Fundamental difference between the English Government and the Governments juft defcribed.-In England all Executive Authority is placed out of the hands of thofe in whom the People put their confidence.-Ufefulness of the Power of the Crown.

N what manner, therefore, has the English

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Conftitution contrived to find a remedy for political evils which, from the very nature of Men and things, feem to be irremediable? How has it found means to oblige those perfons, to whom the People have given up their power, to make them effectual and lasting returns of gratitude?-thofe who enjoy an exclufive authority, to feek the advantage of all?—those who make the laws, to make only equitable ones? It has been by fubjecting them themselves to thofe laws; and, for that purpose, by excluding them from any fhare in the execution of them.

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Thus, the Parliament can establish as numerous a standing army as it pleafes ;-but immediately another Power comes forward, which takes the abfolute command of it— which fills all the pofts in it, and directs its motions at its pleafure.-The Parliament may lay new taxes ;-but immediately another Power feizes upon the produce of them, and alone enjoys the advantages and glory arifing from the difpofal of it. The Parliament may even, if you please, repeal the laws on which the fafety of the Subject is grounded; but it is not their own caprices and arbitrary humours, it is the caprices and paffions of other Men, which they will have gratified, when they fhall have overthrown the columns of liberty.

And the English Conftitution has not only excluded from any fhare in the Execution of the laws thofe in whom the People truft for the enacting of them, but it has also taken from them what would have had the fame pernicious influence on their deliberations, the hope of ever ever invading that executive authority, and transferring it to themselves.

This authority has been made in England one fingle, indivifible prerogative;-it has been made for ever the unalienable attribute of one perfon, marked out and ascertained beforehand by moft folemn laws and longeftablished cuftom; and all the active forces in the State have been left at his difpofal.

In order to fecure ftill more this prerogative against all poffibility of attempts from individuals, it has been farther heightened and strengthened by every thing that can attract and fix the attention and reverence of

the people. The power of conferring and taking away places and employments has also been added to it, and ambition itself has thus been interested in its fupport.

A fhare in the Legislative power has also been given to the Man to whom this prerogative has been delegated: a paffive thare indeed, and the only one that can, with fafety to the State, be trufted to him, but by the means of which he is enabled to defeat every attempt against his conftitutional authority.

Laftly, he is the only felf-exifting and independent Power in the State. The Generals, or the Ministers of State, are fo only by the continuance of his will and pleasure: he would even difmifs the Parliament itself, if ever he saw them begin to entertain dangerous defigns; and he needs only fay one word to difperfe and annihilate every power in the State that might threaten his authority. Formidable prerogatives thefe; but with regard to which we fhall be inclined to lay afide our apprehenfions, if we reflect, on the one hand, on the great privileges of the people by which they have been counterbalanced, and on the other hand, on the happy confequences that refult from their being thus united together.

From this unity, and, if I may so express myself, this total fequeftration, of the Executive authority, this advantageous confequence, in the first place, follows, which has been observed in a preceding Chapter, that the attention of the whole Nation is directed to one and the fame object. The People, befides, enjoy this most essential advantage, which they would

vainly endeavour to obtain under the Government of many, they can give their confidence, without giving power over themselves, and against themselves; they can appoint Trustees, without at the fame time giving themselves Mafters.

Those Men to whom the People have delegated the Power of framing the Laws, are thereby made fure to made fure to feel the whole

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weight of them.-They can increase the rogatives of the Executive power, but they cannot inveft themfelves with it

they cannot direct its motions; they only can unbind its hands.

They are made to derive their importance, nay they are indebted for their existence, to the need in which that Power ftands of their affistance; and they know that they would no fooner have betrayed the truft of the People, and compleated the treacherous work, but they would fee themselves diffolved, fpurned, as inftruments now spent and become worthless.

This fame difpofition of things alfo prevents, in England, that effential defect, in