appealed to the district court, where a like result followed. From the judgment of that court she appealed to this court.

The action involves the right to the possession of certain residence property in the city of Albert Lea, and was submitted to the court below upon the pleadings and a stipulation of facts. It appears that plaintiff is the owner of the premises; that she acquired title thereto by purchase from a former owner, who had theretofore entered into a contract by which he leased and demised the premises to defendant at an in, by the grantee and his heirs, so long as he or any of them should see good, but, if said grantee or his heirs should cease building thereon, then to the grantor's son and his heirs and assigns, was held to convey only an estate for life, and this on condition that the grantee and his heirs should use the land for a shipyard.

In Plympton v. Boston Dispensary, 106 Mass. 544, where a testator expressed a wish that his dwelling house might continue to be pleasing to his wife as her place of residence, and that its use at a stated rent might constitute part of the income secured to her by her jointure, it was held that, so long as she occupied the house, she was tenant for life thereof.

agreed monthly rent of $22; and plaintiff's title is subject to all rights that became vested in defendant thereby. The lease, after reciting the rental of the premises and other usual conditions, contained upon the subject of the term of the tenancy, the following stipulations: "To have and to hold the above rented premises unto the said party of the second part [the tenant], his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for the full term of while he shall wish to live in Albert Lea, from and after the 1st day of December, 1904." The only should become null and void, and that, as long as the lessee should keep his part of the contract, he should enjoy possession, the lease was for such a length of time as the lessee should personally perform the specified conditions, which, of course, could not be longer than the period of his natural life. In People ex rel. Norton v. Gillis, 24 Wend. 201, it was held that a contract by which the owner of a mill stipulated to pay a millwright a certain sum for repairing the mill, and further agreed to secure the mill to the millwright until the profits of the mill should be sufficient to discharge his claim, if regarded as a lease, was a demise until the profits of the mill should be sufficient to discharge the debt, thereby creating an estate for life, determinable when the debt should be paid from the rents and profits from the mill.

In some cases, however, it has been held, for various reasons, that leases of property while occupied for a particular purpose do not create life estates.

A case which, although not directly in point, is of sufficient similarity to warrant its inclusion herein, is Dow v. Abbott, 197 Mass. 283, 84 N. E. 96, in which a devise of a cottage and all it contained, "to use for the term of five years or longer." was construed as a gift of an estate for a period of time as much longer than five years as the donee might desire, and it was held accordingly that the devisee took an estate for life.

In McMasters v. Shellito, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 303, where a testator provided "the place that William lives upon he can live upon as long as he chooses, and, when he dies or leaves it, it is to descend to his two eldest sons." it was held to be clearly the intention of the testator that William should take a life estate, subject to be sooner terminated by voluntary surrender thereof and with drawal from the premises.

In Ely v. Randall, 68 Minn. 177, 70 N. W. 980, it was held that, where a lease of certain premises recited that a consideration therefor was the lessee's covenant to keep a postoffice and a store of merchandise, and that if, at any time, said lessee should cease to keep a postoffice and a store, then the lease

a sawmill, while not creating an estate at will, could not be construed as granting or conveying an estate for years, because it fixed no definite time for its termination; nor as granting a life estate, because it provided for the heirs, executors, adminis trators, or assigns of the grantees holding over, and for the return of possession to the grantor, his heirs or assigns.

In Mhoon v. Drizzle, 14 N. C. (3 Dev. L.) 414, it was held that an agreement whereby one party undertook to let the other use and occupy certain premises during his natural life, or so long as the other party might wish to tend it himself, and no longer, if viewed as a lease, must be considered as a lease at will, which, being terminable at the will of the lessee, was terminable at the will of the lessor also.

In Beauchamp v. Runnels, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 212, 79 S. W. 1105, it was held that, gathering the meaning of the writing from the entire instrument, in the light of the circumstances, a lease, for a nominal consideration, which was "to continue for such time as the said [lessees] or either of them may desire to use the same," could be construed as creating only a tenancy at the will of the lessees, which was therefore also at the will of the lessor,

(Lea v. Hernandez, 10 Tex. 137; Ela v. Bankes, 37 Wis. 89), and under various circumstances where no time is specifically agreed upon. In the lease under consideration, the tenancy is limited by the time defendant shall continue to dwell in Albert Lea; and this limitation takes the case out of the class of tenancies at will. It is equally clear that a tenancy at sufferance was not created by the contract. There has been | no wrongful or unlawful holding over after the expiration of the term. Nor does the rule of tenancy from month to month apply, for the reasons already pointed out.

We therefore turn to the question, the turning point in the court below, whether the instrument created a life estate in defendant within the principles of law applicable to that branch of land titles. It is thoroughly settled that a life estate may be created by a deed, lease, or devise, either with or without a stipulation for the payment of rent. This class of tenancies differs in many essential respects from tenancies at will, or from year.to year, or at sufferance; the principal distinction being that the former confers a freehold upon the tenant, and the latter a mere chattel interest. The lease under consideration embodies all the essentials of a life tenancy. It contains the usual words of inheritance, necessary at common law, running to defendant, "his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns," and grants the right of occupancy for the term stated therein. Life estates or life tenancies are clearly defined in the books, and the lease here involved brings it within | this class of estates. 1 Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, §§ 52, 53, states the rule as follows: "An estate for life may be created either by express limitation or by a grant in general terms. If made to a man for the term of his own life, or for that of another person, he is called a tenant for life. But the estate may also be created by a general grant, without defining any specific interest; as, where a grant is made to a man, or to a man and his assigns, without any limitation in point of time, it will be considered as an estate for life, and for the life of the grantee only. Where a grant is made subject to be defeated by a particular event, and there is no limitation in point of time, it will be ab initio a grant of an estate for life, as much as if no such event had been contemplated. Thus, if a grant be made to a man so long as he shall inhabit a certain place, or to a woman during her widowhood, as there is no certainty that the estate will be terminated by the change of habitation or by the marriage, respectively, of the lessees, the estate is as much an estate for life until the prescribed event takes place as if it had been so granted in express terms."

The author's statement of the law is sustained by the other writers on the subject (4 Kent, Com. 27; 2 Bl. Com. 121), and by the adjudicated cases. In Warner v. Tanner, 38 Ohio St. 118, a life estate was held to be created by a lease for a yearly rent, extending during the time the lessee should continue to occupy the premises for a particular purpose. In Mickie v. Lawrence, 5 Rand. (Va.) 574, the grant was to continue so long as the tenant should pay the stipulated rent. It was held a life estate. A grant "so long as the waters of the Delaware shall run" was held, in Foster v. Joice, 3 Wash. C. C. 498, Fed. Cas. No. 4,974, to create a life estate. In Hurd v. Cushing, 7 Pick. 169, the premises were leased at a fixed yearly rent for the term "so long as the salt works" to be located thereon should continue in operation. It was held a life estate. In Thomas v. Thomas, 17 N. J. Eq. 356, it was held that a right given by a will to occupy, at a specified annual rent, certain premises so long as the devisee “may desire to occupy the same as a drug store," amounted to an estate for life. See also to the same effect, 16 Cyc. Law & Prec. p. 614; Maverick v. Gibbs, 3 M'Cord, L. 315; People ex rel. Norton v. Gillis, 24 Wend. 201; Roseboom v. Van Vechten, 5 Denio, 414; Ely v. Randall, 68 Minn. 177, 70 N. W. 980. The lease in the case at bar comes within the rule of these authorities, and the trial court properly held that it vested in defendant a life estate, terminable only at his death or his removal from Albert Lea.

Insurance conditions ditional protection.

1. A provision in a standard insurance policy, the form of which is prescribed by

Note. For power of agents to bind insurer by oral waiver or estoppel in pais as to forfeiture occurring after issuance of policy and before loss under policies requir ing consent or waiver to be in writing, see subject note to Industrial Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Thompson, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1064.

As to effect of nonwaiver agreement on conditions existing at inception of policy, see subject note to Gish v Insurance Co. of N. A. 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 826.

property for $500. On January 9, 1906, the property covered by the policies was destroyed by fire. It was conceded that no consent by defendant was indorsed on the policy of December 29, 1905, to the issuance of the policy of January 4, 1906. The property, as found by the jury, was worth $3,274. The following, among other issues, was submitted to the jury: "Was there a waiver by the defendant of the condition in the policy as to the additional insurance issued by the German Insurance Company?" Plaintiff introduced parol evidence for the purpose of showing a waiver by defendant of the condition in regard to the additional insurance. His honor, upon the conclusion of the evidence, charged the jury that there was no evidence that the defendant waived

the provision in the policy in regard to tak

Statement by Connor, J.:

Defendant insurance company through its agents at Asheville, North Carolina, on December 29, 1905, issued to plaintiff its policy of insurance against loss or damage by fire to the amount of $1,900 on certain property fully described therein. The policy was of the standard form, set out in full in Revisal 1905, §§ 4759, 4760, and contained the following provisions: "This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void if the insured now has or shall hereafter make or procure any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on property covered in whole, or in part, by this policy." The policy contains this further clause: "This policy is made and accepted subject to the foregoing stipulations and conditions, together with such other provisions, agreements, or conditions as may be indorsed hereon or added hereto, and no officer, agent, or other representative of this company shall have power to waive any provision or condition of this policy, except such as by the terms of this policy may be the subject of agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto; and as to such provisions and conditions no officer, agent, or representative shall have such power or be deemed or held to have waived such provisions or conditions, unless such waiver, if any, shall be written upon or attached hereto; nor shall any privilege or permission affecting the insurance under this policy exist or be claimed by the insured, unless so written or attached." All of which is contained in the “standard policy" prescribed in the statute. On January 4, 1906, another policy was issued by the German Fire Insurance Company on said

out additional insurance in the German Insurance Company, and instructed them to answer the issue "No." Plaintiff excepted. Judgment was rendered for defendant, and plaintiff duly excepted and appealed.

Messrs. H. B. Carter, W. P. Brown, V. S. Lusk, and Zebulon Weaver, for appellant:

The insurer waived the condition as to written waiver by not informing insured of the effect of taking additional assurance.

Grubbs v. North Carolina Home Ins. Co. 108 N. C. 472, 23 Am. St. Rep. 62, 13 S. E. 236; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 321; 19 Cyc. Law & Proc. pp. 791, 792; Horton v. Home Ins. Co. 122 N. C. 498, 65 Am. St. Rep. 717, 29 S. E. 944; Collins v. Farmville Ins. & Bkg. Co. 79 N. C. 279, 28 Am. Rep. 322: Brumfield v. Union Ins. Co. 87 Ky. 122, 7 S. W. 893; Union Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 1 Sadler (Pa.) 570, 17 W. N. C. 243, 4 Atl. 352.

Messrs. Tillett & Guthrie, for appellee: Notice of an intention on the part of a policy holder to do something contrary to the terms of the policy does not estop the company, although not objected to by it, because it had the right to infer that the policy holder intended, at the proper time, to get its consent to the act before doing it.

Liverpool, L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Sorsby, 60 Miss. 302; Worachek v. New Denmark Mut. Home F. Ins. Co. 102 Wis. 88, 78 N. W. 411; Weddington v. Piedmont F. Ins. Co. 141 N. C. 234, 54 S. E. 271, 8 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 497; Goldin v. Northern Assur. Co. 46 Minn. 473, 49 N. W. 246; Sowers v. Mutual F. Ins. Co. 113 Iowa, 551, 85 N. W. 763.

Retention of the premium after notice did not constitute a waiver.

Weddington v. Piedmont F. Ins. Co. supra; Johnson v. American Ins. Co. 41 Minn. 396, 43 N. W. 59.