Opinion of the Court. may be extended for an additional period, not to exceed one year, in cases where by reason of sickness or other cause of disability beyond his control, such Chinese laborer shall be rendered unable sooner to return-which facts shall be fully reported to the Chinese consul at the port of departure, and by him certified, to the satisfaction of the collector of the port at which such Chinese subject shall land in the United States. And no such Chinese laborer shall be permitted to enter the United States by land or sea without producing to the proper officer of the customs the return certificate herein required. "ART. III. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the right at present enjoyed of Chinese subjects, being officials, teachers, students, merchants or travelers for curiosity or pleasure, but not laborers, of coming to the United States and residing therein. To entitle such Chinese subjects as are above described to admission into the United States, they may produce a certificate from their government or the government where they last resided viséd by the diplomatic or consular representative of the United States in the country or port whence they depart. "It is also agreed that Chinese laborers shall continue to enjoy the privilege of transit across the territory of the United States in the course of their journey to or from other countries, subject to such regulations by the Government of the United States as may be necessary to prevent said privilege of transit from being abused. "ART. IV. In pursuance of Article III of the Immigration Treaty between the United States and China, signed at Peking on the 17th day of November, 1880, (the 15th day of the tenth month of Kwanghsii, sixth year,) it is hereby understood and agreed that Chinese laborers or Chinese of any other class, either permanently or temporarily residing in the United States, shall have for the protection of their persons and prop erty all the rights that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens of the most favored nation, excepting the right to become naturalized citizens. And the Government of the United States reaffirms its obligation, as stated in said Ar Opinion of the Court. ticle III, to exert all its power to secure protection to the persons and property of all Chinese subjects in the United States. "ART. V. The Government of the United States, having by an act of Congress, approved May 5th, 1892, as amended by an act approved November 3d, 1893, required all Chinese laborers lawfully within the limits of the United States before the passage of the first named act to be registered as in said act provided, with a view of affording them better protection, the Chinese Government will not object to the enforcement of such acts, and reciprocally the Government of the United States recognizes the right of the Government of China to enact and enforce similar laws or regulations for the registration, free of charge, of all laborers, skilled or unskilled, (not merchants as defined by said act of Congress,) citizens of the United States in China, whether residing within or without the treaty ports. And the Government of the United States agrees that within twelve months from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this convention, and annually, thereafter, it will furnish to the Government of China registers or reports showing the full name, age, occupation and number or place of residence of all other citizens of the United States, including missionaries, residing both within and without the treaty ports of China, not including, however, diplomatic and other officers of the United States residing or traveling in China upon official business, together with their body and household servants. "ART. VI. This Convention shall remain in force for a period of ten years beginning with the date of the exchange of ratifications, and, if six months before the expiration of the said period of ten years, neither Government shall have formally given notice of its final termination to the other, it shall remain in full force for another like period of ten years." 28 Stat. 1210. The first proposition made on behalf of the defendant is that the treaty of 1894 should be construed as covering the whole subject of Chinese exclusion, and that its failure to prescribe any judicial procedure for deportation, or to continue in force any prior statute on that subject, shows that the Commissioner was without jurisdiction. Opinion of the Court. If the words of the treaty of 1894, reasonably interpreted, indicate a purpose to cover the whole subject of Chinese exclusion-including the methods to be employed to effect that result then the proceedings against the defendant before the Commissioner were without authority of law; for the treaty itself does not provide any particular method by which Chinese laborers may be prevented from entering the United States, or for sending them out of the country if they illegally enter, although both nations expressed in the treaty a desire to cooperate in preventing the immigration or coming to this country of such persons. China itself recognized it to be its duty to coöperate with the United States to that end," in view of the antagonism and much deprecated and serious disorders to which the presence of Chinese laborers has given rise in certain parts of the United States." As both countries were agreed that this result should be attained, the court ought to hesitate to adopt any construction of the treaty that would tend to defeat the object each had in view. We must assume that the two Governments knew that a general prohibition of the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States would be ineffectual if no provision were made for determining whether a particular Chinaman seeking to enter the country, and whose right to enter was denied, belonged to the class prohibited from coming within our territorial limits. It is not disputed that such provision exists if section 12 of the act of May 6, 1882, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884, and as continued in force by the act of May 5, 1892, be held not to have been repealed or superseded by the treaty of 1894. That it was competent for the two countries by treaty to have superseded a prior act of Congress on the same subject is not to be doubted; for otherwise the declaration in the Constitution that a treaty, concluded in the mode prescribed by that instrument, shall be the supreme law of the land, would not have due effect. As Congress may by statute abrogate, so far at least as this country is concerned, a treaty previously made by the United States with another nation, so the United States may by treaty supersede a prior act of Congress on the same subject. In Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314, it was Opinion of the Court. said that a treaty was "to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision." In the case of The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 621, this court said "a treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty." So in the Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 599, this court said: "So far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification or repeal." Again, in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 194: "By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always that the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing." See also Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis, 454, 459; Clinton Bridge Case, 1 Woolworth, 155; Ropes v. Church, 8 Blatchf. 304; 2 Story on Const., § 1838. Nevertheless, the purpose by statute to abrogate a treaty or any designated part of a treaty, or the purpose by treaty to supersede the whole or a part of an act of Congress, must not be lightly assumed, but must appear clearly and distinctly from the words used in the statute or in the treaty. In the case of statutes alleged to be inconsistent with each other in whole or in part, the rule is well established that effect must be given to both, if by any reasonable interpretation that can be done; that "there must be a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the new laws and those of the old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro tanto, to the extent of the repugnancy; " and that "if harmony is impossible, and only in that event, the former is repealed in part or wholly, as the case may be." Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. Opinion of the Court. 342, 363; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 93; State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425, 431. In Frost v. Wenie, 157 U. S. 46, 58, this court said: "It is well settled that repeals by implication. are not to be favored. And when two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court-no purpose to repeal being clearly expressed or indicated-is, if possible, to give effect to both. In other words, it must not be supposed that the legislature intended by a later statute to repeal a prior one on the same subject, unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and, therefore, to displace the prior statute." The same rules have been applied where the claim was that an act of Congress had abrogated some of the provisions of a prior treaty between the United States and China. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 550. In that case it was held that the treaty could stand with the subsequent statutes, and, consequently, it was enforced. Like principles must control when the question is whether an act of Congress has been superseded in whole or in part by a subsequent treaty. A statute enacted by Congress expresses the will of the people of the United States in the most solemn form. If not repugnant to the Constitution, it is made by that instrument a part of the supreme law of the land, and should never be held to be displaced by a treaty, subsequently concluded, unless it is impossible for both to stand together and be enforced. So far from there being any inconsistency between the statute and treaty here in question, the twelfth section of the act of 1882, as amended in 1884 and continued in force for ten years from and after the passage of the act of 1892, is in absolute harmony with the treaty and can be enforced without affecting or impairing any right secured by the treaty. On the contrary, the enforcement of that section as amended will serve to advance the purpose of the two countries in respect of Chinese laborers, as avowed in the treaty of 1894. Despite the ingenious argument to the contrary, we do not perceive any difficulty whatever in reaching this conclusion, after carefully |