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pears from a passage in Viner's Abridgment, tit. “DisRELATING TO THE
agreement," A., pl. 6, wherein it is said, that, where a DISPOSITION OF REVERSIONARY INTERESTS OF feme covert is enfeoffed, and afterwards the baron disMARRIED WOMEN IN CHATTELS PERSONAL. agrees to it, yet all things executed between the livery (Continued from p. 235).
and disagreement remain good. In fact, disagreement
and waiver can have no effect whatever in the case Part II.
of a surrender of a limited interest, capable, in itself,
of merging, and actually merging, in consequence The General Result of the Cases, with some Reasons in of such surrender. For if merger would be consequent support of the practicability of dealing with Rever-I on such surrender in the case of a feme sole, by analogy sionary Interests of Married Women by means of Ac
to real estate, and because it would be absurd that a celeration.
life interest and the absolute interest in quasi remainder The general result of the cases may be briefly stated should continue to subsist as distinct interests in the in these general terms:
| same person; merger would be equally consequent in I. An assignment by a married woman of a vested re- the case of a feme covert, unless any obstruction arises versionary interest in chattels personal, if bequeathed from the principles of equity in favor of a feme covert; or settled to her separate use, will be binding upon her merger being the result of the union of the two estates or even after the determination of the coverture,
interests, irrespective of the legal character of the party II. A married woman cannot directly deprive her- in whom they are united. But, as we shall presently self or be deprived of a reversionary interest, as such, see, no such obstruction exists, so that merger does in personalty not given for her separate use, so effect- take place. And if merger once takes place, the prior ually that she will be precluded from asserting a claim interest is thereby absorbed or extinguished; and if to it, if her husband dies before her without having | once absorbed or extinguished, it must for ever cease reduced it into possession.
to exist. If, indeed, a feme, on becoming discovert, disIII. But (even setting aside the authority of Doswell agrees to a conveyance to her in fee, or to an assignment 1. Earle) a married woman may deprive herself or be of the absolute interest in personalty, she may disagree to deprived of chattels personal in which she has a vested that to some purpose; for the subject-matter of the conreversionary interest, by means of the conversion of veyance must necessarily exist, and the subject-matter that reversionary interest into an interest in possession of an assignment of that kind of interest may exist. But in herself, through the operation of merger consequent if she disagrees to and waives a surrender or assignment upon a surrender or assignment made to her of the of a limited interest after merger has taken place, she prior life interest, where, at least, the party to whom cannot thereby call into existence again that interest that prior life interest is limited is some other person which has been absorbed or extinguished, and therefore than her own husband; and by means of a subsequent | is necessarily gone for ever. reduction of the property into the possession of the 2. But, secondly, it is said, that, although the husband.
feme may be unable to avoid the transaction by disIV. If, however, the reversionary interest of a mar- agreeing to and waiving the surrender or assignment, ried woman in personalty is contingent, and bequeathed yet the contrivance must be inefficient, because, even or settled to her separate use, and, à fortiori, if it be admitting her vested reversionary interest might be contingent and not bequeathed or settled to her sepa- merged, yet her contingent right by survivorship cannot rate use, she cannot deprive herself or be deprived of be merged. The reply to this objection is, that there it, so as to be bound after the determination of the is no such thing as a contingent right by survivorship, coverture.
considered as in any way distinct from her vested reWith regard to the third of these propositions, we versionary interest. It is true that the term is used have seen that such is the doctrine of Lachton v. Adams, by Mr. Jacob in the opinion which led to the instituCreed v. Perry, and Wilson v. Oldham, and that such tion of the suit of Wilson v. Oldham; and it is in fact was the opinion of that very eminent lawyer, the late in common use, and is doubtless very convenient to exMr. Jacob. And the writer of these observations sub-press with brevity the right which a married woman mits, that this doctrine is perfectly sound in principle, has to a reversionary interest in personal property, if although certain doubts would seem to be entertained her husband predecease her without having reduced the upon this point by many learned members of the Pro- property into possession. But if it is supposed, that, on fession.
the death of the husband in the lifetime of the wife, 1. One ground of doubt is, that a feme has a general there accrues to her any right or title to the property right to disagree to and waive a purchase or gift on in which her reversionary interest subsists, distinct from becoming discovert. Now, with regard to this, à mar- that which she had during the coverture, such a notion ried woman may even acquire real estate by purchase; is erroneous. The true state of the case is simply this: and the conveyance thereof to her is good in the first the very same kind of right to the property which coninstance, and continues good during the coverture, or stituted her reversionary interest in such property, and until her husband disagrees to it. And although it is which she had at the moment of marriage, she contrue that she may disagree to and waive the purchase tinues to have during the coverture, unaltered by the after her husband's death, (2 Bl. Com. 292; Co. Litt. marriage except in regard to the cessation of her disposing 3. a.; 1 Bac. Abr., tit. “Baron and Feme"), yet this power; and the very same right, and nothing more, she does not amount to a disclaimer of it, and denial of the still has after the coverture has ceased. She gains no estate having ever vested in her, but simply to a dis- new right to the property by surviving her husband: agreement as to retaining what had vested in her while properly speaking, she has no right by survivorship; her covert, and a waiver of it from the time of such dis right is quite independent of survivorship. If her inagreement; for it may be observed, that, in the books, | terest is reduced into possession by the husband during disclaimer and disagreement are mentioned as two dis- the coverture or merged, she loses all right, whether she tinct ways of avoiding a deed, (see 4 Vin. Abr., tit. survives him or not. If, on the other hand, it is not “Disagreement and Disclaimer," and 4 Cru. Dig., c. 26); reduced into possession by him or merged, her right every disagreement not being a disclaimer, which is an continues in her during the coverture and after the act that must be evidenced by a deed, though every discoverture has ceased. The only difference in this last claimer may perhaps be said to be a disagreement. And case between the right as existing during the coverture, the fact that disagreement has not the effect of replacing and the right as existing after the coverture has ceased, things in the same state in which they were before, ap- | is this; that, after the coverture has ceased, the right is no longer liable to be defeated by the reduction of the sonalty be given in trust for a married woman for life, property into possession by the husband, and it is alien- with remainder over, it is no fraud in her husband to disable by the feme.' A right by survivorship, therefore, as pose of it at once; yet there can be little doubt, that, by a distinct thing from the reversionary interest itself, so doing, he disappoints the intentions of the giver. Now, bas no existence. The reversionary interest itself is as regards the design of the giver of a reversionary inthat which constitutes the right, and the only right, terest to a married woman, there is no more manifestawhich the feme has, not only in her husband's lifetime, tion of a design to secure a provision for the wife against but also after his decease. If that reversionary interest the marital power in this case, than in the former case has ceased to exist, by reason of merger or otherwise, of an immediate interest; nor is there even any proof no right remains to her at all, whether her husband be of a desire that she should not enjoy the property until living or dead.
the time fixed for the commencement of her enjoyment 3. It is said that the above mode of barring the wife, thereof, except so far as there is a desire to benefit the by the acceleration of her reversionary interest, is repug- prior taker by the postponement of such enjoyment for nant to the course taken by courts of equity in regard his sake. The obvious and actual motive for the postto married women; and that an obstruction arises from ponement is, to benefit the prior taker, not to secure à the doctrines of 'equity to the adoption of that mode as i provision for the subsequent taker against the marital an effectual means of attaining the desired end
power, or to deprive her, for any reason personal to If it be objected, that, by establishing and carrying herself, of the enjoyment of that provision until the out any such arrangement as that above alluded to, a period actually fixed for the commencement of such court of equity is depriving a married woman, or assist- enjoyment. ing her to deprive herself, of rights which she would Secondly, the above-mentioned contrivance for barhave at law, the answer to this objection is, that, when ring a married woman is no fraud on the policy of the the prior life interest has been surrendered or assigned, law or of the courts of equity. Where is the supposed in such a way that (but for any supposed obstruction especial favour with which a married woman is treated from the doctrines of equity) it would merge in the by a court of equity, as against her husband's power, reversionary interest, and such reversionary interest independently of an express and unequivocal intention would thereby be converted into an interest in posses- of the author of an instrument, except so far as the sion, the wife loses all right at law, if she ever had any, court enforces a settlement out of her own property, without the interference of a court of equity. If the unless she waives it? The creation of a separate inreversionary interest is a legal interest, she loses it by alienable estate is a mere carrying out of the express the legal operation of the surrender or assignment, and unequivocal intention of the giver of the property. in creating a state of things in which the legal conse- If there were any such especial favour, why is it not quence of merger ensues, which accelerates the rever- shewn in regard to equitable reversionary interests in sionary interest, and places the property in the power terms for years? Why is it not shewn in giving dower of of the husband, without the interference of a court a trust estate in cases not within the Dower Act? of equity. Equity, in this case, even if it be called There is no doctrine to the effect, that, where the inteupon to establish or sanction such an arrangement, does rest of a married woman happens to be circumstanced in not deprive the married woman of her legal rights, such a way that it cannot be affected while it continues or assist her in depriving herself of them; for the oper- to be so circumstanced, no means shall be used to change ation of law, consequent upon the legal acts of third the circumstances, so as to place the interest in a position persons, has already taken away those legal rights; and to be affected. To act upon such a doctrine, would be all that the court does is this: to declare that those legal in direct contravention of the fundamental maxim, that rights have been taken away, and that the property is equity follows the law, and, after all, would, in many to be dealt with accordingly. And if the reversionary cases, as in Macarmic v. Buller, be the greatest posinterest is an equitable interest, then, of course, it would sible unkindness to the wife herself. In a case in which be a contradiction in terms to speak of her having any the writer was instructed, a short time ago, to settle a right at law. Equity, in this case, only acts accord deed to har the claim of a married woman to her revering to its well-known course of assimilating equitable sionary interest, the prior taker, who was the widow of and legal interests, in accordance with its maxim, “Equi- the author of that reversionary interest, was desir jus ty follows the law;" allowing the same effect to the as- of giving up her life interest in a small fund, in order signipent or surrender in equity, in the case of such an to settle in business the husband of her daughter to equitable interest, as it would possess at law in the case whom such reversionary interest was limited. Can it of a legal interest; just as it allows the husband's dis- be supposed, that, in a case of this kind, a court of posal of his wife's reversionary interest, and even contin equity would be doing a real kindness to the wife, or gent interest, in the trust of a term for years to bind the best satisfying the intentions of the author of the prowife, by analogy to the effect of his assignment of her vision for her, if it rigidly secured that provision against legal reversionary interest in a term. Donne v. Hart, all means to bring it within the marital power in the 2 Russ. & My. 360.
lifetime of the prior taker? And, besides these conIf it be urged, that the plan in question is a fraudulent siderations, why should that provision be so carefully contrivance to deprive the feme of the provision which guarded against the marital power during the lifetime she would otherwise have, there does not appear to be of the prior taker, when, at the instant of such prior any real foundation for the objection,
taker's decease in the lifetime of the husband, it beFirst, it is no fraud on the intention of the author of comes at once subject to his disposing power ? the instrument creating the reversionary interest, or 4. But it is further objected, that it is a maxim, that not more so than other transactions which are allowed what cannot be done directly, shall not be done indievery day. How can it be supposed that this contriya rectly. This maxim, however, does not apply to the ance would be invalid on the ground of fraud, when a present subject; it only applies to an attempt to do that court of equity holds, that if a reversionary interest, which is contrary to some fundamental rule or principle and even a contingent interest, of a married woman in of policy. The attempt in question is not of that characthe trust of a term for years, is sold by her husband, ter; being only an attempt to bar the claim of a feme such sale will bind her, though the husband dies in her to an interest in personal property by taking away its lifetime, and while the interest still continues rever- | reversionary character. The maxim above mentioned sionary and contingent ? (Donne v. Hart, 2 Russ. & no more applies to this attempt, than it applies to the Mv. 360; 2 Story's Eq. Jurisp. 1410). But, even set. I plan of barring her dower by means of the ordinary ing aside this argument, if an immediate interest in per- /uses to bar dower, where prior to the late Dower Act, no direct attempt, by means of a conveyance or express of the wife, but in order to provide for him in the first declaration, could have accomplished that purpose. instance; or, at least, no more reason why this should
be considered as a fraud on the intention of the author
of the instrument, than an absolute disposition by the No case has yet been adjudged, where an attempt husband of an immediate interest limited in trust for has been made to dispose of personal property in which his wife for her life, (not for her separate use), with reå married woman has a reversionary interest, by the mainder over, or of her equitable reversionary interest use of the preliminary means of merger and accelera- in a term for years, or than the analogous case of a distion, where the prior interest has been limited to the position by the husband and wife of her trust estate in kusband himself. But the writer inclines to the opinion, real property expectant on a life estate in himself. that, even where the husband is the prior taker, the But it will be said, that, as the state of the law must be same means of surrender, merger, and acceleration of presumed to have been known by the author of an inthe wife's reversionary interest may be effectually em- strument, and as the general impression of the Profesployed, as a mode of placing that interest within the sion has been that such a reversionary interest could power of the husband. But, of course, in this case, in not be effectually dealt with; so, a reversionary prowhich the prior interest is limited to the husband, a vision may have been made for the feme, rather than preliminary assignment by the husband will be neces- an immediate one, for the very purpose of protecting it sary: he must first assign his prior interest to a third from the marital power. This, however, is purely conperson; and then the surrender may be made by such jecture. The desire of providing for the husband in third person to the wife.
the first instance, as we have seen, is a reason which All the previous reasoning as to the cases where the may fairly be regarded as fully accounting for the rehusband himself is not the prior taker, except that versionary character of the wife's provision. And, if which is directed against the objection, that the trans- the author of the instrument designed to secure a proaction in question is a fraud upon the intention of the vision for the wife against her husband, we have seen author of the instrument, equally applies to cases where that he could have effectually accomplished that dethe husband is the first taker. But that objection is sign, by making it contingent on her survivorship. far more difficult to meet in cases of the kind last men- But, even if that was clearly and unequivocally his tioned: yet, when the matter is closely considered, it design, in the limitation in question, still the frustrais conceived that it may be completely disposed of, evention of that design by the use of ordinary legal means as it applies to those cases.
would be no more objectionable, as a fraud on his intenWhere an interest is limited to a married woman tion, than the barring of an entail with the view of by way of remainder after a life interest given by the selling the entailed estate and spending the proceeds. same instrument to her husband, a provision is made Yet, in regard to entails of equitable interests, a court for her, after her husband's death, by the very terms of of equity has allowed them to be barred by the same the instrument; and, at first sight, it does seem a fraud means as legal interests, instead of refusing to sanction on the instrument to adopt a contrivance which has the such transactions on the ground of fraud on the issue, effect of depriving her of the provision so made for her, who are entitled to the consideration of the court, and, and limited to commence at a time which is capable of in the case of an entail under a settlement, are purbeing regarded as personal to herself at a time when chasers for valuable consideration. And, as equity, in the wife in general stands most in need of property of this instance, allows legal means to have an effect on her own. But, on closer consideration, there would equitable interests analogous to the effect which those seem to be but little weight in this objection. The time means would have on legal interests; so, it ought to allow of enjoyment is not of the essence of the intention in the same means which would be effectual in the dispothis case. Even in this case, the primâ facie motive for sition of a married woman's legal reversionary interest the postponement of the enjoyment till the period of in personal estate, to be as effectual in the case of her the husband's decease, is, to benefit the husband, as the equitable reversionary interest. For it is a fundamental prior taker. What the author of the instrument es- maxim, that equity follows the law; the true meaning of sentially intended was, to make a provision, generally, which (as the writer has endeavoured to shew in his for the married woman; but, as there was a concurrent“Manual of Equity Jurisprudence," pp. 18-24) is, intention to make a provision for her husband also, the that equity is governed by legislative enactments and general intention for providing for the wife is accom- the rules of law in regard to legal estates, rights, and plished by giving her a reversionary interest after a life interests, and that it is regulated by the analogy interest in her husband. The primâ facie reason, then, of such legal estates, rights, and interests, and the legiswhy her interest was reversionary, and incapable, as lative enactments and rules of law affecting the same, such, of being reduced into the possession of the hus- in regard to equitable estates, rights,' and interests, band, is not a reason personal to herself, and not a rea- | where any such analogy plainly subsists, if, in each son affording any peculiar ground for supposing an ex-case, there are no peculiar circumstances rendering it emption from marital power to have been particularly absolutely necessary to deviate from this rule, or creintended; and not a reason, therefore, which effectually ating an equitable obligation in one of the litigant distinguishes this case of a provision for the wife after parties, and an equitable correlative right in favour of her husband's death, or, in other words, this case of a 1 another litigant party, and requiring a different course reversionary interest expectant on the determination of to be taken in the particular case, without overturning a life interest in the husband, from the other cases where or destroying the general application of any legislative the prior life interest is limited to a third person. The enactments or rules of law that may, in terms or by benefit of the prior taker is the primâ facie reason of analogy, apply to the case. In the case with which we the postponement; or, at all events, that is a reason are now concerned, we are speaking of the “ general apwhich fully accounts for the postponement, and toplication" of certain rules or principles of law to the which such postponement may consequently be fairly case of reversionary interests, where there are no “pecuattributed. And if this be so, there is no substantial liar circumstances.” Any real or supposed hardship that reason, founded on the supposed intention of the author would result from the general application of the legal of the instrument, why legal means should not be used rules or principles of merger to such interests, would not by the husband for reducing the interest of the wife into constitute a sufficient ground for withholding the genepossession, by taking away the reversionary character ral application of those rules or principles. For, equity of the interest which primâ facie was given to it, or follows the law, even where, by so doing, great hardmay be fairly regarded as given to it, not for the benefit I ship is occasioned; as in the case of following the rules 237
of primogeniture in instances where all the younger
Rolls Court. children are wholly unprovided for.
Before the Right Hon. the MASTER OF THE ROLLs, at If the contrivance for barring a married woman by
the Rolls. merger and acceleration be allowed, no doubt great evil will result in many cases, by leaving a widow entirely de
Monday .... June 22 Motions. stitute. But, on the other hand, as in Batt v.Cuthbertson,
Wednesday .. there are many cases where a reduction of the wife's
Pleas, Demurrers, Causes, Further Di.
Thursday interest into possession may rescue a whole family, the
rections, and Exceptions. wife herself included, from abject and hopeless destitu
Saturday ....... 27 tion, or from difficulties of the most trying character;
29 Motions. where the preservation of that interest would be at
Tuesday..... tended with no other good than to provide for an event | Wednesday .. July 1 (that of the survivorship of the wife) which is as likely Thursday....
| Pleas, Demurrers, Causes, Further Di.
1 rections, and Exceptions. not to happen as to happen, and which the wife herself Friday ......... would of course rejoice to risk. The truth would seem Saturday .......
6 Motions. to be, that it is impossible to determine this question on principles of expediency. And, as a question of legal
Wednesday and equitable principle, the writer conceives, that,
Thursday ... looking to the analogies of equity jurisprudence, the pre
Friday ....... ponderance of principle is in favour of the validity of
Saturday ....... the mode of disposition above pointed out, even where the husband himself has the prior life interest. For Tuesday..
14 | Pleas, Demurrers, Causes, Further Dic he submits, that, according to those analogies, equity | Wednesday ... 15" rections, and Exceptions. ought to follow the law by sanctioning the acceleration Thursday .... of her equitable reversionary interest, and ought to Friday ......... confine its protective care to the enforcing of her Saturday ....... equity to a settlement out of such interests, unless she
Monday........ consents to waive the same.
Short Causes, Consent Causes, and Consent Petitions every
Saturday at the sitting of the court.
Notice.-Consent Petitions must be presented, and copies
left with the Secretary, on or before the Thursday preceding EQUITY SITTINGS AFTER TRINITY TERM, I the Saturday on which it is intended they should be heard.
Court of Chancery.
Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND, at Before the LORD CHANCELLOR, at Lincoln's Inn.
Lincoln's Inn. Monday.... June 22 First Seal.-Appeal Motions.
Monday .... June 22 First Seal.-Motions. Tuesday ....... 23
20 | Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Wednesday .... 24 Appeals.
Wednesday ..., Thursday ...... 25 )
and Further Directions.
Thursday Friday ......... 26 26 % (Petition-day).—Unopposed Petitions
965 (Petition-day).--Petitions, (unopposed and Appeals.
first), Short Causes, and Causes. Saturday .......
27 Appeals. Monday.
on s Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, 29 Second Seal.- Appeal Motions. Saturday .......
... 21 and Further Directions. Tuesday........ 30
Monday ........ 29 Second Seal.-Motions. Wednesday .. July 1 } Appeals.
Tuesday........ 30 D. Thursday .......
Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes,
Wednesday .. July 1}
and Further Directions.
2) and Appeals.
(Petition-day).-Petitions, (unopposed Saturday ...... 4 Appeals.
Friday ........ 3
I first), Short Causes, and Causes. Monday...... 6 Third Seal.-Appeal Motions. Tuesday.
Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes,
and Further Directions, Wednesday 8 Appeals.
Monday........ 6 Third Seal.-Motions.
Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, "l and Appeals.
or and Further Directions. Saturday ...... 11
W Monday ........
first), Short Causes, and Causes. Tuesday ....... 14 Appeals.
Saturday ...... Wednesday ...
Monday........ Thursday .... 16)
u Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes,
Tuesday........ (Petition-day).- Unopposed Petitions
and Further Directions. Friday .........
Wednesday ..... and Appeals.
Thursday ...... Saturday ....... 187
(Petition-day).-Short Causes, PetiMonday........ 24 Appeals.
"T tions, and Causes. Tuesday........ 21
Saturday ....... 18 Wednesday .... 22)
Monday........ 20 | Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Thursday ...... 23 Fourth Seal.--Appeal Motions.
21 and Further Directions. Friday ......... 24 General Petition-day.
Wednesday 22 Such days as his Lordship is occupied in the House of Lords Thursday 23 Fourth Seal.-Motions. excepted.
S (General Petition-day).Petitions and Friday
Before Vice-CHANCELLOR KNIGHT BRUCE, at Lincoln's Inn. | Tuesday........ 287
Wednesday ..... 29 Petitions and Causes. Monday .... June 22 First Seal.-Motions.
Thursday ....... 30
92 Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions. Cansas
Friday ......... 31 Short Causes and Causes.
Saturday .... Aug. 1 Bankrupt Petitions. Wednesday ..... 24 Bankrupt Petitions and Causes.
or s Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Thursday ......
| Before VICE-CHANCELLOR WIGRAM, at Lincoln's Inn. 20 and Further Directions. Friday ......... 26 °(Petition-day).--Petitions and Causes. | Monday .... June 22 First Seal.-Motions and Causes. Saturday ..... 27 Short Causes and Causes.
Tuesday........ 23 Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Monday........ 29 Second Seal.-Motions and Causes.
and Further Directions. Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Tuesday........ 30 out and Further Directions.
Friday ......... 26 (Petition-day).--Ditto. Wednesday .. July 1 Bankrupt Petitions and Ditto.
on Short Causes, Petitions, (unopposed
21 first), and Causes. Thursday ...... 2 and Further Directions.
Monday........ 29 Second Seal.-Motions and Causes. Priday ......... 3 (Petition-day).-Petitions and Causes. Tuesday ........
| Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Saturday ........ Short Causes and Causes.
Wednesday .. July 1
and Further Directions.
Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Friday ........ 3 (Petition-day).-Ditto.
Short Causes, Petitions, (unopposed Wednesday .... 8 Bankrupt Petitions and Ditto.
first), and Causes. Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Monday........ 6 Third Seal.-Motions and Causes. ' and Further Directions.
. Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, 10 (Petition-day).--Petitions and Causes. Wednesday Saturday .......
and Further Directions. 11 Short Causes and Causes.
Thursday .. Monday........ 13 Bankrupt Petitions and Ditto.
10 (Petition-day).-Ditto. W Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Tuesday ........
u s Short Causes, Petitions, (unopposed
Saturday ....... 1 and Further Directions.
"I first), and Causes. Wednesday 15 Bankrupt Petitions and Ditto.
Monday ...... 16 Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Tuesday
14 | Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Thursday ....... 16 and Further Directions.
Wednesday 15 and Further Directions. Friday ........ 17 (Petition-day).--Petitions and Causes.
16 18 Short Causes and Causes.
17 (Petition-day).- Ditto. 20 Bankrupt Petitions and Causes.
s Short Causes, Petitions, (unopposed o s Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes,
first), and Causes. 21 and Further Directions.
69 | Pleas, Demurrers, Exceptions, Causes, Wednesday 22
ị Thursday .......
and Further Directions.
Wednesday ..... 23 Fourth Seal.-Motions.
24 (Petition-day).-Petitions and Causes. Thursday 23 Fourth Seal.-Motions and Causes. Saturday ....... Short Causes, Petitions, and Causes.
24 (Petition-day).-Petitions and Causes. Monday........ 27 Petitions and Causes.
| Saturday ....... 25 Short Causes, Petitions, and Causes.