Imágenes de páginas

Breese, of Pwllhele, in the county of Carnarvon, gen- says he is very much disposed to concur in the above tleman, to be apprehended and detained in custody, opinion. without any reasonable or probable cause whatsoever, These cases shew the necessity of carefully inserting, for the space of three hours then next following, and in such notices as the above, the time and place at having afterwards caused him to be committed to a which every act of trespass complained of is commitcertain common gaol or prison, called the Compter, in ted. We say every act, because, notwithstanding the the city of London, and to be there imprisoned, and judgment quoted above, we should not advise any one kept and detained in prison there, without any rea- to rely upon a notice like that in Jacklin v. Fytche. sonable or probable cause whatsoever, for a further Whether any substantial good is obtained by respace of time, to wit, for the space of twelve hours next quiring such notices, may well be questioned. To us following, I do, therefore, as the attorney of and for the it appears that the whole law as to actions against masaid Daniel Breese in this behalf, hereby give you and gistrates requires revision. If they are to be protected each of you notice," &c. In this notice it will be seen at all when they have acted fairly and bonâ fide, it that the place of apprehension and detainer on the 27th ought to be by some more efficient means than exist at of May is not stated ; and though the place of the impri- present; and, if they deserve no protection, a plaintiff sonment, in the Compter, is stated, it is not stated when ought not to be hampered by having to go through that was. “Having afterwards” is too indefinite, and more formal proceedings than in other cases. may mean on the 27th, or some other day. For this omission the notice was held bad, on the authority of Martins v. Upcher.

Review. Lastly, in Jacklin v. Fytche, (14 Mee. & W. 381), the notice was in the following words:-“ For that you. | A Treatise on the Law relating to Patent Privileges, &c. on the 10th day of May, in the year of our Lord 1844,

By WILLIAM HINDMARCH, Esq., Barrister.

[Stevens $ Norton. 1846.] with force and arms, caused an assault to be made upon me, and then caused me to be beaten, seized, and laid |

(Continued from p. 152). hold of, and to be forced and compelled to go into,

It is, of course, well known to those whose practice

has led them to the consideration of the law of patents, along, and through divers public streets and roads to a

and it will be readily imagined by others, that, on such certain prison, to wit, at Louth, in the said parts, questions as whether the designation of an invention and to be unlawfully imprisoned, and kept and de-contained in the petition for a patent, is a correct detained in prison there, in a dark and unwholesome signation; or what is a manufacture within the meanplace there, without any reasonable or justifiable cause

ing of the statute; distinctions of the finest and most whatever, for a long space of time, to wit, for the

technical kind have been taken, and that the author

ities are numerous, and require the greatest care in conspace of forty days then next following, contrary

my sidering them. This part of the subject Mr. Hindto the laws and customs of this realm, and against march has discussed very ably in the 10th chapter of his the will of me the said William Jacklin.” At the work, treating of the grant and its construction, (title trial, (and this it will be important to bear in mind), “Of the Recital," p. 40), and in the first title of the 5th the only evidence given was, that the plaintiff was

chapter, treating of the nature of the art. (P. 77). In delivered into the custody of the gaoler of the house

the latter chapter he has rendered an acceptable service

to the Profession, by referring (for the purpose of ilof correction at Louth, upon a warrant of commit- lustrating the doctrine, that the Statute of Monopolies ment for two calendar months to hard labour, signed did not create any new rights as to the granting of by the defendants, under the Master and Servant Act, letters-patent) to several old authorities, which have 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, which was admitted to be invalid. not been usually cited in text-books on the law of And it was objected, for the defendants, that the notice patents, (see, in particular, pp. 81, 82, 83), and which

assist materially in throwing light upon the construcof action was insufficient, inasmuch as no place was al

tion of the statute. leged with respect to the assault and original imprison- ! On the difficult and much debated question, to what ment. Upon the question being brought before the extent or in what sense a principle may be the subject court, on a motion to enter a nonsuit, they decided, of a patent, Mr. Hindmarch's observations appear to that, as far as regarded the imprisonment at Louth, the us very pertinent and instructive: trespass was properly described, and that being the only .

“It is clear," he says, (p. 90), “ that first principart proved, the notice was sufficient.

ples, such as the fundamental laws of mechanics, che

The first part mistry, or any other science, cannot be made the subof the notice was apparently bad, according to Martins ject of a patent privilege. First principles are capable v. Upcher, as the place where the assault was commit- of an endless variety of uses or applications, and they ted was not expressly stated. It may still, however, l'are the common property of all men, who are at liberty admit of doubt, whether, even as to the assault, the no

Ol' to make any use of them they may think fit, or aptice was not good; and the remark of Rolfe, B., in his

ply them in any manner their ingenuity may suggest,

'I provided they do not attempt to appropriate to themjudgment, deserves attention. He says, “If the caseselves exclusively any ground pre-occupied by any of Martins v. Upcher be admitted to be good law, it other person. No principle or primary law of science does not necessarily follow, that the first part of this can of itself, and apart from the practical application notice is bad, because there no place was mentioned ; l of it, be capable of producing any vendible article of it was left in this respect in perfect ambiguity. Here. L' manufacture; and, therefore, unless a person who dis

l'covers such a principle or law makes some practical I should say that it is the description of one continued

l' use of it, so as to produce some article which the pubact, concluding with the imprisonment at Louth. I lic requires and will purchase, he cannot give the public doubt very much, therefore, whether even that part of the consideration which the law requires to be given the statement is not sufficient." And Baron Parkel for the grant of a sole privilege. The object in law

was not to reward mere speculative discovery, but to be supported by an affidavit of the applicant's belief, encourage industry, and to procure for the public the that he is, at the time of swearing it, the true and first benefit of new manufactures.

inventor. This rule is undoubtedly one proper to be "But every art or invention must adopt principle, or observed by a prudent plaintiff before making his apinclude the application of it to some extent, and the plication; but, if it be meant that it would be equally principle of an invention thus becomes an essential safe in all cases for the defendant to rely upon the obpart of it; indeed, any new art which is made thejection to a motion for an injunction, that the plaintiff subject of a grant by the Crown, can only be some has not filed such an affidavit, then we conceive it new practical application of principles or laws which doubtful whether the doctrine can be considered so has been invented by the patentee for the purpose of settled. Hill v. Thompson came on upon a motion to producing articles of manufacture useful to the public. dissolve an injunction which had been obtained ex *** The word 'principle' is frequently used in such parte, upon an affidavit generally swearing to the apphrases as 'principle of the invention,' to designate plicant's belief that he was the inventor of the improvesome peculiar mode or method of constructing any ments mentioned in the specification; and Lord Eldon's thing according to a particular invention. In this observations were distinctly and exclusively pointed at sense, a principle signifies the particular practical ap- ex parte applications: he said, “ When, in future, an plication of some principle or principles for the pur- injunction is applied for ex parte, on the ground of poses of an invention, which is, properly speaking, an violation of a right to an invention secured by patent, art. Thus, the principle of an invention of a new it must be understood that it is incumbent on the party machine signifies the peculiar art by means of which making the application to swear, at the time of making the new machine is constructed. There is nothing it, as to his belief that he is the inventor. For although, 'improper in this use of the word "principle, and when he obtained his patent, he might very honestly when it is used, that is, when it is used to designate have sworn as to his belief of such being the fact, yet the peculiar mode of constructing anything according circumstances might have subsequently intervened, or to an invention, it is clearly an art which may be information been communicated, sufficient to convince 'made the subject of a patent privilege."

him that it was not his own original invention, and that The different matters relating to the specification, the he was under a mistake when he made his previous prolongation of letters-patent, alterations and disclaim- declaration to that effect.” ers, &c., are all very fully discussed by Mr. Hindmarch, But Lord Eldon did not say, and, we apprehend, and, as we have already observed, he has, to the best of never could have meant to say, that such an affidavit our knowledge, suffered no case of any importance to is necessary where a motion is made for an injunction escape his notice. In the chapter on the specification, upon n otice. When a party alleging himself to be a he has adopted the convenient plan of stating a series of patentee, applies ex parte for an injunction, he applies, propositions as general rules, illustrating each by a series upon the assertion of a legal title which is not in him of authorities on which it is based. Thus:-" The pa- unless he fills a certain character, for an order, which, if 'tentee,” he lays down as the first rule, “must, in his he have not such legal title, would interfere with the despecification, describe the invention which is com- fendant's common-law right. It is, therefore, a perfectly prised in his patent, and not any other. And if it rational condition to impose upon him, that, before he appears that there is any variance, or that the inven- | asks the court to run the risk of doing such an injustice tion as described in the specification is not precisely to the defendant, he shall go beyond the mere producsimilar to that mentioned in the patent, the patenttion of such bis apparent title, and at least pledge his will be void.” This position the author supports by own belief that his title is valid; that is, shall produce referring to Rex v. Wheeler (2 B. & Ald. 345) and to the court the only evidence of title that the ex parte Campion v. Kenyon, (6 B. Moore, 82). The second is, nature of the proceedings permits. But, when he moves " that the patentee must, in his specification, make a upon notice, the production and proof of the grant are 'full disclosure of the nature of his invention, and of of themselves proof of the applicant's title, until it is

the manner in which it is to be performed. And, denied by the defendant's evidence. on this, reference is made to Rex v. Arkwright, (Dav.) Suppose the case of a motion for an injunction, and Pat. Cas. 61); Turner v. Winter, (Dav. Pat. Cas. the plaintiff producing and proving the grant. The 151); Lewis v. Marling, 10 B. & C. 22), and other defendant meets the motion, neither admitting nor decases. And so on, the author proceeds to lay down nying the validity of the legal title, but resting his detwenty-four general rules for the guidance of those who fence merely on the fact of no infringement. Will it be have to frame specifications. It would have been con- contended that the court would put the plaintiff to venient to the reader, if the general propositions had prove, by affidavit, his belief that he is the inventor? been printed as a separate series at the bottom of the Suppose, on the other hand, the defendant denies that the pages in which they occur, in the manner adopted by plaintiff is the true inventor. The plaintiff must then, Mr. Butler, in the 9th edition of Fearne's Contingent by affidavit or otherwise, establish the fact that he is Remainders.

the true inventor, not because such evidence is prima Our time and space prevent us from fully analysing facie necessary ultra the proof afforded by the grant the whole of Mr. Hindmarch's treatise. Suffice it to itself, but because the fact which the grant itself presay, that he appears to have taken the utmost pains to sumes, is denied; and the court would be bound to beomit nothing that could be useful to the professional | lieve the evidence of the defendant, if it is not contrareader; that, in particular, he is very full upon the dicted. We conceive that it is not the belief of the subject of proceedings at law and in equity in respect to patentee that he is the inventor, that is necessary at all the attack or protection of patent rights, and that he to support his patent. The plaintiff's affidavit of belief concludes his volume by a copious collection of forms is no more than evidence of a fact the fact that he is and precedents, useful in practice.

the inventor; liable, like any other piece of evidence, to In the chapter on proceedings in equity, we find be strengthened or weakened, or altogether rebutted, by some statements, with regard to applications for injunc-other evidence; and the ground for requiring it on an tions, which appear to us calculated, to some extent, to ex parte motion, viz. the circumstance of its being the mislead. The author lays it down, on the authority of best evidence then accessible, and the court being unproHill v. Thompson (3 Mer. 626) and Sturtz v. Delarue (5 tected except by such evidence, fails totally upon a Russ. 322), that, whenever an interlocutory application motion made on notice, when the defendant can deny for an injunction to restrain infringement of a patent is the plaintiff's title, and the court can hear all the evimade, whether it be ex parte or upon notice, it must dence that both parties shall think fit to offer upon the question, whether the plaintiff is the true inventor or On a former occasion I remarked, that J. W., in not. A strong proof that the plaintiff's belief is imma- considering the case of estates tail before that of estates terial, except as evidence of the fact, is, that, if the mo- in fee simple, adopted an illogical and unnatural artion is made upon notice after answer, no affidavit, at rangement, and I do not see the least reason to alter least as to title, could be read against the answer, but the opinion then expressed of J. W.'s merits as a guide the injunction must stand or fall upon the answer; in such investigations, in consequence of any of the which shews that the affidavit is not material, when naked assertions of G. S., who has not condescended to the court has such other evidence to proceed upon, as support his views on this subject by any arguments. the nature of the proceeding permits to be produced. The following passage, in addition to the misrepre

Sturtz v. De la Rue (5 Russ. 322) was also a motion sentation it contains, seems to shew that G. S. has fallen to dissolve an ex parte injunction. The argument for into a similar error:-“ But I say that the case of a costs in that case had reference to the injunction that fee simple was entirely different, and that J. W's pohad been obtained, that is, an ex parte injunction; and sition, echoed by J.C.C.), that, if the heir of a person though the Lord Chancellor, in his judgment, does not in had been discovered for the purposes of an estate tail, terms refer to an ex parte injunction, but says an injunc- the same individual would also be heir of the same tion generally, yet, as he was dealing with an ex parte in-person for the purposes of the descent of an estate in junction, there can be no question, that, whatever might fee simple, is quite erroneous; the coincidence is always have been the opinion given by him upon the point, if accidental. He will not deny this on a case being put,” it had arisen, he was, in Sturtz v. De la Rue, not con- &c. (Ante, p. 132). This passage commences by a gross sidering it, but thinking and speaking only of an ex misrepresentation. J. C. C. nowhere echoes J. W.'s parte injunction. Neilson v. Thompson, cited by Mr. position. His (J. C. C.'s) words (ante, p. 113) are, Hindmarch, (p. 334), is, so far as it goes, an authority « We deny that J. W. has proved his position as to the that the doctrine of Hill v. Thompson does not apply course of a descent tail, and, therefore, need not say to a motion made upon notice. We should conclude, more as to his inferences therefrom.” But, although from the authorities and upon the reason of the thing, | we never echoed J. Wi's position, (to adopt the most that, though it will always be prudent to file an afti incongruous metaphor of G. S.), we are not prepared davit as to the belief of the inventor, before moving for to admit that it is so erroneous as he asserts. We deny an injunction, as well upon notice as ex parte, it is that the coincidence was, as he tells us, always accivery doubtful whether a defendant could successfully dental, and submit, that, had he not followed the ilresist a motion made on notice, on no other ground than logical order of investigation adopted by J. W., he the absence of such an affidavit.

would have seen that a descent in fee tail was merely To return to Mr. Hindınarch's work, we should par-descent in fee simple narrowed by the Statute de Donis, ticularly recommend to the perusal of solicitors the and, therefore, must not, by “ accident," but as a neceschapter on the practice in obtaining patents and in pro-sary consequence, have coincided whenever the descent ceeding under Lord Brougham's act, (pp. 503 et seq.), of a fee simple kept within the stricter bounds created which is clearly and fully set forth; and with this ob- by that statute for a descent in fee tail general. servation we shall now conclude our notice of this book, The case put by G. S. is that of a fee tail male, to pronouncing it a useful addition to the libraries of those which more restricted species of the genus fee tail the lawyers who have, or desire to have, anything to do position of J. W. did not extend; but probably G. S. with patents.

would argue, that, because every fee tail male is a

fee tail, it follows that every fee tail is a fee tail male; Correspondence.

if not, it is impossible to guess how he means the case he puts to apply.

G. S. proceeds to notice some of the anomalies inciTO THE EDITOR OF "THE JURIST."

dent to an estate in fee tail, and the differences which SIR,- I should have written to you a fortnight since, distinguish it from an estate in fee simple. I am still had I not thought that J. W. would probably expose inclined to think that the explanation of these difficulsome of the inaccuracies of G.S., and, therefore, waited, ties suggested in my former letter is the correct one; por in order to see J. W.'s remarks, before I offered any of am I prepared to allow that the opinion of the editor of my own. It seems, however, that I have waited in Bythewood (vol. 1, p. 139) is erroneous. I fully see vain; and I now trust you will permit me, albeit at the the force of the arguments of G.S. on this subject, but eleventh hour, to avail myself of your columns, in cannot admit them to be conclusive; on the contrary, order to expose the gross inaccuracies and misrepre- I am still inclined to think, that, in the case supposed, sentations of G. S.

the death of a coparcener before entry under the old The second paragraph of G. S. contains the following law, it would be more correct to say, that a reiterated words:-“When J. W. expounds the rules of the or successive descent would have taken place, than to common law, and their application to particular cases, say, that, until entry, the inheritance remains vacant. no one can desire a sounder or more perspicuous guide," Can the inheritance, I would ask, ever be vacant, even &c. In his very next paragraph he proceeds, “ J. W. for a moment? and does not the law cast it on the heir may have proved, for aught I know, that, at the com- | for the time being immediately on the death of the anmon law,"* &c. And, again, a little further on, “I cestor, or other party dying entitled? It is true, that fully admit all that is expressed and implied by J. WE's the heir, on whom the inheritance is so cast, may neauthorities." (Ante, p. 132).

glect to improve his legal seisin into such an estate as Now, it seems to me that the second of these quota- | would constitute him a fresh root of descent; but can tions is not exactly consistent with the first and third. his so neglecting to perfect his inchoate right to become Has G. S., I would ask, carefully read and followed such root, make the descent cast upon him by act of J. Wr's arguments, and the authorities on which they law any the less a descent ? If he so neglect to make are based ? Unless he has done so, he should not have himself a root of descent, tuo successive heirs, no doubt, presumed to term him a sound and perspicuous guide, will both claim in the same right, i.e. each as heir (pro or to declare that he admits all that is “expressed and tanto) for the time being to their common ancestor, implied by his authorities.” On the other hand, if he and may, therefore, constitute but one degree for some has done so, he must surely be prepared to say, whether, purposes; but they are not the less two successive in his opinion, J. W. has, or has not, proved the points heirs, and must, therefore, we maintain, inherit by yila in question; and the words “for aught I know," &c. tue of two successive descents. seem, in such case, utterly out of place.

It is not possible to go fully into this question here;

but I may remark, that it seems clear, that successive unnoticed, and so miss an opportunity of applying his descents of a reversion were possible under the old law, ever-ready stores of legal learning. The words used although each successive heir was obliged to make him- are," that, accurate writer as Coke is, he used the exself heir to the creator of the reversion. The estate of pression loosely, and, as other of our greatest authorities such successive heirs, although seisin was impossible, have done, while deciding one point in a case, did not admitted (by the creation of a fresh reversion, or by perceive another, which might also have been raised." other alienation) of being improved into such an estate (Ante, p. 113). And, again, “ J. W. boldly proposes as constituted any heir so improving it a root of de- that the authorities are erroneous. When we state that scent; and, therefore, as each successive heir might Littleton is the person &c., and that Blackstone, Harhave exercised such ownership, had he chosen, the law greave, and Preston follow on the same side, the reader would not allow creditors' claims to be in all cases de- will scarcely be surprised when he finds us prepared to feated by the heir of a reversion having neglected so to indulge a sort of legal prejudice, and take our chance do. It seems but fair, that the law should regard every with them, rather than with J. W.(Ante, p. 115). deceased person's estate as assets for the benefit of Or, again, “ Coke is an authority we are bound to follow creditors, to the full extent to which the deceased owner when he tells us what the law on any point is, but" might in his lifetime have alienated it; and we think &c. (Ante, p.116). I most positively assert that G. G. S. lays too much stress on the fact of an estate being S. cannot, in my former letter, find any stronger pasassets, &c. It is clear, that the fact of an estate of in-sages in justification of his misrepresentation. What I heritance being assets for the benefit of a deceased per- did was to examine J. WE's authorities. I greatly son's creditors, does not, as he seems to assert, (ante, doubt G. S.'s having done so. p. 133), necessarily prove that the descent thereof would On the whole, it seems that G. S.'s view of the course devolve on his heirs as such, or, in other words, that he of descent under the new statute coincides with that was an actual root of descent thereof. It would be maintained in my former letter; but on this point I nearer the truth to say, that it proves that he had it in cannot feel very certain, so admirable is the ambiguity, his power to become such root, had he taken proper so curious the confusion, of G. S.'s English style. I steps to do so; but I do not pretend to lay this down as will only extract one example: “On the death of the an invariable rule.

purchaser's daughter after entry, her son and his aunts "Quot heredes tot descensus" would be a brief state- take by descent from the daughter, and as her heir: ment of my view of the subject, against which the case the act has performed its office when it has furnished of several coparceners would not militate, for they the rule for ascertaining these persons.” (Ante, p. 133). constitute between them only one single composite heir. | I should be really glad to have this sentence explained. And I should define a descent to be, that momentary | The most natural meaning of the words seems to be, that, change of ownership which takes place when any estate of in the case proposed, the act furnishes us with a rule inheritance is set in motion by the death of the person last for ascertaining these persons, i, e. the purchaser's entitled thereto. If this be not so, & descent is not the daughter's son and his aunts; and here, too, G. S. would, easy thing we have always deemed it. We have good perhaps, tell us, " that no one can desire a sounder and authority for asserting, that the “ descensus" to the more perspicuous guide.” I should, however, prefer dead is “ facilis;" we had always deemed the “de- trusting to family Bibles and parish registers. scensus" from the dead equally so. If, however, G. In conclusion, I must again apologise for trespassing S. be right, we must look for some less classical epithet, so largely on your valuable columns, but feel sure, that, and admit that the laws of legal gravitation are very as you have inserted the misrepresentations of G. S., tolerant of temporary suspension. But this, perhaps, you will not deny me an opportunity of answering ought not to surprise us, as no fact is more certain, than them.

J. C. C. that they occasionally propel the weightiest things, broad acres, for instance, upwards. It should, however, be here remarked, that G. S.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. might consistently argue, that, since the new statute, the inheritance remains vacant until some act of pur:

April 25.-Lord Denman, C. J., delivered the judgchase; and that, from the death of the last purchaser

ment of the court in the following cases, tried at the to such act of purchase by some one of his successive sittings after last term or during the Spring Circuit, in heirs, is but one descent. For the statute seems to me which rules had been moved for:simply to create a new requisite, in order to constitute a root of descent.

Defries v. Littlewood-Rule nisi. G. S. proceeds to write, (ante, p. 133), “J. W. no

Saunders v. The Guardians of St. Neot's Union-Rule

refused. tices, as an objection,” &c. I reply, J. W. does no

Tennant o. Craston-Rule refused. such thing in either of his papers! So much for the

Ellis v. Abrahams-Rule refused. accuracy of G.S.

Roe v. The Marquis of Westmeath-Rule refused. G. S. concludes with some remarks on J. W.'s diffi

Vincent v. Dore-Rule nisi. culties as to curtesy. I do not agree with these re

Hill v. Haywood-Rule nisi. marks; but cannot here do more than refer to the re

Lewis v. Samuel-Rule refused. marks on the rationale of the question contained in my Green v. Wincott-Rule refused. former letter, and would beg to invite particular atten

Humfrys v. Marsh-Rule refused. tion to my quotations from Coke and Preston.

April 27.-Lord Denman, C. J., delivered the judg. These names remind me of another gross misrepre

ment of the court in the following cases :sentation of G. Si's. “I am not," quoth he, (ante, p. 132)," hardy enough to dispute J. W.'s authorities, as

Reg. v. Douglas-Objections in arrest of judgment overJ.C. C, does, or to assert with J. C. C., that such law

ruled; rule for a new trial to be argued on Satur. yers as Littleton and Coke were likely to forget all

day, May 23.

Solomon o. Lawson-Rule absolute for arresting judgtheir learning, except so far as it might bear on the

ment. very question for the time being under consideration.”

Griffith v. Lewis-Rule discharged.
With this compare the three following passages of Alfred v. Farlow-Rule discharged.
J.C. C.'s, the first of which supposes not that Coke-
of Littleton nothing whatever is said—was likely to

lv tol And in the following case, tried on the Northern forget his learning on any point, but that he might Circus possibly, through carelessness or haste, pass over a point! Hill v. Maynard — Rule nisi.

The court directed that all the cases in which a rule JOHN PARSONS, Wolverhampton, Staffordshire, edge tool nisi in arrest of judgment had been or shall be granted,

manufacturer, May 8 and June 13 at 11, District Court of should be put down in the Special Paper, instead of the

Bankruptcy, Birmingham: Off. Ass. Christie ; Sols. MotNew Trial Paper.

teram & Knowles, Birmingham.-Fiat dated April 22.

MEETINGS. April 30.—The court will, on Monday next, May 4, John Roberts, Kidderminster, Worcestershire, clothier, May give judgment in the following cases:

22 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-George Barnes v. Shore | Bodmer v. Butterworth

Simpkin, Faversham, Kent, tailor, May 22 at 11, Court of Reg. o. Conyers Gillett v. Whitmarsh

Bankruptcy, London, Sam. Harrison, Poole, proReg. v. Pelham Holford v. Bailey

vision merchant, May 20 at half-past 12, Court of Bank.

ruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Richard Blacklocks, Lydd, Kent, Reg. o. Jesse Hall | Doe d. Dark v. Bowditch

innkeeper, May 20 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, and The court will sit on Saturday, the 9th, and Monday, ac.—Thomas Ellis, Great St. Helen's, St. Helen's, London, the 11th days of May next, and proceed in disposing of wine merchant, May 20 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, the business in the Special Paper and New Trial Paper, aud. ac.-Jas. Nunn, Baker-street, Portman-sq., Middlesex, and give judgment in cases then pending.

haberdasher, May 21 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud, ac.-William Buchanan, Old Jewry chambers, London,

merchant, May 20 at half-past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, LonLondon Gazettes.

don, aud. ac.--Henry Lake, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, printer, May 21 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol,

aud. ac.-John Thomas, Bristol, marble mason, May 21 at TUESDAY, APRIL 28.

12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, and. ac.- Thomas BANKRUPTS.

Knight and Michael Thos. Knight, St. Peter and St. Paul, CHARLES JOHN BOND, Tranquil-vale, Blackheath, Kent,

Bath, Somersetshire, upholsterers, May 21 at 11, District

Kent, Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, aud. ac.; May 26 at 11, div.tailor, May 8 and June 12 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy,

| Benj. Hewitt, Eddowes Bowman, and John E. Bowman, London: Off. Ass. Whitmore; Sol. Engleheart, Great Knight Rider-st., Doctors'-commons.Fiat dated April 22.

Nantwich, Cheshire, bankers, May 19 at 11, District Court HANNAH WALDUCK, widow, Nelson-square, Blackfriars

of Bankruptcy, Liverpool, aud. ac.--Thos. Hodgson, Liverroad, Surrey, dealer and chapwoman, May 5 at 2, and June

pool, bookseller, May 19 at half-past 11, District Court of 9 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London : Off. Ass. Alsager ;

Bankruptcy, Liverpool, aud. ac. - Peter Owen, Liverpool,

miller, May 22 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liver. Sol. Bevan, 6, Old Jewry.-- Fiat dated April 27.

pool, aud. ac.-John Brock, Chester, innkeeper, May 22 at JAMES LAWS, Broad-street, Golden-square, Middlesex,

11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool, aud. ac.-Rich. grocer and tea dealer, May 12 at 2, and June 9 at half-past

Edwards, Huddersfield, Yorkshire, woollen draper, May 23 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Edwards : 1

at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.; May 28 Sol. Burn, Great Carter-lane, Doctors'-commons.--Fiat

at 11, div.--John Holroyd and Robert S. Holroyd, Soyland, dated April 24. CHARLES PULLING, Hay's-wharf, Tooley-street, and

Halifax, Yorkshire, cotton spinners, May 30 at 11, District Trinity-square, Southwark, Surrey, potato salesman, dealer

Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.-James Walker the and chapman, May 12 at half.past 2, and June 9 at 2,

younger, Leeds, Yorkshire, butcher, May 18 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, London : Off. Ass. Edwards; Sols.

Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.; May 19 at 11, div.

William Wilks, Leeds, builder, May 18 at 11, District Court Maples & Co., Frederick's-place, Old Jewry.--Fiat dated April 13.

of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac. ; May 19 at 11, div.- John ALFRED BIRCHALL, Manchester, share broker, May 14

Holland, Buxted, Sussex, draper, May 19 at 2, Court of and June 11 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Manches.

Bankruptcy, London, div.-James Page, Devonshire-terrace,

Fulham-road, Middlesex, builder, May 21 at 11, Court of ter: Off. Ass. Hobson; Sols. "Sale, Manchester ; Reed &

Bankruptcy, London, div.-Robert Banister, Portsea, HampLangford, Friday-street, Cheapside, London.--Fiat dated

shire, draper, May 20 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, April 20.

fin. div. - Richard Freeman, Wisbeach St. Peter's, Isle of Ely, JAMES HAMPSON, Manchester, iron founder and machine

Cambridgeshire, builder, May 20 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, maker, dealer and chapman, May 14 and June 11 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Manchester : Off. Ass. Hobo

London, div.- Augustus Radcliffe the elder and Augustus son; Sols. Coppock & Woollam, Stockport; Coppock,

Radcliffe the younger, Hermitage-place, St. John's-street-rd., Cleveland-row, St. James's-square, London.-Fiat dated

Middlesex, patent glaziers' and artists' diamond manufacturers,

Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.-Thomas Caswell and April 17. THOMAS CREWDSON, Liverpool, stock and share broker,

Jas. Thomas Tindall, Northampton and Sheffield, leather May 7 at 11, and May 29 at 12, District Court of Banka

sellers, May 22 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.ruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Morgan ; Sols. Green, Liver

John Bunn, Norwich, builder, May 21 at 1, Court of Bank

ruptcy, London, div. - William Evans, Borthwen, Llanpool; Gregory & Co., Bedford-row, London.-Fiat dated April 21.

gelynin, Merionethshire, miller, May 19 at 12, District Court OWEN HUGHES, Holyhead, Anglesea, Carnarvonshire,

of Bankruptcy, Liverpool, div.-- Jesse Banning, Liverpool, linen draper, dealer and chapman, May 15 and 29 at 12,

stationer, May 19 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Li

verpool, div.-Robert Campion and John Campion, Whitby, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Caze

Yorkshire, bankers, May 19 at 11, District Court of Banknove; Sols. Roberts, Carnarvon ; Curry & Co., Liverpool ;) Sweeting & Byrne, Southampton-buildings, Chancery-lane,

ruptcy, Leeds, div.-J. Pemberton, Knostrop, Leeds, York. London.-Fiat dated March 28.

shire, soap boiler, May 19 at 11, District Court of BankGEORGE LEATHER and CHARLES WETHERELL

ruptcy, Leeds, fin. div. WARDLE, Holbeck, Leeds, Yorkshire, earthenware ma

CERTIFICATES. nufacturers, dealers and chapmen, May 14 and June 18 at To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on the 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds : Off. Ass. Young ;

Day of Meeting. Sols. Shackleton, Leeds; Sudlow & Co., 20, Chancery Thomas Tubb, Palace-row, New-road, Middlesex, cow. lane, London.-Fiat dated April 21.

keeper, May 19 at half-past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London. EDWARD HILL, Stourport, Worcestershire, hosier, dealer Richard Blacklocks, Lydd, Kent, innkeeper, May 20 at

and chapman, May 11 and June 8 at 1, District Court of 11, Court of Bankruptcy, 'London.--Thos. Castle, Newbury, Bankruptcy, Birmingham: Off, Ass. Bittleston; Sols. Berkshire, horse dealer, May 21 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, Pritchard & Ingram, Stourport; Rawlins, Birmingham.-- London.--J. Emmins, Princes-road, Notting-hill, Kensington, Fiat dated April 21.'

Middlesex, builder, May 21 at half-past ii, Court of BankWILLIAM PERRY, Wolverhampton, Staffordshire, iron ruptcy, London.-John Stevens, Clement's-inn, Middlesex,

founder, dealer and chapman, May 9 and June 6 at 11, Dis-builder, May 19 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-Geo. trict Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham : Off. Ass. Whit-Little, Liverpool-street, King's-cross, St. Pancras, Middlesex, more; Sols. Bennett & Thorne, Wolverhampton.-Fiat corn chandler, May 19 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London. dated April 15.

I Jonas Wilkinson and Zaccheus Wilkinson, Clayton-heights,

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