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stated by the bill and those established by the evidence, might either
incline the court to modify the relief or to grant no relief at all, the
court, even though it sees that the granting or modified relief would be
attended with considerable difficulty, will not support a demurrer. Ib.
12. The general rule is that the truth of material and relevant matters, set
forth with requisite precision, are admitted by demurrer, but in a case
of great magnitude, involving questions of grave and far-reaching im-
portance, that rule will not be applied, and the case will be sent to is-
sue and proofs. Ib.
13. The legislation of the State of Connecticut, in respect to the taxation
of shares of stock in a local corporation, held by non-residents, which
is set forth in the statement of facts, is not in conflict with paragraph 1
of section 2 of article IV of the Federal Constitution, or the Four-
teenth Amendment to that Constitution. Travellers' Insurance Co. v.
14. The court below erred in dismissing this action, for want of jurisdic-
abuse of its priviliges, is recognized as law in Louisiana. New Orleans
Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 336.
4. In Louisiana a corporation is liable to be proceeded against for taking
illegal rates by quo warranto to the suit of the State. Ib.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. The District and Circuit Courts of the United States are always open for
the transaction of some business which may be transacted under the
orders of the judge in his absence, and on such transaction rest the
plaintiff's claims in this case, which the court sustain as business which
could be transacted by the clerk in the absence of the judge, following
the departmental construction of the statutes. United States v. Fin-
2. Of course if that construction were obviously or clearly wrong it would
be the duty of the court to so adjudge; but if there simply be doubt
as to the soundness of that construction, the action of the Government
in conformity with it for many years should not be overruled except
for cogent reasons. Ib.
The obligee in a bond which supersedes an order confirming a sale of real
estate, and directing the immediate execution of a deed and delivery
of possession thereof to the purchaser, is entitled, after that order has
been affirmed on the appeal, to recover as damages for the breach of the
obligation of the bond the value of the use and possession, that is to
say in this case, the rents and profits of the real estate during the time
the purchaser is kept out of the possession and use of the real estate
by the supersedeas bond, and the appeal in which it was allowed.
Woodworth v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 334.
1. The time at which a party appeals to a court of equity for relief affects
largoly the character of the relief which will be granted. New York
City v. Pine, 93.
2. A failure to pursue statutory remedies is not always fatal to the rights
of a party in possession, and if full and adequate compensation is made
to the plaintiff, sometimes the possession of the defendant will not be
3. A court of equity may take possession and finally end a controversy like
the present by securing the payment of adequate compensation in lieu
of a cessation of the trespass. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
In this case there is nothing whatever in the bill of exceptions to show that
the evidence contained therein is all the evidence that was given on the
trial, and the court cannot presume, for the purpose of reversing the
judgment, that there was no evidence given upon which the jury might
rightfully have found the verdict which they did. United States v.
Coffee Queen Mining Company, 495.
1. The classification of life and health insurance companies separately from
fire, marine and inland insurance companies, and mutual benefit and
relief organizations doing business through lodges and mutual benefit
associations, made by the State of Texas in respect of insurance, is not
80 arbitrary and destitute of reasonable basis as to be obnoxious to con-
stitutional objection. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Mettler, 308.
2. In an action on a life insurance policy it is not necessary to prove the
fact of death beyond a reasonable doubt. A verdict for the party in
whose favor the weight of evidence preponderates will be sustained. Ib.
3. The inference of death may arise from disappearance under circum-
stances inconsistent with a continuation of life. Ib.
4. The belief of the family of an assured that he is dead is not admissible
on the trial of an action on a policy of insurance on his life as inde-
pendent evidence of the fact of his death, but the entertainment of such
belief may be proven as tending to show innocence of fraud. And, in
this case, the evidence which was admitted cannot be presumed, the
entire record considered, to have had any influence whatever on the
verdict except from the point of view in which it was admissible. Ib.
5. No other objection urged constituted reversible error or requires partic-
ular mention. Ib.
1. The question involved in this case upon the merits is, in substance,
whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alluvion caused by the recession
of the Mississippi River to the extent of many hundred feet east of the
point where it flowed in 1852, at the time when the plaintiff's prede-
cessor took title to the property by virtue of a patent from the United
States. The trial court held she was, and the Supreme Court of the
State of Missouri hold she was not. In the opinion of this court the
case involves no Federal question, and it is dismissed on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. Sweringen v. St. Louis, 38.
2. In an action of ejectment against private individuals, the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court cannot be maintained on the ground that by aver-
ments that plaintiffs were ousted in violation of the treaty of October 21,
1803, and of the Fifth Amendment, the provisions of which it was the
duty of the Federal Government to observe, it appeared that the case
aroso under the Constitution, or laws, or treaties of the United States.
Filhiol v. Maurice, 108.
3. The rulo reiterated that this court has no jurisdiction under the third
division of section 709 of the Revised Statutes unless the party seeking
the writ of error has unmistakably invoked for the protection of an
asserted right, title, privilege or immunity, the Constitution, or some
treaty, statute, commission, or authority, of the United States. Mich-
igan Sugar Company v. Michigan, 112.
4. Whore a party, drawing in question in this court a stato enactment as
invalid under the Constitution of the United States, or asserting that
the final judgment of the highest court of a State denied to him a right
or immunity under the Constitution of the United States, did not raise
such question or specially set up or claim such right or immunity in
the trial court, this court cannot review such final judgment and hold
that the state judgment was unconstitutional, or that the right or im.
munity so claimed had been denied by the highest court of the State,
if that eourt did nothing more than decline to pass upon the Federal
question because not raised in the trial court, as required by the stato
practice. Erie Railroad Company v. Purdy, 148.
5. If, upon examining the record, this court had found that a Federal
question was properly raised, or that a Federal right or immunity was
specially claimed in the trial court, then the jurisdiction of this court
would not have been defeated by the mere failure of the highest court
of the State to dispose of the question so raised, or to pass upon the
right or immunity so claimed. Ib.
6. The defendant in error moved to dismiss the action on the ground that
no Federal question was decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa. Held,
that the motion should be overruled, as the plaintiff explicitly based his
right of action on Rev. Stat. 88 5197, 5198, and as the judgment of the
trial court, and that of the Supreme Court of the State, denied such
right, this court therefore has jurisdiction. Talbot v. Sioux City First
National Bank, 172.
7. In those statutes relating to illegal interest, it is the interost charged,
and not the interest to which a forfeiture might be enforced that the
statuto regards as illegal, and if interest greater than the legal rate is
charged, it may be relinquished, and recovery had at the legal rate. Ib.
8. Matters within the pleadings in this case having been left undetermined
by the court below, and the cause having been detained for the pur-
pose of thereafter passing upon them, and for tho entry of a further
decree, the decree entored below was not final, and this court is
without jurisdiction to pass upon it. Covington v. Covington First
National Bank, 270.
9. If a bill be brought to enforce or set aside a contract, though such con-
tract be connected with a patent, it is not a suit under the patent laws,
and the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court can only be maintained upon
the ground of diversity of citizenship. Excelsior Pipe Co. v. Pacific
Bridge Co., 282.
10. Although the bill be an ordinary bill for the infringement of a patent,
of which the Circuit Court would have jurisdiction, if the answer show
that it is really a suit upon a contract the court should dismiss the bill.
11. Where a bill is filed by a licensee (the license being set up merely to
show the title of the plaintiff to the patent) against the patentee and
another party to whom the patentee has granted a conflicting license,
the jurisdiction of the court is not ousted by reason of allegations in
tho answor that the plaintiff had forfeited all his rights under the
licenso by failure to comply with its terms and conditions, by reason of
which the licenso had been revoked by the patentee. Ib.
12. The authority of the Government in prescribing regulations in respect
of transit being unqualified, and the existing regulations not open to
constitutional objection, the court below could not interfere by habeas
corpus with the collector's orders, and its ruling on an offer of evid-
ence, the entire record considered, was not erroneous. Lee Gon Yung
v. United States, 306.
13. In order to warrant the exercise by this court of jurisdiction over the
judgments of state courts, there must be some fairground for asserting
the existence of a Federal question, and in the absence thereof a writ
of error will be dismissed, although the claim of a Federal question
was plainly set up; and where by the record it appears that such a
claim, although set up, had no substance or foundation, the fact that
it was raised was not sufficient to give this court jurisdiction. New
Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 336.
14. Upon a careful review of all questions, the court is of opinion that no
Federal question exists in this record, and that the court is without
jurisdiction in this case. Ib.
15. The original jurisdiction, vested by the Constitution in this court over
controversies in which a State is a party, is not affected by the question
whether the State is a party plaintiff or party defendant. Minnesota
v. Hitchcock, 373.
16. A dispute as to the title to real estate is a question of a justiciable pa-
ture, and can properly be determined in a judicial proceeding. 16.
17. The United States are to be taken, for the purposes of this case, as the
real party in interest adverse to the State. Ib.
18. This court has jurisdiction of this controversy, and is called upon to
determine the case on its merits. Ib.
19. Not only the technical rules of statutory construction, but also the
general scope of the legislation in these matters, and the policy of the
United States in respect to public schools, and also to Indians, concur
in sustaining the contention of the Government that none of these
ceded lands passed under the school grant to the State. 16.
20. The court is of opinion that the claim of Minnesota to these lands
cannot be sustained, and that the bill should be dismissed. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.
1. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, sustaining the act of
February 3, 1897, which provided that “section 4742 of Mansfield's
Digest of the Laws of Arkansas, heretofore put in force in the Indian
Territory, is hereby amended by adding to said section the following:
“Provided that if the mortgagor is a non-resident of the Indian Terri-
tory, the mortgage shall be recorded in the judicial district in which
the property is situated at the time the mortgage is executed. All
mortgages of personal property in the Indian Territory heretofore exe-
cuted and recorded in the judicial district thereof in which the prop-
erty was situated at the time they were executed are hereby validated,"
is sound as applicable to this case. McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel