wills it, and because it is right. As his whole well-being depends on God only, his supreme interest must consist entirely in pleasing God. He can receive no good when God will not give it, and God will not give unless he be pleased. In order, therefore, to the discovery of man's supreme interest and duty, it is absolutely necessary to discover, first, what is the preceptive will of God, or what God requires man to do.

This philosophy can never accomplish; and hence I assert it to be vain and deceitful in its nature; vain, with respect to the end at which it aims, and deceitful, with respect to the means which it employs, and the conclusions which it labours to establish.

There are three methods in which it has been supposed mankind may obtain the knowledge of the preceptive will of God, and, of course, of their own interest and duty.

I. By immediate revelation.

II. By arguing analogically from his providential dispensations.

III. By arguing from a supposed character of God, either derived from his works, or determined a priori.

The first of these methods lies out of the present question. The two remaining ones I propose now to examine; and assert,

I. That analogical argumentation from the providence of God can never teach us his preceptive will, except in a manner greatly imperfect and unsatisfactory.

In philosophy thus directed, we always argue from what God has done to what he will do, i. e. from the past and present state of his providence, we undertake to determine what his designs are, and how they will terminate; and hence derive our conclusions concerning the will of God, or that law by which our conduct ought to be regulated. This method of philosophizing is attended with insuperable difficulties.

In the first place, we know but a very small number of the beings and events which have existed; but to form just views of the real scope of providence, we ought to know every being

and every event. To understand the true character of a complicated machine, we must understand the nature and the operations of every part. He who knows but one in a thousand of such parts, and has seen the operations of that one part only, would be thought wholly destitute of common sense, were he to boast of a thorough knowledge of the whole. The great machine of providence is infinitely more complex, the proportion of the parts unknown to those which are known is infinitely greater, and the approximation to the knowledge of the whole infinitely less, than in the machine supposed. What then must be the character of him who boasts of a thorough knowledge of Providence?

Second, We know not thoroughly the nature of those beings and events with which we are best acquainted. The nature of every being, and of every event, so far as the present question is concerned, depends chiefly, or, perhaps, with more propriety wholly, on its connections with others. What are the uses of this being, or this event? What are the purposes which it is designed to accomplish? are the questions which are ever intended to be solved in our inquiries of this nature. But these questions philosophy can never satisfactorily solve. The immediate uses and purposes are, indeed, frequently obvious; but those which lie at a very little distance are, for the most part, unknown. Bread, we know, will nourish man, and safely determine that bread was formed for this end; but why man exists at all, why he thus exists, and why he is thus to be nourished, we know not. That which we know avails not, therefore, to the purpose in view.

All intermediate and subordinate ends in creation and Providence are capable of being understood only by the knowledge of the ultimate end, i. e. the purpose in which all earthly things terminate. To this end all things directly tend; with it all are indissolubly connected; and for it all are designed and brought into being. But this end is wholly unknown. If it exist on this side of the grave, it has never been conjec tured. If it exists beyond the grave, it can only be conjectured; for we can only conjecture whether man will exist beyond the grave. The ultimate end of all earthly things being,

therefore, wholly unknown, the true nature of all preceding subordinate ends is also unknown, and of course the real scope of Providence.

In such a state of things, analogies must plainly be of little use. The arguments which they actually furnish are all direct corroboratives of the scriptural system of theology and morality. Without the Scriptures, they are a labyrinth without a clue. No higher proof need be given of this than the discordant and contradictory explanations of them adopted by philosophers; no two of whom, either ancient or modern, agree in their constructions of Providence.

How ridiculous an employment would it be thought in a clown, should he undertake to interpret the designs of a statesman in the management of a great empire; to determine from what he had done what he would hereafter do; and to decide on his own duty, and that of his fellow-subjects, from a construction of the analogies which he supposed himself to observe in the conduct of the ruler? Yet the clown is infinitely nearer to the statesman in understanding than the philosopher to the Supreme Ruler, and infinitely more able to comprehend the analogies visible in the government of an empire, than the philosopher those which appear in the government of the uni

verse,

Third, The character of God cannot be perfectly known from creation and providence.

Of the truth of this assertion I am entirely convinced; yet I shall decline attempting a discussion of it at this time, because the occasion will not allow me to enter into so wide a field, and because you have, not long since, heard my opinions and arguments at large in discourses professedly formed on this subject. Such a discussion, it ought further to be observed, is wholly unnecessary for the present purpose, as philosophers have totally disagreed concerning that character of God which is supposed to be visible in his works; and as the prevailing philosophy wholly denies the existence of such a being.

The only possible means of discovering the will or law of God, which can be furnished by his works, are either his designs or his character. I flatter myself, that it has been prov

ed that his designs can never be learned from his works. If his character be also undiscoverable from this source, the conclusion is certain, that his law must also be undiscoverable. If his character can be learned imperfectly only, his law must, at the utmost, be known in a degree equally imperfect. If his character be uncertain, his law must be at least equally uncertain; and that his character is uncertain, so far as his works disclose it, and philosophy has discovered it, cannot be denied by any one acquainted at all with the discordant opinions of philosophers. Of course, the conclusion must be admitted, that to philosophy the law of God, and the duty, and supreme interest of man, must, so far as this method of investigation is relied on, be undiscoverable. Thus man, as a subject of the divine government, cannot, by philosophy, ever thoroughly know, from this source of proof, what is that conduct which he is bound to observe, in order to please God, and obtain his favour.

The view of this subject, here given, does, however, by no means exhibit the greatest difficulty under which philosophy labours. Man is not only a subject of the divine government, and therefore in the highest degree concerned to know the divine law, that he may obey it, but he is also a rebel subject; and, therefore, in the highest degree concerned to discover the means of restoration to the favour of God. Man has violated such precepts of the divine law as, either by revelation or common sense, are discovered and acknowledged; such precepts, for instance, as require him to be thankful to his Maker, and sincere, just, and kind to his fellow-men. These things may be considered here as certainly known to be parts of the law of God, because those philosophers who acknowledge a God generally agree, that these are plainly duties of But all men have violated the precepts which require these things. The first interest of all men is, therefore, to obtain a knowledge of the means, if there be any, of reconciliation to God, and reinstatement in the character and privileges of faithful subjects. To be thus reconciled and reinstated, men must be pardoned; and pardon is an act of mere mercy. But of the mercy of God there are no proofs in his providence.

man.

Could we then discover the law of God by examining his works, the knowledge of it would avail nothing to our future well-being. That we are sinners cannot be disputed, and, so far as philosophy can discover, sinners must be condemned and punished.

II. Arguments, drawn from a supposed character of God, whether derived from his works or determined a priori, labour under difficulties equally great.

First, It is impossible to determine the character of God by arguments a priori.

The celebrated Dr. Clarke has indeed attempted thus to prove the divine character, and his attempt is a specimen of very respectable talents, and of the most laudable designs. Yet I cannot but think it has failed. The very words, necessary and necessity, which are so important to his scheme, are not, I apprehend, used by him with any clear, precise meaning. Perhaps I ought rather to say, that I cannot perceive any such meaning in his manner of using them. From his illustrations I should believe, that he means nothing more by necessary existence than existence merely. He does not appear to me to have proved even the unity of God; and unless this can be evinced, I am doubtful whether it will be possible to prove the perfect character of the Godhead. As his is the only respectable effort of this kind which I have seen, it is unfor me to take notice of any other.

necessary

Second, Should the character of God be supposed completely ascertained from what he has done, or fully determined a priori, still insurmountable difficulties would attend every attempt to gain from this source the object aimed at by philosophy.

The only character of God which can be here admitted is that of infinite perfection. The designs of a being infinitely perfect must be formed to extend through eternity and immensity, and must embrace all beings and all events, together with all their relations and operations. That, therefore, which by itself would be a wholly improper part of creation or providence, might, from its relation to the whole great work, be en