attention of Parliament; and in the Act called the Petition of Right, paffed in the third year of the reign of Charles the First, it was enacted, that no perfon fhould be held in cuftody, in confequence of fuch imprison

ments.

But the Judges knew how to evade the intention of this Act: they indeed did not refuse to discharge a Man imprisoned without a cause; but they used so much delay in the examination of those causes, that they obtained the full effect of an open denial of Juftice.

The Legiflature again interpofed, and in the Act paffed in the fixteenth year of the reign of Charles the First, the fame in which the Star-Chamber was fuppreffed, it was enacted, that “if any person be committed " by the King himself in perfon, or by his "Privy Council, or by any of the members

thereof, he shall have granted unto him, "without any delay upon any pretence what"foever, a writ of Habeas Corpus; and that the Judge fhall thereupon, within three "Court days after the return is made, exa,

"mine and determine the legality of fuch "imprisonment."

This Act feemed to preclude every poffibility of future evasion: yet it was evaded ftill; and by the connivance of the Judges, the perfon who detained the prifoner could, without danger, wait for a fecond, and a third writ, called an Alias and a Pluries, before he produced him.

All these different artifices gave at length birth to the famous Act of Habeas Corpus, paffed in the thirtieth year of the reign of Charles the Second, which in England is confidered as a fecond great Charter, and has definitively fuppreffed all the resources of oppreffion. (a)

The principal articles of this act are, To fix the different terms allowed for bringing a prisoner those terms are proportioned to the distance; and none can in any cafe exceed twenty days.

(a) The real title of the Act is, An Act for better securing the Subject, and for prevention of Imprisonments beyond the Seas,

2. That, the Officer and Keeper neglecting to make due returns, or not delivering to the prifoner, or his agent, within fix hours after demand, a copy of the warrant of commitment, or shifting the cuftody of the prisoner from one to another, without fufficient reafon or authority, (specified in the act) shall for the first offence forfeit one hundred pounds, and for the fecond, two hundred, to the party grieved, and be difabled to hold his office.

3. No perfon, once delivered by Habeas Corpus, fhall be recommitted for the fame offence, on penalty of five hundred pounds.

4. Every perfon committed for treafon or felony fhall, if he require it in the first week of the next term, or the first day of the next feffion, be indicted in that term or feffion, or elfe admitted to bail; unless the King's witneffes cannot be produced at that time and if acquitted, or if not indicted and tried in the fecond term or feffion, he fhall be discharged of his imprisonment for fuch imputed offence.

5. Any of the twelve Judges, or the Lord Chancellor, who shall deny a writ of Habeas Corpus, on fight of the warrant, or on oath that the fame is refufed, fhall forfeit feverally to the party grieved five hundred pounds.

6. No inhabitant of England (except perfons contracting, or convicts praying to be tranfported) fhall be fent prifoner to Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or any place beyond the Seas, within or without the King's dominions; on pain that the party committing, his advisers, aiders, and affiftants, fhall forfeit to the party grieved a fum not less than five hundred pounds, to be recovered with treble cofts; fhall be disabled to bear any office of truft or profit; fhall incur the penalties of præmunire (the imprisonment for life, and forfeiture of all goods, and rents of lands during life); and fhall be incapable of the King's pardon.

воок II.

CHAPTER I.

Some Advantages peculiar to the English Conftitution. 1. The Unity of the Executive Power.

E have seen, in former Chapters, the

WE refources of the different parts of the

English Government for balancing each other, and how their reciprocal actions and reactions produce the freedom of the Constitution, which is no more than an equilibrium between the ruling powers of a State. I now propose to shew, that the particular nature and functions of these fame conftituent parts of the Government, which give it fo different an appearance from that of other free States, are moreover attended with peculiar and very

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