facilitate subsequent negotiations, the Department of State found the subject embarrassed by greatly perplexing complications arising out of reservoir dams either already built or authorized through the concurrent action of the Federal or State authorities, and that the legal questions involved were under careful investigation and should be disposed of before the United States would be in a condition to negotiate.

Some of these questions suggested by the Secretary of State have been determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in favor of the United States in the case of United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company and the Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Company, Limited, 174 United States Reports, 690. From this case the treaties between the United States and Mexico and the official reports contained in Senate Doc. No. 229, second session Fifty-fifth Congress, it appears, (1) that where the Rio Grande River is the boundary the line is the middle of the stream; (2) that the navigation of the river is free and common to the vessels and citizens of both countries, without impediment or interruption; (3) that the river is navigable at lest for several hundred miles above its mouth; (4) that this navigability has been largely depleted by the cutting off of the waters of the river and its tributaries in Colorado and New Mexico by dams and reservoirs; (5) that the volume of water below El Paso for irrigation and other domestic purposes has been greatly reduced by the same means; (6) that the navigability of the river and the supply of water for irrigation will be further injuriously affected and cut off by the construction of the proposed dams and reservoirs at and near Elephant Butte, in New Mexico, by the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company and the Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Company, Limited, appellees in said cause, or by the construction of other such large and extensive dams and reservoirs.

In the case referred to the Supreme Court of the United States held and decided that it would be a violation of the laws of the United States thus to diminish the navigability of the river, and directed the court below to inquire into the facts, and if it was found that the navigability of the river was substantially diminished to restrain the acts by which it was done. So far as the committee is advised a final decree in the cause has not been rendered. The acts of Congress of March 3, 1891, January 21, 1895, February 26, 1897, and May 11, 1898, upon which the claim of right to construct such dams and reservoirs is supposed to be based, through license from the Secretary of the Interior, are in effect repealed by the proposed bill where others have right to the water by prior appropriation. It is, however, to be borne in mind that in the opinion of the Attorney-General (Senate Doc. No. 229, pp. 187 to 190) the Secretary of the Interior has no power to authorize the construction of dams which will diminish the navigability of rivers.

By the construction of the proposed international dam at El Paso several important ends will be attained. Among these may be mentioned, (1) a more constant and uniform current will be produced, and thereby prevent frequent changes in the bed of the river by violent avulsions, erosions and deposits; (2) the arid belt between El Paso and the mouth of the Concho River will be supplied with a just share of water for irrigation; (3) the navigability of the river will be restored and preserved, thus enforcing treaty rights and the domestic policy of the United States as well; (4) the claim of heavy damages

by Mexico (Document 229, pp. 179, 180), aggregating more than $35,000,000, will be amicably adjusted, and (5) a feasible mode will be provided for regulating in future the use of the waters of the river so as to secure to each country concerned and to its inhabitants their legal and equitable rights in said waters. These results will be accomplished without injury or injustice to any State or Territory through which the river flows, for, as said by Gen. Anson Mills, the commissioner of the United States, the flow of water in the river at El Paso (Document 229, p. 13)

is likely to be ample for the supply of the proposed international reservoir, after deductions are made for all the small reservoirs that are likely to be constructed for storage in Colorado and the probable increase of canals in Colorado and New Mexico.

[Senate Executive Report No. 1.]

Mr. Lodge, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following report:

The islands which are the subject of this treaty lie outside the boundaries of the Philippine Archipelago, as described in Article III of the treaty of peace of December 10, 1898. They have always formed a part of the Sulu Archipelago. The possessions of the Sulu sultanate were the subject of a dispute which runs back to the middle of the eighteenth century. It is not necessary here to trace in detail the questions involved in the dispute. It is sufficient to say that by the protocol agreed upon March 7, 1885, between Great Britain, Germany, and Spain the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago of Sulu was recognized, and in return Spain renounced all claims of sovereignty over any part of Borneo and over certain adjoining islands which were named, as well as others comprised within the zone of 3 marine leagues from the Borneo coast.

This settled the sovereignty of Spain over the islands of Cagayan Sulu and Sibutu and their dependencies which are the subjects of this treaty. They belonged to Spain at the time when the treaty of Paris was signed. That it was the intention of our commissioners to include in the cession of the Philippine Islands all the islands in that region or connected with that group which were under the sovereignty of Spain there is no doubt, but the lines of delimitation which are stated in article 3 leave Cagayan Sulu and Sibutu outside. It is, of course, a well-established principle of law that a particular description overrides a general one, and when Spain protested against our taking possession, as we did, of these two islands, it became apparent, on investigation, that her protest, whatever the intention of the commissioners or of the general description might have been, was well founded in point of law. Other powers were anxious to secure these two islands, and it would have been greatly to the disadvantage of the United States to have allowed them to pass into the possession of any other power. For these reasons this treaty was made and the two islands purchased so as to remove all doubts as to our title to them and to include them, as it was intended they should be included, in the original cession of the Philippine Islands.

The committee recommend the ratification of the treaty without amendment.

February 21, 1901.

[Senate Report No. 2402.]

Mr. Morgan, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following report, being the views of the minority.

The views of the minority of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Senate resolution 470, reported adversely from that committee, are as follows:

Whereas an agreement with Costa Rica, and also with Nicaragua, has been made with the United States in the following terms, namely:

Protocol of an agreement between the Governments of the United States and of Costa Rica in regard to future negotiations for the construction of an interoceanic canal by way of Lake Nicaragua.

It is agreed between the two Governments that when the President of the United States is authorized by law to acquire control of such portion of the territory now belonging to Costa Rica as may be desirable and necessary on which to construct and protect a canal of depth and capacity sufficient for the passage of vessels of the greatest tonnage and draft now in use from a point near San Juan del Norte, on the Caribbean Sea, via Lake Nicaragua, to Brito, on the Pacific Ocean, they mutually engage to enter into negotiations with each other to settle the plan and the agreements, in detail, found necessary to accomplish the construction and to provide for the ownership and control of the proposed canal.

As preliminary to such future negotiations it is forthwith agreed that the course of said canal and the terminals thereof shall be the same that were stated in a treaty signed by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and Great Britain on February 5, 1900, and now pending in the Senate of the United States for confirmation, and that the provisions of the same shall be adhered to by the United States and Costa Rica. In witness whereof the undersigned have signed this protocol and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Resolved, That the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of July 4, 1850, gives no right to Great Britain to demand that the Congress of the United States shall withhold its ratification of said agreements or shall abstain from legislation to provide for their prompt execution.

Resolved, That the ratification by Great Britain of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of February 5, 1900, as the same has been amended in the Senate, is not a condition precedent to legislation by Congress in providing for the execution of said agreements with Costa Rica and Nicaragua; nor are the principles or provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which was ratified July 4, 1850, any just or admissible ground of objection on the part of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty to the enactment of a law by Congress providing for the execution of such agreements with Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

The questions presented by the resolutions that have been adversely reported by the majority of the Committee on Foreign Relations are very plain, and they relate only to the right of Great Britain to direct or control or obstruct or prevent Congress, as a lawmaking body, from legislating for the promotion of a ship canal through Nicaragua and Costa Rica with the consent of those States.

The House bill No. 2538, known as the Hepburn bill, is the only measure before Congress relating to such canal that has received the sanction of either House, and it has been on the Senate Calendar, after passing the House by a vote almost unanimous, since the 14th day of May, 1900, when it was reported to the Senate by the Committee on Interoceanic Canals without dissent.

When that bill passed the House of Representatives the ClaytonBulwer treaty had been brooding over our most vital rights and threatening the sovereignty of the United States for a half century. Its discussion as an impediment to our right to construct and control a ship canal through Nicaragua had excited among the people of the United States a deep sense of humiliation, which has grown into a strong resentment toward its authors and toward those who, being unwilling to fix a period for its abrogation, are committed to its indefinite continuance.

In the meantime, during the sixteen years that Congress has been engaged in active investigation and legislation on this subject, at great expense, Great Britain has maintained a studious silence as to any claim of right or comity to interfere with, protest against, or to criticise the action of Congress and of the President as to any of these numerous and varied proceedings.

Great Britain has observed the silence that is golden so discreetly that no record is found in all our intercourse with that Government to indicate her displeasure with anything the United States has said or done, and she remains silent.

This supremely dignified reticence may indicate a lying in wait for an opportune moment of advantage or a calculation that her frown may at any time startle us into paralysis, but it can not indicate indifference to a movement that threatens to transfer a very large part of the world's commerce from Liverpool to New York as a world's trade

center.

Great Britain, as the owner of nearly half the stock in the Suez Canal, now worth above 700 per cent premium and yielding net dividends for twenty years past of more than 15 per cent, and as the military occupant of Egypt and the ambitious conqueror of a domain that will bring all of eastern, southern, and the half of northern Africa under her imperial scepter, can not be indifferent to such a rival as the Nicaraguan Canal.

The House of Representatives was not unconscious of this sleeping monarch, but it was conscious that the President, supported by the authority and power of Congress, would be stronger in his diplomatic power and prestige to deal with this silent antagonist when its claims or objections were notified to the United States, if that event should

ever occur.

The House of Representatives, unconscious of such an objection as that the President and the Senate had abdicated the treaty-making power in favor of Great Britain, so that the United States could never negotiate with Nicaragua or Costa Rica for the right to own and con