closed which we might wish to be disclosed, and which is necessary to a thorough comprehension of the subject. They do not show, that what is disclosed and believed is untrue or improbable, but that it is mysterious and incomprehensible; in other words, that it contains things which lie beyond the human capacity. This, instead of being a solid objection against the revelation of the Scriptures, is a mere exposition of human ignorance. In this part of their conclusions there is no controversy between them and us.

The mysteriousness of the Scriptures, in several particulars, has been often directly, as well as insidiously objected against their divine origin. To me it appears to be a plain and powerful argument in favour of that origin. Were there nothing in creation or providence which man could not comprehend, one important proof that they were works of God would be taken away. Were there nothing in revelation which man could not perfectly understand, a similar proof of its reality would be destroyed. What man can thus understand, man might, for ought that appears, have also devised.

Objections of this nature must, to possess any real force, arise from something which we know, and not from that of which we are ignorant. The things objected to ought to be inconsistent with something seen and understood, otherwise whatever perplexity they may occasion in those who dwell upon them, they can never produce rational conviction.

Second, Another class of objects, against which similar objections have been made, is composed of facts, manners, and other local circumstances. The Scriptures, being written in a distant age and country, record facts which must, in a considerable measure, be connected with facts and circumstances necessarily unknown by us; and appeal to manners, customs, and other local circumstances which must be equally unknown. The same difficulties may therefore be raised in this as in the former case, and with the same success. In both cases our ignorance, and not the falsehood of the things declared, is the cause of the difficulties specified. By this I intend, that a person perfectly acquainted with the things stated in the Scriptures, and with all their appendages, would not only clearly discern the truth

and propriety of the statement, but be able to explain its truth and propriety to our full satisfaction; while, at the same time, the same person being supposed to be as ignorant as ourselves, would find all the difficulties in the statement which are found by us. Still the statement is the same, and neither more nor less true, but is more or less explicable as the person proposed is more or less informed.

Hence it is clear, that although Christians should not be able to show how many facts recorded in the Scriptures took place; by what facts they were preceded or followed; what were their causes, attendants, or consequences, this furnishes no solid objection to the Scriptures as a revelation. Every objection of this nature must, to be solid, contradict some known fact, and be attended with difficulties of some other nature than mere inexplicableness. If this be admitted as a proof of falsehood in writings, no ancient history can be believed.

A happy illustration of these sentiments, and a strong proof of what may even now be done to throw light on this class of objects in the Scriptures, may be found in the first volume of Lardner's Credibility of the Gospel History. In this able and successful work, a system of facts impossible to be completely understood, unless developed in some such method, is unanswerably proved to be true.

The very same difficulties are found, and to a greater degree, in the works than in the word of God. Under the impressions made by the former, the same men become atheists who, under those made by the latter, become deists. Those, on the contrary, who require proofs and inconsistencies with something known, to support or destroy their belief, will admit the world to be the work, and the Scriptures to be the word of God. So true is the declaration of the committee of public instruction to the national convention of France, that a nation of theists must of course become revelationists.

This method of objecting to the Scriptures will make little impression on men disposed impartially and thoroughly to examine, and possessed of the proper means of examination. Still there is danger from it to you. Think not this a censure

or a proof of disesteem. You are young; you will find difficulties; you may be perplexed; you may doubt. Every difficulty you will not be able to remove. Such as you would be able to remove, you will not always find the necessary time and means of removing. Inclination, industry, proper books, and able friends, may not be easily found. Study therefore, and in season, so far as you can, the evidences by which revelation is supported, and suffer nothing to destroy their force, or to unsettle your faith, unless it clearly opposes something which is really known.

II. Another source of danger to you is the confidence with which most philosophers assert their doctrines, and advance their arguments.

It is an unjust, yet it is a common conclusion of the mind, that confidence in asserting is as an argument of knowledge in the assertor. You have doubtless often heard observations like this, "He must know, or he would not assert so strongly "and confidently." From the advantages of education which you have enjoyed, I presume you have however adopted an opinion directly contrary to that above specified; and are all ready to say, that bold assertions and confident airs of knowledge and wisdom are of course suspicious, and that instead of being influenced by them to believe the more readily, you should only be induced to doubt. Still let me inform you, there is danger to you from this source. Peremptory declarations, bold assurance, and that appearance of knowledge which defies opposition, have ever had no small influence in gaining credit to the doctrines which they were intended to support. Youths, unacquainted with the world, and with the arts and address which are used in it, and untaught, or taught only by books that usually assertions are roundly made, because they are faintly believed by the assertor, as lies are commonly backed by oaths and curses, will not rarely imagine, that what is so plumply said must be true, or at least highly probable. This will happen especially when the assertor is a man of talents and reputation. In such a man vanity is not expected to rule, prejudice to decide, nor arrogance to dictate. On the

contrary, he is presupposed to examine with care, to assent only to evidence, and to assert from rational conviction. It would be happy were this preconceived opinion verified by experience, but most unhappily no opinion is more fallacious. All the prejudices which are found in ordinary men are often found in those of superior minds, and not unfrequently in higher degrees. To these they superadd, in many instances, that pride of talents which operates to a groundless, deceitful, and, let me add, contemptible confidence in their own decisions, and a magisterial and oracular method of communicating them to mankind. Suspect these appearances, therefore, wherever you find them, and remember, that confidence of assertion and airs of triumph infer not any certainty in the opinion declared.

III. Another source of the danger specified is found in the various methods used by philosophers to persuade their readers, that their opinions are embraced by the great body of mankind, especially of the ingenious and learned.

It is a remarkable fact in the history of man, that vice has always claimed a superiority over virtue, irreligion and unbelief over faith. In common life, no sooner does a man enter boldly upon the practice of vice and licentiousness, than he arrogates to himself a character superior to that of his sober companions, and to his own former character. A loose man rarely speaks concerning one of more worth without evident proofs of conscious superiority. Virtue itself, if you will take the pains to examine, will be found to be, in his view, the weak and inferior part of his neighbour's character, and vice the great and superior ingredient in his own. According to this method of estimation, Satan, as described in the Scriptures, is the most respectable being in the universe.

The superiority claimed by infidels over believers is not less unfounded, even if we admit what few Christians would probably admit, viz. that its foundation is not exactly the same. Christians believe, that the Scriptures are, and infidels that they are not, a divine revelation. Neither they nor we know ; both classes merely believe, for the case admits not of know

ledge, nor can it be determined with certainty. The only question to be decided between the contending parties, is which believes on the best evidence. Infidels are believers equally with Christians, and merely believe the contrary position. That faith, therefore, which is best supported, is the most rational, and ought to confer the superiority of character.

At the present time, a new engine is abundantly employed to establish this distinction in favour of infidels. It is boldly asserted, that the world has hitherto lain in a state of ignorance and infancy; that it has been chained by authority, and influenced by superstition, but that it has, at the present time, broken at once its bonds, roused itself into manly exertion, and seized intuitively upon the whole system of truth, moral, political, and natural. Of this mighty and propitious change in the affairs of man, infidel philosophers claim to be the sole authors. Hence the character of ingenious and learned is challenged as being in a sense their exclusive property.

I cheerfully admit, young gentlemen, that many infidels have been ingenious men; that some of them have been learned men, and that a few of them have been great men. Hume, Tindal, and a few others, have been distinguished for superior strength of mind, Bolingbroke for eloquence of the pen, Voltaire for brilliancy of imagination, and various others for respectable talents of different kinds. But I am wholly unable to form a list of infidels which can, without extreme disadvantage, be compared with the two Bacons, Erasmus, Cumberland, Stillingfleet, Grotius, Locke, Butler, Newton, Boyle, Berkeley, Milton, Johnson, &c. In no walk of genius, in no path of knowledge, can infidels support a claim to superiority or equality with Christians.

Nor am I less ready to acknowledge, that ingenious men have lately made, and are still making many improvements in science and in arts. Unhappy would it indeed be, if, after all the advantages of preceding ages, the present should be unable to advance at all; if no additional truth should be discovered, and no erroneous opinion detected. But what, let me ask, would have been our situation, had these and many other able men of past ages never lived? How much of all which