Hewitt v. Prime, 21 Wend. 7982, Judge Nelson, in delivering the opinion of the court in an action like the one under consideration, uses this language: "It is now fully settled, both in England and here [citing several authorities in both countries], that acts of service by the daughter are not necessary. It is enough if the parent has a right to command them, to sustain the action. * * * The ground of the action bas often been considered technical, and the loss of service spoken of as a fiction, even before the courts ventured to place the action upon the mere right to claim the services; they frequently admitted the most trifling and valueless acts as sufficient." Further on in the opinion the judge uses this language: "The action then being fully sustained, in my judg ment, by proof of the act of seduction in the particular case, all the complicated circumstances that followed come in by way of aggravating the damages." In White v. Nellis, 31 N. Y. 405-409 (which was an action for debauching plaintiff's minor daughter, and communicating to her a venereal disease, by which she was made sick and unable to labor), the judge uses the following language: "Whenever the wrongful act, by immediate and direct cousequence, deprives the master of the service of his servant, or injuriously affects his legal right to such service, the law gives a remedy." "It is not sufficient to sustain the action to prove the seduction merely. That is the wrongful act from which it must appear that a direct injury to the relative rights of the master has followed. The right of the master, as recognized by the law, is to have the services of the servant undisturbed by the wrongful act of another. * * ** In cases of debauchery, the ordinary consequences that affect the master are the pregnancy and lying-in of the servant, during which she is unable to render him service. Hence the precedents of pleadings in this form of action have perhaps invariably alleged a loss of service through those consequences. But it by no means follows that there is no remedy where the loss of service is the direct effect of the wrongful act, although produced by some other consequence. All that the law can require is damnum et injuria, for these constitute, when directly connected, the proper and complete elements of an action on the case, and whenever they combine as an immediate cause and effect, the law cannot deuy a remedy with a departure from principle. It is maintainable because a wrongful act has caused a direct injury to a lawful right. In such case the right of the master to a remedy for an injury to his enjoyment of the services of his servant is equally clear, whether it be produced by beating and wounding the servant, or enticing him from employment, or forcibly abducting him, or |