responsible for carrying on the Government can be at issue with the legislative body, as Mr. Roosevelt has been recently. In this he is at one with his English fellow-citizen. Both are accustomed to the sway of a Prime Minister, himself the creation of the House of Commons, and working always in harmony with it. The development in Britain's political methods during the nineteenth century has been thoroughly assimilated by the daughter-state, and here they stand whole-heartedly together. From the older ox the younger has learned to plough.

It is indeed probably beyond question that Great Britain and Canada are now more substantially one in outlook than at any previous period in their history. Their people are familiar with the same types of political machinery, they enjoy identical liberties. If Canada has had grievances in the past, the impression of the average man is that they have been removed, and that all is now smooth sailing. One is hardly prepared for a complaint from Canada that she has suffered. and is still suffering, at the hands of a jealous stepmother, and that there is a good deal yet to do in order to be rid of irksome leading-strings. Yet a book which appeared last year by an eminent and learned Canadian lawyer rings from end to end with the thought that Canada has nearly always been badly treated, or that she would have been badly treated but for her own strenuous and successful resistance, and that she is not yet a free state. With great skill and ingenuity the author works up an elaborate case against Great Britain. She has checked Canada unduly in the past; she is checking her unduly still, and resisting her assertion of the privileges of the grownup. Canada has a long list of grievances. Mr. Ewart has read widely,

2 "The Kingdom of Canada and other Essays," by John S. Ewart, K.C. Toronto: Morang & Co., 1908.

not, one fears, so much to see his subject as a whole, but to make points against Great Britain. Yet his bark is worse than his bite. Beginning with denunciation he ends, like a Hebrew prophet, with benediction. After all, the two countries are now getting on very well together, he admits, and he wishes them always to stand side by side.

None the less is his list of Canada's supposed grievances worth examination. The first one is that to-day, by Great Britain's fault, Canada has the nondescript title of "Dominion" instead of being a kingdom. When Canada was federated Sir John Macdonald intended that the new state should be called the "Kingdom of Canada." By this title he wished to assert Canada's equality of status with the mother-land. She was to be an auxiliary kingdom, and, starting with a title of equality, as her population grew, Canada, without further organic change, would take naturally the position among the various states of the Empire to which her importance entitled her at each phase of development. It is easy to say that to call Canada a Kingdom would have made no real difference. But perhaps it is as shallow to make too little of names as it is to make too much. Two centuries ago Prussia was extremely anxious for the status of a kingdom. When her ruler gained his point he took equal rank with Louis the Fourteenth and other kings of his time, and the subsequent history of Prussia has not shown that this accession of dignity in title was unimportant. But Canada was not allowed to become a kingdom because a nervous British minister feared to irritate the Republicans of the United States by setting up a new monarchy on their border; and so at his demand the proposed kingdom became the "Dominion." Certainly this minister at least must have thought that names

were important, and now we have a note of indignant regret that Sir John Macdonald's idea was not carried out. Mr. Ewart would still change "Dominion" to "Kingdom," and thus assert Canada's political equality with Great Britain. He would have Canada definitely renounce the idea that the Imperial Parliament has any jurisdiction over her. He wishes Great Britain and Canada to stand together in a free union of perfectly equal states. He does not wish a British Empire, for to him an "Empire" means the dominance of one central state over inferior states. Yet he is no Republican. King Edward would still be Sovereign of Canada; indeed, the King, and the King alone, would be the permanent tie between the two countries. They would

work together, without any thought that one state had control over the other. Since King Edward could not be in two places at once, it would seem as if he must be represented in Canada by a viceroy. Mr. Ewart does not say who is to appoint the viceroy. Certainly it cannot be the Government of Great Britain, which is to have no authority in Canada; and it can hardly be the King, who can perform no political acts except through the medium of a responsible minister. Is the Parliament of Canada then to appoint him? The question is not uninteresting or unimportant, but here we need not discuss it further.

It may be that, in regard to this title of Kingdom, Canada has a grievance, though it is not a grievance very widely known or felt. Of course it is interesting to find that forty-three years ago a British minister, with a stroke of his pen, changed Canada from a proposed kingdom to a "Dominion," in spite of the emphatic wishes of those who created the new federation. But for our present relations the question is whether Britain would do this now. Assuredly she would not. Yet Mr.

Ewart persists that unreasonable restrictions upon Canada still endure. and he draws up a considerable list of disabilities from which she suffers. Canada could not hold biennial parliaments; an Act of the British Parliament makes it obligatory for the Canadian Parliament to sit annually. Canada could not take a census every twelfth year instead of every tenth year. The Maritime Provinces of Canada, with their three legislatures, could not take the economical step of uniting under one. Canada has no power to change her own capital, or even the quorum in her House of Commons, should she so desire. She has not complete control over such matters as coinage, copyright, and shipping. even that engaged in her own coasting trade. The powers of Canada's Parliament, like those of a State in the American Union, are strictly confined to her own actual territory. Even there she is not supreme, for the British Parliament has sovereign jurisdiction in Canada, as everywhere else in the Empire; all of Canada's legislation is null and void that conflicts with that of the United Kingdom; on any Canadian measures the United Kingdom still has the power of disallowance, and an Imperial Act can at any time override a Canadian Act. If Britain declares war on any state, Canada is at war too, though her Government may disapprove of the declaration. In short, Burke's pictures of Britain "as from the throne of Heaven she superintends all the several inferior legislatures," is still true, Mr. Ewart seems to think, of her relations with Canada.

It looks as if Canada were cribbed, cabined and confined. But Mr. Ewart is too good a constitutional lawyer not to know that Canada really can do what she likes within the limits of the law of nations. It is true that the Constitution of Canada was created

and might be revoked by an Act of the Imperial Parliament. But it will never be revoked, and any amendments that Canada desires she can have. Such amendments are made with great ease. If the United States wishes to amend its constitution it must go through an elaborate process of submitting the proposal to the vote of each of the States-a process so difficult that less than twenty amendments have been made in 120 years. Canada has merely to express by vote in Parliament what amendments she desires and almost automatically the British Parliament passes the necessary Bill. No doubt Canada's amour propre would be saved if her own enactment were alone necessary. But this might be even too easy; it is, in practice, not a bad thing that two parliaments must be consulted before a final step is taken. The method may be a little belated, but it springs out of the relation between parent and child. Be the forms what they may, the fact remains that Canada controls her own destiny. It is no reproach that forty years ago Great Britain did not let Canada do all that she wished. It is hardly a reproach to a parent that he restrained his son in youth. The restraints may or may not have been wise. What is important is that the youth's manhood should be fully recognized when he reaches that stage.

In the end the people of Canada have always had their way, and this will continue to be the case. That their own way will lead to separation from Britain I do not believe; that it will lead to closer organic union with Britain I do not believe either. Canada will steadily become more independent in her outlook, more determined to retain and develop control of her own affairs, more ambitious to rank among the nations of the earth. She can surrender none of her authority to any political body not controlled by her own people. It is not likely that any cen

tral Parliament for the British people would be efficient. Rapid and complete adjustment to local conditions is one of the secrets of political as well as business efficiency. It is hard to see how any one can imagine that the welfare of Canada would be promoted by organic union with other states which would leave her in any respect less free than she now is to make this rapid adjustment.

One may well doubt whether organic union even between Canada and the United States with their contiguous territory would make for good government on the North American continent. I heard a wise statesman say recently that because the centralization at Washington is already so vast, it would probably be in the interest of the United States, did Canada not already exist, that she should be brought into being. A whole continent could not be well governed in one state. If this is true of North America, how much truer is it likely to be of the widely-scattered regions that now make up the British Empire! A common public opinion over such an area would be impossible; and to what are we to trust for the control of an organic union if it is not public opinion? Great Britain is nearer geographically to Canada than to any other of the larger sections of the British Empire; yet in many things there is no public opinion common to the two countries. Great Britain does not share Canada's dread of immigration from the East, simply because to her this is no menace. Recently, when Canada, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was profoundly stirred over the Alaska Boundary question, Great Britain was apathetic or in sympathy with the opinion that Canada was combating. There is a similar apathy in Canada now regarding Britain's alarm over the designs of Germany. Imagination is not strong enough for countries so widely separated, and with problems

so different, to feel acutely the more immediate issues of each other.

Present-day exponents of Imperial theories are a little apt not to have viewed the problems in the light of the long past in which they have developed. The two supreme questions of Empire which are new and pressing with each political change are also very old-how shall burdens be divided equally, and how shall there be equality in control among those who bear the burdens? Adam Smith wrestled with these problems when the British Colonies in America first took up arms, and found no solution that could be adjusted to facts. Subsequent thinkers have fared no better. The problems are in truth intellectually insoluble; the uncontrollable logic of facts, the conclusions of which may not be by us foreseen, will alone determine them.

Assuredly they will not be solved by the pressure of the exigencies of Europe alone. For some reason a great continent has chosen to turn itself into an armed camp, with its various political units ready at a moment's notice to spring at each other's throats. So stupendous is this array of power that it fills the rest of the world with awe, if not with admiration. Great Britain shares the dangers which Europe chooses to impose upon itself. Her burden is abnormal, artificial, one may hope transient. Must the scale of the individual British citizen's responsibility all over the world be adjusted to the exacting standard of Europe alone? Yes, if altruism prevailed in politics, and if the minds of the multitude could be swayed by a discerning few possessing world-wide vision. But the citizen of Canada, plain, unlettered, unimaginative, is not thinking of the situation in Europe. He does not listen expectant to hear whether the German Emperor, in an after-dinner speech, is a little more or a little less optimistic

about the continuance of peace. What he is thinking of is the resources to build his own house, to construct the school-house, the highways, the railways that a new country urgently needs. Even a small tax-bill vexes his thrifty soul, for he has not yet been trained to bear heavy burdens of this kind, and he will be slow to learn the lesson. To talk of this man accepting, or remotely approximating to, the standards of Europe in regard to military equipment is absurd. The old questions are as insoluble as ever. The burden cannot be divided equally, and without equality of burden there can be no unity of control.

What then can be done? Must the great states of the Empire drift apart with the prospect of each becoming a separate nation with no relation to the others? God forbid! There are times when one grasps at the thought of an Imperial Zollverein as containing the solution of the whole matter. Make it the commercial interest of the various parts of the Empire to hold together and permanent union is assured. Perhaps! But one pauses before the possible effect of such a change upon the future of Britain herself. To see a Canadian traveller, returned from England, unpack his trunks is an objectlesson; there are all kinds of fabrics, durable and beautiful, bought in England for much less than they would cost in Canada, and it is a stupendous commerce in such things that keeps Britain alive. To make them even a little dearer may be to destroy a vast trade. Assuredly no voice from over the seas has any right to urge upon Britain a course that may be to her full of danger. Moreover, even were such a union possible, it could not be regarded as permanent, for each state must be left free to enter and to withdraw at pleasNothing will endure that interferes with the national aspirations of the various portions of the Empire.

ure.

In regard to burdens, one may only hope for a levelling-down in Europe, and, at the same time, for a fevelling-up in Canada. While Canada must repudiate the military standards of Europe as necessarily to be imitated by her, the stern truth cannot be avoided that these standards have obtained a footing both in America and in Asia. Just because the world to-day, with its intricate relationships, represents something like a unit, both Japan and the United States have had to prepare themselves for emergencies not of their own creating. If Canada aims, as she does aim, at being a great nation, she cannot expect always to be protected by any arm but her own. After all, the basis of human well-being lies in each man's capacity to take care of himself. Canada has yet to learn this lesson of true manhood. There are signs that she has begun to learn it, and to-day no better promise of success lies before an aspirant to political leadership in Canada than in a strong appeal to the Canadian conscience on this point. But one may hope that at the same time the standard of preparedness set by Europe will be lowered. Only one state seems now to bar the way to accomplishing this, and perhaps the waste involved in unbridled militarism will before long force this state to moderate its ambitions. Then for the British Empire a simpler standard of common burdens may slowly be evolved, and in time the British and the Canadian tax-payer may have an equal share in responsibility.

At any rate, other parts of the Empire cannot expect much longer from Great Britain the admission, so frankly made at the last Colonial Conference, that she is fully responsible for their protection. Canada has never admitted that she holds it to be her duty to share in whatever wars Great Britain may undertake. Each question, she says, will be determined as it arises.

Would it be unfair were Great Britain to say the same thing regarding Canada? When we ask the question, what is defensible in theory is seen to be impossible in practice. If Canada became involved in war, could Great Britain hold aloof and perhaps see the territory of Canada impaired? Would Canada see Germany overwhelm Britain and make no move to help the motherland? The Times recently threatened that, should Australia not do more to fill up her waste areas, she could not count upon Britain's defence if some other state undertook the task. Could Great Britain then stand by and see Japan or Germany attack Australia? One comes back again to the truth that the problems of the Empire are just now intellectually insoluble.

"An impotent conclusion after saying so much," a reader may well say. "Why write at all only to reach it?" Perhaps in the presence of a multitude of theories of Empire it is worth while to see for a moment exactly where we are, even though we may not quite know whither we are going. We are at the point where Canadian national feeling is already strong and growing stronger, and it must have free play. But it is in no sense hostile to Great Britain. The mischief of a book such as Mr. Ewart's is that it may tend to foster alienation; if people are told with great skill and persistence that they have grievances they are not unlikely to believe it. To say that Britain's handling of Canadian questions has been ideally wise would be absurd. She has made blunders, and her lastthe tactless dealing with the Alaska Boundary dispute-caused a resentment in Canada that is not yet understood in London. But this is not what Canada chooses to think of chiefly. She is not nursing grievances. prefers to think of the sacrifices Britain made to win and hold Canada and of the generosity with which this

She