Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB
[graphic]

No. 472-VOL. X.

JANUARY 24, 1846.

Price 1s., with Supplement, 2s.

The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity:

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors]

[blocks in formation]

H. W. CRIPPS, Esq. of the Middle Temple, Barrister at Law.

The Lord Chancellor's f E. T. HOOD, Esq. of the Inner

[blocks in formation]

{B Temple, Barrister at Law.

G. Y. ROBSON, Esq. of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law.

[ocr errors]
[blocks in formation]

It has been, and is, too much the fashion in writings professing to point out the course of study fitted to form an accomplished Barrister, to lay out a map of so immense a field of knowledge, that every one, with common sense, must see the impossibility of any one man having time and strength to travel over it; and must suspect either that the writer has written without thought, or that his object in writing has been, not to tell the student really what he ought to do, but to astonish his readers with a picture of the wonders that he the writer must be supposed to have performed.

Even Mr. Warren, in his delightful book on Law Studies, a book containing much sound wisdom, not the less practical because it is clothed in the language of enthusiasm,—even Mr. Warren, who, to use a homely expression, "ought to know better," and does know better, stretches out before the appalled student such a fearful list as must make any man think, if he is not too much stunned by the disclosure to think at all, that, to become a Barrister qualified to plead with credit, and to satisfy the other exigences of a Barrister's position in the world, requires the intellect of a demi-god, and the habits of one who, like the miraculous child of Zanoni, can be ever smiling, ever thoughtful, and ever sleepless*.

Mathematics, chemistry, history, political economy, logic, and a dozen other things, appertaining both to abstract science and to its practical application, are prescribed as the discipline and the preparation for studying the law. And when we come to the great study itself, then so many books are prescribed as part of the

*Those, if any, of our grave readers, who ever read such light works as novels, are referred, for the illustration of this allusion, to Sir Edward Lytton Bulwer's extraordinary piece of mysticism, called "Zanoni."

[blocks in formation]

{

G. J. P.SMITH, Esq. of the Inner
Temple; and

Queen's Bench Bail Court {A. Y. KIRWAN, Esq. of Gray's

[blocks in formation]

Inn, Barrister at Law.

D. POWER, Esq. of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law.

Court of Exchequer.... {W.M. BEST, Esq. of Gray's Inn,

Barrister at Law.

Ecclesiastical and Admi- J. P. DEANE, D.C.L. of Doctors"

ralty Courts

Court of Review

........

[ocr errors][merged small]

Commons.

W. W. COOPER, Esq. of the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law.

necessary course of reading, that, to believe in the truth and soundness of the doctrine thus laid down, one must adopt the maxim, "Credo quia impossibile est."

It should not be forgotten, in planning the destinies of a young lawyer, that the greatest men are not those who know most, but those who can do most; that he who is for ever reading, can have no time for thinking, for organising and classifying his knowledge, and for so incorporating it with his mind, that it becomes a part of him, and can be used at a moment's notice with vigour and precision.

A certain amount of classical and scientific knowledge is undoubtedly proper, not to form the Barrister in particular, but to form the gentleman; and, undoubtedly also, occasions will occur, in the career of a lawyer, as well as of the members of many other professions, in which unforeseen events may call for knowledge, which, if he does possess, the better for him; but the possibility that a lawyer may have to deal with a case involving chemical or mechanical, or even military, knowledge, is no more a reason for his attempting, before entering upon the study of the law, to be well acquainted with chemistry, or mechanics, or fortification, and gunnery and strategy, than the possibility that an officer may be called upon, as military secretary to a colonial governor, to preside as Vice-Chancellor over a colonial court of equity, would be a reason for every young gentleman destined for the army, being told to read Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Mitford on Pleading, and Daniell's Practice, &c., before he could creditably go to Sandhurst or to Woolwich.

The true course for a man intending to go to the bar is, we believe, this: assuming that he is prepared by a liberal education, such as no gentleman ought to lack, let him, both before commencing and while pursuing his purely legal education, select those branches of human knowledge for which he feels some love; and,

EWSPAP

cious, and, in many cases, absolutely fatal,—is the notion that the value of the knowledge acquired, is in proportion to the quantity of lines over which the eye has travelled.

Against the practice founded upon such a notion, it is, that we protest; and our advice to every student who means to be a lawyer is, to ascertain what are the best books on the law, and to read those till he fully understands them. He may at the end of a year have read but a dozen books, while his more voracious fellow

if he feels no love for any in particular, then let him select those which tend to historical and political instruction. Let him, on these subjects, acquire knowledge by the careful reading and re-reading of a few of the best books that treat of them, (there are not in any branches of human knowledge a great many good books), and by thinking of the subjects of those books in the intervals of time not necessarily devoted either to professional study or to pure amusement. In this way an able man may become, by the time he has reached mature manhood, tolerably profound and ac-student will have read forty; but the reader of the complished in some one or two departments of human twelve will be at the end of the year the better lawyer knowledge, besides that which he professes, and may be of the two. able to wield the knowledge that he has so acquired for the benefit of his clients and of his own reputation. They who can do even this, do much; and they who can do more, must be preternatural men, men of whom there is not one born in an age.

We may, perhaps, in some future Number, supply a deficiency which naturally exists in Mr. Warren's work, by pointing out an advantageous course of reading for the student intending to go to the conveyancing and equity bar.

PROPERTY.
(Continued from p. 4).

On the subject of contingent remainders Mr. Ker's Letter contains the following remarks:"As to section 8 of the Transfer Act, and also of the proposed bill. The 8th section of the act would seem to have had these objects: first, to preclude the creation after the 31st December, 1844, of contingent remainders, liable, under the doctrine relating to contingent remainders, to be defeated by the premature failure of such contingent limitations, created after the 31st Dethe particular estate; secondly, to enlarge the scope of cember, 1844, as would be liable, under the doctrine of contingent remainders, to be defeated by the failure, even at maturity, of the particular estate; thirdly, to preserve contingent remainders created before the 1st failure of the particular estate. Of these objects the January, 1845, from being defeated by the premature first and second are sought to be effected by enacting, in substance, that all contingent limitations, created after the 31st December, 1844, which, according to the preexisting law, would be contingent remainders, shall operate as executory devises or uses, with all the properties of such a devise or use."

With regard to professional reading, we should recommend the same principles to be kept in view, mo- THE AMENDMENT OF THE LAW OF REAL dified, of course, by reference to the consideration, that, as a man applies the largest portion of his time and mental labour to the subject of his professional pursuit, he can of course extend his researches more widely therein than in any other field of inquiry. However we are not, for the student, advocates of extensive reading, but rather of repeated and thoughtful reading, and above all, at the commencement, of difficult reading*. The good books which unfold the principles of the law are few, and the object of the incipient lawyer should be to saturate his mind with principles. It would be far better, for instance, for a student intending to acquire a knowledge of equity pleading, to read again and again Lord Redesdale's Treatise, and the chapters on pleading in Daniell's Practice, than to run through these works and everything that is said about equity pleading in a variety of other practical works, all useful in their way, and fit to be consulted in after years in the transaction of business, but all repetitions of the matters contained in the two treatises that we have named, so far as principles are concerned. So, with regard to conveyancing, we would infinitely prefer, in point of value, the knowledge of a man who "1. As a contingent devise or use, though by way should have thoroughly possessed himself of Mr. Hayes' of remainder, is necessarily unexecuted, (while an exeIntroduction, or of Burton's Compendium, or of Wat-cutory devise or use is not necessarily contingent), the kins's Principles, (with Morley's Notes), than that of the student who should be able to say, that he had in the same time read through the six volumes of Cruise's Digest, and all the notes in Bythewood's Precedents, and half-a-dozen conveyancing works besides. Not that we would discourage from extensive reading in the end; for our view is, that, for many years of the professional career of a lawyer, scarcely any piece of business ought to be or can well be transacted by him, without much and careful reading on the learning connected with it; so that, in a course of ten years or so, every lawyer who is in earnest will have read most extensively. But what we discourage, as worse than useless,-as perni

[blocks in formation]

term executory' does not, in strictness, ascertain the peculiar species of limitation with which, by this enactment, all contingent remainders, whether created at the common law or by way of use or devise, are intended to be identified. The executory devise or estate to which reference is intended to be made is of course a contingent devise or use, so limited as to be incapable of taking effect as a remainder; and the true interpretation, therefore, of the enactment is, that a contingent limitation by way of remainder, whether created at the common law or under the Statute of Uses, or by devise, shall take effect in the very same manner as a contingent use or devise not limited by way of remainder." Now, in order to satisfy the terms of this enactment, it appears to be necessary that we should, in the first place, apply the learning of contingent remainders, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the given limitation would, under the old law, have taken effect as a contingent remainder or not; and in the next place apply the learning of executory devises or uses for the purpose of inventing an hypothesis adequate to give that limitation all the effect of an executory devise or use,"

3

*

[the act says nothing of executory uses]; "and we must, if possible, so work out this process, as that, while we attribute to the limitation (for this the enactment expressly requires) all the peculiar qualities of an executory devise or use, none of the beneficial properties* which the same limitation, taking effect as a remainder, would have possessed, may be sacrificed. But, having ascertained that the given limitation would have been valid as a contingent remainder, then, as it is of the very essence of an executory devise or use to have (in contradistinction to a remainder) a substantive self-dependent existence, and to be incapable of taking effect as a remainder, we are compelled to disconnect the limitation in construction or supposition of law from the particular estate."

This exposition might have been very clear and useful if the subject had stood in need of anything of the sort; but, as it so happens that the text conveys its meaning to the understanding much more shortly, and with greater perspicuity, than the commentary, we must regard the latter as a piece of mere mystification, like that which M. Jourdain's preceptor throws over the art of speech:"Le Maître de Philosophie.-L'R se prononce en portant le bout de la langue jusqu'au haut du palais; de sorte qu'étant frôlée par l'air qui sort avec force, elle lui cède, et revient toujours au même endroit, faisant une manière de tremblement: R, RA.

"Monsieur Jourdain.-R, R, RA; R, R, R, R, RA. Cela est vrai. Ah! l'habile homme que vous êtes, et que j'ai perdu du temps! R, R, RA.”

"Le Maître de Philosophie. Je vous expliquerai à fond toutes ces curiosités."

We need scarcely remind our readers that the only distinction between "executory devises" and "contingent remainders" (terms which, as they are perfectly well understood, we see no reason for quarrelling with) is, that contingent remainders will take effect according to the expressed intention, unless prevented by the operation of certain technical rules, (including, either expressly or virtually, the rule against perpetuities), while executory devises will take effect according to the expressed intention, without being subject to any restriction other than that imposed by the rule against perpetuity. When, therefore, we find that contingent remainders have ceased to exist in our law, in other words, that the technical rules by which the intention expressed in certain kinds of future limitations was formerly liable to be defeated are abolished, we abandon the distinction which the existence of those rules alone made necessary, and, treating all future limitations as being subject to the same law, only inquire in each case what is the expressed intention, and how it agrees with the rule against remoteness. To inquire, before we decide on the operation of a limitation which we know is to be construed as an executory devise, whether, under an obsolete law, it would have been treated as a contingent remainder, is mere pedantry. This is the plain meaning of perhaps the plainest enactment that ever appeared on the statute book. But we have yet scarcely penetrated the outer boundary of the fog which the Lord Chancellor's correspondent has cast around the subject:

"If we take the common case of a settlement to the use of A. for life, and from and after his death to the use of his first and other sons successively in tail, and

* What beneficial properties? How beneficial, and to whom, and where mentioned or hinted at in the act?

It has been objected, that the repealed enactment did not affect vested remainders, and, therefore, that, without inquiring whether a limitation was a contingent or a vested remainder, one might treat a vested remainder as being an executory limitation under the act. This would merely be to arrive at the truth by a circuity, for the rule, that every limitation which may operate as a remainder must do so, is only abolished as to contingent remainders.

suppose the life estate to have been created by one instrument and the fee to have been limited by another instrument, (subject to the life estate), to the use of the first and other sons of A. in tail, the limitation to the sons might take effect out of the reversion in fee, as an executory use, and yet confer, on the birth of a son, and in the lifetime of A., a vested estate tail; so that, in the case supposed, the limitation would, while in suspense, be wholly independant of the life estate, and, of course, unaffected by its premature determination, and yet be capable of conferring, on the happening of the contingency, all the advantages of a vested remainder. This hypothesis, however, is inadmissible, for, in the state of circumstances supposed, the limitation to the sons would not have taken effect as a contingent remainder, nor, consequently, would it be within the provisions of the 8th section of the Transfer Act."

So far, so thick. If any one of our readers can see any meaning or purpose in the above extract, we shall be glad to hear from him. In what follows there is a glimmer of light :

"We are, therefore, reduced to the necessity of taking the limitations of the settlement as they stand expressed in one and the same instrument; first viewing them in the relation of particular estate and remainder, in order to raise the case contemplated by the act; then detaching, in construction, the limitation to A., and reading the limitation to the sons as a substantive limitation from and after the death of A. to the use of his first and other sons successively' in tail. Now, assuming this to be the only process by which a limitation, required to have at once the distinctive characteristics of a contingent remainder and all the essential qualities of an executory devise or use, can be conceived to partake of such opposite natures, we are met by the difficulty of shewing, either that, consistently with the doctrine of executory limitations, the limitation to the sons, so construed, is capable of conferring a vested interest on the birth of a son living A., or that, if it be not so capable, no practical inconvenience can result from its retaining until the death of A. all the properties of an executory devise or use." [Why stop at the death of A.? why not say boldly "for ever?"] "On the one hand, it might be objected, that the limitation, if considered as capable of vesting in the lifetime of A., would really take effect, according to the known laws of a contingent remainder, and contrary to the known laws of an executory devise or use," [What laws, and by whom known?] "in direct opposition, therefore, to the express enactment of the statute; on the other, that, unless the limitation were considered as capable of vesting in the lifetime of A., this method of protecting contingent remainders would induce serious practical evils. In support of the former objection, the authority of an eminent text-writer might be cited to shew that a limitation, from and after the death of A., to the use of his first and other sons,' taking effect otherwise than as a remainder, would not, until the death of A., give a vested estate; but that a son of A. in esse could, living A., have no estate; the limitation would be executory, and confer on him and his heirs a certain fixed right to an estate in possession at a future period." (Butl. Fearne, Cont. Rem. 1, 2 (a)).

[ocr errors]

As the point here cited from Mr. Butler's note to Fearne contains everything in the way of doubt upon the effect of the repealed enactment which the commentator has been able to bring forward, it may be well, flimsy as it is, to dissect it. The doubt intended tion to A. for life, and after his death to his eldest son to be suggested is, we suppose, whether, under a limitain tail, the limitation in tail, considered (in obedience to the act) as in the nature of an executory devise, will give a vested estate to A.'s eldest son immediately on his birth, and in A.'s lifetime, or whether the gift is to be construed literally, as deferred until the death of A.

It is to be observed, that the question before us relates exclusively to limitations in immediate succession (particular estate and remainder) where the future estate is obviously postponed only for the sake of limiting some immediately antecedent estate. Now, in all cases where, as the phrase is, the postponement of enjoyment is only made for the convenience of the estate," the perfectly settled rule in the construction of executory gifts is, that words of futurity in the gift do not postpone the vesting. "It may be laid down as a general rule, that, where a testator creates a particular estate, and then goes on to dispose of the ulterior interest expressly in an event which will determine the prior estate, the words descriptive of such event occurring in the latter devise will be construed as referring merely to the period of the determination of the possession or enjoyment under the prior gift, and not as designed to postpone the vesting." (1 Jarman on Wills, 726). It is obvious that the only class of cases to which the repealed enactment could possibly apply is that which comes most plainly and inevitably within this rule. And yet, for the purpose of raising a doubt as to its applicability, we are referred to an opinion of Mr. Butler on the case of an independant limitation of the fee, to take effect "on the 1st of January next," and wholly irrespective of any prior estate created at the same time. But, even in the case of an executory devise in these terms, "after the death of A., I give Whiteacre to A.'s eldest son and his heirs," where A. is tenant for life at the date of the will, it is well known, that, on the death of the testator living A., the eldest son, if in being, will take a vested estate. (See Fearne, C. R. 451; Lytton v. Lytton, 4 Bro. C. C. 441).

The letter proceeds thus: "It may be contended, perhaps, that, as a limitation which is, in its inception, an executory devise or use, may eventually take effect as a remainder; so the limitation in question may, during the suspense of the contingency, be an executory use, and, on the happening of the contingency, vest as a remainder; but the enactment is express that the limitation shall take effect as an executory devise or estate, (i. e. use), and seems to impose the necessity of discovering some mode in which it may vest contrary to the common-law doctrine of remainders."

This, even if intended merely to puzzle the juniors in the pupils' room, would be rather shallow, but, addressed to the Lord Chancellor, on public business, is something worse. The words are, "Every estate which would have taken effect as a contingent remainder shall take effect (if in a will or codicil) as an executory devise, and (if in a deed) as an executory estate of the same nature and having the same properties as an executory devise," i. e. as an executory estate of the same nature as an executory devise would take effect." The quibble is founded on the perfectly proper ellipsis of the words in italics. According to the author of the letter, it is possible gravely to contend, that the clause refers to estates which would formerly have taken effect in possession, in the same manner as a contingent remainder, while contingent, would take effect, (even on this absurd construction he cannot avoid supplying the ellipsis), and enacts, that henceforth such estates shall take effect in possession, in the same manner as an executory devise, while it remains executory, would take effect in possession!

After this notable criticism, the writer proceeds to state why the commissioners have thought fit to reject so much of the repealed enactment as aims at giving effect to contingent remainders on the happening of the contingency after the natural determination of the particular estate. Having read so far, we thought we were prepared for anything, but the first ground on which the commissioners, "after full discussion and mature consideration," have rejected the provision, startled us. It is this:

"First, that, admitting the law to be, as regards the cases in question, defective, the mischief is not peculiar to contingent remainders, but, in some degree, at least, affects generally future gifts to classes, of personal as well as of real estate. Thus, if personal estate be limited to A. for life, and after his death to the children of B., and if B. survive A., and have children, some born before and some after A.'s death, the after-born children are excluded; for, though, if there be no child of B. born before A.'s death, the gift will open from time to time, to let in all the after-born children; yet, if there be a child antecedently born, then on A.'s death the gift finally closes. And the same rule applies to even an executory bequest."

We are puzzled to know how to speak of this objection. We might have asked, "Why, if the evil extends to personalty, should not the remedy be extended in like manner?"-if we had not been estopped by the following passage in an earlier part of the letter:"Had the case been otherwise, we should not have deemed it consistent with exact or methodical legislation to mix up a detached point as to personal chattels in an act relating to the transfer of real estates."

So that, if there be a mischievous rule of law affecting both real and personal estate, it must just remain untouched, since to amend it as to real estate, and not as to personalty, would be wrong, and to amend it as to both in the same act would be worse. But does the suggested amendment come within this category? Is it quite clear that the rule of tenure requiring that a remainder shall take effect, if at all, immediately on the determination of the particular estate, is exactly analogous to the rule of construction in Devisme v. Mello, (1 Bro. C. C. 536), Odell v. Crone, (3 Dow, 61), &c., determining what persons shall be deemed to have been intended by a general gift to a class? And, granting this to be clear, and it being undeniable that the rule in Devisme v. Mello, &c., extends to executory devises, is it quite clear that an enactment placing contingent remainders in the situation of executory devises in all respects would be a partial interference with the rule in Devisme v. Mello, &c.?

We have now done with this unlucky Letter, and its miserable result. Instances of ignorant and presumptuous legislation are unfortunately too frequent; but the obstruction of the course of legal reform, by such a combination of indolence, petulant carping and interference, blundering without the excuse of ignorance, and incapacity without that of inexperience, as we have just witnessed, proceeding from a source which might well have been expected to combine the most cheerful and enlightened co-operation with the soundest professional learning and discretion, is a spectacle which we believe to be unexampled, and hope will remain unparalleled.

It is clear, from the experience of the last few sessions, that our once boasted system of real property will speedily be reduced to an incoherent heap of legislative crudities, if the task of reform be not at once made worthy of the ambition of first-rate men, by appointing a commission, with instruction to frame a comprehensive scheme,-and worthy of the serious devotion of their time, by giving them a liberal remuneration.

We now turn to the Law Review and Concise Forms. In a well-written article on conveyancing reform, in the last Number of that most unequal periodical*, we find a recommendation of Lord Brougham's Parliamentary Forms, against which we think it our duty to protest. After citing some condemnatory opin

* Among the better things in the recent Number is an article on the unfortunate dispute between the press and a portion of the bar, which has redounded so little to the credit of either party: it is excellent in temper, reasoning, and expression.

ions which have been published by Mr. Davidson and Mr. Sweet, the writer says, "We cannot think, however, that these gentlemen can have allowed themselves to do justice to these acts; and we are disposed to think that they are, without knowing it, labouring under an undue bias, as they are severally the editors of extensive and popular collections of precedents, well known in the Profession; and we presume that these collections must now be remodelled." This is, to compare small things with great,-something like the quarter's salary, for the sake of which Lord John Russell was, according to some people, willing to take office. We shall be curious to see the new collections of precedents "remodelled" upon Lord Brougham's plan, which these gentlemen, after having ineffectually recorded their protest, are doubtless engaged in preparing. After this little inaccuracy in point of taste, the reviewer proceeds thus:-"As we are among those who think that these last two acts are a boon to the Profession," [we agree in this opinion, if the question is to be regarded in the "quarter's salary" point of view, and if, as is said, the parliamentary forms have ever been, or are likely to be, used], "and as we are quite satisfied that they can be employed safely and advantageously in many conveyancing transactions, we have great pleasure in laying before our readers some precedents under the Conveyancing Act, which have been prepared by a learned friend, in whom we have great confidence, as they will best explain the powers of the act; and we would simply add two observations of a practical kind to those given by Mr. Neale:-First, the forms in the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 119, are not applicable to a sale alone. They are also most of them applicable to a conveyance by way of mortgage settlement or any other conveyance. Secondly, the practitioner, before he shuts up these acts as useless and impracticable, will do well to consider, whether, if the particular transaction comes within their scope, he will be allowed costs according to the present scale if he does not avail himself of these proisions. This last observation also applies with peculiar force to any attempt, after the 1st January next, to assign a satisfied term." (To any solicitor who troubles himself with the numismatic bearing of the question, we would say, "Try; you will get the smaller fee at all events, and will avoid any concern with the 'skill, labour, and responsibility' incident to the use of the parliamentary form ").

ties, the lands and hereditaments hereinafter described,
and intended to be hereby conveyed and assured, with
the appurtenances, were conveyed and assured to the use
of the said A. B., his heirs and assigns; subject never-
theless to a proviso or agreement in the said indenture
now in recital contained for the redemption of the said
premises on payment by the said C. D., his heirs, exe-
cutors, administrators, or assigns, of the sum of £
with interest for the same after the rate of 57. for every
1007. by the year, at the time and in the manner in the
same indenture mentioned and appointed. AND WHERE-
As the said principal sum of £- still remains due and
owing upon the security of the said herein before-recited
indenture of mortgage, all interest in the said sum
having been duly paid and satisfied up to the day of the
date of these presents. Now THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH,
that, in consideration of £ sterling now paid by the
said C. D. to the said A. B., the receipt whereof is hereby
by him acknowledged, he the said A. B. doth grant
Unto the said C. D., his heirs and assigns, for ever, All
&c. [parcels]. AND the said A. B. covenants with the
said C. D., that he the said A. B. hath done no act to
encumber the said premises. IN WITNESS" &c.
A conveyancer who might wish to dispense with the
interference of the great Zamiel of law reform in his
incantation, and to rely only on the familiar aid of his
own dii minores, would frame the charm and do the
deed in smaller compass, thus:-
"AN INDENTURE, made on the
day of
18-,
Between A. B., of the one part, and C. D., of the other
part. WHEREAS, by indenture made on the day
of - between &c., the hereditaments hereinafter de-
scribed were conveyed to the use of the said A. B. in
fee, by way of mortgage, for securing payment to him,
his executors, administrators, or assigns, by the said
C. D., his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns,
of £- with interest, which principal and interest
monies have this day been paid. Now THIS INDENTURE
WITNESSETH, that the said A. B. grants All [parcels],
with their appurtenants, and all his estate and interest
therein, Unto and to the use of the said C. D. and his
heirs; AND, for himself, his heirs, executors, and ad-
ministrators, covenants with the said C. D. and his
heirs, that the said A. B. hath not been party or privy
to any incumbrance on the premises. IN WITNESS" &c.

1

The forms before us, taken in connexion with the act of Parliament, are sufficiently open to serious criticism; but our business is not with the miserable details of the two ill-drawn and abortive acts which now exist as a snare for the unwary, but with the general principle upon which they are framed, and the extension of which to every branch of conveyancing, by a host of similar crudities, is threatened. The Legal Review says

The forms given by the reviewer are not happily chosen for the purpose of illustrating his first proposition, that the act is applicable to other transactions than sales. They are ten in number:-No. 1. "Grant by vendor to purchaser in fee." No. 2. "Grant by vendor seised in fee, and his wife, to purchaser, to uses to bar dower." No. 3. "Grant by devisee and trustee to pur- "The commencement of the change is not a small chaser in fee." No. 4. "Grant of a wife's estate in fee one, but it must proceed, and from present appearances to purchaser in fee." No. 5. “Grant of a moiety of a we are inclined to think, that, if the public did not call messuage to purchaser in fee." No. 6. "Appointment for it, the Profession would. It will demand, that any and grant by vendor to purchaser in fee." No. 7. benefit that can be obtained from a complete series of "Grant by mortgagee under a power of sale to pur- acts, on the plan of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 119, shall be chaser in fee." No. 8. "Grant by joint tenants to pur-placed at the option of the practitioner. Nothing less chaser in fee." No. 9. "Reconveyance by mortgagee in than this will now satisfy the demand. It may be defee to mortgagor." No. 10. "Reconveyance by mort-layed by various causes: interest will have its sneer; gagee in fee to mortgagor by indorsement." Eight conveyances on sales of the simplest description, and two forms of a reconveyance, no mortgage, no settlement. As a specimen of the conciseness which has been attained with the help of the act, we may take No. 9. "THIS INDENTURE, made the day of 18in pursuance of an Act to facilitate the Conveyance of Should this threat be carried into execution, we hope Real Property, Between A. B. [mortgagee], of the one that the results will be printed separately in the vapart, and C. D. [mortgagor], of the other part. WHERE-rious editions of the Statutes at Large, for the conveAs, by an indenture of release, bearing date &c., and made between &c., in pursuance of the statute for rendering a release as effectual for the conveyance of freehold estates as a lease and release by the same par

ignorance will have its laugh; and still more the desire to spend life easily and quietly, and with as little trouble as possible, may retard the taking the necessary steps; but many years-probably many months—will not be allowed to elapse without further progress in this direction."

nience of such members of the Profession as may not wish to invest money in the purchase of "Precedents in Conveyancing, by Lord Brougham & Co."

Our objections to the principle thus avowed are so

« AnteriorContinuar »