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If I were ever startled at my own presumption--and certainly I have frequently had occasion to be, it is now. A little mountain David, unexpectedly called from the charge of his diseased flock to meet the great Goliah of the Cross; and to accept of this call, is certainly one of the most presumptuous acts of sober life.

It is, I believe, the general opinion of the Free Enquirers within the United States, that the Christian ranks cannot furnish a more ingenious, a more ready practised advocate, than him with whom I have the honor to debate on this occasion. Theological disputation, either in the editorial chair, upon the rostrum, or within the desk, has long been his chosen avocation, But for my myself, I am far indeed from being accustomed to public speaking; nor did I ever publicly DEBATE with

any one.

A man may be a close thinker, and as he leisurely sits in his office, secluded from the world, he may be able to express his thoughts on paper; but all this is no evidence of a talent for public debate.

It will be readily admitted that truth in its general effects is better than error; and that whatever a man believes, is truth with him, whether it be real truth or not; consequently we ought to look upon every man's efforts to promulgate his opinions, as evidence of good will to mankind.

Without occupying time in pointing out those circumstances which you must all readily see operate in favor of my opponent, and to my disadvantage; or in making further apologies for having consented to meet him; I proceed to the question which we have mutually agreed to discuss, namely:

Is there any being or agent in existence that is not material?

My opponent takes the affirmative side of this question, and of course, to make out his case, he must prove that there is such a being in existence, and all the task I have to perform, is to prevent his doing "so. The negative side of the question is made out to begin with; for it is certain that we have no real knowledge of any such being, inasmuch as no such being has ever made any perceptible impression upon any of our senses. You see, then, at once, that the burden of proof lies with my antagonist. It is like this:-Suppose a man asserts that in some mountain the location of which he does not himself even pretend to know a tremendous great animal exists; then, of course, it belongs to him to prove it, so he advances his arguments. Now, his arguments are not such

as to cause me to believe that his great animal exists; but am I on this account bound to prove there is no such animal?-am I to prove that the earth is solid, because Capt. Symmes fails to convince me it is hollow? By no means. All I have to do is to show the weakness of the arguments adduced. It is none of my business, with pick-axe and crowbar, to dig to the earth's centre to prove the negative of Capt. Symmes's hypotheses and dreams. Here, then, it would seem, that I might sit down and rest until my opponent has apparently made out his case. But you believe, and from your cradles you have believed, that his case is already made out; so there is yet work enough for me to do.

To eradicate what I conceive to be the deep rooted errors which have been early, repeatedly, and most industriously impressed upon our sentient parts, and at the same time to remove some of the sandy foundations upon which my opponent would otherwise erect some of his arguments, I shall now present you with an outline-a mere skeleton (for time will not admit of more) of my system of metaphysics.

Permit me, however, to remark, before I proceed further, that I shall not aim at eloquence. I wish to reason with you. And I wish you to feel that truth and not victory is my object, and ought to be your object. Any appeals to you on this occasion in relation to the consequences of of any opinions whatever, would, be quite out of place. We take it for granted that truth is better than error; and it is more than a day's work to decide, beyond dispute, on which side of our question the truth lies. Were it not begging the question, and were it inconsistent with the object of our meeting, to moralize on the consequences of opinions, I might go on to state the overwhelming amount of misery that has arisen from the doctrine of spiritualism; while my opponent or opponents might be equally eloquent in portraying the consequences which they imagine will arise from materialism when it becomes prevalent. But no such boy's play can be admitted. We meet as philosophers, not as sectarian zealots. No dictation, no aristocracy of mind, is this day to be exercised; we meet on the democratic principle of equality, 1 have yet to request you not to hesitate to admit any position which I may advance, unless you can give some other reason for not admitting it than that an than that I ad

vanced it.

Nothing is more clear than that every real substance or being must bə of some extent; and it is equally self-evident that extent without resistance, impenetrability, or solidity, (I prefer the latter term,) cannot be any anything but empty space;-which is but another term for nothing. Matter, then, is solid extent, or solid space. All persons will readily admit, that whatever is extended and solid-though destitute of all other properties-is matter. I therefore call extension and solidity the essential properties of matter; at the same time admitting that all kinds of matter possess other properties, such as attraction, mobility, indestructibility, &c. all of which, together with the essentia!, constitute the general properties of matter. Although we speak of the properties of matter (instead of material properties) just as we do of the students of a college, and just as if matter itself were one thing, and its properties something else; yet, in fact, matter is but a combination of properties. Take away extension,

solidity, attraction, and all other properties, and it is impossible even to imagine that anything would remain.

Now to me it is utterly impossible to conceive, nor can I see the least reason to suppose, that there is, or can be, any being or entity-anything that can act or do anything, that is not material, that is, composed of matter. Air is matter, light, caloric, the electric fluid, odors, vapors, &c., are all material. It is true that as bodies they are not solid; but the ultimate atoms of which they are composed must be something or nothing, and if something they must be solid, and if solid, they must be of some extent, for it is self-evident that there can be no solidity without extension.

It is as human beings that we say a thing is or is not; and to all human understanding there is not-there cannot be,-any spiritual beings in the modern sense of the word spirit. By spiritual being is now meaned an immaterial being, but language cannot express a greater absurdity than an immaterial being. For by immaterial is meaned that which has not the essential properties of matter. Now the essential properties of matter are at least two, namely, extension and solidity; and a moment's close thought, must inevitably, and forever satisfy you, that there cannot be solidity without extension, and that extension without solidity is the empty space, which is but another term for nothing. I do beseech you, if you regard your own peace-if you would have your opinions founded on a rock, and not to be shaken by the many windy doctrines, to reflect closely and repeatedly on the subject now before us. I wish you to think closely, and see if it be not as difficult to admit that a real being exists without extension, without solidity, without parts, as it is to admit that the half of a thing is as much as the whole of it. Do I go too far, then, when I assert that there cannot be any real being that is not material? Does it belong to me to prove what is entirely self-evident; or does it rather belong to him to prove the contrary who has the temerity to assert to the contrary?

Here, again, it would seem that I ought to sit down and wait-and wait forever, for my opponent to prove the glaring absurdity that nothing is something. But, my hearers, he will not attempt to prove any such thing-he will not stick to his text-he will not make out his case-he will give it up. All he can dream of doing—all he can reasonably attempt to do, is to throw dust in your eyes! He will speak of the existence of matter; of its various combinations and movements; of supposed indications of design; of the order in which events occur, &c. And finally tell you that notwithstanding all I have yet said, there must be something existing prior to, and independent of, matter. If I asked how this can be, he may perhaps put us off in the old way, by ex-laiming,"Oh, it is one of the mysteries of godliness."

I shall therefore pursue my system of metaphysics, and in doing so I shall speak of, and explain, or inform you how materialists do explain, many things which have led men in dark ages, to suppose the existence of unearthly things, to which they gave the name of deity, soul, ghost, &c. Having already defined matter, I come now to speak of its existence. There is no reason, as I conceive, why solid space may not have always existed, as well as empty space. Indeed, with me, it is more con