« AnteriorContinuar »
Opinion of the Court.
record shall affirmatively show the fact. Russell v. Ely, 2 Black, 575, 580. In the cited case the court, after remarking that the bill of exceptions did not purport to give all that a certain witness had testified to, said that according to a wellknown rule the court under such a condition of the record was bound to presume that there was that in the witness's testimony which justified the instruction. It was then added by the court : “What purports to be the entire deposition of Baker is sent up by the clerk of the District Court, and is printed in the record before us, and if properly before us might sustain the exception. But this deposition is not incorporated into the bill of exceptions, nor so referred to in it as to be made a part of the record of the case.
It is only a useless encumbrance of the transcript, and an expense to the litigating parties.” The court thus refused to look at the deposition which purported to be the entire deposition of the witness because it was not made a part of the bill of exceptions.
In this case there is nothing whatever in the bill of exceptions to show that the evidence contained therein is all the evidence that was given on the trial, and we cannot presume, for the purpose of reversing the judgment, that there was no evidence given upon which the jury might rightfully have found the verdict which they did.
So, in Texas & Pacific Railroad Company v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 606, which was an action to recover damages against the company for the death of plaintiff's husband, resulting from the negligence of the company, it was remarked, in regard to the evidence in the case, that “The bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all the evidence, and it would be improper to hold that the court should have directed a verdict for defendants for want of that which may have existed.”
It is true there is printed herein, together with the bill of exceptions, the statement that a motion for a new trial was made, and the remarks of the court are set forth upon his denial of the motion. The court said that if the verdict were to be set aside, it would have to be based solely upon the failure of evidence to show that Ross was a citizen of the United States, but the court also remarked that at the time when he gave the
Statement of the Caso.
instruction to the jury, that Ross must have been not only a bona fide resident of the Territory but a citizen of the United States, when the cutting of the timber was done, be believed it to be a true expression of the law applicable to the case under the pleadings. It is plain that in the view of the judge when the case was submitted to the jury, he thought there was evidence upon which a jury might find the fact of the citizenship of Ross. His subsequent statement made upon the refusal to grant a new trial, which inferentially, perhaps, admits that there was not sufficient evidence to show that Ross was such citizen, leaves a foundation for the belief that there was room upon the evidence for a difference of opinion in regard to that fact. However that may be, the record is in such a state that we cannot say that all the evidence given upon the trial is contained in the bill of exceptions, and, therefore, we cannot say that there was no evidence of the residence, and of the citizenship of Ross, upon which the verdict of the jury might be sustained. If there were evidence that Ross was a citizen and a bona fide resident, it is admitted that the verdict could not be disturbed by this court. There may have been evidence upon both propositions sufficient to sustain the verdict. The judgment must, therefore, be
SOUTHWESTERN COAL COMPANY v. MoBRIDE.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
No. 230. Argued April 21, 1902.—Decided May 19, 1902.
The act of Congress, approved June 28, 1898, known as the Curtis Agt, did
not operate to deprive the lessors of coal mines in the Choctaw Nation of royalties due and owing to them for coal mined under valid leases, prior to that date.
This litigation was begun in the United States Court for the Indian Territory, Central Judicial District, sitting at Atoka, by
Statement of the Caso.
the filing of a bill in equity on behalf of Hyram Y. McBride, a citizen of the Choctaw Nation. The defendants named in the bill were the National Bank of Denison, the Southwestern Coal and Improvement Company (hereafter referred to as the Coal Coinpany) and J. A. Randell, as administrator of the estate of G. G. Randell, deceased. The Coal Company is an appellant in this court, while McBride and Randell are the appellees. It was averred in the bill that on April 6, 1894, the complainant (McBride) was the owner of a three twenty-seconds share in a certain coal or mining interest situated in the town of Coalgate, Indian Territory, which coal claim was being operated, under royalty contracts, by the Coal Company; that, to secure an indebtedness due by the complainant to the National Bank of Denison, complainant had executed and delivered a mortgage upon his aforesaid share; and that, under the assumed authority of a power of sale contained in the mortgage and pursuant to a combination between the bank and one G. G. Randell, a purported sale of said share of complainant was made to said Randell, but that said pretended sale, for various stated reasons, was illegal and void. It was further averred that from the tiine of said pretended sale the Coal Company had failed to make payments of royalties due upon said share of complainant, and was liable to account therefor. The prayer of the bill was, in substance, that the sale in question be declared a nullity and that the various defendants account to complainant in respect to the royalties received and retained.
The bank filed its answer, and therein disclaimed having any interest in the unpaid royalties claimed by complainant and Randell, as administrator of G. G. Randell. In its answer the Coal Company, among other things unnecessary to be stated, admitted that it had withheld payments from March 1, 1897, of royalties on the coal mining share referred to in the complaint, and averred that the amount of said unpaid royalties aggregated $2617.29. The Coal Company also further specifically pleaded in its answer as follows:
“ Defendant Coal Company further states that on the 28th day of June, 1898, the President of the United States approved an act entitled "An act for the protection of the people of the
Statement of the Case.
Indian Territory, and for other purposes,' and which said act of Congress is commonly known as the ‘Curtis bill,' and by section sixteen of said act it was provided that it should be unlawful for any person, after the passage of said act, except as otherwise provided therein, to claim, demand or receive for his own use, or the use of any one else, any royalty on coal, or any rents on any lands or property belonging to any one of said tribes or nations in said Territory, or for any one to pay to any individual any such royalty or rents or any consideration therefor, what
“And that by virtue of the provisions of said act of Congress hereinabove referred to, on and after the 28th day of June, 1898, no royalties accrued to any person upon this said interest claimed by the plaintiff in said mines; and that by virtue of the provisions of said act of Congress, hereinabove referred to, the royalty which accrued upon said interest so claimed by the plaintiff in said mines and which said Coal Company had not paid over to said defendant bank in accordance with plaintiff's instructions, is no longer due and payable to the said plaintiff or any person claiming under him, and cannot be claimed, demanded or received by the plaintiff, or any other person; and that by virtue of section eighteen of said act of Congress, hereinabove referred to any person claiming, demanding or receiving any of the royalties which the plaintiff claims accrued upon the interest claimed by him in said coal mines, becomes guilty of a misdemeanor, which is punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00,) and is liable to forfeit possession of the property in question.”
A written stipulation was thereafter entered into between the complainant and the defendant Randell, administrator, wherein it was agreed that the complainant was entitled to $900 of the sum admitted by the Coal Company to be unpaid, and that the said defendant administrator was entitled to the remainder, or the sum of $1717.29. Upon the pleadings in the cause and the stipulation referred to, a motion for judgment against the Coal Company for $2617.29 was filed on behalf of the complainant and said defendant administrator. The motion was granted, and a judgment was entered accordingly. An
Opinion of the Court.
appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Indian Territory, and that court affirmed the judgment. 54 Southwestern Rep. 1099. The judgment of atfirinance was in favor of McBride and Randell, administrator, against the Coal Company and the sureties on its supersedeas bond (Clarence W. Turner and Homer B. Spaulding,) for the amount of the original judgment, with interest and costs. An appeal was then prosecuted by the Coal Company, and Turner and Spaulding to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court affirmed the judgments, (104 Fed. Rep. 1007) and the cause was then appealed to this court.
Mr. James Hagerman for appellant. Mr. Clifford L. Jackson and Mr. Joseph M. Bryson were on his brief.
No counsel appeared for appellee.
MR. JUSTICE White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The sole question presented for the consideration of the courts below and necessary to be passed upon by this court was, and is, Did the act of Congress, approved June 28, 1898, known as the Curtis Act, operate to deprive the lessors of coal mines in the Choctaw Nation of the royalties due and owing to them for coal mined under valid leases prior to the date named? The question necessarily requires a construction of section 16 of the act, which reads as follows:
“ SEC. 16. That it shall be unlawful for any person, after the passage of this act, except as hereinafter provided, to claim, demand or receive, for his own use or for the use of any one else, any royalty on oil, coal, asphalt or other mineral, or on any timber or lumber, or any other kind of property whatsoever, or any rents on any lands or property belonging to any one of said tribes or nations in said Territory, or for any one to pay to any individual any such royalty or rents or any consideration therefor whatsoever; and all royalties and rents hereafter payable to the tribe shall be paid, under such rules and regulations as