PART EIGHT-COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS- XLV. JUDGES, JURISDICTION, REMEDIES, AND APPEL- § 797. Jurisdiction and power of court. § 810. Hearing and scope of review. § 813. -Errors not assigned.... PART NINE-EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS JUDICIAL NOTICE- WEGIHT-STIPULATIONS-CONCESSIONS- FORMER DECISIONS-RES STARE DECISIS ADJUDICATA- XLVII. FORM AND CHARACTER OF EVIDENCE § 831. Documentary evidence... Page 189 189 189 190 § 848. Construction and meaning of language or words.......... 190 § 852. Miscellaneous subjects of evidence and presumptions. 190 190 § 859. -Presumptions of correctness, and burden of prov- 190 § 862. Common or commercial designation-Evidence in 190 § 869. Value, American price, export, foreign and market 191 LI. RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE DECISIS § 879. Application of rules in general.... 191 § 880. Nature and finality of decision and of former action_.. FINDINGS AND DECISIONS-REVIEW OF EVIDENCE § 885. Review of weight of evidence in general. PART ELEVEN-PROTECTIVE MEASURES BY THE PRESI- § 897. Validity of findings or orders, and effect of validity.. PART ONE. Analysis by Sections GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF TARIFF LAWS I. ACTS OF CONGRESS GENERALLY (§§ 1-40) A. PURPOSE AND VALIDITY-DELEGATION OF POWER § 1. Nature and purpose of tariff laws It is well settled that although tariff acts are made for the future in the sense that they embrace later designed articles or machines coming within the definitions set up in the act, the meaning of such definitions is that prevailing when the act was passed. E. Dillingham, Inc., et al. v. United States-46 B. GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION-REPEAL-PLEADING STATUTES-FOREIGN LAWS § 5. In general The specific language of a statute is the best evidence of congressional intent. United States v. Border Brokerage Co.-10 It is well settled that although tariff acts are made for the future in the sense that they embrace later designed articles or machines coming within the definitions set up in the act, the meaning of such definitions is that prevailing when the act was passed. E. Dillingham, Inc., et al. v. United States-46 § 7. Common or commercial meaning of words While many items have been held by this court to be, or not to be, "machines," there is no "judicial determination" of what a machine is. It remains simply a question of common meaning and each case must be decided on the basis of its own facts, technical and legislative. United States v. Idl Mfg. & Sales Corp.—17 The general rule is that Congress is regarded as having used the name of an article in the commercial sense and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the language has the same meaning in commerce that it has in ordinary use, which use, of course, is to be determined as of the date of the enactment of the statute. United States v. Victoria Gin Co., Inc., et al.—33 The common meaning to be given to a term or word used by Congress in a tariff act provision is a question of law to be determined by the court, and in making such determination, the court may rely upon its own understanding of the word or term used; and it may refer to lexicographers, scientific authorities, and the testimony of witnesses, which evidence is advisory only and has no binding effect on the court. United States v. National Carloading Corp., James S. Baker Import Co.-70 The court assumes that Congress attributed to words of the Tariff Act their common meaning unless the evidence or some other factor indicates otherwise. John S. James, etc. v. United States-75 175 I. ACTS OF CONGRESS GENERALLY-Continued B. GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION LAWS-Continued § 7. Common or commercial meaning of words-Continued In determining common meaning the court may accept or reject evidence of such meaning and may, as an aid, consult dictionaries and other authorities. United States v. C. J. Tower & Sons -87 The meaning of a tariff term is presumed to be the same as its common or dictionary meaning in the absence of evidence to the contrary. United States v. C. J. Tower & Sons-87 Too great reliance should not be placed on a general dictionary to determine the common meaning of technical terms. Firth Sterling, Inc. v. United States-130 § 15. Intent of Congress It was not the intent of Congress to provide an importer with a procedural device by which he could nullify proceedings brought by an American manufacturer under section 516 of the 1930 Tariff Act. United States et al. v. Nylonge Corporation-55 The court's responsibility in all cases involving the meaning of words in the Tariff Act is to ascertain what Congress intended by the use of those words. John S. James, etc. v. United States-75 The court assumes that Congress attributed to words of the Tariff Act their common meaning unless the evidence or some other factor indicates otherwise. John S. James, etc. v. United States-75 Congress exempted only certain items of church furniture from import duty, and it is incumbent on court, in endeavoring to carry out the will of Congress, not to expand the exempted list beyond the clear intent of Congress. United States v. Rambush Decorating Co., et al.—123 Congress never intended to limit the "not specially provided for" provision of paragraph 1021 of the 1930 Act to just those floor coverings made from flax, hemp, jute or the like, and, the dictum of this court in the cases of United States v. J. L. Hudson Co., 23 CCPA 313, T.D. 48177 and United States v. Damrak Trading Co., Inc., 43 CCPA 77, C.A.D. 611, applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to paragraph 1021 are plainly error. H. W. Robinson Air Freight Corp. v. United States—148 Where Congress intended to limit a provision for a floor covering to the material from which the covering is made, it did so in express, unequivocal language, and, therefore, where Congress has not so limited the provision, the absence of such a limitation cannot be considered mere legislative oversight. H. W. Robinson Air Freight Corp. v. United States-148 16. Judicial, legislative and executive functions § 17. Supplying, rejecting and transposing words It is not the function of the court to "define" technological terms in the tariff act, but rather to construe and apply them on a case by case basis. Firth Sterling, Inc. v. United States130 I. ACTS OF CONGRESS GENERALLY-Continued B. GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION LAWS-Continued § 20. Re-enactment as adoption by Congress of previous construction § 23. -Particular applications of rule of adoption Congress exempted only certain items of church furniture from import duty, and it is incumbent on court, in endeavoring to carry out the will of Congress, not to expand the exempted list beyond its clear intent. United States v. Rambush Decorating Co., et al.-123 § 26. Time of taking effect, and prospective or retroactive operation The general rule is that Congress is regarded as having used the name of an article in the commercial sense and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the language has the same meaning in commerce that it has in ordinary use, which use, of course, is to be determined as of the date of the enactment of the statute. United States v. Victoria Gin Co., Inc., et al.—33 The meaning of words used in tariff acts is fixed at the time of the enactment and does not fluctuate as the meaning of words might subsequently vary. United States v. Victoria Gin Co., Inc., et al.—33 § 28. Extrinsic aids to construction § 31. PART TWO. -Evidence to contradict or explain, and reference to dictionaries or other books. The common meaning to be given to a term or word used by Congress in a tariff act provision is a question of law to be determined by the court, and in making such determination, the court may rely upon its own understanding of the word or term used; and it may refer to lexicographers, scientific authorities, and the testimony of witnesses, which evidence is advisory only and has no binding effect on the court. United States v. National Carloading Corp., et al.—70 In determining common meaning the court may accept or reject evidence of such meaning and may, as an aid, consult dictionaries and other authorities. United States v. C. J. Tower & Sons-87 Too great reliance should not be placed on a general dictionary to determine the common meaning of technical terms. Firth Sterling, Inc. v. United States-130 TREATIES AND RECIPROCITY AGREEMENTS II. GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS § 41. In general The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did not modify or change the classification of x-ray apparatus, as used in paragraph 353 of the 1930 Tariff Act, but merely modified the duties as to merchandise already comprehended by that paragraph. E. Dillingham, Inc., et al. v. United States-46 Appeal by the United States from the judgment of the Customs Court which held null and void a provision in the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.D. 52739, increasing the duty on women's leather gloves from 25% to 35% ad valorem, under paragraph 1532(a) of the 1930 Tariff Act. The government contends that the provision increasing the duty was not null and void for want of proper notice of intention to negotiate; that the wording of the notice was such as to give reasonable notice that the rate of II. GENERAL CONSIDERATION OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS— Continued § 41. In general—Continued duty on such merchandise might be increased. United States v. Aris Gloves, Inc.-126 The phrase "mutually advantageous tariff concessions" held not so definite as to necessarily preclude consideration of rate increases any more than it would preclude consideration of lower rates, and although the phrase itself is not specific as to what the proposed purpose of the negotiations was to be, when read in conjunction with the phrase "for possible modification of duties and other import restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or specific continuance of existing customs or excise treatment," the scope of the negotiations contemplated is ample to put an interested party on notice. United States v. Aris Gloves, Inc.-126 § 44. Construction The phrase "mutually advantageous tariff concessions" held not so definite as to necessarily preclude consideration of rate increases any more than it would preclude consideration of lower rates, and although the phrase itself is not specific as to what the proposed purpose of the negotiations was to be, when read in conjunction with the phrase "for possible modification of duties and other import restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or specific continuance of existing customs or excise treatment,” the scope of the negotiations contemplated is ample to put an interested party on notice. United States v. Aris Gloves, Inc.-126 Appeal by the United States from the judgment of the Customs Court which held null and void a provision in the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T.D. 52739, increasing the duty on women's leather gloves from 25% to 35% ad valorem, under paragraph 1532(a) of the 1930 Tariff Act. The government contends that the provision increasing the duty was not null and void for want of proper notice of intention to negotiate; that the wording of the notice was such as to give reasonable notice that the rate of duty on such merchandise might be increased. United States v. Aris Gloves, Inc.—126 PART THREE. DUTIABLE IMPORTATIONS-EXEMPTIONS-CLASSIFICATION OF ARTICLES FOR DUTY OR FREE ENTRY. IV. GOODS DUTIABLE OR EXEMPT-LOST OR DESTROYED GOODSGOODS IMPORTED FOR TEMPORARY OR SPECIAL USE-FOR STATE OR EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC OR RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS GOODS OF PERSONS ARRIVING IN U.S.-REIMPORTATION-AMERICAN GOODS RETURNED § 53. American goods returned after exportation § 54. -Advancement, manufacture or repair while abroad Section 308(1) does not apply broadly to any and all articles repaired, altered or otherwise changed in condition, but is expressly limited to those articles entering this country which are to be repaired, altered or otherwise changed in condition. United States v. Border Brokerage Co.-10 |