2. The plain purpose of Congress was to give effect to mortgages of non-
residents, which had been, before the passage of the act, recorded in
the judicial district in which the property was situated at the time the
mortgages were executed. Ib.
3. The act as so construed and applied was a valid exercise of Congress-
ional power, and in circumstances like those of the present case, cannot
be justly impugned as depriving the attaching creditor of property
within the meaning of the Constitution. Ib.
4. The power of a legislature to pass laws giving validity which were before
ineffectual, is well settled. Ib.
1. Section 7 of the act of March 3, 1899, c. 413, 30 Stat. 1004, in effect abol-
ishes the rank of Commodore, at least as far as respects the active list
of the line of the Navy, and lifts those in that rank to that of Rear Ad-
miral. Clearly that was a special provision in respect to which the at-
tention of Congress was at the time directed, and when in section 13
Congress prescribed a general rule for the salaries of naval officers,
such general rule cannot be understood as repealing that special pro-
vision. Rodgers v. United States, 83.
2. That section fixed the amount of the salary but did not affect any gen-
eral provisions of law affecting a difference between salary while at sea
and while on shore.
1. Patent No. 404,414, issued Juue 4, 1889, to William R. Jones, for
"method of melting molten pig metal," is a good and valid patent, and
was infringed by the defendant. Carnegie Steel Company v. Cambria
2. The process described in the patent consisted of a large reservoir between
the blast furnaces and the converters, in which should always be main-
tained a large quantity of metal, which should be drawn off in small
quantities at a time and replenished by a like quantity of metal from
the blast furnaces. Ib.
3. A process patent can only be anticipated by a similar process.
ess patent is not anticipated by mechanism which might, with slight
alterations, have been adapted to carry out that process, unless at least
such use of it would have occurred to one whose duty it was to make
practical use of the mechanism described. Ib.
4. A disclaimer may extend to a part of the specification as well as to a
claim or one feature of a claim, though it would be otherwise if the
purpose of the disclaimer had been to alter the description of the in-
vention, or convert the claim from one thing into something else. Ib.
5. A stipulation of counsel entered into for the purpose of saving time may
be repudiated where the facts subsequently developed show that with
respect to a particular matter it was inadvertently signed, provided
that notice be given in sufficient time to prevent prejudice to the
opposite party, Ib.
See JURISDICTION, 11, 12, 13.
Section 4747 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that no sum of money
due, or to become due, to any pensioner shall be liable to attachment,
levy or seizure, by or under any legal or equitable process whatever,
whether the same remains with the Pension Office, or any officer or agent
thereof, or is in course of transmission to the pensioner entitled there-
to, but shall inure wholly to the benefit of such pensioner, protects the
fund only while in the course of transmission to the pensioner; but,
when the money has been paid to him, it has enured wholly to his bene-
fit, and is liable to seizure as opportunity presents itself. McIntosh v.
Aubrey, 122.
1. In the exercise of original jurisdiction by this court the usual practice
in equity cases is to hear applications for leave to file bills, ex parte,
and, ordinarily, leave is granted as of course. Washington v. Northern
Securities Company, 254.
2. But this is not an invariable rule, and where it is apparent on the face
of the proposed bill that there is a defect of parties, which cannot be
supplied without ousting the jurisdiction, leave will be denied. Ib.
3. Where the objection is one of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and
the case is of grave importance, leave to file will be granted that the
fullest argument may be had. Ib.
1. A Federal question was presented by the contentions of the plaintiff in
error, and this court is of opinion, that while there was a lake abut-
ting on or to the north of the lots, the plaintiff would take all land be-
tween the meander line and the water, and all accretions, it was com-
petent for the defendant to show that there was not, at the time of the
survey, nor since, any such lake, and to contend that, in such a state
of facts there could be no intervening land, and no accretion by re-
liction. French-Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 47. Same v. Col-
2. This was an appeal from a decree of the Court of Private Land Claims,
confirming the title of the appellees to a tract of land in New Mexico.
Held, that in the absence of any sufficient attack upon the record, or
of any evidence on the part of the Government going to disprove or
discredit the averments therein, it formed enough of a basis for the
finding of the court below that there was a grant made as stated in its
findings, and that such grant and the record thereof in the archives
had been destroyed under the circumstances stated. United States v.
Pendell, 189.
3. The treaty of December 30, 1853, between the United States and Mexico,
and the act of Congress in support of it, were not intended to debar
parol proof of the existence and of the contents of a grant which had
been destroyed under the circumstances detailed, or that, under such
circumstances, a presumption that the grant had been recorded could
not be indulged. Ib.
4. In this case the evidence of possession was sufficient, in connection with
the other evidence, upon which to base a presumption that the peti-
tioner had a title to the land, which should be confirmed. Ib.
5. The terms of the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 854, (establishing the
Court of Private Land Claims,) with reference to a proceeding like
this, leave no room for doubt that it was the intent of Congress to re-
quire that, before a decision of the court in the premises, all those as-
serting claims in the land, adverse to the United States, should be
made parties, and should be heard in support of their validity. United
States v. Green, 256.
6. By the law in force at the time of the sale under consideration, a grant
initiated in the manner in which the one in question is claimed to have
been, could not exceed in the aggregate four sitios.
7. In its essential feature this case is like Ely's Administralor v. United
States, 171 U. S. 220. Ib.
8. It may be presumed that the Mexican officials duly performed the duty
imposed upon them of registering the fact of the making of a grant of
public lands.
9. In Cameron v. United States, 148 U. S. 301, the matter passed upon was
not the same as that which is present in the case at bar. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, 18 to 22.
1. Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general,
(the terms of the general being broad enough to include the matter
provided for in the special,) the fact that the one is special and the
other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be con-
sidered as remaining an exception to the general, and the general will
not be understood as repealing the special, unless a repeal is expressly
named, or unless the provisions of the general are manifestly incon-
sistent with those of the special. Rodgers v. United States, 83.
2. In case statutes are alleged to be inconsistent with each other, effect
must be given to both, if by any reasonable interpretation, that can be
done; and like principles must control when the question is whether
an act of Congress has been superseded in whole or in part by a sub-
sequent treaty with a foreign nation. United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 213.
The property involved in this suit is improved real estate in the city of
Washington; and the controlling question presented is, whether the
sale of it under a deed of trust stands in the way of its redemption by
Mrs. Hitz upon her paying the debt secured by the deed of trust.
Held: As between the parties to the original cause the title to the real
estate in question was bound by the filing of the cross-bill by Mrs.
Hitz. The deeds which Mrs. Hitz sought to have set aside are valid and
enforceable instruments. The sale by Tyler as trustee conferred no
title as against Mrs. Hitz. Mrs. Hitz is entitled in this suit to redeem
the property by paying such sum as may be due on account of the
debt to secure which the deed to Tyler was made. Hitz v. Jenks, 155.
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