Breese, of Pwllhele, in the county of Carnarvon, gen- Lastly, in Jacklin v. Fytche, (14 Mee. & W. 381), the notice was in the following words:-" For that you, on the 10th day of May, in the year of our Lord 1844, with force and arms, caused an assault to be made upon me, and then caused me to be beaten, seized, and laid says he is very much disposed to concur in the above opinion. These cases shew the necessity of carefully inserting, in such notices as the above, the time and place at which every act of trespass complained of is committed. We say every act, because, notwithstanding the judgment quoted above, we should not advise any one to rely upon a notice like that in Jacklin v. Fytche. Whether any substantial good is obtained by requiring such notices, may well be questioned. To us it appears that the whole law as to actions against magistrates requires revision. If they are to be protected at all when they have acted fairly and bonâ fide, it ought to be by some more efficient means than exist at present; and, if they deserve no protection, a plaintiff ought not to be hampered by having to go through more formal proceedings than in other cases. Review. A Treatise on the Law relating to Patent Privileges, &c. has led them to the consideration of the law of patents, hold of, and to be forced and compelled to go into, along, and through divers public streets and roads to a certain prison, to wit, at Louth, in the said parts, and to be unlawfully imprisoned, and kept and detained in prison there, in a dark and unwholesome place there, without any reasonable or justifiable cause whatever, for a long space of time, to wit, for the space of forty days then next following, contrary to the laws and customs of this realm, and against the will of me the said William Jacklin." At the trial, (and this it will be important to bear in mind), the only evidence given was, that the plaintiff was delivered into the custody of the gaoler of the house of correction at Louth, upon a warrant of commitment for two calendar months to hard labour, signed by the defendants, under the Master and Servant Act, 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, which was admitted to be invalid. And it was objected, for the defendants, that the notice of action was insufficient, inasmuch as no place was alleged with respect to the assault and original imprisonment. Upon the question being brought before the court, on a motion to enter a nonsuit, they decided, that, as far as regarded the imprisonment at Louth, the trespass was properly described, and that being the only "It is clear," he says, (p. 90), "that first principles, such as the fundamental laws of mechanics, chepart proved, the notice was sufficient. The first part mistry, or any other science, cannot be made the subof the notice was apparently bad, according to Martins ject of a patent privilege. First principles are capable v. Upcher, as the place where the assault was commit- of an endless variety of uses or applications, and they ted was not expressly stated. It may still, however, common property of all men, who are at liberty admit of doubt, whether, even as to the assault, the no'to make any use of them they may think fit, or aptice was not good; and the remark of Rolfe, B., in his ply them in any manner their ingenuity may suggest, provided they do not attempt to appropriate to themjudgment, deserves attention. He says, "If the case 'selves exclusively any ground pre-occupied by any of Martins v. Upcher be admitted to be good law, it other person. No principle or primary law of science does not necessarily follow, that the first part of this 'can of itself, and apart from the practical application notice is bad, because there no place was mentioned; of it, be capable of producing any vendible article of it was left in this respect in perfect ambiguity. Here, manufacture; and, therefore, unless a person who discovers such a principle or law makes some practical I should say that it is the description of one continued use of it, so as to produce some article which the pubact, concluding with the imprisonment at Louth. Ilic requires and will purchase, he cannot give the public doubt very much, therefore, whether even that part of the statement is not sufficient." And Baron Parke On the difficult and much debated question, to what extent or in what sense a principle may be the subject of a patent, Mr. Hindmarch's observations appear us very pertinent and instructive: 6 are the to the consideration which the law requires to be given for the grant of a sole privilege. The object in law was not to reward mere speculative discovery, but to 'encourage industry, and to procure for the public the 'benefit of new manufactures. "But every art or invention must adopt principle, or include the application of it to some extent, and the 'principle of an invention thus becomes an essential 'part of it; indeed, any new art which is made the subject of a grant by the Crown, can only be some 'new practical application of principles or laws which 'has been invented by the patentee for the purpose of 'producing articles of manufacture useful to the public. "The word principle' is frequently used in such 'phrases as 'principle of the invention,' to designate some peculiar mode or method of constructing any'thing according to a particular invention. In this 'sense, a principle signifies the particular practical application of some principle or principles for the pur'poses of an invention, which is, properly speaking, an art. Thus, the principle of an invention of a new 'machine signifies the peculiar art by means of which 'the new machine is constructed. There is nothing 'improper in this use of the word 'principle,' and 'when it is used, that is, when it is used to designate 'the peculiar mode of constructing anything according 'to an invention, it is clearly an art which may be 'made the subject of a patent privilege." The different matters relating to the specification, the prolongation of letters-patent, alterations and disclaimers, &c., are all very fully discussed by Mr. Hindmarch, and, as we have already observed, he has, to the best of our knowledge, suffered no case of any importance to escape his notice. In the chapter on the specification, he has adopted the convenient plan of stating a series of propositions as general rules, illustrating each by a series of authorities on which it is based. Thus:-"The pa'tentee," he lays down as the first rule, "must, in his specification, describe the invention which is comprised in his patent, and not any other. And if it appears that there is any variance, or that the invention as described in the specification is not precisely similar to that mentioned in the patent, the patent 'will be void." This position the author supports by referring to Rex v. Wheeler (2 B. & Ald. 345) and Campion v. Kenyon, (6 B. Moore, 82). The second is, "that the patentee must, in his specification, make a full disclosure of the nature of his invention, and of 'the manner in which it is to be performed.' And, on this, reference is made to Rex v. Arkwright, (Dav. Pat. Cas. 61); Turner v. Winter, (Dav. Pat. Cas. 151); Lewis v. Marling, 10 B. & C. 22), and other cases. And so on, the author proceeds to lay down twenty-four general rules for the guidance of those who have to frame specifications. It would have been convenient to the reader, if the general propositions had been printed as a separate series at the bottom of the pages in which they occur, in the manner adopted by Mr. Butler, in the 9th edition of Fearne's Contingent Remainders. Our time and space prevent us from fully analysing the whole of Mr. Hindmarch's treatise. Suffice it to say, that he appears to have taken the utmost pains to omit nothing that could be useful to the professional reader; that, in particular, he is very full upon the subject of proceedings at law and in equity in respect to the attack or protection of patent rights, and that he concludes his volume by a copious collection of forms and precedents, useful in practice. In the chapter on proceedings in equity, we find some statements, with regard to applications for injunctions, which appear to us calculated, to some extent, to mislead. The author lays it down, on the authority of Hill v. Thompson (3 Mer. 626) and Sturtz v. Delarue (5 Russ. 322), that, whenever an interlocutory application for an injunction to restrain infringement of a patent is made, whether it be ex parte or upon notice, it must be supported by an affidavit of the applicant's belief, that he is, at the time of swearing it, the true and first inventor. This rule is undoubtedly one proper to be observed by a prudent plaintiff before making his application; but, if it be meant that it would be equally safe in all cases for the defendant to rely upon the objection to a motion for an injunction, that the plaintiff has not filed such an affidavit, then we conceive it doubtful whether the doctrine can be considered so settled. Hill v. Thompson came on upon a motion to dissolve an injunction which had been obtained ex parte, upon an affidavit generally swearing to the applicant's belief that he was the inventor of the improvements mentioned in the specification; and Lord Eldon's observations were distinctly and exclusively pointed at ex parte applications: he said, "When, in future, an injunction is applied for ex parte, on the ground of violation of a right to an invention secured by patent, it must be understood that it is incumbent on the party making the application to swear, at the time of making it, as to his belief that he is the inventor. For although, when he obtained his patent, he might very honestly have sworn as to his belief of such being the fact, yet circumstances might have subsequently intervened, or information been communicated, sufficient to convince him that it was not his own original invention, and that he was under a mistake when he made his previous declaration to that effect." But Lord Eldon did not say, and, we apprehend, never could have meant to say, that such an affidavit is necessary where a motion is made for an injunction upon n otice. When a party alleging himself to be a patentee, applies ex parte for an injunction, he applies, upon the assertion of a legal title which is not in him unless he fills a certain character, for an order, which, if he have not such legal title, would interfere with the defendant's common-law right. It is, therefore, a perfectly rational condition to impose upon him, that, before he asks the court to run the risk of doing such an injustice to the defendant, he shall go beyond the mere production of such his apparent title, and at least pledge his own belief that his title is valid; that is, shall produce to the court the only evidence of title that the ex parte nature of the proceedings permits. But, when he moves upon notice, the production and proof of the grant are of themselves proof of the applicant's title, until it is denied by the defendant's evidence. Suppose the case of a motion for an injunction, and the plaintiff producing and proving the grant. The defendant meets the motion, neither admitting nor denying the validity of the legal title, but resting his defence merely on the fact of no infringement. Will it be contended that the court would put the plaintiff to prove, by affidavit, his belief that he is the inventor? Suppose, on the other hand, the defendant denies that the plaintiff is the true inventor. The plaintiff must then, by affidavit or otherwise, establish the fact that he is the true inventor, not because such evidence is primâ facie necessary ultra the proof afforded by the grant itself, but because the fact which the grant itself presumes, is denied; and the court would be bound to believe the evidence of the defendant, if it is not contradicted. We conceive that it is not the belief of the patentee that he is the inventor, that is necessary at all to support his patent. The plaintiff's affidavit of belief is no more than evidence of a fact-the fact that he is the inventor; liable, like any other piece of evidence, to be strengthened or weakened, or altogether rebutted, by other evidence; and the ground for requiring it on an ex parte motion, viz. the circumstance of its being the best evidence then accessible, and the court being unprotected except by such evidence, fails totally upon a motion made on notice, when the defendant can deny the plaintiff's title, and the court can hear all the evi dence that both parties shall think fit to offer upon the question, whether the plaintiff is the true inventor or not. A strong proof that the plaintiff's belief is immaterial, except as evidence of the fact, is, that, if the motion is made upon notice after answer, no affidavit, at least as to title, could be read against the answer, but the injunction must stand or fall upon the answer; which shews that the affidavit is not material, when the court has such other evidence to proceed upon, as the nature of the proceeding permits to be produced. Sturtz v. De la Rue (5 Russ. 322) was also a motion to dissolve an ex parte injunction. The argument for costs in that case had reference to the injunction that had been obtained, that is, an ex parte injunction; and though the Lord Chancellor, in his judgment, does not in terms refer to an ex parte injunction, but says an injunction generally, yet, as he was dealing with an ex parte in-person for the purposes of the descent of an estate in junction, there can be no question, that, whatever might have been the opinion given by him upon the point, if it had arisen, he was, in Sturtz v. De la Rue, not considering it, but thinking and speaking only of an ex parte injunction. Neilson v. Thompson, cited by Mr. Hindmarch, (p. 334), is, so far as it goes, an authority" that the doctrine of Hill v. Thompson does not apply to a motion made upon notice. We should conclude, from the authorities and upon the reason of the thing, that, though it will always be prudent to file an affidavit as to the belief of the inventor, before moving for an injunction, as well upon notice as ex parte, it is very doubtful whether a defendant could successfully resist a motion made on notice, on no other ground than the absence of such an affidavit. To return to Mr. Hindmarch's work, we should particularly recommend to the perusal of solicitors the chapter on the practice in obtaining patents and in proceeding under Lord Brougham's act, (pp. 503 et seq.), which is clearly and fully set forth; and with this observation we shall now conclude our notice of this book, pronouncing it a useful addition to the libraries of those lawyers who have, or desire to have, anything to do with patents. Correspondence. TO THE EDITOR OF "THE JURIST." SIR,-I should have written to you a fortnight since, had I not thought that J. W. would probably expose some of the inaccuracies of G. S., and, therefore, waited, in order to see J. W.'s remarks, before I offered any of my own. It seems, however, that I have waited in vain; and I now trust you will permit me, albeit at the eleventh hour, to avail myself of your columns, in order to expose the gross inaccuracies and misrepresentations of G. S. 66 The second paragraph of G. S. contains the following words: :"When J. W. expounds the rules of the common law, and their application to particular cases, no one can desire a sounder or more perspicuous guide," &c. In his very next paragraph he proceeds, J. W. may have proved, for aught I know, that, at the common law," &c. And, again, a little further on, fully admit all that is expressed and implied by J. W.'s authorities." (Ante, p. 132). On a former occasion I remarked, that J. W., in considering the case of estates tail before that of estates in fee simple, adopted an illogical and unnatural arrangement; and I do not see the least reason to alter the opinion then expressed of J. W.'s merits as a guide in such investigations, in consequence of any of the naked assertions of G. S., who has not condescended to support his views on this subject by any arguments. The following passage, in addition to the misrepresentation it contains, seems to shew that G. S. has fallen into a similar error:-" But I say that the case of a fee simple was entirely different, and that J. W.'s position, (echoed by J. C. C.), that, if the heir of a person had been discovered for the purposes of an estate tail, the same individual would also be heir of the same fee simple, is quite erroneous; the coincidence is always accidental. He will not deny this on a case being put," &c. (Ante, p. 132). This passage commences by a gross misrepresentation. J. C. C. nowhere echoes J. W.'s position. His (J. C. C.'s) words (ante, p. 113) are, We deny that J. W. has proved his position as to the course of a descent tail, and, therefore, need not say more as to his inferences therefrom." But, although we never echoed J. W.'s position, (to adopt the most incongruous metaphor of G. S.), we are not prepared to admit that it is so erroneous as he asserts. We deny that the coincidence was, as he tells us, always acci dental, and submit, that, had he not followed the illogical order of investigation adopted by J. W., he would have seen that a descent in fee tail was merely a descent in fee simple narrowed by the Statute de Donis, and, therefore, must not, by "accident," but as a necessary consequence, have coincided whenever the descent of a fee simple kept within the stricter bounds created by that statute for a descent in fee tail general. The case put by G. S. is that of a fee tail male, to which more restricted species of the genus fee tail the position of J. W. did not extend; but probably G. S. would argue, that, because every fee tail male is a fee tail, it follows that every fee tail is a fee tail male; if not, it is impossible to guess how he means the case he puts to apply. G. S. proceeds to notice some of the anomalies incident to an estate in fee tail, and the differences which distinguish it from an estate in fee simple. I am still inclined to think that the explanation of these difficulties suggested in my former letter is the correct one; nor am I prepared to allow that the opinion of the editor of Bythewood (vol. 1, p. 139) is erroneous. I fully see the force of the arguments of G. S. on this subject, but cannot admit them to be conclusive; on the contrary, I am still inclined to think, that, in the case supposed, the death of a coparcener before entry under the old law, it would be more correct to say, that a reiterated or successive descent would have taken place, than to say, that, until entry, the inheritance reinains vacant. Can the inheritance, I would ask, ever be vacant, even for a moment? and does not the law cast it on the heir for the time being immediately on the death of the an"Icestor, or other party dying entitled? It is true, that the heir, on whom the inheritance is so cast, may neglect to improve his legal seisin into such an estate as would constitute him a fresh root of descent; but can his so neglecting to perfect his inchoate right to become such root, make the descent cast upon him by act of law any the less a descent? If he so neglect to make himself a root of descent, two successive heirs, no doubt, will both claim in the same right, i. e. each as heir (pro tanto) for the time being to their common ancestor, and may, therefore, constitute but one degree for some purposes; but they are not the less two successive heirs, and must, therefore, we maintain, inherit by virtue of two successive descents. Now, it seems to me that the second of these quotations is not exactly consistent with the first and third. Has G. S., I would ask, carefully read and followed J. W.'s arguments, and the authorities on which they are based? Unless he has done so, he should not have presumed to term him a sound and perspicuous guide, or to declare that he admits all that is "expressed and implied by his authorities." On the other hand, if he has done so, he must surely be prepared to say, whether, in his opinion, J. W. has, or has not, proved the points in question; and the words "for aught I know," &c. seem, in such case, utterly out of place. It is not possible to go fully into this question here; but I may remark, that it seems clear, that successive descents of a reversion were possible under the old law, although each successive heir was obliged to make himself heir to the creator of the reversion. The estate of such successive heirs, although seisin was impossible, admitted (by the creation of a fresh reversion, or by other alienation) of being improved into such an estate as constituted any heir so improving it a root of descent; and, therefore, as each successive heir might have exercised such ownership, had he chosen, the law would not allow creditors' claims to be in all cases defeated by the heir of a reversion having neglected so to do. It seems but fair, that the law should regard every deceased person's estate as assets for the benefit of creditors, to the full extent to which the deceased owner might in his lifetime have alienated it; and we think G. S. lays too much stress on the fact of an estate being assets, &c. It is clear, that the fact of an estate of inheritance being assets for the benefit of a deceased person's creditors, does not, as he seems to assert, (ante, p. 133), necessarily prove that the descent thereof would devolve on his heirs as such, or, in other words, that he was an actual root of descent thereof. It would be nearer the truth to say, that it proves that he had it in his power to become such root, had he taken proper steps to do so; but I do not pretend to lay this down as an invariable rule. “Quot heredes tot descensus” would be a brief statement of my view of the subject, against which the case of several coparceners would not militate, for they constitute between them only one single composite heir. And I should define a descent to be, that momentary change of ownership which takes place when any estate of inheritance is set in motion by the death of the person last entitled thereto. If this be not so, a descent is not the easy thing we have always deemed it. We have good authority for asserting, that the "descensus" to the dead is "facilis;" we had always deemed the "descensus" from the dead equally so. If, however, G. S. be right, we must look for some less classical epithet, and admit that the laws of legal gravitation are very tolerant of temporary suspension. But this, perhaps, ought not to surprise us, as no fact is more certain, than that they occasionally propel the weightiest things, broad acres, for instance, upwards. It should, however, be here remarked, that G. S. might consistently argue, that, since the new statute, the inheritance remains vacant until some act of purchase; and that, from the death of the last purchaser to such act of purchase by some one of his successive heirs, is but one descent. For the statute seems to me simply to create a new requisite, in order to constitute a root of descent. G. S. proceeds to write, (ante, p. 133), "J. W. notices, as an objection," &c. I reply, J. W. does no such thing in either of his papers! So much for the accuracy of G. S. G. S. concludes with some remarks on J. W.'s difficulties as to curtesy. I do not agree with these remarks; but cannot here do more than refer to the remarks on the rationale of the question contained in my former letter, and would beg to invite particular attention to my quotations from Coke and Preston. These names remind me of another gross misrepresentation of G. S.'s. "I am not," quoth he, (ante, p. 132), "hardy enough to dispute J. W.'s authorities, as J. C. C. does, or to assert with J. C. C., that such lawyers as Littleton and Coke were likely to forget all their learning, except so far as it might bear on the very question for the time being under consideration." With this compare the three following passages of J. C. C.'s, the first of which supposes not that Cokeof Littleton nothing whatever is said-was likely to forget his learning on any point, but that he might possibly, through carelessness or haste, pass over a point unnoticed, and so miss an opportunity of applying his ever-ready stores of legal learning. The words used are," that, accurate writer as Coke is, he used the expression loosely, and, as other of our greatest authorities have done, while deciding one point in a case, did not perceive another, which might also have been raised." (Ante, p. 113). And, again, "J. W. boldly proposes that the authorities are erroneous. When we state that Littleton is the person &c., and that Blackstone, Hargreave, and Preston follow on the same side, the reader will scarcely be surprised when he finds us prepared to indulge a sort of legal prejudice, and take our chance with them, rather than with J. W.” (Ante, p. 115). Or, again, "Coke is an authority we are bound to follow when he tells us what the law on any point is, but" &c. (Ante, p. 116). I most positively assert that G. S. cannot, in my former letter, find any stronger passages in justification of his misrepresentation. What I did was to examine J. W.'s authorities. I greatly doubt G. S.'s having done so. On the whole, it seems that G. S.'s view of the course of descent under the new statute coincides with that maintained in my former letter; but on this point I cannot feel very certain, so admirable is the ambiguity, so curious the confusion, of G. S.'s English style. I will only extract one example: "On the death of the purchaser's daughter after entry, her son and his aunts take by descent from the daughter, and as her heir: the act has performed its office when it has furnished the rule for ascertaining these persons." (Ante, p. 133). I should be really glad to have this sentence explained. The most natural meaning of the words seems to be, that, in the case proposed, the act furnishes us with a rule for ascertaining these persons, i. e. the purchaser's daughter's son and his aunts; and here, too, G. S. would, perhaps, tell us, "that no one can desire a sounder and more perspicuous guide." I should, however, prefer trusting to family Bibles and parish registers. In conclusion, I must again apologise for trespassing so largely on your valuable columns, but feel sure, that, as you have inserted the misrepresentations of G. S., you will not deny me an opportunity of answering them. J. C. C. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. April 25.-Lord Denman, C. J., delivered the judgment of the court in the following cases, tried at the sittings after last term or during the Spring Circuit, in which rules had been moved for: Defries v. Littlewood-Rule nisi. Saunders v. The Guardians of St. Neot's Union-Rule refused. Tennant v. Craston-Rule refused. Ellis v. Abrahams-Rule refused. Roe v. The Marquis of Westmeath-Rule refused. ment of the court in the following cases:- Reg. v. Douglas-Objections in arrest of judgment overruled; rule for a new trial to be argued on Saturday, May 23. Solomon v. Lawson-Rule absolute for arresting judgment. Griffith v. Lewis-Rule discharged. Alfred v. Farlow-Rule discharged. And in the following case, tried on the Northern Circuit: Hill v. Maynard-Rule nisi. CHARLES JOHN BOND, Tranquil-vale, Blackheath, Kent, tailor, May 8 and June 12 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Whitmore; Sol. Engleheart, Great Knight Rider-st., Doctors'-commons.-Fiat dated April 22. HANNAH WALDUCK, widow, Nelson-square, Blackfriarsroad, Surrey, dealer and chapwoman, May 5 at 2, and June 9 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Alsager; Sol. Bevan, 6, Old Jewry.-Fiat dated April 27. JAMES LAWS, Broad-street, Golden-square, Middlesex, grocer and tea dealer, May 12 at 2, and June 9 at half-past i, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sol. Burn, Great Carter-lane, Doctors'-commons.-Fiat dated April 24. CHARLES PULLING, Hay's-wharf, Tooley-street, and Trinity-square, Southwark, Surrey, potato salesman, dealer and chapman, May 12 at half-past 2, and June 9 at 2, Court of Bankruptcy, London: Off. Ass. Edwards; Sols. Maples & Co., Frederick's-place, Old Jewry.-Fiat dated April 13. ALFRED BIRCHALL, Manchester, share broker, May 14 and June 11 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Manchester: Off. Ass. Hobson; Sols. Sale, Manchester; Reed & Langford, Friday-street, Cheapside, London.-Fiat dated April 20. JAMES HAMPSON, Manchester, iron founder and machine maker, dealer and chapman, May 14 and June 11 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Manchester: Off. Ass. Hobson; Sols. Coppock & Woollam, Stockport; Coppock, Cleveland-row, St. James's-square, London.-Fiat dated April 17. THOMAS CREWDSON, Liverpool, stock and share broker, May 7 at 11, and May 29 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Morgan; Sols. Green, Liverpool; Gregory & Co., Bedford-row, London.-Fiat dated OWEN HUGHES, Holyhead, Anglesea, Carnarvonshire, linen draper, dealer and chapman, May 15 and 29 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool: Off. Ass. Cazenove; Sols. Roberts, Carnarvon; Curry & Co., Liverpool; Sweeting & Byrne, Southampton-buildings, Chancery-lane, GEORGE LEATHER and CHARLES WETHERELL WARDLE, Holbeck, Leeds, Yorkshire, earthenware manufacturers, dealers and chapmen, May 14 and June 18 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds: Off. Ass. Young; Sols. Shackleton, Leeds; Sudlow & Co., 20, Chancerylane, London.-Fiat dated April 21. April 21. London.-Fiat dated March 28. JOHN PARSONS, Wolverhampton, Staffordshire, edge tool manufacturer, May 8 and June 13 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham: Off. Ass. Christie; Sols. Motteram & Knowles, Birmingham.-Fiat dated April 22. MEETINGS. John Roberts, Kidderminster, Worcestershire, clothier, May 22 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-George Simpkin, Faversham, Kent, tailor, May 22 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Sam. Harrison, Poole, provision merchant, May 20 at half-past 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Richard Blacklocks, Lydd, Kent, innkeeper, May 20 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Thomas Ellis, Great St. Helen's, St. Helen's, London, wine merchant, May 20 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Jas. Nunn, Baker-street, Portman-sq., Middlesex, haberdasher, May 21 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud, ac.-William Buchanan, Old Jewry-chambers, London, merchant, May 20 at half-past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London, aud. ac.-Henry Lake, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, printer, May 21 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, aud. ac.-John Thomas, Bristol, marble mason, May 21 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, aud. ac.— -Thomas Knight and Michael Thos. Knight, St. Peter and St. Paul, Bath, Somersetshire, upholsterers, May 21 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Bristol, aud. ac.; May 26 at 11, div.Benj. Hewitt, Eddowes Bowman, and John E. Bowman, Nantwich, Cheshire, bankers, May 19 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool, aud. ac.-Thos. Hodgson, Liverpool, bookseller, May 19 at half-past 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool, aud. ac.-Peter Owen, Liverpool, miller, May 22 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liver11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liverpool, aud. ac.-Rich. pool, aud. ac.-John Brock, Chester, innkeeper, May 22 at Edwards, Huddersfield, Yorkshire, woollen draper, May 23 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.; May 28 at 11, div.-John Holroyd and Robert S. Holroyd, Soyland, Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.-James Walker the Halifax, Yorkshire, cotton spinners, May 30 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.; May 19 at 11, div.younger, Leeds, Yorkshire, butcher, May 18 at 11, District of Bankruptcy, Leeds, aud. ac.; May 19 at 11, div.-John William Wilks, Leeds, builder, May 18 at 11, District Court Holland, Buxted, Sussex, draper, May 19 at 2, Court of Fulham-road, Middlesex, builder, May 21 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.-James Page, Devonshire-terrace, Bankruptcy, London, div.-Robert Banister, Portsea, Hampshire, draper, May 20 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London, fin. div. Richard Freeman, Wisbeach St. Peter's, Isle of Ely, Cambridgeshire, builder, May 20 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.-Augustus Radcliffe the elder and Augustus Radcliffe the younger, Hermitage-place, St. John's-street-rd., Middlesex, patent glaziers' and artists' diamond manufacturers, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.-Thomas Caswell and sellers, May 22 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.Jas. Thomas Tindall, Northampton and Sheffield, leather John Bunn, Norwich, builder, May 21 at 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London, div.- William Evans, Borthwen, Llangelynin, Merionethshire, miller, May 19 at 12, District Court stationer, May 19 at 12, District Court of Bankruptcy, Liof Bankruptcy, Liverpool, div.-Jesse Banning, Liverpool, verpool, div.-Robert Campion and John Campion, Whitby, Yorkshire, bankers, May 19 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, div.-J. Pemberton, Knostrop, Leeds, Yorkshire, soap boiler, May 19 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Leeds, fin. div. CERTIFICATES. To be allowed, unless Cause be shewn to the contrary on the Day of Meeting. Thomas Tubb, Palace-row, New-road, Middlesex, cowkeeper, May 19 at half-past 1, Court of Bankruptcy, London. EDWARD HILL, Stourport, Worcestershire, hosier, dealer-Richard Blacklocks, Lydd, Kent, innkeeper, May 20 at and chapman, May 11 and June 8 at 1, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham: Off. Ass. Bittleston; Sols. Pritchard & Ingram, Stourport; Rawlins, Birmingham.Fiat dated April 21. WILLIAM PERRY, Wolverhampton, Staffordshire, iron founder, dealer and chapman, May 9 and June 6 at 11, District Court of Bankruptcy, Birmingham: Off. Ass. Whitmore; Sols. Bennett & Thorne, Wolverhampton.-Fiat dated April 15. 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-Thos. Castle, Newbury, Berkshire, horse dealer, May 21 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-J. Emmins, Princes-road, Notting-hill, Kensington, Middlesex, builder, May 21 at half-past 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-John Stevens, Clement's-inn, Middlesex, builder, May 19 at 11, Court of Bankruptcy, London.-Geo. Little, Liverpool-street, King's-cross, St. Pancras, Middlesex, corn chandler, May 19 at 12, Court of Bankruptcy, London. -Jonas Wilkinson and Zaccheus Wilkinson, Clayton-heights, |