fons, and they are fuppofed to fit in Parliament on their own account, and for the fupport of their own interefts. In confequence of this they have the privilege of giving their votes by proxies; (a) and, when any of them diffent from the refolutions of their Houfe, they may enter a proteft against them, containing the reasons of their diffent. In a word, this In a word, this part of the Legislature, being deftined frequently to balance the power of the people, what it could not receive in real strength, it has received in outward fplendor and greatness; fo that, when it cannot refift by its weight, it overawes by its bulk.

In fine, as thofe various prerogatives by which the component parts of the Legislature are thus made to balance each other, are all. intimately connected with the State, and flourish and fade away according to the viciffitudes of public profperity and adverfity, whatever particular oppofitions may take place among those parts, there never can arise never can arife any, when

(a) The Commons have not that privilege, because they are themselves proxies for the People.-See Coke's Inft. iv.

P. 41.

the general welfare is really in question. And when, to refolve the doubts that may arife in political fpeculations of this kind, we caft our eyes on the debates of the two Houses for a long fucceffion of years, and fee the nature of the laws which have been proposed, both those which have paffed, and those which have been rejected, as well as of the arguments that have been urged on both fides, we shall remain convinced of the goodness of the principles on which the English Legiflature is formed.

CHAPTER

IV.

A third Advantage peculiar to the English Government. The Power of propofing Laws, lodged in the Hands of the People.

A

Third circumftance which I propose to fhow to be peculiar to the English Government, is the manner in which the offices of the three component parts of the Legislature have been divided among them, and regulated.

If the Reader will be pleased to observe, he will find, that in most of the ancient free States, the fhare of the People in the business of Legislation, was to approve, or reject, the propofitions which were made to them, and to give the final fanction to the laws. The function of those persons, or in general thofe Bodies, who were intrusted with the Executive power, was to prepare and frame the Laws, and then to propose them to the People: and, in a word, they poffeffed that

branch of the Legislative power which may be called the initiative, that is, the prerogative of putting that power in action. (a)

This initiative, or exclufive right of propofing, in Legislative affemblies, exclufively attributed to the Magiftrates, is indeed is indeed very ufeful, and perhaps even neceffary, in States of a republican form, for giving a permanence to the laws, as well as for preventing the

(a) This power of previously confidering and approving fuch laws as were afterwards to be propounded to the People, was, in the first times of the Roman Republic, conftantly exercifed by the Senate: laws were made, Populi juffu, ex auctoritate Senatus. Even in cafes of elections, the previous approbation, and auctoritas of the Senate, with regard to those persons who were offered to the fuffrages of the People, was required. Tum enim non gerebat is magiftratum qui ceperat, fi Patres auctores non erant facti. Cic. pr. Plancio, 3.

At Venice the Senate alfo exercises a power of the fame kind, with regard to the Grand Council, or Affembly of the Nobles. In the canton of Bern, all propofitions must be difcuffed in the little Council, which is compofed of twentyfeven Members, before they are laid before the Council of the two hundred, in whom refides the fovereignty of the whole Canton. And in Geneva, the law is, "that nothing "fhall be treated in the General Council, or Affembly of the "Citizens, which has not been previously treated and ap"proved in the Council of the two hundred; and that nothing shall be treated in the two hundred, which has not been previously treated and approved in the Council of the "twenty-five."

diforders and ftruggles for power, we have mentioned before; but upon examination we fhall find this expedient attended with inconveniences no less than the evils it is meant to remedy.

Those Magiftrates, or Bodies, at first indeed apply frequently to the Legislature for obtaining fuch branches of power as they dare not of themselves affume, or for removing fuch obftacles to their growing authority as they do not yet think it safe for them peremptorily to fet afide. But when their authority has at laft gained a fufficient degree of extent and stability, as farther manifestations of the will of the Legislative power could then only create obftructions to the exercise of it, they begin to confider this Legiflative power as an enemy whom they must take great care never to roufe. They confequently convene the Affembly as feldom as they can. When they do it, they carefully avoid propofing any thing favourable to public liberty. Soon they even intirely ceafe to convene the Affembly at all; and the People, after thus lofing the power of legally afferting their

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